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Abstract 
 
This is a thesis about the applicability of the jus in bello to armed conflicts involving non-
state armed groups. The thesis focuses on the thresholds of applicability. These are the 
definitions of actors and situations that activate the applicability of the jus in bello. The aim 
is to illuminate and critique the regulatory rationales behind the different definitions of 
actors and situations in the different thresholds. The evolution of the thresholds is 
reviewed chronologically. Accordingly, the enquiry ranges from the 19th century doctrines 
of recognition of belligerency and insurgency, through common article 3 and Additional 
Protocols I and II, to the law developed by the ICTY and included in the Rome Statute 
for the International Criminal Court. While the thresholds constitute the centre of the 
enquiry, their meaning and function are further elucidated by the analysis of the process 
of their assessment, as well as the extent of the substantive legal regime they activate.  
The central question of the thesis is whether there has been a gradual shift from a status-
based rationale to one focused on the humanitarian protection of individuals, in the 
evolution of the thresholds of applicability. A status-based rationale fits with a system of 
horizontal regulation of state-like collective entities and allows considerations and 
perceptions of the ascription of status through legal regulation to determine the threshold 
of applicability. A humanitarian-protection rationale is more related to a system of 
vertical regulation irrespective of status and links the applicability of the law to the 
individual and her protection. The argument proposed is that such a gradual shift is 
indeed visible, if tempered by the continuous role that considerations of status have in 
conflict situations and the still largely decentralised system of assessment of the 
applicability of the law. 
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1. Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. The practical challenges 
 
Armed violence that involves non-state armed groups has been increasingly prominent 
on the world stage since the Second World War. Today the majority of conflicts around 
the globe are of this nature.1 This fact alone suffices to justify the practical importance of 
addressing the issues posed by such conflicts and, specifically, of trying to minimise some 
of their effects through legal regulation. 
There are, moreover, characteristics of such conflicts that raise the stakes even higher. 
Conflicts involving non-state armed groups often coincide with or result in the collapse 
of state structures and social structures, especially when a conflict is between a recognised 
government and a group that seeks to overthrow it or secede.2 Another such situation is 
where there is no effective government in the territorial state and non-state armed groups 
are battling each other in order to fill the vacuum.3  The collapse of state and social 
structures can increase human and, particularly, civilian insecurity and suffering on many 
levels. Not only are the material conditions of civilian life dependent on the provision of 
organised services that can be interrupted in such circumstances; the breakdown of order 
may make the prevention and punishment of acts related to the conflict and which 
increase such suffering very difficult.  
An additional characteristic of such conflicts is, all too often, their ferocity. Whether it is 
due to the proximity of the adversaries or to the perceived existential importance of the 
result, internecine struggles have long been understood to be particularly harmful to 
individual human beings.4 Such conflicts can often result from or lead to dehumanising 
attitudes towards the enemy and its perceived supporters.5 Such attitudes can lead to the 
                                              
1 See, for relevant data, N. Gleditsch et al ¶$UPHG&RQIOLFW 1946-$1HZ'DWDVHW·  Journal of Peace 
Research 615.  
2 Such conflicts seem to be the most frequent types. Examples include the conflicts throughout the period of 
decolonisation, such as the war in Algeria, but also conflicts such as the one in Kosovo in the late 1990s or some 
aspects of the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
3 An example of this kind is the ongoing conflict in Somalia.  
4 See Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, Book III, par. 82-4, on the particular nature of conflicts within city states. 
5 See e.g. R. Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Arrow Books, 2004). 
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perpetration of heinous acts,6 but also to the unwillingness or inability of existing 
structures to prevent or punish them. 
The law of armed conflict,7 as a protective and specialised legal regime, can play an 
important role in containing some of the consequences of such violence and in 
minimising human suffering.8 However, some of the characteristics of conflicts that 
include non-state armed groups do not only cause humanitarian problems, they also 
contain practical obstacles for the application of this legal regime. Thus, for example, the 
fluidity of the conflict might make it difficult to discern the regulated actors; armed 
groups might change formations and appellations. Moreover they may show a limited 
willingness and ability to recognise and apply international rules. The breakdown of social 
order might seem to be incompatible with the application of a formalised legal regime to 
the extent that there are no channels and structures for the prevention and punishment 
of violations. It can be practically difficult to apply an international legal regime that was 
initially developed with highly organised and formalised structures of a state army in 
mind to a non-state armed group.9 Importantly, in the case of a conflict between a non-
state actor and a government, the government will often not recognise the existence of an 
armed conflict and try to block the applicability of a legal regime that limits its freedom 
of action and recognises its adversary as a party to the conflict.10   
This stance, often adopted by governments, provides a link between the practical 
difficulties that need to be overcome with the conceptual issues that need to be 
understood. These conceptual issues are at the very core of the thesis.  
 
                                              
6 A phenomenon that is particularly common in such conflicts are the deliberate attacks on the civilian population. 
See Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (28 October 2007) UN doc. S/2007/643. 
Another SKHQRPHQRQ LV WKH SUDFWLFH RI ¶HWKQLF FOHDQVLQJ·. 6HH ' 3HWURYLF ¶(WKQLF &OHDQVLQJ $Q $WWHPSW DW
0HWKRGRORJ\·European Journal of International Law 342. 
7 On terminology see below section 1.3. 
8 The law of armed conflict is not the only protective regime applicable. International human rights law also 
continues to apply in a complementary way. See ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion 
(1996), par. 25; ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion 
(2004), par. 106. Indeed, the development of human rights has influenced the development of the law of armed 
FRQIOLFW6HHHJ70HURQ¶7KH+XPDQL]DWLRQRI+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZ·American Journal of International Law 
 0HURQ ¶+XPDQL]DWLRQ· While the effects of this influence are relevant to this enquiry, the thesis focuses 
exclusively on the law of armed conflict as it has evolved. 
9 The 19th century jus in bello regime is discussed in chapter 2.  
10 7KHWHUP¶SDUW\WRWKHFRQIOLFW·LVGLVFXVVHGIXUWKHULQWKHFRQWH[WRIFRPPRQDUWLFOHDQG$GGLWLRQDO3URWRFRO,,
in chapters 3, 5, and 8. 
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1.2. Conceptual issues 
 
1.2.1. The applicability of the law of armed conflict in a state-centric system 
 
The central conceptual and structural difficulty stems from the state-centric origins of 
international law.11 The origins and development of the discipline shadow those of the 
modern (nation-)state system and, therefore, reproduce its structure. In the state-centric 
system, as expressed in the traditional 19th-early 20th century strict positivist view,12 there 
is exclusively one type of entity ² the state ² recognised by the law as a legal person, a 
subject of rights and obligations.13 All other entities are objects of the law and this 
includes not only other group entities but also natural persons, individuals.14 This dualism 
meant that it was not structurally and conceptually possible for international law to 
directly regulate non-state entities.  
Moreover, the process of acceptance of an actor into this (limited) community of subjects 
of international law was decentralised and non-mandatory. The actor had to be 
recognised as an equal by its eventual peers.15 Once the actor was recognised as a state 
the legal regime of international law was activated and the actor became a subject with  
international rights and obligations. In that sense the process of recognition was, as 
Lauterpacht has put it,16 declaratory of facts and constitutive of rights.17 This meant that 
the existence of legal rights was a result of certain qualities of the actor as appreciated by 
                                              
11 These settings are more extensively introduced in section 2.1. 
12 This view of the past may be of course ex post facto exaggerated and simplified. SHH'.HQQHG\¶,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ
DQGWKH1LQHWHHQWK&HQWXU\+LVWRU\RIDQ,OOXVLRQ·(1997) 17 Quinnipac Law Review 99. .HQQHG\¶1LQHWHHQWK· 
13 See H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law, (Literal Reproduction of the 1866 edition, edited by R. Dana, 
Clarendon Press, 1936), 25 ff. (Wheaton); L. Oppenheim, International Law (Longmans, 1905) 341; See also H. 
.HOVHQ ¶5HFRJQLWLRQLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ7KHRUHWLFDO2EVHUYDWLRQV·American Journal of International Law 
605, 606 (.HOVHQ¶5HFRJQLWLRQ·). Even the writers who conceded that other entities could, in certain circumstances, 
be considered as subjects stressed that the states are the most important, by far, subjects or that other entities only 
derivatively acquire rights and duties. See, for example, T. Lawrence, Les Principes de Droit International (Dotation 
Carneggie pour la Paix internationale, 1920), 55. 
14 See, for example, H. Triepel, Droit International et Droit Interne (Dotation Carneggie pour la Paix internationale, 
1920, original of 1899), 20. )RUDKLVWRU\DQGFULWLTXHRIWKLVDSSURDFKVHH*0DQQHU¶7KH2EMHFW7KHRU\ of the 
,QGLYLGXDOLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ·American Journal of International Law 428.  
15 See, generally, on recognition H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 1947) 
(Lauterpacht, Recognition); .HOVHQ¶5HFRJQLWLRQ·; T. Chen, The International Law of Recognition (Stevens & Sons, 1951) 
(Chen). 
16 Lauterpacht, Recognition, 6. 
17 See further J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2006), 19 ff.  
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the other members of the community of states. It was a process of acceptance, during 
which legal regulation was directly linked with the ascription of legal status. While the 
WHUP¶OHJDOVWDWXV·PLJKWQDUURZO\DQGQHXWUDOO\VLPSO\connote the rights and obligations 
and the legal standing that a legal person has in a given system,18 in a system that was 
built around the sovereignty of collective entities such status can only be that of a 
recognised subject of the law. The very application of international law to an entity was 
equated to its status as a subject of international law. Therefore, the status conferred had 
a symbolic, political force: it carried prestige.   
Through this process the application of the legal regime is conceptually linked with the 
provision of status. This conceptual paradigm has significantly influenced the regulation 
of non-state groups involved in armed conflict. Indeed, its influence extends beyond the 
existence of the conceptual absolute of the subject/object dualism.19 Even through the 
development of more functional and flexible approaches to the concept of international 
legal personality a link between legal regulation and the conferment of status can be 
IRXQG7KLV LV UHIOHFWHG IRUH[DPSOH LQ6KDZ·VFRQFise definition of international legal 
SHUVRQDOLW\DV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQSOXVVRPHIRUPRIFRPPXQLW\DFFHSWDQFH·20 If transposed to 
a situation of conflict, this definition can point to the fact that the material qualities of a 
particular group have allowed it to conduct hostilities with some success, which leads the 
community to acknowledge the need to include the actor in its regulatory system.  
 
1.2.2. The functions of status and their conflict with humanitarian protection 
 
Having discussed how the state-centric origins and characteristics of the system have 
influenced the link between applicability of international law and the ascription of status, 
it is important to set out the different kinds and functions of status in the context of an 
armed conflict. 
                                              
18 )RUH[DPSOH ¶VWDWXV· LQ ODZLVGHILQHGLQWKH2[IRUG(QJOLVK'LFWLRQDU\DV´7KHOHJDOVWDQGLQJRUSRVLWLRQRID
person as determined by his membership of some class of persons legally enjoying certain rights or subject to certain 
OLPLWDWLRQVµ 
19 See above fns 13-14. See aOVR+$XIULFKW ¶3HUVRQDOLW\ LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ·  American Political Science 
Review 217, for further references. 
20 M. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 177. 
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Such status may be military, political, or legal. Military status is the result of the success 
the group has achieved in the armed struggle and the extent to which it poses a military 
threat to the government. Political status is linked to military status but extends beyond 
the temporal and material confines of the conflict. It might signify the political power and 
influence that the group wields, not just in terms of military power, but also in terms of 
its influence in society, its level of social and political organisation, the extent to which 
the group is recognised as a political actor internationally, and so on. 
Such political status during a conflict can signify the potential for success of the group in 
achieving the goals of its military struggle and its political viability beyond the conflict. 
0RUHRYHUDFKLHYLQJDFHUWDLQSROLWLFDOVWDWXVPD\EHPRUHWKDQLQFLGHQWDODJURXS·VJRDOV
may include altered political and legal status. This can be the case where the armed group 
is fighting for greater autonomy or, especially, independence, but also when it is fighting 
to overthrow the government or alter the balance of power in a legally entrenched way. 
Accordingly, the acknowledgment of military and, especially, political status during the 
conflict can be perceived as signifying and leading to the eventual legal status the group is 
fighting for.   
While the eventual or expected altered legal status can influence the behaviour of the 
actors in the conflict, there is also a question of the functions of legal status during a 
conflict. During a conflict legal status consists of the fact that the armed group is viewed 
in law as a party to the conflict. One aspect of this is relatively straight-forward: Legal 
status is commensurate to the specific substantive rules extended. This can be termed 
specific legal status or legal status stricto sensu. To the extent that a set of legal rules is 
extended to a non-state armed group, there is an alteration of the legal status of the non-
state armed group with respect to the law of armed conflict. For example, to the extent 
that common article 3 applies, the non-state armed group is recognised in law as a party 
to the conflict; its members have rights and obligations in accordance with common 
article 3.21 
Another aspect of legal status is, however, less straightforward. Being seen in law as a 
party to a conflict can be perceived to have wider implications of legal status beyond the 
                                              
21 See Chapter 3. 
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conflict and beyond the law of armed conflict. In this sense, the legal regulation in the jus 
in bello translates as personality, subjecthood, and status in general public international 
law. The legal regulation extended becomes something more than the sum of the specific 
rules. It declares or constitutes an entity in the international legal structure. Such legal 
status can be termed general legal status or legal status lato sensu. It relates more directly 
to, and to some extent is conflated with, the political status of the group and its potential 
existence as an entity beyond the armed conflict. It exists more at the level of perception 
of both the group itself and the government it is fighting against.  It is, as it were, where 
legal and political status are conflated. It is a result of a legal system built on the 
sovereignty of group entities. Accordingly, any regulation and any legal status conferred 
can be perceived as recognising such an entity.  
This latter phenomenon is more acute in cases where the question is the application of 
the law of international armed conflict.22 As we will see, however, this paradigm also 
influences how states perceive the applicability of the law in non-international armed 
conflicts.23 Further elaboration of this function of status requires the prior analysis of the 
relevant instruments and legal regimes. This function relates to the approach of states in 
relation to the applicability of the law and the link between the very applicability of the 
law (legal status stricto sensu) and (the perception of) the ascription of state-like 
legal/political status (legal status lato sensu).24 
The WHUP¶VWDWXV-EDVHGUDWLRQDOH·LVXVHGWRGHQRWHVLWXDWLRQVZKHUHWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH
jus in bello has seemed to rest on such considerations. Both conceptually and in practice 
the effects that a status-based rationale will have on the (non-)applicability of the law are 
very important as they are related not only to the extent and content of the applicable 
protective rules but also to whether such conflicts are regulated by international 
humanitarian law at all. Accordingly, a status-based rationale for the applicability of the 
legal regime can be at odds with and frustrate a fundamental goal of the legal system; the 
protection of human beings. 
                                              
22 See chapters 2 and 4. 
23 See chapters 3, 5, and 7. 
24 Discussion of how states perceive the applicability of the law will persist throughout the thesis, while more 
conclusive observations will be offered in section 8.3. 
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,QFRQWUDVWWRWKLV¶VWDWXV-EDVHGUDWLRQDOH·LVZKDWZLOOEHUHIHUUHGWRDVWKH¶KXPDQLWDULDQ
protection rationaOH·¶7KHSULQFLSOHRIKXPDQLW\·LVUHFRJQLVHGDVRQHRIWKHIXQGDPHQWDO
principles of the law of armed conflict,25 aiming to ´alleviating as much as possible the 
calamities of warµ as an early instrument puts it.26 Accordingly, the humanitarian 
protection rationale is understood, in this thesis, as the impetus to extend legal regulation 
that protects individual human beings from the ¶FDODPLWLHVRIZDU·6WUXFWXUDOO\WKLVFDQ
also be understood as shifting the focus from a system of regulation that has collective 
entities at its centre to one that focuses on the individual and her protection. If it is the 
case that the considerations behind the applicability of the legal regime focus exclusively 
on the status of collective entities, the humanitarian protection of individuals is 
compromised. 
The question at the heart of this thesis is whether in the application of the jus in bello to 
conflicts involving non-state armed groups a progression can be seen from a status-based 
rationale to a humanitarian-protection rationale. Whether there is a progression from a 
legal system that extends the applicability of international law because of the status that 
the non-state armed group has achieved, to a legal system that extends regulation in order 
to provide humanitarian protection irrespective of the respective status of the parties. 
The thesis looks into the evolution of the applicable regimes over time in order to detect 
whether such a progression exists and, if so, what its limits would be. In the following 
sections some terms will be clarified before the focus of the thesis is set out in more 
detail. 
 
1.3. Clarification of certain terms 
 
Different terms can be used for the law that governs the hostilities.27 The Latin term jus 
in bello (law in war) is the relatively older term and carries connotations of the formalised, 
                                              
25 J. Pictet, Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law (Henri Dunant Institute, 1985) (Pictet, Principles); 
Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 16 
(Dinstein). 
26 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight. Saint 
Petersburg, 29 November/11 December 1868 (St. Petersburg Declaration). 
27 See, generally, Dinstein,, 12 ff. 
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status-based legal regime that developed in the 18th and 19th centuries. It is redolent of 
WKH FRQFHSW RI ¶ZDU LQ WKH OHJDO VHQVH· DQG QRWLRQV RI VXEMHFWKRRG DQG VRYHUHLJQW\
Strictly speaking, the term includes, in addition to the rules of humanitarian protection 
contained in the Geneva Conventions28 and Protocols,29 rules such as the rights and 
duties of third states.30 7KH WHUP ¶ODZRI DUPHG FRQIOLFW·RQ WKHRWKHUKDQGGHQRWHV D
more functional and technical approach in regulating armed violence and stems from the 
FRQFHSWRI¶ZDULQWKHPDWHULDOVHQVH·7KHWHUPLQRORJLFDOPRYHIURPWKHjus in bello to the 
ODZRIDUPHGFRQIOLFWPLUURUV WKHPRYHIURP¶ZDU· WR ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·DV OHJDO WHUPVRI
art.31 Finally, the WHUP ¶LQWHUQDWLRQDO KXPDQLWDULDQ ODZ· GHQRWHV WKH SULPDF\ RI
humanitarian protection as a rationale for the regulation of hostilities, although it is often 
defined simply as the law applicable in armed conflicts.32 While the most apparently 
neutral term is WKH WHUP ¶ODZ RI DUPHG FRQIOLFW· DOO WKH SDUDGLJPV FR-exist, sometimes 
uneasily, in contemporary discussions of the legal system. In addition, to the extent that 
there has been a shift from one to the other, it is not always clear when exactly that took 
place. Accordingly, the terms will be mostly used interchangeably unless the attributes of 
the terms, mentioned above, are being discussed. 
The topic of the thesis is the applicability of jus in bello regimes on non-state armed 
groups. A full positive definition of what is an armed group for this thesis is not possible 
at this stage in the thesis. This is partly because there is a variety of typologies of groups 
with which this thesis is concerned. It is also because the definition of these groups 
forms part of the subject matter of this thesis. That is, the questions what is an armed 
group and what is an armed conflict are central to determining when the legal regime is 
applicable and vice versa.  
                                              
28 Geneva Convention I on Wounded and Sick in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31; Geneva Convention II 
on Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85; Geneva Convention III on Prisoners of 
War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135; Geneva Convention IV on Civilians, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287. 
29 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflict, 12 December 1977, 1125 UNTS 3; Additional Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflict, 8 
June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609. 
30 6XFKTXHVWLRQVKRZHYHUDUHDOVRRIWHQVXEVXPHGXQGHUWKHJHQHUDO WHUP¶LQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQLWDULDQ ODZ·6HH
for example, the contents of D. Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (2nd ed., Oxford 
University PressDQGFULWLFLVPWRWKDWHIIHFWLQ$2UDNKHODVKYLOOL¶%RRN5HYLHZ·British Yearbook of 
International Law 371.  
31 6HH&*UHHQZRRG¶7KH&RQFHSWRI:DULQ0RGHUQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ·International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 283. *UHHQZRRG¶&RQFHSW· 
32 See article 2(b) of Additional Protocol I. See also Interim Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) (26 January 1993) UN doc. S/25274, 13-15. See also fn 30 above. 
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Nevertheless, the types of groups that will primarily concern this thesis are groups that 
are fighting against the territorial government or against each other. These groups usually 
claim they are fighting collective grievances and possibly profess some aspirations of self-
rule through secession, autonomy or the overthrow of the government. 
Among the armed groups that are not the focus of this thesis are protesters, terrorists 
and private military companies (PMCs). As the thesis is concerned with the applicability 
of the law of armed conflict, protesters, even if armed, when participating in riots or 
internal disturbances are not included as far as the definition of an armed conflict is 
concerned. This is expressed in article 1(2) of Additional Protocol II.33 
Terrorists and PMCs are categories of combatants not categories of belligerents.34 They 
might be participants in a conflict but they are not parties to a conflict.35 Terrorists and 
armed groups are not mutually exclusive categories. The legal category of terrorism is 
linked with the law of armed conflict in many respects. Primarily, terrorism can be a 
question of means and methods of combat.36 Groups that routinely employ terrorist 
means and methods may come to be known as terrorist groups and such a group may be 
a party to an armed conflict. It can also form part of or be linked to the armed forces of a 
party to the conflict.37 7KH GHWHUPLQDWLRQ RI D JURXS DV ¶WHUURULVWV· KRZHYHU GRHV QRW
entail the existence of an armed conflict.38  
                                              
33 $UWLFOH  RI $GGLWLRQDO 3URWRFRO ,, GHILQHV ´situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 
LVRODWHGDQGVSRUDGLFDFWVRIYLROHQFHDQGRWKHUDFWVRIDVLPLODUQDWXUHµDVQRWEHLQJ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFWV· 
34 For the distinction see H. Meyrowitz, ¶/HVWDWXWGHVJXpULOOHURVGDQV OHGURLW LQWHUQDWLRQDO·  Journal de 
Droit International 875 (Meyrowitz). 
35 6HHFRPPRQDUWLFOHWRWKH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQV´In the case of armed conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflictµ 
36 It should be noted here that there is no yet widely accepted one definition of terrorism. See, generally, B. Saul, 
Defining Terrorism in International Law (Oxford UniverVLW\3UHVVDQGRQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ¶WHUURULVP·DQG
international humanitarian law pp. 271 ff. The prohibition of terrorist methods in international humanitarian law has 
lead to some judicial consideration of such methods. See Prosecutor v Galic, Judgment, IT-98-29-A, 30 November 
2006. 
37 An example would be the link between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban government of Afghanistan during the 2001 
conflict against the US coalition. 
38 Nor is the terrorist nature of the acts significant for the determination of intensity for the existence of an armed 
conflict. See 3URVHFXWRUY%RäNRVNLDQG7DUÿXORYVN\, Judgment, IT-04-82-T, 10 July 2008, par. 190. (%RäNRVNL) See further, 
-3HMLF¶7HUURULVW$FWVDQG*URXSV$5ROHIRU,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ"·British Yearbook of International Law 71, 
82 ff. This is not to deny that the US Government has taken, and is still taking, a different view. See the speech by H. 
.RK86'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWH/HJDO$GYLVRU¶7KH2EDPD$GPLQLVWUDWLRQDQG,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ·0DUFK
reiterating the position that the US is involved in an armed conflict with Al Qaeda. Available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm 
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Similar considerations apply where PMCs are concerned. They can form part of the 
armed forces of a party to the conflict and their participation can lead to many interesting 
legal issues.39 Alternatively, they might be sent by a state or employed by a government 
that is not the one of their state of nationality or the state of incorporation of the PMC. 
In any of these cases the PMC is a participant in the conflict but not a party to the 
conflict. 
7RSXW LWGLIIHUHQWO\WKHTXHVWLRQ¶ZKDW LVDQDUPHGJURXS· LVYHU\FORVHO\ OLQNHGWRWKH
TXHVWLRQ ¶ZKDW LV DQ DUPHG FRQIOLFW· 7KHVH TXHVWLRQV FDQnot be considered separately. 
Answering the former helps answer the latter and vice-versa. 
  
1.4. Focus and scope: a history of thresholds 
 
To answer the central question on the evolution of rationale behind the application of the 
law to armed conflicts involving non-state armed groups this thesis focuses on thresholds 
of applicability. In the law of armed conflict the threshold of applicability sets the 
material field of application of a legal regime, whether it is the regime of a specific treaty 
or treaties or DFXVWRPDU\ODZUHJLPH7KHWHUP¶WKUHVKROG·LVGHILQHGDVD´Eorder, limit 
RID UHJLRQ WKH OLQHZKLFKRQHFURVVHV LQHQWHULQJµRUDV´WKHPDJQLWXGHRU LQWHQVLW\
WKDWPXVWEHH[FHHGHGIRUDFHUWDLQUHDFWLRQRUSKHQRPHQRQWRRFFXUµ40 The threshold 
will determine when a group is an armed group regulated by the legal regime and when a 
situation is an armed conflict and, therefore, calls for the application of a specialised, 
protective legal regime. It is the turning point where the law qualifies the material 
situation and the actors involved. By looking at the creation, interpretation and 
application of thresholds over time and over different legal regimes one can begin to 
understand the history of the regulation of armed conflicts involving non-state armed 
groups.  
Moreover, through the criteria expressed or implicit in a threshold one can analyse the 
different approaches and rationales behind the regulatory regimes and the thresholds of 
                                              
39 See the symposium in (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 961-1074.  
40 Both definitions are from the Oxford English Dictionary. 
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their applicability. How such thresholds are constructed signifies the rationale behind the 
decision, on a general level, to extend legal regulation and everything ² both practical and 
symbolic ² that this entails. This is why the thresholds and the specific set of criteria of 
which they consist form the basis of this thesis. 
Thresholds usually consist of a set of criteria that need to be satisfied before the legal 
regime is activated. These specific criteria may be more or less expressly stipulated. They 
may appear in the text of a treaty, as is the case of article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II.41 
Alternatively, they may be implicit and less clear, as is the case with common article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions.42 These criteria form the very centre of the enquiry as they will 
tell us what kind of actor and what kind of situatiRQ¶PHULW·DVSHFLILFNLQGRIUHJXODWLRQ 
What the criteria tell us about the kinds of actors and situations that are regulated is 
supplemented by the consequences they entail and developed by the process of their 
application. The consequence of attaining a certain threshold is the applicability of a 
certain substantive legal regime. This tells us what legal regulation ² what rights and 
duties, what privileges and limitations ² pertain to the actor described through the 
criteria; what rules and measures of protection befit the situation at hand. In practice and 
in the perceptions of the actors there will have to be a certain balance between what the 
actor looks like and what rules apply to it. Such a balance can influence the acceptability 
and practicability of the legal construction. Therefore, the applicable legal regime can 
influence the process of formation of a specific threshold. This process can take the 
form, for example, of a diplomatic conference, alongside the formulation of the 
substantive legal regime.43 Moreover, to the extent that the criteria that form the 
threshold are ambiguous, the legal regime activated, as we will see,44 can influence the 
interpretation of the threshold. Accordingly, reference will be made to the legal rules 
activated, if only to the extent that this is necessary in understanding the function of 
particular thresholds.  
                                              
41 Defining an arPHG FRQIOLFW IRU WKH 3URWRFRO DV RQH RFFXUULQJ ´in the territory of a High Contracting Party 
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted 
military operations and to implement this Protocol.µ 
42 6SHDNLQJRQO\RIDQ´DUPHGFRQIOLFWQRWRIDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHUµ 
43 Interesting examples of the inter-relation of threshold and substance can be seen in the 1974-7 Diplomatic 
Conference that resulted in Additional Protocols I and II. See sections 4.3.3. and 5.3.3-5. 
44 See e.g. sections 5.4.4-5. 
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Finally, how the decision is made in the international system on whether a particular legal 
regime is applicable will also be influenced by and influence the threshold itself. This is 
because the number and the nature of criteria that have to be satisfied might have an 
effect on such a process of application.45 For example, the complexity of the criteria or 
the difficulty in assessing their existence could have an effect on the process of their 
assessment.46 Moreover, what kinds of actors are involved in this process is also 
significant.47 The available mechanisms for application might influence the sorts of 
criteria considered acceptable, functional and practicable and develop their meaning 
accordingly. Finally, specific actors (and especially judicial institutions) can have an effect 
in the elaboration, refinement and legal certainty of the criteria contained in the 
threshold.48  
Ultimately, questions of status, as will be seen, often play a role in the formation of the 
threshold, in the content of the legal regulation, and in the process of the application of 
the threshold and activation of the substantive rules. As thresholds provide the blueprint 
for the structure and function of the legal regime, they constitute a helpful focus-point 
for the analysis of the evolution of the rationales for applicability. As thresholds define ² 
or avoid to define ² WKHNLQGRIDFWRUVDQGVLWXDWLRQVWKDW¶PHULW·LQWHUQDWLRQDOUHJXODtion, 
probing these definitions can help illuminate the different rationales behind them and 
how these have evolved. Indeed, the thesis will adopt a roughly chronological sequence. 
It will analyse the thresholds of applicability as developed over time. It will do so by 
focusing on the criteria that form the different thresholds, in the context of the 
consequences and process of the application of the legal regime. Through the evolution 
of the systems of applicability the question will be whether there can be seen a shift from 
a status-based to an individual-protection based rationale. 
 
                                              
45 For a juxtaposition between a non-defined threshold and one containing a number of restrictive criteria see 
chapters 3 and 5 on common article 3 and Additional Protocol II. 
46 This was an argument made in the context of the existence of a right to self-determination and its influence on the 
threshold of Additional Protocol I. See section 4.3.1. 
47 See, for example, section 3.4.1. for the framework of state practice, influencing the assessment of the applicability 
of common article 3. 
48 See especially sections 6.5. and 7.4. 
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1.5. Methodology 
 
Although the thesis makes extensive use of the analyses and constructions of scholars, 
the methodology of the enquiry places primary sources at the very centre of research. 
This is not only because this author believes in the usefulness and importance of 
clarifying legal terms and instruments, as this is a requisite for communicating both 
within and about the law; it is also because an enquiry into concepts can only hope to 
minimise its arbitrariness and artificiality by looking as close as possible to the relevant 
behaviour of actors. Such behaviour, crystallised through legal instruments or accruing 
through state practice or institutional interpretation, will be analysed in this thesis.  
$PRQJ WKHDQDO\VLVRI WUHDWLHV WKH FRXUWV· MXULVSUXGHQFHDQG WKHSUDFWLFHRI VWDWHV DQG
armed groups,49 it will be seen, an emphasis is placed on the narration and analysis of the 
travaux préparatoires of the instruments discussed. One reason for this is that, although 
supplementary means of interpretation,50 travaux préparatoires often contribute to the 
elucidation of terms, a precise understanding of which is necessary for their application. 
The argument that the importance of travaux is greater than their formal position has a 
long pedigree.51 Additionally, the narration of the travaux provides the link between 
history and law, shows the stakes behind abstract formulations,52 and the potential 
dynamism of such moments of creation. Ultimately, as this thesis attempts to trace and 
comprehend the conceptual significance of the words that form the thresholds, the 
travaux give us a window into how states, through their agents, (mis)understand these 
words and their combinations.  
 
1.6. Structure of the thesis 
 
                                              
49 The analysis of the practice of armed groups will be useful irrespective of whether this practice can be considered 
to contribute to the formation of customary international law. 
50 As per article 32 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. 
51 One of the first expositions was in + /DXWHUSDFKW ¶6RPH 2EVHUYDWLRQV RQ 3UHSDUDtory Work in the 
,QWHUSUHWDWLRQRI7UHDWLHV·Harvard Law Review 549.  
52 'HDOLQJZLWKWKHSROLWLFDOVWDNHVLQYROYHGLQQHJRWLDWLRQVZKLOHZULWLQJDERXWODZPLJKWSHUKDSV¶FRQWDPLQDWH·WKH
legal narrative. Indeed, Klabbers has argued that the use of travaux in interpretation can lead to the selective use of 
WKHSDVW6HH-.ODEEHUV¶,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO+LVWRULHV7KH'HFOLQLQJ,PSRUWDQFHRITravaux Préparatoires in Treaty 
,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ"·Netherlands International Law Review 267, 269. 
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In accordance with the chronological approach adopted in the thesis, the second chapter 
of the thesis attempts to situate and analyse the classical jus in bello regulatory paradigm by 
looking at the rise and fall of the legal categories of recognition of belligerency and 
insurgency. The expressly state-like nature of the criteria are analysed and put into the 
context of the decentralised and non-mandatory process of their assessment as well as 
their legal consequences. The conferment of status through recognition is at the centre of 
this paradigm.  
The third chapter looks at the beginning of the modern era of regulation with the 
creation of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which constitutes an 
important shift towards a humanitarian protection rationale. The non-definition of its 
threshold, it is argued, veils the tension between the conceptually still dominant status-
based paradigm of belligerency and an attempt to depart from it. This tension is tracked 
through a discussion of the creation of the article. The attempt to depart from the past is 
manifested in the aspirations of its automatic applicability, without a process of 
recognition as such, as well as the modesty of its substantive regime. The successes and 
limits of the project are deduced from the relevant practice. 
Chapters four and five concern a subsequent attempt at multilateral treaty-making. This 
occurred at the apex of the historical process of decolonisation and resulted in the two 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. Chapter four looks at the inclusion of 
wars of national liberation in the category of international armed conflicts through article 
1(4) of Additional Protocol I. The different rationales for this inclusion, and the 
prominence of status as their common ground, are analysed through the debate 
contained in the travaux of the 1974-77 Diplomatic Conference. Article 1(4) is analysed 
and its (non-)application tracked. 
Chapter five examines the attempt, and its relative failure, to address some of the 
shortcomings of common article 3 through a new instrument, Additional Protocol II. 
The fate of this attempt was foretold in the travaux. The new threshold and its rather 
unbalanced nature are analysed and linked to the past and future of regulatory rationales.  
Chapter six looks at how the institutionalisation of the process of applicability of the jus 
in bello regimes, through the creation and operation of courts and tribunals, has affected 
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the rationale for applicability. Some of the issues informing the chapter are the 
development of international criminal law, the creation of a customary law threshold, the 
expansion of the applicable substantive legal regime and the elaboration of the criteria for 
applicability. It is asked whether, through these developments, there has been a 
significant move in the paradigm and rationale for applicability.  
Chapter seven tracks the creation and early stages of function of a permanent 
international judicial institution, the International Criminal Court. The tension between 
TXHVWLRQV RI VWDWXV DQG WKH &RXUW·V IXQFWLRQ LV DQDO\VHG WKURXJK WKH travaux. The new 
threshold(s), in article 8 of its Statute and as applied in the early jurisprudence of the 
Court, is analysed in an effort to see whether the Court constitutes the consolidation of a 
shift initiated by the development of the international criminal law regime and 
institutions. This is then related back to the jus in bello in order to answer the central 
question of this thesis.  
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2. Chapter 2: The law before 1949 ² Recognition of Belligerency and 
Insurgency 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The history of modern international law is said to begin in 1648, with the treaty of 
Westphalia and the institution of the concept of state sovereignty as the cornerstone of 
the international system.1 The baVLFFRQFHSWVLQWKLVV\VWHPQDPHO\WKRVHRI¶VWDWHV·DQG
¶VWDWHKRRG·JUDGXDOO\FU\VWDOOLVHG LQ WKHth and, especially, the 19th centuries. This was 
the result of both international relations and the development of the overall intellectual 
approach. Accordingly, while this era saw the effort for the construction of a stable state 
system,2 it also gave birth to classical positivism.3 This intellectual approach rested on 
strict and absolute dualisms and on the construction of clear conceptual hierarchies.4 
Moreover, the positivist approach meant that international law did not emanate from god 
or nature and apply over the various actors in the human community, but it was to be 
found in the relations between independent, sovereign states.5 These sovereign states were 
the ultimate authority and the only subjects of the legal system.6 There was nothing above 
them: no actor and no value. The status of a sovereign state was the measure of all in the 
legal system.  
                                              
1 This is the widely accepted view today. See, e.g, A. Cassese, International Law (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 
2005), 24 ff; P. Malanczuk (ed.), $NHKXUVW·V0RGHUQ,QWURGXFWLRQWR,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ (7th ed., Routledge, 1997), 11 ff. 
2 Especially since the 9LHQQD &RQIHUHQFH RI  6HH  ) 0QFK ¶9LHQQD &RQJUHVV · LQ 5 %HUQKDUGW
Encyclopedia of Public International Law vol. 7 (Max Planck Institute, 1984), 522-5.  
3 7KH ¶SRVLWLYLVW WUDGLWLRQ· FR-existed with, but completely dominated, rival approachHV 6HH 6 1HII ¶ $ 6KRUW
+LVWRU\RI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ·LQ0(YDQVHGInternational Law (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2006), 29, 38 ff. 
1HII ¶+LVWRU\·6HHDOVR$$QJKLH ¶)LQGLQJWKH3HULSKHULHV6RYHUHLJQW\DQG&RORQLDOLVP LQ1LQHWHHQWK-Century 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ·   Harvard International Law Journal   $QJKLH ¶3HULSKHULHV· .HQQHG\ ¶1LQHWHHQWK·, 
112. 
4 This is something very much present in the work of Auguste Comte, considered as the father of philosophical 
positivism, first developed through his work Course on Positive Philosophy, published between 1830 and 1842. 
5 6HH1HII¶+LVWRU\· 
6 See section 1.2 fns 13-14 for the exclusive subjecthood of states. 
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The primacy of sovereignty during the nineteenth century was reflected in the law of war. 
The ability to wage war became an attribute of state sovereignty.7 There was no place for 
DQDVVHVVPHQWRIZKHWKHUDZDUZDV ¶MXVW·RU ¶XQMXVW·8 At the same time, however, this 
formalisation of war as an instrument of policy between sovereigns, allowed for the 
elaboration of a system of rules, a code of conduct,9 agreed between sovereigns. This 
system of rules concerned various aspects of war ² from the effects of war on third states 
to the mitigation of some of the horrors of war.10 Moreover, the non-justiciability of the 
OHJDOLW\RU ¶MXVWQHVV·RIZDUFHPHQWHGWKHVHSDUDWLRQRI WKH jus ad bellum from the jus in 
bello, and the gradual emancipation of the latter from the former.11 Once both sides were 
to be regulated irrespective of the merits of their goals, the rationale for regulation, 
whether practical or humanitarian, could be developed into detailed rules. 
While it is easier to understand how absolute and formal state sovereignty can give rise to 
a code of conduct in war between states, the regulation of civil wars in that system seems 
paradoxical. In the same way that states were sovereign in their external relations, the 
VWDWH·V JRYHUQPHQW ZDV IUHH WR GHDO ZLWK DUPHG WKUHDWV WR LWV DXWKRULW\ LQ ZKDWHYHU
fashion it deemed fit.12 Nevertheless, the same era gave birth to a legal regime for the 
UHJXODWLRQRIDUPHGFRQIOLFWVZDJHGZLWKLQVWDWHVDQGWRWKHWHUPRIDUW¶FLYLOZDU· 
While the most significant reason for this was, as will be seen in this chapter, the effects 
of such conflicts on the interests of third states,13 on a more abstract level the 
crystallisation of the concept of statehood influenced the definition and regulation of 
non-state groups. On the one hand, the category of non-state armed groups can only be 
                                              
7 This position persisted well into the 20th century. See, for example, See C. Hyde, International Law Chiefly as 
Interpreted and Applied by the United States vol. 2 (Little, Brown & Co., 1922) 189. (Hyde, vol. 2):, ´,WDOZD\VOLHVZLWKLQ
the power of a State to endeavour to obtain redress for wrongs, or to gain political or other advantages over 
DQRWKHUQRWPHUHO\E\WKHHPSOR\PHQWRIIRUFHEXWDOVRE\GLUHFWUHFRXUVHWRZDUµSee further S. Neff, War and the 
Law of Nations (Cambridge University Press, 2005), especially at 196 ff. (Neff, War) 
8 On the concept and doctrine of just wars see Neff, War, 29 and 50 ff. For its abandonment through the rise of 
positivism see ibid 177 ff. 
9 Ibid, 186 ff. 
10 Although, as we will see, at this stage the system was more concerned with the former than the latter aspects. 
11 On the different logic of the separation today sHHIRUH[DPSOH$5REHUWV¶7KH(TXDO$SSOLFDWLRQRIWKH/DZVRI
:DU$3ULQFLSOHXQGHU3UHVVXUH·International Review of the Red Cross 931. 
12 The distinction between matters between and matters within states, and the regulation solely of the former, was at 
WKHYHU\FHQWUHRIWKHOHJDOUHJLPHHYHQIURPWKHWLPHRI:HVWSKDOLD6HH1HII¶+LVWRU\·, on the regulation of 
religious matters. 
13 Hence the centrality of the law of neutrality. See below section 2.2.5. 6HH 5 )DON ¶-DQXV 7RUPHQWHG 7KH
,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZRI,QWHUQDO:DU·LQ-5RVHQDXHGInternational Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton University Press, 
1964), 206 (Falk). 
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defined as armed groups that are not a state. Accordingly, the crystallisation of what is a 
state, in international relations and theory,14 makes it easier to delineate what is not a 
state. On the other hand, the formalisation of what is a state lent the blueprint for what 
any collective actor should aspire to, in order to be a subject in the international legal 
system and achieve international legal status. Accordingly, both the negative and positive 
aspects of the definition of the non-state actor to be regulated are dependent and 
influenced by the dominant concept of statehood.15  
This influence is still with us today. The conceptual paradigm of statehood and its 
influence on the rationale for the applicability of the legal regime on non-state armed 
groups have been central features in the international legal system. The tension between a 
status-based and a humanitarian-protection rationale, developed throughout the thesis,16 
is very much related to these features. The two legal innovations of the period, namely 
the doctrines of recognition of belligerency and recognition of insurgency offer an 
instructive starting point. This is why, although the practice of recognition of belligerency 
and insurgency today has largely fallen into desuetude,17 it is important to discuss in detail 
the international legal regime that applied before the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The 
differences and similarities between the pre- and post-1949 legal regimes will help 
elucidate the evolution of the rationales for applicability as well as the limits of this 
evolution.  
According to a widely accepted trichotomy armed conflicts in the pre-1949 legal regime, 
can be categorised, in ascending order of magnitude, as rebellion, insurgency, and 
belligerency. Categorisation of the armed conflict was intimately related to the status of 
the actors involved in it. The categories have been a fixture of legal doctrine for the last 
                                              
14 Indeed, much of the writing in the period consists of detailed listing of the forms and permutations of statehood, 
and the legal consequences of this variety. See for example A. Rougier, Les Guerres Civiles et le Droit des Gens (Librairie 
de la Société du Recueil Général des Lois et des Arrêts, 1903), chapters 2 to 6 (Rougier). 
15 MRUHRYHU LWZDV WKH(XURSHDQ ¶FLYLOLVHG·QDWLRQ-VWDWH WKDWZDV WKHEOXHSULQW6HHHJ$QJKLH ¶3HULSKHULHV·
6HHDOVR<2QXPD¶:KHQZDVWKH/DZRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO6RFLHW\%RUQ"² An Inquiry of the History of International 
Law from an IntercivilizatioQDO 3HUVSHFWLYH·   Journal of the History of International Law 1 (Onuma, 
¶,QWHUFLYLOL]DWLRQDO· 
16 And introduced in section 1.2. 
17 See J. Siotis, /H'URLWGHOD*XHUUHHWOHV&RQIOLWV$UPpVG·XQ&DUDFWqUH1RQ-International (Librairie Générale de Droit et 
de Jurisprudence, 1958), 223 ff (Siotis). There are some exceptions, as will be seen. 
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250 years,18 and are also adopted by more modern writers.19 This is so, even though the 
terminology with respect to the first two categories, rebellion and insurgency, is often 
inconsistent and confusing.20 RHEHOOLRQ LV ZKHUH ´WKHUH LV VXIILFLHQW HYLGHQFH WKDW WKH
police forces21 of the parent State will reduce the seditious party to respect the municipal 
OHJDO RUGHUµ22 and the punishment of the rebels is according to municipal law.23 
Accordingly, international law is not applicable and so not considered in this thesis.   
Therefore, the two basic concepts relating to the international regulation of internal 
armed conflict in the pre-1949 legal regime are belligerency and insurgency. Of the two, 
belligerency developed more fully as a legal concept ensuing certain rights and obligations 
while insurgency never moved beyond a purely ad hoc practice.24  In addition, the 
existence of these concepts and, especially, the practice related to them did not fully 
overlap temporally. Recognition of insurgency developed partly in order to address 
certain problematic aspects of the practice of recognition of belligerency as the latter 
gradually fell into desuetude.  
As stated above,25 the focus of this thesis is on the criteria forming the threshold for the 
applicability of the legal regime. These will be analysed and understood in the context of 
the substantive regime they activate and the process of their application.  
 
2.2. Recognition of Belligerency 
 
                                              
18 E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations; or, The Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and 
Sovereigns (Carnegie Institution, 1916, first ed. 1758), 336. See also article 151 of the Lieber Code of 1863 See 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field of 24 April 1863. See Rougier, 30 ff. 
19 See, for example, the analysis in Falk, 197; L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 4 (Moir); H. Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements (Clarendon Press, 
1988), 23. (Wilson) 
20 +\GHIRUH[DPSOHXVHVWKHWHUPV¶LQVXUUHFWLRQUHEHOOLRQFLYLOZDU·6HH+\GHvol. 2, 193. See also N. Padelford, 
International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil War (The Macmillan Company, 1939), 1. (Padelford, Spanish) 
21 Although, occasionally, reference is made to the military. See the definition given in ibid., 1, using the terms 
¶LQVXUUHFWLRQ·DQG¶UHYROW·to UHIHUWRZKDWLQWKLVWH[WLVQDPHG¶UHEHOOLRQ·0\UHIHUHQFH 
22 L. Kotzsch, The Concept of War in Contemporary History and International Law (Librairie E. Droz,, 1956), 230; Y. 
/RRWVWHHQ¶7KH&RQFHSWRI%HOOLJHUHQF\LQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ·Military Law Review, 109, 113. According 
WR)DONUHEHOOLRQFRQVLVWVRQO\RI´VSRUDGLFFKDOOHQJHWRWKHOHJLWLPDWHJRYHUQPHQWµ 
23 Moir, 4.  
24 See, for example, Lauterpacht, Recognition  ´%elligerency is a relation giving rise to definite rights and 
obligations, while insurgency is not 
25 Section 1.4. 
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2.2.1. Introduction 
 
The development of the concept of recognition of belligerency began gradually from the 
end of the 18th century26 and, by all accounts, had achieved a certain degree of conceptual 
clarity by the mid-19th century with the American Civil War.27 Although the practice had 
occurred with some consistency in the beginning of the 19th century in Latin America28 as 
well as in Europe,29 the concept was not dealt with in a doctrinal treatise until 1866, in a 
much celebrated footnote.30 %HOOLJHUHQF\ FDQ EH GHVFULEHG IXQFWLRQDOO\ DV ´D
formalization of the relative rights and duties of all actors vis-à-YLVDQLQWHUQDOZDUµ31 or, 
GHILQHGGHVFULSWLYHO\DV´DQDFWRIWKHSDUHQWJRYHUQPHQWRURIDIRUHLJQ6WDWHEy which a 
contending party in a civil strife is clothed with the legal qualification to make war, and 
the legal consequences of the international law of war flow from the moment such 
UHFRJQLWLRQLVJUDQWHGµ32  
If the former statement helps us understand the purpose that the concept was meant to 
serve, the latter definition is very useful in delineating the pertinent elements and 
characteristics of the doctrine of belligerency. Indeed, it points out that the starting point 
for the activation of the legal regime is the recognising act. This is a very central feature 
of the doctrine and, as it will be seen, it influences many of its aspects and its function as 
a process of ascription of status.  
                                              
26 6HH+:HKEHUJ¶/D*XHUUH&LYLOHHWOH'URLW,QWHUQDWLRQDO·, (1938) Recueil des Cours 1, 13 ff placing the beginning 
of the formation of the concept at the war of American Independence of 1774-1783 (Wehberg). See also E. Castrén, 
Civil War (Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1966), 40 (Castrén). 
27 See, for example, R. Oglesby, Internal War and the Search for Normative Order (Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), vii (Oglesby); 
H. Smith, Great Britain and the Law of Nations (P. S. King & Sons, 1932), 302 (Smith, Great Britain$0DF1DLU¶7KH
/DZ UHODWLQJ WR WKH &LYLO :DU LQ 6SDLQ·   Law Quarterly Review   0DF1DLU ¶6SDLQ· $ 0DF1DLU
International Law Opinions vol. 1 Peace (Cambridge University Press, 1956), 138 (MacNair, Opinions). 
28The practice emerged in the context of the revolutions in Latin America especially in relation to Spanish Colonies. 
See especially J. Moore, A Digest of International Law vol. I (Government Printing Office, 1906), 170 ff; (Moore, 
Digest); Siotis, 64 ff. 
29)RU WKH FDVH RI WKH *UHHN UHYROXWLRQ VHH & (XVWDWKLDGqV ¶/D 3UHPLqUH $SSOLFDWLRQ HQ (XURSH GH OD
5HFRQQDLVVDQFHGH%HOOLJpUDQFH3HQGDQWOD*XHUUHG·,QGpSHQGDQFHGH OD*UqFH· LQEn Hommage a Paul Guggenheim, 
5HFXHLO G·pWXGHV GH 'URLW ,QWHUQDWLRQDO (Imprimerie de la Tribune de Genève, 1968), 22 (Eustathiadès); Siotis, 70 ff. 
Indeed, the Greek revolution is said to be the first important application of the doctrine after the American 
revolution. See Neff, War 262.  
30 7KH$PHULFDQMXULVW5'DQDDGGHGDIRRWQRWHRIWKHOHQJWKRIDVKRUWFKDSWHULQWKHHGLWLRQRI:KHDWRQ·V
International Law. See Wheaton, 29 ff, fn 15. 
31 Falk, 203. 
32 Chen, 303. The latter definition LV DOVR DGRSWHG E\ 9 'XFXOHVFR ¶(IIHW GH OD 5HFRQQDLVVDQFH GH O·eWDW GH
Belligérance par les Tiers, y Compris les Organisation Internationales, sur le Statut Juridique des Conflits Armés À 
Caractère Non-,QWHUQDWLRQDO·Revue Générale de Droit International Publique, 125, 127-8 (Duculesco). 
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These definitions also give us the main features of the doctrine, which will be analysed 
below. A non-state armed group is recognised as a belligerent by the parent government 
or a third state. When this occurs, the full legal regime that applies to wars between states 
is applicable. The process by which this happened and consequences thereof will be 
discussed below. Firstly, however, we need to address the question of threshold. 
 
2.2.2. Criteria for the applicability of the legal regime: War and the ability to wage it. 
 
The criteria for the applicability of the legal regime need to describe two closely 
interrelated elements: the actors and the situation. The doctrine of belligerency seems to 
prioritise the latter: the starting point is the material existence of a situation, the intensity 
of which amounts to a war. According to WKHDWRQ ´WKH VWDWH RI WKLQJV EHWZHHQ WKH
parent State and insurgents must amount in fact to a war, in the sense of international 
ODZ«>5@HFRJQLWLRQ LV RI D IDFWµ33 There must, therefore, exist a conflict of such a 
magnitude as to be perceived as a war. The magnitude of the conflict seems, therefore, 
logically to precede and contain the characteristics of the actors.34  
A variety of factors can point to a sufficient magnitude of the conflict. Wheaton provides 
an indicative list. 
 
The actual employment of military forces on each side, acting in accordance with 
the rules and customs of war,35 such as the use of flags of truce, cartels, exchange 
of prisoners, and the treatment of captured insurgents by the parent State as 
prisoners of war; and, at sea, employment by the insurgents of commissioned 
cruisers, and the exercise by the parent government of the rights of blockade of 
insurgent ports against neutral commerce, and of stopping and searching neutral 
                                              
33 Wheaton, 29, fn 15.  
34 $V + 6PLWK ¶6RPH 3UREOHPV RI WKH 6SDQLVK &LYLO :DU·   British Yearbook of International Law, 17, 18 
6PLWK¶6SDQLVK·FOHDUO\SXWVLW´>Z@KDWZHFDOO´EHOOLJHUHQWUHFRJQLWLRQµLV[...] the recognition of the existence of a 
war. The existence of a war is purely a question of fact.µ7KHDFWRUV·FKDUDFWHULVWLFVZLOOEHVHWRXWLQWKLVVHFWLRQ
below. 
35 See, however, Chen, at 365, who points out the absurdity of the requirement of this factor prior to the activation 
of the legal regime. 
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vessels at sea. If all these elements exist, the condition of things is undoubtedly 
war; and it may be war, before they are all ripened into activity.36 
 
Another important factor is the occupation of a portion of the territory by the 
insurgents,37 a factor which also serves as a criterion for statehood.38  
The first factor to consider is the absence of the humanitarian effects of the hostilities. 
Matters like the number of victims or the overall effect of the hostilities on the civilian 
population do not directly affect the legal qualification of the conflict. This is also why 
WKHZRUG¶PDJQLWXGH·LVPRUHDSSURSULDWHLQWKLVLQVWDQFHUDWKHUWKDQWKHWHUP¶LQWHQVLW\·
which, as will be seen in the following chapters, has come to contain humanitarian 
elements.39 Indeed, the absence of humanitarian considerations among the criteria 
indicates that the humanitarian protection of individuals does not inform significantly the 
underlying rationale for the regulation of the conflict.40  
Moreover, a related factor for the necessary magnitude is the predominance of maritime 
elements. ,QGHHG:KHDWRQSRLQWVRXWWKDWWKHVLWXDWLRQZLOOEH´IDUPRUHGHFLVLYHZKHUH
WKHUH LV PDULWLPH ZDU DQG FRPPHUFLDO UHODWLRQV ZLWK IRUHLJQHUVµ41 The question of 
magnitude, then, was to an extent viewed from outside the conflict and from the 
perspective of third states. There was sufficient magnitude to the extent that the 
hostilities could not be contained in the territory of the state and would extend beyond it, 
affecting third states. Where an internal armed conflict caused de facto obstacles to 
commercial relations, it became harder for third states to ignore. Finally, it will be noted 
that no express requirement of duration exists. While it is probable that a certain period 
                                              
36 Wheaton, 30, fn 15. 
37 See, e.g, The Prize Cases (1864), 67 US 635. See also Hyde, vol. 2, 200, who adopts the language of the Court.  
38 See below fn 46. 
39 See sections 3.3.1 and 6.5.3. 
40 Occasionally, the argument that humanitarian considerations might be served by recognising belligerency ² rather 
than that they are a legal criterion ² was deployed. See the example of the British Foreign Secretary George Canning, 
conversing with the Austrian Chancellor Metternich and arguing for the recognition of the belligerency of the 
Greeks in Smith, Great Britain, 296. See, however, Lauterpacht, Recognition, 227-8, who refers to the specific case but 
JRHVRQWRDUJXHWKDWWKH´KXPDQLWDULDQDUJXPHQWLVWRDODUJHH[WHQWGHFHSWLYHµDVUHFRJQLWLRQGRHVQRWVHHPWR
have a strong effect on the humanity of the conduct. 
41 Wheaton, 30, fn 15. 
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of time will have lapsed before the hostilities reach their magnitude, no additional 
duration is considered as a necessary separate criterion.42 
The criterion relating to magnitude entails certain characteristics of the actors. These are 
related to their organization and their capacity to wage war. The armed group need to 
have the ability to occupy and control territory, to affect the maritime interests of third 
states, potentially even to wage maritime war, and to apply the full legal regime applicable 
to international wars. This ability necessitates a level of organisation that puts them on a 
par, as far as the war effort is concerned, with a state. The magnitude achieved is a tribute 
to the effectiveness of the JURXS·V war effort. The relative sophistication necessary to 
conduct maritime war, particularly, entails a level of military organisation. Accordingly, 
attributes of such military organisation are understood, in the writings of the time, 
WKURXJK WKH LVVXH RI PDJQLWXGH ,Q WKDW VHQVH WKH DFWRUV· FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DUH ORJLFDOO\
subsumed in the characteristics of the situation. The status of the actors is achieved 
WKURXJKWKHVLWXDWLRQWKH\KDYHFUHDWHG,I¶ZDULQWKHOHJDOVHQVH·FDQRQO\EHZDJHGE\
sovereigns and the armed group has caused a conflict of the magnitude of war, they have 
the ability to support their claim to sovereignty. 
7KLVGRHVQRWPHDQWKDWRUJDQLVDWLRQLVQRWH[SUHVVO\FRQVLGHUHG:KHDWRQUHTXLUHV´WKH
existence of a de facto political organisation of the insurgents, sufficient in character, 
population and resources, to constitute it, if left to itself, a State among the nations, 
UHDVRQDEO\FDSDEOHRIGLVFKDUJLQJWKHGXWLHVRID6WDWHµ43 Two points may be made on 
this language and the reference to political rather than military organisation. The first one 
is the proximity of these criteria to those of statehood,44 if not necessarily to the same 
degree. The second point is the prospective character of these factors. It accentuates how 
recognition of belligerency signifies more than the temporary application of a specialised 
legal regime. It also signifies the viability of the group and its prospects of achieving 
                                              
42 The question of duration will be brought into the debate later, and especially through the language of Courts and 
Tribunals. See e.g. section 6.5.3. 
43 Wheaton, 30, fn 15. While Wheaton can be seen as the main authority on point, it is important to point out that 
there are writers that focused more narrowly on military organisation. See, for example, Rougier, 39.  
44 Cf. Article ,RIWKH0RQWHYLGHR&RQYHQWLRQRQWKH5LJKWVDQG'XWLHVRI6WDWHV´7KH6WDWHDVDSHUVRQRI
international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) 
government; and (d) capacity to entHULQWRUHODWLRQVZLWKRWKHU6WDWHVµ6HHDOVRL. Oppenheim, International Law vol. 
II. Disputes, War, and Neutrality (7th HGHGLWHGE\+/DXWHUSDFKW/RQJPDQ·V, 1952), 250 (Oppenheim/Lauterpacht) 
´7KHSULQFLSOHV«DUHHVVHQWLDOO\WKHVDPHDVWKRVHUHODWLQJWRWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRI6WDWHVDQG*RYHUQPHQWVµ 
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sovereign status.45 In that way the applicability of the jus in bello is linked to the legal status 
that the non-state armed group wants to achieve through and beyond the conflict. 
Furthermore, the centrality of political organisation reflects the importance of the 
political, and not just military, status that the group has achieved. Through the application 
of the jus in bello this political status is translated into state-like legal status during the 
conflict and the prospective legal status of statehood. The need for the humanitarian 
protection of individuals has no place in this rationale.   
The above criteria gradually emerged both in the doctrine and in state practice. A 
particularly clear exposition of the interplay between the present facts and the potential 
RIWKHLQVXUJHQWVIRUVRYHUHLJQW\LVFRQWDLQHGLQ863UHVLGHQW*UDQW·VPHVVDJHWRWKH86
Congress, justifying his refusal to recognise the belligerency of Cuba, in 1870.  
 
The question of belligerency is one of fact and not to be decided by sympathies 
for or prejudices against either party. The relations between the parent state and 
the insurgents must amount, in fact, to war in the sense of international law. 
Fighting, though fierce and protracted, does not alone constitute war; there must 
EHPLOLWDU\IRUFHVDFWLQJLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHUXOHVDQGFXVWRPVRIZDU«DQGWR
justify a recognition of belligerency there must be, above all, a de facto political 
organization of the insurgents sufficient in character and resources to constitute it, 
if left to itself, a state among nations capable of discharging the duties of a state, 
and of meeting the just responsibilities it may incur as such toward other powers 
in the discharge of its national duties.46 
 
Occasionally, the prospective element could also be understood as a political or strategic 
calculation. US President Monroe, referring, in 1822, to the revolutions in Latin America, 
ZDV OHVV FLUFXPVSHFW LQ DUJXLQJ WKDW´DV VRRQDV WKHPRYHPHQW DVVXPHGVXFKD VWHDGy 
and consistent form as to make the success of the provinces probable, the rights to which 
they were entitled by the law of nations, as equal parties to a civil war, were extended to 
                                              
45 See also J. Moore, Collected Papers vol. 2, (Yale University Press, 1944),  DUJXLQJ WKDW ´WKH LQVXUJHQWV PXVW
present the aspect of a political community or a de facto power, having a certain coherence, and a certain 
LQGHSHQGHQFHRISRVLWLRQLQUHVSHFWRIWHUULWRULDOOLPLWVRISRSXODWLRQRILQWHUHVWDQGRIGHVWLQ\µ 
46 Quoted in Moore, Digest, 194-5. Note the similarity of the language with the one employed in Wheaton four years 
earlier. See above fn 45 and text. 
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WKHPµ47 This element of political calculation qualifies the declared predominance of the 
present facts of the conflict. It identifies the applicability of the jus in bello with the 
expectation of sovereign status. Furthermore, it accentuates the role that the discretion 
and the political interests of the recognising actor have in granting the recognition.  
 
2.2.3. The role of the interests of third states 
 
This leads to thHGLVFXVVLRQRI DQDGGLWLRQDO ´subjectiveµ48 element in the doctrine. In 
accordance with the decentralized nature of the international legal system and the final 
decision on the existence of the factual criteria residing firmly on states, the existence of 
the factual criteria needs to be complemented by circumstances rendering it necessary for 
third states to grant recognition. Recognition of belligerency is fundamentally optional.49 
A third state will have, to the extent that the above criteria exist, the right but not the 
duty to grant recognition.50 Conversely, to the extent that the above criteria do not exist a 
third state will have the duty to refrain from recognising the group as belligerents.51 
Accordingly, the existence of circumstances rendering the grant of recognition necessary 
for the recognising state can be considered, from the viewpoint of that state, to be an 
additional criterion.  
In practice, this meant that recognition was granted predominantly to conflicts with a 
strong maritime element. As the central tenet of the activated legal regime was the law of 
neutrality, the necessity of activating the legal regime mostly arose when neutral 
commerce and navigation were threatened, especially due to the nature of transport at 
that time. This occurred particularly when the insurgents possessed and used a naval 
force or, at least and more commonly, when they controlled ports and adjacent waters.52 
Wheaton, for example, admitted that in the case of a conflict in a land-locked state 
                                              
47 Ibid., 170. 
48 Chen, 365. 
49 See Siotis 112 ff. 
50 As Wheaton puts it ´7KH UHDVRQ ZKLFK UHTXLUHV DQG FDQ DORQH MXVWLI\ WKLV VWHS E\ WKH JRYHUQPHQWRI DQRWKHU
country, is, that its own rights and interests are so far affected as to require a definition of its own relations to the 
SDUWLHVµDGGLQJWKDWWKHH[HUFLVHRIWKLVULJKWPD\EHPDGHNHHSLQJLQPLQG´WKHJUHDWHUSROLWLFDOJRRGµ. Wheaton, 
29, fn 15. 
51 Ibid, 30, fn 15; Lauterpacht, Recognition, 176. 
52 6HH0DF1DLU¶6SDLQ·  
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circumstances requiring recognition would be unlikely to arise, except being where the 
recognizing state was territorially contiguous and affected by land.53  
If viewed as an additional criterion, however, recognition could be viewed as problematic 
in law. Although the need to grant recognition could be viewed as a form of 
measurement of the intensity of the conflict, the deference to the interests of third states 
as final arbiter added a further uncontrollable element of political expediency. It further 
distanced the rule from an objective understanding of the factual characteristics of the 
conflict, thus harming the certainty and cohesiveness of the rule. This element of political 
expediency bolsters the point made in the previous section on the prospective nature of 
the recognition, in accordance with the calculations of third states, on the eventual 
statehood of the group. 
On the other hand, recognition can be viewed as a reflection of a central rationale of the 
legal regime; the regulation of the interests of third states through the ascription of status 
to the parties to the conflict, rather than the interests of the participants, or, indeed, the 
individuals, caught in the conflict. The interests of third states are central in determining 
the applicability of the law and the ascription of status to the parties.  
These highly decentralized and subjective elements of the doctrine and practice, led to 
the perception that recognition of belligerency was deficient as a legal doctrine. To 
remedy this, different approaches were attempted. One was to focus on the existence of 
the factual characteristics of the actor and the conflict and, to the extent that the criteria 
were fulfilled, pronounce the granting of recognition as obligatory.54 This approach 
reflected the effort to devise purely factual criteria and to move to a virtually automatic 
process of the granting of status and the application of the law.55 It was, however, not 
supported by the practice of states.56  
                                              
53 Wheaton, 29, fn 15. Wehberg, 23-6, supplies the examples of the Polish (1831) and Hungarian (1848) revolutions, 
arguing that the reason belligerency was never recognised concerned their land-locked nature.  
54 See Siotis, 128 ff. for a discussion of the opinions of authors like Fiore and Bluntschli, arguing for the obligatory 
nature of recognition of belligerency.  
55 Automatic application was central, as will be seen, in the change of paradigm attempted through common article 
3.  
56 See for the interesting example of the Dominican revolt against Spain MacNair, Opinions, 141-2. See also, for 
IXUWKHUSUDFWLFH0DF1DLU¶6SDLQ·-3.  
44 
 
The above effort was central to the treatment of the subject by Lauterpacht. In this 
FRQWH[W LW LV LPSRUWDQW WR UHFDOO /DXWHUSDFKW·V IRUPXODWLRQ RQ WKH ODZ RI UHFRJQLWLRQ
Recognition is declarative of facts and constitutive of rights.57 In the context of 
belligerency this would mean that recognition would be declarative of the facts that make 
a group a contending party in a civil war and constitutive of the legal consequences of the 
international law of war, with the status that these carry. Furthermore, the relation 
between the existence of the facts, the assessment of the facts by the relevant actors and 
the constitution of legal rights58 will determine the pre-eminence of the declarative or 
constitutive nature of the act. While the constitutive element of recognition 
acknowledges the power of the recognising actor in activating the net of rights and 
obligations included in the legal regime extended, the declarative element ensures that the 
recognising act will be based on pre-existing fact. 
Lauterpacht summarizes the criteria as follows: (a) an armed conflict of a general 
character; (b) the insurgents must occupy and administer a substantial portion of national 
territory; (c) conduct the hostilities according to the laws of war through organized armed 
IRUFHV ZLWK UHVSRQVLEOH DXWKRULW\ G ´FLUFXPVWDQFHV PDNLQJ LW QHFHVVDU\ IRU RXWVLGH
VWDWHV WRGHILQH WKHLU DWWLWXGHE\PHDQVRI UHFRJQLWLRQµ59 When these criteria are there 
third states have a duty to apply the law to the facts.60 Indeed, this duty helps understand 
WKHUROHRIFULWHULRQGIRU/DXWHUSDFKW7KH ¶QHFHVVLW\· LQ GFRXOGEH LQWHUSUHWHGDVD
TXHVWLRQ RI LQWHUHVWV RI WKH WKLUG VWDWH 7KLV KRZHYHU ZRXOG PDNH /DXWHUSDFKW·V
GHILQLWLRQFLUFXODU,IWKLUGVWDWHV·LQWHUHVWVPDNHLWQHFessary for them to recognise then 
WKHUHLVQRWPXFKVHQVHLQFDOOLQJLWDGXW\)RU/DXWHUSDFKW·VFULWHULDWREHFRPPHQVXUDWH
with his general objectivist approach, the necessity in criterion (d) should only mean that 
states are forced to define their attitude. This significantly reduces the discretion of third 
states in their application of the law to the facts on the ground.  
,QGHHGLQ/DXWHUSDFKW·VDUJXPHQWGLVOHVVRIDOHJDOFULWHULRQDQGPRUHRIDIRUPRI
jurisdiction, if that term can be used broadly. When certain interests of these states are 
                                              
57 Lauterpacht, Recognition, 6. 
58 On the importance of the establishment (la constatation) of the facts by the relevant actors see Kelsen, 
¶5HFRJQLWLRQ·, 606.  
59 Lauterpacht, Recognition, 176.    
60 See ibid.´7KHHVVHQFHRIWKDWSULQFLSOH LV WKDWUHFRJQLWLRQLVQRW LQWKHQDWXUHRIDJUDQWRIDIDYRXURUD
matter of unfettered political discretion, but a duty imposed by the facts of thHVLWXDWLRQµ 
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affected, they are empowered to take a position on the applicability of the law and, 
therefore, the ascription of status. Before that point, to recognise would be considered a 
´gratuitous demonstration of moral supportµ61 and ´an international wrong as against 
WKH ODZIXO JRYHUQPHQWµ62 When, however, they do take a position, they are bound to 
apply the facts to the law correctly.63 For Lauterpacht, the recognising act is declarative of 
the facts of the conflict rather than of the interests of the third parties. Accordingly, if the 
facts are such third states have the duty to recognise the belligerency.  
A similar approach to that of Lauterpacht was adopted by the Institut de Droit 
International, which attempted a codification of the legal rule in 1900.64 Again, according 
to this approach, the interests of third states would not be viewed as a criterion but as an 
extra-legal variable that might activate the exercise of the legal right to grant recognition, 
to the H[WHQWWKDWWKHRWKHUFULWHULDDUHPHWHYHQWKRXJKWKH,QVWLWXW·VGHILQLWLRQGRHVQRW
speak of a duty to recognise.   
This debate highlights some of the problems of the doctrine and practice of belligerency 
as a decentralised process of ascription of status. It should also be seen, however, in the 
context of a wider debate in the jus in bello on the objective or subjective character of 
war.65 While the former casts war as a material fact, the latter casts it as a legal regime 
brought into existence by the free will of a sovereign.66 Moreover, insofar as states have 
full control over whether a material situation amounts to war, either by starting it or 
recognising it, there is little space for non-state actors to be regulated against the will of 
the states involved. Accordingly, the jus ad bellum, and the decline of the right of states to 
use force as they deemed fit, developed in parallel with the move from the legal concept 
RI ¶ZDU· WR WKDW RI DQ ¶DUPHG FRQIOLFW· DV DQ REMHFWLYH PDWHULDO VLWXDWLRQ67 The latter 
development, as will be seen in the next chapter, allowed the aspiration for an objective 
                                              
61 Wheaton, 30, fn 15. 
62 Lauterpacht, Recognition2QWKHRWKHUKDQGOHVVFOHDUO\´>W@RUHIXVHWRUHFRJQLVHWKHLQVXUJHQWVDVEHOOLJHUHQWV
although these conditions are present is to act in a manner which finds no warrant in international law. 
63 See ibid., 175. 
64 6HH ,QVWLWXW GH 'URLW ,QWHUQDWLRQDO ¶'URLWV HW GHYRLUV GHV 3XLVVDQFHV pWUDQJqUHV DX FDV GH PRYHPHQW
LQVXUUHFWLRQQHO HQYHUV OH JRXYHUQHPHQWV pWDEOLV HW UHFRQQXV TXL VRQW DX[ SULVHV DYHF O·LQVXUUHFWLRQ· 6HVVLRQ GH
Neuchâtel, 1900, available at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiF/resolutionsF/1900_neu_02_fr.pdf (IDI 1900). See also D. 
6FKLQGOHU ¶6WDWH RI :DU %HOOLJHUHQF\ $UPHG &RQIOLFW· LQ $ &DVVHVH HG The New Humanitarian Law of Armed 
Conflict (Editoriale Scientifica, 1979), 3 (Schindler). 
65 See Neff, War, 173-4. 
66 This is why a central element in that debate is the necessity or lack thereof of a declaration of war. See ibid., 235-6. 
67 See ibid., 335-6. 
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and automatic system of applicability of international legal rules on non-state armed 
groups.  
Moreover, this move towards an objective system of applicability relates, as will be seen 
in the next chapters, to the move from a status-based to a humanitarian-protection-based 
rationale. The pairs subjective/objective and status/humanitarian-protection should not 
be seen as identical. Indeed, it is possible to have a subjective and decentralised system of 
assessing the need to apply humanitarian rules. Nevertheless, the move to an objective 
and centralised applicability can allow moving away from the interests of both third states 
and the territorial government in ascribing or not ascribing status to the non-state armed 
group through the applicability of the jus in bello. 
 
2.2.4. The process of ascription of status ² who grants recognition and how 
 
The process of granting recognition can help clarify the use of the above criteria in 
practice. An examination of the issue reveals the interplay and balance between the 
factual characteristics of the criteria and the optional nature of recognition. Recognition 
can be granted either by the incumbent government, against which the insurgents are 
fighting, or third states, deciding to take a position because of the circumstances of the 
conflict. In both cases, it is a question of the decision adopted by a particular actor when 
faced with a set of facts. The actors ascribing legal meaning to the facts,68 will activate the 
legal regime of belligerency, and will do so in accordance with their interests. 
Accordingly, the existence of a state of war, as a matter of law, will be pronounced by 
these state-actors and can be deduced by their actions.  
An aspect of the non-mandatory nature of the extension of recognition is that 
recognition by one actor does not bind another actor. If, for example, a third state 
recognises the belligerency of the armed group this act does not bind other third states. 
Similarly, even if the government recognises the belligerency of its adversary, this act 
does not bind third governments. Accordingly, the granting of recognition would create a 
                                              
68 $VSXWE\.HOVHQ¶5HFRJQLWLRQ·´«WKHUHDUHQRDEVROXWHGLUHFWO\HYLGHQWIDFWVIDFWV´LQWKHPVHOYHVµEXW
RQO\IDFWVHVWDEOLVKHGE\WKHFRPSHWHQWDXWKRULW\LQDSURFHGXUHSUHVFULEHGE\WKHOHJDORUGHUµ 
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net of bilateral relations between the recognising state and the recognised belligerent that 
would not bind third states.69 Therefore, although, in terms of the substantive law, 
recognition of belligerency would activate a coherent legal regime,70 in terms of actors 
bound by this regime, it would generate a piecemeal net of bilateral relations.71 
Explicit recognition, as an outright declaration of the existence of belligerent status, was 
rare.72 What is more usual is for states to act in a way that would either activate or 
recognise the application of the legal regime activated through the recognition. Thus, by 
recognising the applicability of the legal regime, the state recognises the existence of the 
facts to which the legal status of the armed group corresponds.73 The most common 
occurrence, and the closest thing to an explicit recognition of belligerency, is the 
declaration of blockade, by the legitimate government, and a declaration of neutrality,74 
by third states.75 $¶EORFNDGH·PHDQVWKDWWKHSRUWLVVHDOHGDQGXQGHUWKHFRQWURORIWKH
belligerent imposing such blockade so that nothing can go in or out. A declaration of 
blockade can be understood as recognition of the fact that the insurgents are in control 
of the territory in the port that is being blockaded. By recognising their control over the 
territory and conceding the necessity of cutting them off from commercial contact with 
third states, the incumbent government, to the extent that it manages to impose an 
effective blockade, activates the laws of neutrality and recognises the belligerent status of 
the armed group. On the other hand, a declaration of neutrality on the part of a third 
state has the effect of activating the duty of absolute impartiality of that state and, 
therefore, the legal equality of the two parties, ascribing thereby belligerent status to the 
insurgents.76 
                                              
69 See Siotis, 109-110. 
70 See section 2.2.5 below. 
71 The only necessary coherence is in relation to the position third states will adopt towards both belligerents. 
Therefore, while a third state is free to decide whether to activate the legal regime, it has to do so towards both 
actors.  
72 See, to that effect, Lauterpacht, Recognition, 177. He mentions, however, as a rare exception, the recognition of the 
Chilean belligerency by the Government of Bolivia in May 1891. Duculesco, 129, mentions the recognition of 
Cuban belligerency by Peru in 1869. 
73 The contents of the legal regime extended, and therefore the legal status of the group, are discussed below in 
section 2.2.5. 
74 See, for example, Oglesby, 35. See section 2.2.5 below. 
75 See, e.g., 5:LOVRQ ¶5HFRJQLWLRQRI ,QVXUJHQF\DQG%HOOLJHUHQF\· ) 31 American Society of International Law 
Proceedings, 136, 141-2.  
76 See section 2.2.5. 
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It is therefore not surprising that the locus classicus of belligerent recognition consists of a 
combination of these two forms in the case of the American Civil War (1861-5).77 On 
April 30, 1861, President Lincoln declared a blockade of the Southern States, following 
their attack on Fort Sumpter.78 On May 14 of the same year, Great Britain issued a 
declaration of neutrality.79 3UHVLGHQW /LQFROQ·V DFWLRQ ZDV H[SOLFLW HQRXJK WR FRQYLQFH
not only the British, but also the Supreme Court of the United States. In the seminal Prize 
Cases,80 the Supreme Court found a state of war and, therefore, the belligerent status of 
the Southern States. It must be noted, however, that the Supreme Court did not find that 
a state of war existed because RI 3UHVLGHQW /LQFROQ·V GHFODUDWLRQ of blockade. Rather, it 
viewed this declaration as declaratory of the existence of such a state of war.81 
Furthermore, in response to complaints by the US Government that the recognition by 
the British was premature and therefore constituted an intervention in the internal affairs 
RIWKHFRXQWU\WKH%ULWLVK*RYHUQPHQWXVHG3UHVLGHQW/LQFROQ·VGHFODUDWLRQRIEORFNDGH
as proof that the factual characteristics of the conflict where present and Britain was free 
to declare its neutrality.82 
Another interesting example of the interplay between declaration of blockade and 
declaration of neutrality is the case of the Greek revolution, arguably the first case of 
recognition of belligerency on the European continent. The case demonstrates the 
evolution of the attitude of third states with respect to the Greek challenge against the 
Ottoman Empire (1821-30).83 In this case there was initially a proclamation of neutrality 
by the Senate of the Ionian Islands, then a British protectorate. This proclamation, 
                                              
77 See Smith, Great Britain, 302 ff.; Oglesby, 33 ff 4 :ULJKW ¶7KH $PHULFDQ &LYLO :DU· LQ 5 )DON HG The 
International Law of Civil War (Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 30, especially 42 ff. 
78 2QWKH&RQIHGHUDWHVLGH3UHVLGHQW/LQFROQ·VGHFODUDWLRQZDVPDWFKHGE\3UHVLGHQW'DYLV·SURFODPDWLRQLQYLWLQJ
applications for letters of marquee. See Oglesby, 35. 
79 For the advice of the British Foreign Office on the matter see the letter of 6 May 1881, from Lord John Russell to 
Lord Lyons extracted in MacNair, Opinions, 138. 
80 The Prize Cases (1864), 67 US 635.  
81 In an oft quoted passage, at 666, per Justice Grier, echoing in detail the abovementioned criteria for recognition, 
WKH&RXUWVDLG´$FLYLOZDULVQHYHUVROHPQO\GHFODUHGLWEHFRPHVVXFKE\LWVDFFLGHQWV² the number, power, and 
organization of the persons who originate and carry it on. When the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile 
manner a certain portion of territory; have declared their independence; have cast off their allegiance; have 
organized armies; have commenced hostilities against their former sovereign, the world acknowledges them as 
EHOOLJHUHQWVDQGWKHFRQWHVWDZDUµ6HHalso 6PLWK¶6SDQLVK· 
82 6HH-*DUQHU¶4XHVWLRQVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZLQWKH6SDQLVK&LYLO:DU·American Journal of International 
Law 66, 72-3 *DUQHU ¶6SDQLVK·. Similarly, the Law Officers advised that the blockade imposed by the Spanish 
Government after the revolt of San Domingo in 1864 was an assertion of a state of war. See MacNair, Opinions, 140-
1; Smith, Great Britain, 313 ff. 
83 See Smith, Great Britain, 281 ff; Oglesby, 19 ff.; Wehberg, 18; Eustathiadès, 22. 
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however, was issued on 7 June of 1821, within few months of the beginning of the 
UHYROXWLRQ DQG VHHPV WR KDYH EHHQ FRQVLGHUHG ´VRPHZKDW SUHPDWXUHµ84 Later on, 
however, the Greeks declared a blockade on Ottoman ports on the 25th of March of 1822 
thus forcing third states to take a position with respect to the conflict. The basic question 
rested on whether the blockade was effective, justifying states interested in the conflict to 
apply the laws of neutrality. This led, especially in the case of Britain,85 to the gradual 
elaboration of an attitude of impartiality and non-intervention that eventually developed 
into recognition of belligerency through a declaration of neutrality expressed in British 
diplomatic papers.86 
In the cases of the American Civil War and the Greek Revolution the material criteria 
matched the interests of third states in the recognition of belligerency and the 
conferment of status. One aspect of these interests can be the potential statehood of the 
insurgent entity. The status elements of this aspect have been discussed above.87 A 
second, and more direct, interest is the activation of the substantive legal regime, and 
particularly the rules of neutrality. To this, and its effects on the status of the entity, we 
will now turn. 
 
2.2.5. The legal regime activated through recognition of belligerency 
 
Recognition of belligerency led to the activation of the full regime of the jus in bello 
applicable between states. To put it simply, by recognition of belligerency the adversaries 
are put on an equal footing in their relations with each other, as well as those with third 
states.88 This had conceptual as well as practical dimensions. The fundamental change in 
the legal regime covering the relations of the insurgents with the incumbent government 
as well as with third parties is UHIOHFWHGLQWKHIXQFWLRQRIWKHFRQFHSWRI¶ZDU·DVDOHJDO
                                              
84 See Smith, Great Britain, 285. 
85 The belligerency of the Greek insurgents was also recognised by France and Russia. See Siotis, 75. Austria-
+XQJDU\FRQVLGHUHGWKH*UHHNVDVUHEHOVDQG´QRWHQWLWOHGWRWKHVDPHULJKWVRIZDUDVOHJLWLPDWHEHOOLJHUHQWVµ6HH
Smith, Great Britain, 297, quoting &DQQLQJ·VGLVSDWFKRIWKHst of December 1824. 
86 See Lauterpacht, Recognition, 178-9; Smith, Great Britain, 297; Wehberg, 20; Siotis, 74, for the language used and the 
precise dates.  
87 As seen in section 2.2.2. 
88 See, for a clear exposition of the shift, Rougier, 21-8. 
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WHUP ¶7KH ODZ RI ZDU· RU ¶VWDWH RI ZDU· ZDV D FRPSUHKHQVLYH UHJLPH RI UXOHV FOHDUO\
VHSDUDWHGIURP¶WKHODZRISHDFH·89 ,QGHHGIRU*URWLXVZDU¶EHOOXP·PHDQW´QRQDFWLR
VHG VWDWXVµ90 Moreover, the ability to wage war was viewed as an inherent feature of 
sovereignty. In a decentralized world, where the use of force was not prohibited by any 
international norm with constitutional aspirations, waging war was both a prerogative of 
states as well as a method to settle disputes between the only sovereign actors.91 
Accordingly, only subjects of international law had the legal capacity to wage war.92 
Recognising such a capacity in a non-state actor was to give it, albeit provisionally and for 
the specific purpose of waging war,93 the legal status of a state. 94 
On the other hand, the change in legal status has important consequences for the legal 
relations of the actors. By far the most important and extensive changes come through 
the application of the legal regime of neutrality.95 The laws of neutrality comprise an 
extensive and detailed array of rights and duties that, for the purposes of presentation, 
can be simplistically divided into two groups: on the one hand there is a duty of absolute 
impartiality on behalf of third parties; on the other hand both parties acquire certain legal 
rights in the exercise of their war effort.96 
Neutrality as absolute impartiality means that third states have to refrain from any act or 
policy that could benefit either party to the conflict. Trade in materials that could benefit 
the military capacities, referred to as contraband, is prohibited.97 In order to enforce this 
prohibition belligerents are given the right to intercept neutral vessels on the high seas, 
                                              
89 See Schindler, 16. This was reflected in the separation of the two legal regimes in classical international law 
treatises. See Neff, War, 177 ff. 
90 ´Not a series of actions but a state RIDIIDLUVµ (My translation). Quoted in Lord MacNair and A. Watts, The Legal 
Effects of War 4th ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1966), 3 (MacNair/Watts). 
91 L. Oppenheim, International Law (2nd HG/RQJPDQV  FRXOGQ·WEHFOHDUHU ´7REHFRQVLGHUHGZDU WKH
contention must be going on between States.µ(Oppenheim) 
92 Indeed, the identification of the actor (states), with the situation (war) is obvious in many of the definitions of war 
attempted. See, apart from Oppenheim, C. Hyde, International Law vol. III (2nd ed. Little, Brown & Co., 1945), 1686 : 
´DFRQGLWLRQRIDUPHGKRVWLOLWLHVEHWZHHQ6WDWHVµ. 
93 See Siotis 109  & =RUJELEH ¶'H OD 7KpRULH &ODVVLTXH GH OD 5HFRQQDLVVDQFH GH %HOOLJpUDQFH j O·$UWLFOH  GHV
&RQYHQWLRQVGH*HQqYH·Droit Humanitaire et Conflits Armés 83, 86-7 who views the international personality 
FRQIHUUHGWKURXJKUHFRJQLWLRQRIEHOOLJHUHQF\DVD¶IXQFWLRQDO·SHUVRQDOLW\. 
94 See Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, 248. 
95 For a thorough investigation see S. Neff, The Rights and Duties of Neutrals (Manchester University Press, 2000). 
(Neff, Neutrals) See also 5%LQGVFKHGOHU¶1HXWUDOLW\&RQFHSWDQG*HQHUDO5XOHV·LQ5%HUQKDUGWHGEncyclopedia 
of Public International Law vol. 3 (Elsevier, 1997), 549.   
96 See, for example, Oppenheim, 347 ff. 
97 A codification of the law on contraband occurred with the Declaration of London of 26 February 1909. See Neff, 
Neutrals, 136-142; Oppenheim, 480. 
51 
 
check them for contraband and seize the ship as well as the cargo if contraband is found. 
These can then be confiscated as legitimate prize. An elaborate system of prize courts 
developed, being domestic courts of the belligerent entity applying rules of international 
law in order to determine whether the ship and cargo were lawfully seized and should be 
confiscated.98 The belligerents are under the obligation to recognise the decrees of the 
prize courts of their adversary.99 The non-state armed group acquires belligerent rights100 
and the right to enforce them.  
Furthermore, belligerents can impose, and third states are obliged to respect, a blockade 
on the port controlled by another belligerent. The blockade must be effective to qualify. 
This rule101 reflects the continuous dependence of belligerent rights on the effectiveness 
of the non-state armed group. To the extent that the belligerent cannot impose and 
maintain an effective blockade third parties do not have an obligation to respect it. As 
will be seen, the central and continuous role of effectiveness in relation to blockades is 
crucial for the existence of a state of belligerency. 
The above rules demonstrate that neutrality imposes an obligation of impartiality that is 
qualitatively different to a policy of non-intervention. Impartiality in neutrality requires 
more than abstaining from intervention. It consists of specific positive obligations owed, 
to the same extent, to both parties to the conflict. This is not the case when a policy of 
non-intervention is followed, absent recognition of belligerency. Furthermore, even if 
third states decide not to stay impartial, to the extent that one party to the conflict is still 
the de jure government and the other consists of the non-state armed group, third states 
can assist the government in its effort while they cannot assist the armed group. 
Assistance to the government would be considered as a legitimate policy on the part of 
third states.102 Assistance to the group, on the other hand, would qualify as intervention 
in the internal affairs of the state and would be rightly viewed by the territorial 
                                              
98 Oppenheim, 238. 
99 See MacNair, Opinions, 139, for the reaction of the British government to the decision of the American 
government to disregard a Confederate Prize Court decree.  
100 6HH61HII ¶7KH3UHURJDWLYHVRI9LROHQFH - In Search of the Conceptual Foundations of Belligerents' Rights' 
(1997) 38 German Yearbook of International Law 41. 
101 The rule was codified at the Declaration of London (1909). See Neff, Neutrals, 138-9. 
102 A right but not a duty. 6HH0DF1DLU¶6SDLQ·-3. 
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government as an act of aggression.103 The qualitative difference between neutrality and 
non-intervention directly relates to questions of status. The activation of the specific set 
of belligerent rights and the strict regulation of the net of bilateral relations between the 
belligerents and third states equates the status of the non-state armed group with that of 
the state, in the context of the conflict. 
The recognition of status, however, also has some consequences of humanitarian 
importance, this time with respect to the relations between the belligerents. Another 
body of law activated through recognition of belligerency are the rules governing the 
treatment of prisoners of war (POWs).104 Captured combatants are to be considered and 
treated as POWs. Again, the activation of these rules has practical as well as conceptual 
consequences. Initially, and importantly, the treatment of the captured members of the 
belligerent forces has to adhere to certain humanitarian standards. It is important to point 
out, however, that detailed rules mostly developed towards the end of the 19th century, 
initially through national legislation and eventually in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
1907.105  
Moreover, whatever humanitarian protection is extended through these rules is directly 
linked to the status of the entity. The status of POWs is qualitatively different to that of 
unrecognised rebels to the extent that they are not considered criminals. This relates to 
the idea that the status of the non-state group is directly related to the status of the 
government actor it opposes. The applicability of domestic criminal law is an affirmation 
of the superiority of the government actor, while the applicability of the international legal 
norms relating to POW status is an affirmation that the conflict cannot be seen as a 
purely internal affair. This is further reflected in that their detention can only last for the 
duration of the hostilities after the end of which they have to be released. Furthermore, 
such detention is not punitive in character but is only meant to preclude them from 
returning to belligerent action. Again, it should be noted that this status is provisional, as 
                                              
103 G. Scelle, ¶/D*XHUUH&LYLOH(VSDJQROHHWOH'URLWGHV*HQV·Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 
197, 227 (Scelle). See also Falk, 203. 
104 A. Rosas, The Legal Regime of Prisoners of War (Soumalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1976), 59 ff 5RVDV61HII¶3ULVRQHUV
RI :DU LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ 7KH 1LQHWHHQWK &HQWXU\· LQ 6 6FKHLSHUV HG Prisoners in War (Oxford University 
Press, 2010).  
105 See Rosas, 69 ff. 
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is the entire status of belligerency. If one side prevails there is nothing to preclude it from 
trying the captured forces for treason.106  
 
2.2.6. Belligerency: An overview 
 
The doctrine of recognition of belligerency is considered to be one of the most important 
legal innovations of the 19th century.107 Through the analysis above, the predominant 
characteristics of the doctrine have been shown to relate to how third states treat a 
conflict between a government and a non-state armed group,108 and to how the activation 
of the legal regime relates to the ascription of status, both legal and political, to the non-
state actors.  
In terms of legal criteria, the actors have to bring about a situation of the magnitude of 
war between states, while possessing not only the military but also the political level of 
organisation that will allow them to stand as states in the international system. In terms of 
the process of application, the practice is fundamentally decentralised and optional, and it 
leads to a net of bilateral relations. In terms of legal consequences, the legal regime 
activated is the full regime applicable to wars between states, with neutrality at its centre 
and, again, the temporary ascription of legal status to the armed group as its result. 
Recognition of belligerency, through its criteria, process of application, and 
consequences, is linked directly to the ascription of state-like legal status. Moreover, the 
role of the political organisation and the prospective political viability of the entity, as a 
criterion for recognition, underlines the mutual relation between legal and political status. 
Ultimately, being recognised as a belligerent meant that the entity was not only a party to 
the conflict, but a subject of international law, in a legal system where only states where 
considered as such. Considerations of the humanitarian protection of individuals were 
largely absent from this rationale. 
                                              
106 See Oppenheim, 69-70. 
107 Neff, War, 258. 
108 See, however, for a rare example, the 2SLQLRQ RI WKH 4XHHQ·V $GYRFDWH WR (DUO *UDQYLOOH RI  6HSWHPEHU  
recognising the belligerency of two rival non-state armed groups, the African Chiefs at Bonny River and the Ja Ja 
group, in Lauterpacht, Recognition, 205. 
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By the time of the Spanish Civil War (1936-9), the practice of recognition of belligerency 
was already falling into disuse. Ever since its clearest exposition, in the American Civil 
War, recognition was not often granted, although it was discussed in the works of 
doctrine and the deliberations of governments. The dramatic shift in the legal status of 
the armed group, entailing a plethora of symbolic and practical consequences, made 
states unwilling to use it. Furthermore, the decentralized, piecemeal and, ultimately, 
arbitrary process of granting recognition allowed unwilling states to ignore the factual 
characteristics of conflicts meriting recognition. Recognition was often seen as 
impracticable and undesirable. This phenomenon found its peak in the case of the 
Spanish Civil War, discussed below.109 However, it had already led to the development of 
a slightly different concept, doctrinally in the shadow of recognition of belligerency, but 
in practice more flexible and adaptable. 
 
2.3. Recognition of Insurgency 
 
2.3.1. Introduction 
 
The concept of recognition of insurgency developed subsequent to and in close practical 
and conceptual relation with that of recognition of belligerency.110 The most prominent 
cases, which led to the development of the concept, arose in relation to the process of 
decolonisation in South America during the last decades of the 19th century, particularly 
the revolutions in Cuba (1868-1898) and Chile (1891).  
A variety of issues led to this development. As mentioned, the use of the doctrine of 
recognition of belligerency had led to difficulties. The existence of a rigid set of criteria 
often did not fit well with the unreliable process of the ascription of the status through 
recognition. In addition, the activation of the full legal regime applicable to wars between 
states meant that the consequences of applying the criteria were rather sweeping. 
                                              
109 See section 2.4. 
110 6HH(&DVWUpQ¶5HFRJQLWLRQRI,QVXUJHQF\·, (1965) 4 Indian Journal of International Law&DVWUpQ¶,QVXUJHQF\· 
According to Castrén, 42 fn WKH*UHHNUHYROXWLRQ´ZDVWKHILUVWLQVtance of a distinction between recognition of 
EHOOLJHUHQF\DQGUHFRJQLWLRQRILQVXUJHQF\µ 
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Furthermore, to the extent that recognition of belligerency was a matter of bilateral 
relations there was incongruence between the activation of a full legal regime reflecting 
an objective status on a bilateral basis and the non-existence of that status as a matter of 
general international law, since the recognition by some states did not bind others.  
According to the doctrine of recognition of belligerency, the insurgent entity was either 
something of a proto-state or an unlawful entity of piratical character in the maritime 
context. There was no middle ground. The binary nature of the concept was put starkly 
E\ :KHDWRQ ´,I LW LV D ZDU WKH LQVXUJHQW FUXLVHUV DUH WR EH WUHDWHG>«@DV ODZIXO
EHOOLJHUHQWV,I LW LVQRWDZDUWKRVHFUXLVHUVDUHSLUDWHVDQGPD\EHWUHDWHGDVVXFKµ111 
There was space for a middle ground, where the interests of third states could be 
protected without the immediate granting of the status of belligerent to the insurgents.112 
Moreover, third states or the parent government could have interests affected by the 
fighting that remained within the territory of the parent state and did not spill out into 
the sea. A way of addressing these issues without bringing into play the relatively 
expansive effects of the legal regime triggered by the recognition of belligerency was 
sought.   
The most common phrase to describe the concept of recognition of insurgency, 
distinguishing it from the related concept of recognition of belligerency, is that the 
former is an ad hoc recognition of certain rights and duties, which the recognising state 
considers necessary under the circumstances, rather than the activation of a coherent 
legal regime. Accordingly, recognition of insurgency has been described as a ´catch-all 
phraseµ113 encompassing a concatenation of such rights and duties. The rights and duties 
conferred in any particular case must be directly warranted by the situation and are 
limited with respect to their temporal scope. Therefore, specific rights and duties are 
granted for such a period in time, as can only be justified by the specific factual situation. 
Accordingly, the fundamental feature of insurgency, when opposed to belligerency, is that 
                                              
111 Wheaton, 30-1, fn 15. 
112 &DVWUpQ¶,QVXUJHQF\· 
113 Falk, 199. 
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it is an aggregate of specific rights and duties expressly conferred, rather than an activated 
legal regime.114 
 
2.3.2. Criteria 
 
The criteria for recognition of insurgency are, factually speaking, similar but of a lesser 
degree to those of recognition of belligerency.115 The factual intensity of the armed 
conflict is considered to be something between mere disturbances and an actual civil 
war.116 The same applies to the organisation of the insurgents.117 Indeed, the two criteria 
seem usually to be correlative.  
The exact level of the hostilities and the organisation of the actor that would warrant 
recognition of insurgency but not of belligerency were never expressed clearly. In effect, 
the distinction is left to the recognising actor. This is because a wide spectrum of factual 
situations lies between the two poles of internal riots and civil war and the exact factual 
characteristics of the necessary magnitude were not clarified.  
A further element adding to the lack of clarity in the criteria for recognition of insurgency 
is that the interests of the actor in activating the regime, rather than the exact facts of the 
conflict, may account for the recognition of insurgency. However, some characteristics 
seem to divide insurgency from belligerency. For instance, the existence of a maritime 
element (or adjacent territory) often precipitated recognition of belligerency.118 While the 
proposition that naval forces and hostilities constitute the step from insurgency to 
belligerency cannot be posited as a rule, the maritime element often played a role in 
necessitating the activation of the law of neutrality and therefore the recognition of 
belligerency.119 
                                              
114 See Lauterpacht, Recognition, 270. 
115 6HH&DVWUpQ¶,QVXUJHQF\· 
116 See also Chen, 407.   
117 TKLVDFFRUGLQJWR&DVWUpQ¶,QVXUJHQF\·PD\E\´GHIHFWLYHµZKHQFRPSDUHGWRWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQQHFHVVDU\
for belligerency.  
118 See above section 2.2.2, especially fn 43 and text. 
119 One step before is the issue of blockades and quasi-blockades, which will be discussed below. 
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Accordingly, some authors viewed insurgency as belligerency without the recognition.120 
This formulation can only be sustained when the optional character of recognition of 
belligerency is brought to mind. Insurgency is then viewed as a factual situation that was 
seen by the recognising actors, for reasons that may have or may not have had to do with 
law, as not reaching the levels of belligerency. The logic of defining insurgency not as 
what it is but as what it is not is manifested in the language used by US President Grant 
in his 1875 message to US Congress, with respect to the Cuban War of Independence. 
He did not  
 
find in the insurrection the existence of such a substantial political Organization, 
real palpable, and manifest to the world, having the forms and capable of the 
ordinary functions of governmeQWWRZDUGLWVRZQSHRSOHDQGWRRWKHU6WDWHV«RU
to take the contest out of the category of a mere rebellious insurrection, or 
occasional skirmishes, and place it on the terrible footing of war, to which a 
recognition of belligerency would aim to elevate it.121   
 
In this statement by President Grant the prospective element in the legal qualification of 
facts is understated, but the predominance of the element of political organisation is again 
present. 
The level of hostilities and the degree of organisation of the actor is likely to correspond 
to a loss of control by the de jure government over its territory.122 This means, in effect, 
that the more the government loses control over the administration of the territory, the 
more the insurgents will begin to take control of areas, creating the factual characteristics 
that may lead third states to recognise them. Accordingly, the control of a portion of the 
territory of the state is a separate criterion for the recognition of insurgency, as in the case 
of belligerency. Indeed, the control of territory is a necessary criterion in both 
belligerency and insurgency as it represents the basic minimum for the actor to have a 
state-like appearance and claim state-like status in the jus in bello and beyond.  
                                              
120 See Chen, 398-9, referring to authors such as Wilson and Hyde.  
121 See Moore, Digest, 196-7. See also Lauterpacht, Recognition, 271. 
122 See, with respect to recognition of belligerency, Scelle, 273, who sees the obligation of the state to have control 
and provide security in its territory as the flip side of its right to be recognised as the legitimate government in its 
external relations.  
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From the point of view of third states, the administration of territory means that they 
may have to deal with the insurgents in order to protect their interests in that territory. 
These might be financial and trade interests or the well-being of their nationals. In that 
sense, territory can play the role that naval conflict does in cases of belligerency and 
provide the link between the factual criteria of the magnitude of the conflict and the need 
for third states to acknowledge the situation, to the extent that their interests in that 
territory are threatened. The extent to which the political interests of third states are to be 
considered a formal criterion for the recognition of insurgency, follows the relevant 
debate123 with respect to recognition of belligerency.124 The crucial difference, however, 
seems to be between interests of third parties threatened on the high seas, in the case of 
belligerency, and in the territory controlled by insurgents, in the case of insurgency. As a 
consequence of the difference in interests a different set of rules will have to be activated, 
one not necessarily containing the law of neutrality. 
 
2.3.3. Process of recognition 
 
Recognition of insurgency can be granted either by the incumbent government or, more 
usually, by third parties.125 It is granted to the extent that third parties find it necessary to 
deal with the insurgents and if one of the specific criteria or the necessary degree for the 
recognition of belligerency is not met. The considerations leading to the granting of 
recognition and the consequences that flow from it differ, however, from case to case. 
This flows from the ad hoc nature of such recognition. With respect to the considerations 
and rationales behind the decision to grant recognition, the incumbent government might 
opt for recognising the insurgency either for humanitarian reasons or for reasons related 
to international legal responsibility.  
Accordingly, it has been argued that the recognition of the insurgents, and the application 
of some degree of international law to them, might be used for the application of 
                                              
123 See above section 2.2.3. 
124 )RUDQDXWKRUZKR WKLQNV LW LVD IRUPDOFULWHULRQVHH5:LOVRQ ¶,QVXUJHQF\DQG,QWHUQDWLRQDO0DULWLPH/DZ·
(1907) 1 American Journal of International Law, 46, 51.  
125 )RUWKHSULPDU\UROHRIWKLUGVWDWHVVHHDOVR&DVWUpQ¶,QVXUJHQF\· 
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minimum humanitarian standards leading to a tempering of the ferocity of the 
hostilities.126 Indeed, recognition of insurgency, importantly, allows the extension of 
certain humanitarian protections without the conferral of the state-like status associated 
with belligerency.127 This constitutes the first conceptual de-coupling of the applicability 
of rules of humanitarian protection from the full ascription of state-like legal status in the 
jus in bello. As will be seen below, however, the dominance of the paradigm of belligerency 
and the haphazard application of insurgency limit severely both the conceptual and 
practical effects of the de-coupling.  
Apart from possible humanitarian considerations, to the extent that the legitimate 
government acknowledges the fact that it has lost control over the acts that are 
committed in or from this part of its territory, and that the said government is making 
efforts for the suppression of this insurgency, it eschews international responsibility for 
the acts of the insurgents in and from that territory.128 This can be an important factor 
for both the legitimate government and third states to reach the decision to grant such 
recognition. 
As far as third states are concerned, the granting of recognition will usually be related to 
their need to enter into relations with the insurgents, and in order to protect their 
interests, for example in the area of trade. Additionally, a formal declaration to that effect 
could provide guidance to their citizens, courts and administrative officials with respect 
to the dangers or consequences arising out of the insurgency.129  
The dividing line between recognition of insurgency and belligerency is blurred. For 
instance, while it was stated above that a signifier of belligerency was often the existence 
of a maritime element in hostilities, such a factor has led third states to recognise 
insurgency as well. Most of the cases relevant to recognition of insurgency, as is the case 
with recognition of belligerency, pertain to maritime warfare and the capture and 
movement of insurgent vessels.130 This poses a practical question: whether insurgent 
vessels are to be dealt with as piratical or whether they should be granted belligerent 
                                              
126 See ibid., 448; Falk, 201. 
127 The Institut de Droit International makes clear, in article 4(2) of its codification that the application of certain 
humanitarian rules does not constitute recognition of belligerency. See IDI 1900. 
128 Castrén, 42; Chen, 407. 
129 6HH&DVWUpQ¶,QVXUJHQF\· 
130 See, for examples, Lauterpacht, Recognition, 298 ff. 
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rights pertaining to maritime warfare. Although earlier practice targeted insurgent vessels 
as piratical, this was gradually considered to be unreasonable, the distinguishing factor 
being the political motives of the insurgent vessels rather than what one authority calls 
animus furandi (the intention to steal), referring to the mental element corresponding to 
the perpetration of acts of piracy.131   
An important function of the concept of insurgency is to demarcate the middle ground 
between internationally criminal acts of piracy and belligerent acts of war and, therefore, 
between the legal statuses of outlaw and belligerent. An example of where such a middle 
ground would be useful to states is where an armed conflict has reached a certain level of 
intensity and the actors have reached a certain level of organisation where it would not be 
appropriate to label the insurgent actor as a pirate but where other states do not want to 
recognise the belligerency of the non-state party.  
This dilemma was manifest, for example, in the case of the Greek revolution. A few 
months into the revolution, in October 1821, before the creation of the provisional 
government of 1822 and the declaration of blockade in 1823, the British Foreign Office 
was grappling with the dilemma arising from the inadequacy of the categories of 
EHOOLJHUHQF\ DQG SLUDF\ ´LW ZRXOG QRW EH SURSHU WR FRQVLGHU 3HUVRQV DV Pirates >«@
provided their intentions were in fact satisfactorily distinguished from the mere predatory 
FKDUDFWHU RI 3LUDF\ DV FRQVLGHUHG LQ /DZµ132 On the other hand, declaration of 
blockades and the corollary acknowledgement of the effective nature of such blockades 
might signify the acknowledgment of belligerent status and therefore recognition of 
belligerency.  
A decision to recognise the existence, through the acceptance of a limited and piecemeal 
conferral of rights and duties, of the insurgent actors under international law signifies a 
first and tentative undermining of the national legal order, as embodied in the de jure 
JRYHUQPHQW 7KH LQVXUJHQWV FHDVH WR EH ¶RXWODZV· DQG DOWKRugh still subject to the 
internal laws regarding their rebellion, assume a limited and temporary degree of 
                                              
131 &DVWUpQ¶,QVXUJHQF\·%XWVHH/DXWHUSDFKWRecognition, 305 ff, arguing that the animus furandi is not an essential 
element of piracy.  See Chen, 404 writing of a presumption of non-piratical character, which can be rebuffed if the 
vesseOV´FRPPLWGHSUHGDWLRQXSRQVKLSVRUSURSHUW\RIIRUHLJQVWDWHVµ 
132See Smith, Great Britain, 284 ² opinion of Sir Christopher Robinson, the Foreign Office Legal Advisor. This 
opinion is also referred to by Wehberg, 21. 
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personality under international law.133 Accordingly, the emphasis in the construction and 
the exercise of the concept is placed on the provisional and piecemeal character of the 
rights conferred.  
Moreover, this legal construct is important as it conceives of an actor that does not 
conform to a strict subject/object dualism. This allows the demarcation of a legal status 
stricto sensu, related specifically to the law of armed conflict, from the full legal status of a 
subject of international law. While belligerency was also concerned directly with the jus in 
bello, the extension of the full legal regime applicable to wars between states and the direct 
shift from non-entity to full subject meant that the legal status conferred could only be 
that of a subject of general public international law. While recognition of insurgency 
constitutes a first breach of that dualism it was too haphazard a practice to threaten the 
predominance of the belligerency paradigm. 
 
2.3.4. Consequences: legal rules but not a legal regime 
 
Apart from the non-piratical character of the insurgent vessels, the consequences of the 
recognition of insurgency vary on a case by case basis and depend on whether the 
recognition is granted by the government or by a third state.134  
To the extent that the recognition is granted by the government, it has been argued that 
the criminal laws of the state will no longer be applied to the insurgents. If captured, they 
can be treated as POWs, rather than subjected to the criminal laws of treason.135 This 
might be viewed rather as an application of minimum humanitarian standards than an 
activation of the legal regime covering POWs, because of the ad hoc nature of the 
application of the rules. In any case, however, should the incumbent government prevail 
in the conflict, there is nothing to stop it from applying the laws of treason and rebellion, 
in order to punish the insurgents, as is also the case with belligerency.136 
                                              
133 6HH&DVWUpQ¶,QVXUJHQF\·. 
134 See ibid. 
135 See ibid., 449; Padelford, Spanish, 2. . 
136 6HH&DVWUpQ¶,QVXUJHQF\·PHQWLRQLQJWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKH¶RXWFRPHRIWKHLQVXUUHFWLRQ· 
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Normally, the rights conferred will only be effective on the territory of the state137 and 
not on the high seas.138 The link between the exercise by the insurgents of rights in the 
territory and on the high seas can be seen in the practice relating to blockades. In the case 
of the Brazilian revolution of 1893, Great Britain and the United States initially denied 
the insurgents the right to blockade Rio de Janeiro.139 Eventually, however, their earlier 
decision was tempered to the extent that the blockade could EH SURYHG HIIHFWLYH ´LQ
FRQQHFWLRQZLWKFRPPHUFLDOZDUIDUHµ140 The same approach was taken in the case of the 
Bolivian revolution of 1891.141 7KH PLGGOH SRVLWLRQ ZRXOG EH WKDW ´ULJKWV PD\ EH
exercised in the territorial waters of the state in insurrection in order to prevent carriage 
WRWKHHQHP\RIJRRGVGHVWLQHGWRVHUYHZDUOLNHSXUSRVHµ142  
Indeed, the case of blockade seems to connect recognition of insurgency and recognition 
of belligerency. This is because it is the link between the territorial occupation of the 
port, a material factor for, at least, insurgency, and the effects of this occupation on 
commerce on the high seas, through the control of shipping in and around the port. The 
effectiveness of the blockade can affect neutral commerce, leading third states to grant 
recognition. If they choose not to, however, they can, as a matter of practice, respect the 
control of insurgents in their territorial waters and allow them to intercept shipping.143 
This is the practice named quasi-blockade, and illustrates the ad hoc nature of recognition 
of insurgency and how the latter can be granted in situations where a good case for 
recognition of belligerency could also be made.  
In this context, the role of the concept of territorial sovereignty in the relation to 
insurgency and belligerency should be discussed.144 Territorial sovereignty, or the loss 
thereof, might be said to be reflected in the approach of international law in relation to 
the recognition of insurgency. The first bundle of rights accorded to insurgents will 
usually be in relation to individuals and assets present in the territory under their control. 
                                              
137 See Chen, 405. 
138 See Padelford, Spanish&DVWUpQ¶,QVXUJHQF\· 
139 See for the relevant practice Moore, Digest, 203 ff. 
140 &DVWUpQ ¶,QVXUJHQF\· - 3 -HVVXS ¶7KH 6SDQLVK 5HEHOOLRQ DQG ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ· -1937) 15 Foreign 
Affairs 260, 271 (Jessup). 
141 See Moore, Digest, 203. See also Lauterpacht, Recognition, 274-&DVWUpQ¶,QVXUJHQF\·4-445. 
142 See ibid., 452. 
143 For the elaboration of the concept of quasi-blockade DQGWKH¶IDFWXDO·UDWKHUWKDQ¶OHJDO·FKDUDFWHURIWKHSUDFWLFH
VHH0DF1DLU¶6SDLQ·-8.  
144 See also Chen, 406. 
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Moreover, the conferment of such rights might be in the interests of the government. To 
the extent that the insurgents exercise control over part of the territory the government is 
released from international responsibility for acts of insurgents in that territory. Thus, the 
exclusivity of the link of territorial sovereignty to the lawful government is suspended. 
7KLV VXVSHQVLRQ UHIOHFWV WKH JRYHUQPHQW·V ORVs of control over territory. To the extent 
that international legitimacy of the government is the flip side of its obligation to exercise 
control internally,145 UHFRJQLWLRQ RI LQVXUJHQF\ RQ WKH JURXQGV RI LQVXUJHQWV· internal 
control begins a piecemeal suspension of responsibilities and rights of the government 
that increases the non-VWDWHJURXS·Vinternational status. 
Furthermore, third states can enter into relations with the insurgents, to the extent that 
this is necessary for their interests.146 Such was the case, for example, with respect to the 
Bolivian insurrection of 1899, where the US entered into negotiations with the insurgents 
in order to safeguard American nationals.147  
The ad hoc and piecemeal nature of the activation of legal rules is also reflected in whether 
the recognition of the specific rights and duties binds third states. Castrén argues that 
recognition of insurgency, to the extent that it does not create a status but only confers 
certain rights envers the recognising actor does not bind others. That is, recognition by the 
government would not necessarily bind third states to respect the rights conferred on the 
insurgents by the government,148 although it can mean that the insurgents should not be 
treated as pirates. This is, however, a point of policy rather than a legal rule. Third states 
retain the right to make that decision for themselves.149 Nor does recognition of the 
insurgents by third states bind the government to confer the corresponding rights in its 
territory.150  
 
Finally, the nature of recognition of insurgency as an ad hoc practice is reflected in the 
modes of granting recognition. The character of the relations between the recognising 
                                              
145 Cf. Scelle, 273. 
146 Lauterpacht, Recognition, 270; Castrén, ¶,QVXUJHQF\·&KHQFRQVLGHUVVXFKLQWHUFRXUVH´LQHYLWDEOHµ 
147 See Lauterpacht, Recognition, 275-6; &DVWUpQ¶,QVXUJHQF\· 
148 See ibid., 450. 
149 This was also the case, it is reminded, with respect to recognition of belligerency. See section 2.2.4. There, 
however, there was an incongruity between the activation of a cohesive legal regime and status, and the validity of 
this regime only among the states that have exercised their right to grant recognition. 
150 See ibid., 453. 
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states and the insurgents militates against the use of formalized modes of recognition, 
even more so than with recognition of belligerency. Lauterpacht argues that, to the extent 
that the rights need to be expressly set out, there can be no implied activation of a legal 
regime.151 However, since the conferral of rights can be ad hoc and piecemeal, the 
recognition of insurgency may amount to little more than the aggregate of such rights 
FRQIHUUHG ZLWKRXW LW EHLQJ QHFHVVDU\ WR EH H[SUHVVO\ ODEHOOHG ¶UHFRJQLWLRQ RI
LQVXUJHQF\·152 As far as the government is concerned recognition could be granted 
expressly, by stating the exact rights conferred, or tacitly, through the conferral of such 
rights.153 For example, in the practice of the United States, the mode has been mainly 
through municipal law enactments.154  
 
Ultimately, the ad hoc nature of the rights and duties extended, as well as the 
fundamentally optional nature of the practice, mean that recognition of insurgency 
cannot be described as a cohesive concept or as a practice creating a particular legal 
UHJLPH ´,W LV WKXV LPSRVVLEOH WR GHILQH LQ DGYDQFH WKH OHJDO Vituation consequent on 
UHFRJQLWLRQRILQVXUJHQF\«>(@DFKFDVHLVWREHMXGJHGVHSDUDWHO\RQLWVPHULWVµ155 Nor is 
there a necessary connection between the facts of the conflict and the set of rules 
extended, because of the role that political calculations and the decentralised and optional 
process of application play.156 In that sense, however, the flexible and ad hoc practice of 
recognition of insurgency can be said to fit better within the decentralised pre-1949 
international system, than the unwieldy regime of belligerency. 
 
2.3.5. Insurgency: An overview 
 
Recognition of insurgency developed to balance some of the more problematic aspects of 
the practice of belligerency. These aspects related to the absolute dualisms of the 
                                              
151 Lauterpacht, Recognition, 276.  
152 7KXV&DVWUpQ¶,QVXUJHQF\·.  
153 Ibid. 
154 See ibid.DGGLQJWKDWWKLVSUDFWLFH´KDVPDGHWKH$PHULFDQSROLF\RIUHFRJQLWLRQRQHRIJUHDWHODVWLFLW\EXW
FRQFRPLWDQWO\VRPHZKDWLQFRQVLVWHQWµ 
155 See ibid, 446. 
156 See Falk, 202. 
65 
 
positivist era as expressed in the law of war. According to the dualism between subjects 
and objects, when a group used force it would be viewed either as a state or as a 
criminal/pirate group. To the extent that the ascription of status was so central in the 
doctrine and so important as a result, this weighed heavily on the practice of belligerency.  
The answer then was to create an ad hoc practice that closely followed the blueprint of 
EHOOLJHUHQF\EXWDOORZHGPRUHIOH[LELOLW\DQGOHVVILQDOLW\LQWKHDFWRUV·SRVLWLRQV,QWHUPV
of criteria, insurgency mirrored but diluted those of belligerency. The magnitude of the 
conflict was again to be similar to that of war between states. The control of territory was 
seen as a minimum criterion, while magnitude was predominantly viewed through the 
interests of third states, as was the case in belligerency. One possible difference with 
belligerency was a less close link with maritime war, to the extent that third states opted 
for recognition of insurgency rather than belligerency often when they did not want to 
activate the regime of neutrality. More flexible practices, such as the respect of effective 
blockades and quasi-blockades were used instead. The haphazard nature of state practice, 
however, does not allow the stipulation of a general rule. 
In terms of the process of application, the situation was, again, very similar to that of 
belligerency. The less dramatic consequences allowed more flexibility in the practice, but 
this also meant that there was even less coherence in the legal rules. Arguably, the 
practice was even more ad hoc and haphazard, than in the case of belligerency. This was 
the case with respect to which state would recognise and when it would do so. It was also 
the case with respect to what rules were extended.  
Indeed, the biggest difference between insurgency and belligerency is to be found in 
terms of the legal rules activated. Recognition of insurgency led to an ad hoc 
concatenation of rules, rather to a regime. Importantly, it did not include the activation of 
the laws of neutrality. Again, the practice does not allow the identification of a standard 
set of rules. It can support the conclusion, however, that the rules extended led to a 
degree of international legal personality and status between the absolutes of piratical and 
state-like status.  
To the extent that recognition of insurgency led to a limited legal status commensurate to 
the specific rules extended, rather than the full status of a state in the jus in bello, it is an 
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important episode in legal regulation. It showed that the absolute subject/object dualism 
was not workable in international practice and that international law could conceive of 
and regulate an entity without fully equating it with a state. The concept was, however -- 
in terms of criteria, process of application, and legal consequences -- very much in the 
shadow of the paradigm of belligerency, and functioned as an ad hoc substitute for it. In 
addition, the haphazard practice of its application meant that it never developed into a 
separate legal doctrine.  
Finally, as has been shown, the practice of recognition of insurgency developed primarily 
to allow third states more flexibility in determining their relations with the armed group. 
It was therefore more a question of a more flexible accommodation of the process of 
ascription of status, than the development of a humanitarian-protection rationale, even 
though the practice occasionally allowed the extension of some humanitarian rules.  
 
2.4. Conclusion: Moving forward 
 
Recognition of belligerency constitutes the first legal doctrine concerned with the 
regulation of conflicts involving non-state armed groups. It reflects the centrality of the 
concept of the state, as the only and absolute sovereign, in that it allows the regulation of 
non-state armed groups to the extent that they can be put on a par with states in the 
context and for the duration of the conflict. While it constitutes an important legal 
innovation, it carries the shortcomings of a practice of decentralised and optional 
ascription of status, which is both lacking in legal certainty and consistency and, 
importantly, excludes the protection of individual human beings from its rationale.  
One factor that contributed to the move towards a system of humanitarian protection 
was the decline of the doctrines of belligerency and insurgency. The combination 
between the dramatic consequences of the recognition of belligerency and the 
decentralised and optional process of its application contributed to the gradual disuse of 
the concept. In the meantime, while the parallel development of the practice of 
recognition of insurgency had allowed some flexibility in the activation of specific legal 
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rules, the even more haphazard nature of that practice did not allow it to crystallise in a 
legal system.  
The gradual decline of both doctrines can be seen in the absence of practice at the 
beginning of the 20th century and, particularly, in the absence of recognition of 
belligerency in the case of the Spanish Civil War (1936-9). The latter was a case where the 
criteria for belligerency were, without doubt, satisfied.157 The insurgents controlled a 
significant portion of the territory, including ports. They commanded a large part of 
6SDLQ·V DUP\ DQG QDY\ 7KH\ KDG D KLJK OHYHO RI ERWK PLOLWDU\ DQG SROLWLFDO
organisation.158 
While the criteria were there, there were also acts that could have been interpreted as an 
implicit recognition of belligerency and lead to the activation of the regime of neutrality. 
Indeed, blockades were imposed by both parties,159 but were not accepted by third 
states.160 7KHVH ´XQLIRUPO\ GHQLHG WKH 6SDQLDUGV WKH OHJDO ULJKW WR VHL]H IRUHLJQ YHVVHOV
XSRQ WKH KLJK VHDV IRU SDVVLQJ RU DWWHPSWLQJ WR SDVV DQQRXQFHG EORFNDGH OLQHVµ161 
Interestingly, the denial of the legality of the blockades was not based on their 
ineffectivenHVV7KLUGVWDWHV´GLGQRWKRZHYHUGHQ\WKHULJKWRIHLWKHUSDUW\WRUHJXODWH
foreign shipping inside of the three-mile limit or to prevent, therein, access of supplies to 
WKHHQHP\µ162 For example, on 17 November 1936 the British forces were informed that 
the insurgent group was going to impose a blockade on the port of Barcelona. The 
Foreign Minister, when asked in the commons whether this would not be an act of 
piracy, drew a distinction between actions on the high seas and in ports controlled by the 
group.163 This was an example of a quasi-blockade164 accepting the authority of the armed 
group to control shipping within the territory under their sovereignty but not in the open 
seas and illustrating the dividing line between recognition of insurgency and belligerency. 
Recognition of belligerency never came.165 
                                              
157 Oglesby, 38-9. 
158 Padelford, Spanish, 1. 
159 Ibid., 9. 
160 *DUQHU¶6SDQLVK·-3. 
161 Padelford, Spanish, 10. 
162 Ibid., 13. 
163 See *DUQHU¶6SDQLVK·, 71-2. 
164 See MDF1DLU¶6SDLQ·, 487-8. 
165 For a list of acts that arguably constituted recognition of insurgency see Padelford, Spanish, 3. 
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The reason was that the majority of third states did not want to activate the regime of 
neutrality, with its strict rules of non-interference, but opted for a policy of non-
intervention that allowed them a freer movement.166 The regime of non-intervention did 
not allow the Government to benefit from its higher legal status on the one hand, and on 
the other, allowed states that had fewer scruples to disregard the agreement to offer 
military help to the insurgents.167 This is why the Government of Spain protested that by 
adopting the policy of non-intervention, third states had effectively intervened against the 
government.168 Moreover, the criticism was echoed in the work of authors,169 to the 
effect that the refusal to apply the law to the facts constituted an act of omission.  
As a primary focus of the doctrine of belligerency is to regulate the ascription of status 
and the relations between the parties to the conflict with third states, the case of the 
Spanish Civil War can be seen as a failure of the doctrine and a culmination of the 
gradual disuse of the doctrine of belligerency. Furthermore, although recognition of 
insurgency was used as a substitute in this case, the criticism mentioned above indicate 
that it was not viewed as a sufficient method of regulating the relations between the 
parties and third states. 
However, the practice of recognition of insurgency can be viewed as a second factor in 
moving the legal system forward. It has been argued that recognition of insurgency 
moved towards a more objective and automatic application of the legal regime.170 
Nevertheless, a proper understanding of both doctrine and practice belies this. The 
haphazard nature of the practice shows that there is no move here towards the automatic 
application of a specific set of rules when a set of objective criteria are fulfilled. In that 
sense, recognition of insurgency cannot be viewed as a precursor of the legal regime 
initiated through common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.  
                                              
166 A non-intervention agreement and a Commission to implement it were created, but were ineffectual. See Jessup, 
269-70. For the functions of the non-intervention system and the different mechanisms created see Padelford, 
Spanish, 53 ff. For a helpful summary of the regulations see Castrén, 62. 
167 See Wehberg, 11, quoting Talleyrand, who, when asked by a lady what the policy of non-intervention meant, 
replied : « Madame, non-intervention est un mot diplomatique qui signifie à peu près la même chose 
TX·LQWHUYHQWLRQ » 
168 6PLWK¶6SDQLVK·-8.  
169 See, for example, Siotis, 170 ff ; Scelle, 197. 
170 See Neff, War, 274, following Sadoul.  
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What the practice of recognition of insurgency did show, however, was that there could 
be a space between no regulation and full regulation. While this space, in the case of 
insurgency, was negotiated on an ad hoc basis, the development of the practice showed 
that the absolute dualisms between subject and object or state and non-state were no 
longer tenable. Thus, the way was opened for such an agreement on a multilateral, 
objective, automatic level.  
Such an agreement was facilitated by the gradual multilateralisation and 
institutionalisation of the international system at the beginning of the 20th century.171 
Finally, conflicts such as the one in Spain, but especially World War II, contributed to an 
increasing realisation of the horrors of war, internal or international, and the 
development of the regulation of humanitarian aspects of conflicts involving non-state 
armed groups. The shortcomings of the status-based rationale could allow the 
development and eventual emancipation of a humanitarian-protection rationale.  
                                              
171 See, for example, D. .HQQHG\ ¶7KH 0RYH WR ,QVWLWXWLRQV·   Cardozo Law Review 841 (Kennedy, 
¶,QVWLWXWLRQV·. 
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3. Chapter 3: Common article 3 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, it was suggested that the system regulating the conduct of armed 
conflicts in the 19th century was strongly influenced by status-based considerations. In 
this chapter a different, if not entirely unrelated, regulatory rationale will be examined. 
Apart from its concerns with state sovereignty, the 19th century also saw the beginnings 
of codification of rules of humanitarian content. These provided some protection and 
relief for both soldiers1 and civilians.2 The rules were confined to inter-state armed 
conflicts.3 This seems to reflect that any concept of humanitarianism was strongly 
influenced by concerns of sovereignty. Moreover, humanitarian protections were 
sometimes dependent on the perceived level of ¶civilisation· of the group.4 This level of 
civilisation was presumed to the extent that the group had been accepted, as an 
independent nation-state, in the community of (mostly European) states.5 In this way 
humanitarian protection was closely linked, both conceptually and in practice, with the 
artificial paradigm of the (nation) state. 
Gradually, the protective rationale of the rules developed further, alongside the process 
of ascription of status that was described in the previous chapter. This was due both to 
the increased public sensitivity in relation to the horrors of war and to the development 
of the international institutional framework. New technological developments meant that 
war often led to results even more horrendous than those of the past, both in terms of 
                                              
1 See the 1868 St.Petersburg Declaration. See also the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded in Armies in the Field. Geneva, 22 August 1864.    
2 Some relevant rules were included in the Brussels Declaration (e.g. art. 38) and the 1880 Manual of the Law of War 
on Land. See The Laws of War on Land, Oxford, 9 September 1880, and Project of an International Declaration 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War. Brussels, 27 August 1874.    
3 With the exception of the 1863 Lieber Code.   
4 6HHIRUH[DPSOH(&ROE\ ¶+RZWR)LJKW6DYDJH7ULEHV·American Journal of International Law 279. See 
DOVR)0HJUHW¶)URP6DYDJHVWR8QODZIXO&RPEDWDQWV$3RVWFRORQLDO/RRNDW,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZ·V
¶2WKHU··LQ$2UIRUG (ed.) International Law and its Others (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 265. 
5 See, e.g. $QJKLH¶3HULSKHULHV·, 70. See also 2QXPD¶,QWHUFLYLOL]DWLRQDO·. 
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the suffering of combatants and the effect that the hostilities had on civilians.6 Moreover, 
there was an increasingly widespread awareness of the suffering related to conflict, owing 
to the development of a popular press and to the fact that so many were affected by the 
World Wars of the first half of the twentieth century. This was also notably the case with 
the Spanish Civil War,7 which saw the mobilisation of public opinion not only in relation 
to the outcome but also in relation to the suffering in the conflict.8  
At the same time, there was a tendency to develop the international institutional 
framework in ways that placed new limits on the concept of state sovereignty, in an 
effort, albeit failed, to avert war.9 Limits were placed on the prerogative of states to start 
wars, initially through the imposition of procedural safeguards10 and eventually through a 
treaty, if not very widely ratified, and in practice ineffective, banning war altogether.11 
Moreover, the development of the institutional framework and the gradual legal 
regulation of the jus ad bellum affected the regime of neutrality,12 which was the main 
status-based legal consequence of the jus in bello regulation.13 This was compounded by 
structural problems in the application of the legal regime that related to decentralisation 
and the non-mandatory character of recognition.14 These factors gradually eroded the 
19th century doctrine of recognition of belligerency and insurgency. One of the 
consequences of this was a decrease of importance in consideration of ascription of 
status. The erosion of the previous legal regime, allowed the development of a new one.     
From the end of the nineteenth century into the beginning of the twentieth century, there 
was further development of the codification efforts. Indeed, the turn of the century was 
marked by a series of treaties regulating the conduct of hostilities,15 the law of 
                                              
6 See Neff, War, 201 ff. 
7 In a similar way, the battle of Solferino in 1859 had led Henry Dunant to write his A Memory of Solferino that led to 
the development of the Red Cross movement.  
8  See A. Beevor, The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939 (Phoenix, 2006), especially chapter 21. 
9 See .HQQHG\¶,QVWLWXWLRQV·, 856 ff.  
10 See articles 10 to 13 of the Covenant of the League of Nations of 28 June 1919.  
11 Pact of Paris (Kellog-Briand) of 27 August 1928, 94 LNTS 57. 
12 On the post-WWI development (and survival) of the law of neutrality see Neff, Neutrals, 145 ff. 
13 See section 2.2.5. 
14 See section 2.2.4. 
15 See, for example, Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907.    
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neutrality,16 as well as the treatment of prisoners of war.17 These rules were, however, 
only applicable to international armed conflicts. It took the Second World War for there 
to be sufficient humanitarian impetus to regulate non-international armed conflicts 
through treaties. 
In the previous chapter the state-like characteristics of the criteria for the application of 
the legal regime were analysed, alongside the decentralised process of recognition and 
application of the full regime applicable to international wars. In the present chapter 
there will be an analysis, along the same lines, of the first step in the elaboration of a new 
legal regime for the regulation of armed conflicts involving non-state armed groups. This 
first step was made by codifying minimum humanitarian standards in common article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions. 
The chapter will begin with an analysis of the creation of common article 3 through the 
travaux préparatoires. The difficulties of extending regulation to non-international armed 
conflicts, chiefly because of the link between legal regulation and the ascription of status, 
will be seen in the negotiating process. The concept of non-international armed conflict 
will then be analysed, in an effort to define it and to see to what extent there has been a 
departure from the paradigm of war between states. Finally, there will be a discussion of 
state practice in order to see whether the new legal regime achieved its automatic 
applicability avoiding the decentralised process of application through recognition, as well 
as whether there is a departure from the paradigm of inter-state war.  
 
3.2. The process of creation of common article 3 
 
3.2.1. The International Committee of the Red Cross and early efforts in the extension of 
humanitarian protection 
 
                                              
16 See Hague Convention (V) respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on 
Land, 18 October 1907.    
17 See the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 27 July 1929.    
73 
 
A very significant role in the development and application of humanitarian rules, 
protecting both combatants and civilians, was played by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC was created in 1859 with the goal of providing 
humanitarian relief and was the driving force behind the 1864 Geneva Convention.18 The 
primacy of the humanitarian rationale in the work of the ICRC stood at odds with the 
extension of humanitarian rules only to international armed conflicts. Indeed, the ICRC 
energetically pursued its task in providing humanitarian relief as well as promoting 
extensive regulation of internal armed conflicts, attempting to influence states into 
developing a treaty regime.  
An early effort was made in 1912 in the conference of state-parties to the 1864 and 1906 
Geneva Conventions.19 There the ICRC attempted to introduce a draft treaty on the role 
it could play in internal armed conflicts. While the draft was not even discussed at the 
time, the ICRC was more successful in the 1922 Red Cross Conference. There a non-
binding resolution was passed providing for National Red Cross Societies to intervene 
and provide humanitarian protection. If this was not possible, the ICRC was empowered 
to do so.20 A further initiative was taken in 1938, in the shadow of the Spanish Civil War, 
at an ICRC Conference taking place in London, in preparation for the scheduled for 
1940 Conference to amend the 1929 Geneva Conventions. The ICRC, in proposing rules 
for the intervention of the organisation, advanced a trichotomy of armed conflicts, 
mirroring the traditional categories of rebellion, insurgency and belligerency.21 The 
resolution finally adopted, however, dealt only with the application of certain 
humanitarian standards without addressing questions of threshold.22 The outbreak of the 
Second World War prevented the 1940 Conference from taking place.   
                                              
18 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field. Geneva, 22 August 
1864.    
19 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field. Geneva, 6 
July 1906.    
20 On the basis of this resolution the ICRC attempted to persuade the parties to the Spanish Civil War to accept, to 
some extent, the principles of the Geneva Conventions. See J. Pictet (ed.) The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: 
Commentary, III Geneva Convention Relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War (International Committee of the Red Cross,  
1960), 29 (Pictet, CommentaryDQG*'UDSHU ¶+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZDQG,QWHUQDO$UPHG&RQIOLFWV·  Georgia 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 253, 261. 
21 See Siotis, 186. 
22 Resolution 14 called for the Red Cross societies to work for the respect of the humanitarian principles of the 
Geneva and Hague Conventions and their applications on the wounded and captured and the respect of the life and 
liberty of non-combatants. See ibid. 
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3.2.2. The road to the 1949 Diplomatic Conference  
 
Immediately after the end of the Second World War, however, efforts for the extension 
of humanitarian rules to non-international armed conflicts were renewed and certain 
preliminary conferences took place. Notable examples were the 1946 Conference of 
National Red Cross Societies, the 1947 Conference of Government Experts, in Geneva, 
and, finally, the 1948 ICRC Conference in Stockholm. The negotiations in these 
conferences were concerned with the development of the Geneva Conventions. In each 
of them, there seemed to be a tension between an effort to apply the whole of the 
Geneva Conventions to internal conflicts, and the perceived effects that this would have 
on the legal status of the parties.23 The text that ended up being submitted to the Geneva 
Diplomatic Conference of 1949 underwent various changes throughout these three 
preliminary Conferences. The main points of the evolution of the text are considered 
here.24  
In the 1946 Conference of National Red Cross Societies the application of the entire 
Geneva Conventions to non-international armed conflicts was proposed, allowing 
however for the possibility of the parties to renounce such application.25 The 1947 
Conference of Government Experts did not accept this but did propose at least a partial 
DSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQVDOORZLQJIRU¶WKHprinciples· of the Conventions to 
be applied, while dropping the possibility of renunciation. Importantly this was 
complemented by the stipulation/disclaimer that the application of this legal regime 
´VKDOOLQQRZD\GHSHQGRQWKHOHJDOVWDWXVRIWKH3DUWLHVWRWKHFRQIOLFWDQGVKDOOKDYHQR
HIIHFW RQ WKDW VWDWXVµ26 This disclaimer was one of the few elements of the proposed 
article to generate solid support through the tumultuous process27 of the creation of the 
                                              
23 Ibid., 187-191.  
24 )RU D FRQFLVH SUHVHQWDWLRQ VHH ' (OGHU ¶7he Historical Background of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
&RQYHQWLRQRI· (1979) 11 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law  37, 42 ff (Elder). 
25 The text, quoted in Pictet, CommentaryZDVDVIROORZV´,QWKHFDVHRIDUPHGFRQIOLFWZLWKin the borders of a 
State, the Convention shall also be applied by each of the adverse Parties, unless one of them announces expressly 
LWVLQWHQWLRQWRWKHFRQWUDU\µ 
26 See ibid., 31 
27 Indeed, as the Soviet delegate pointed out at the final Plenary Session´1RRWKHULVVXHKDVJLYHQULVHWRVXFKORQJ
GLVFXVVLRQDQGWRVXFKDGHWDLOHGDQGH[KDXVWLYHVWXG\µ6HH IIB Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva of 
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final text. Its importance for the comprehension of the arrangement will gradually 
become apparent.  
The text, which came to be known, inaccurately,28 as the Stockholm proposal, was 
submitted to the 1948 XVII ICRC Conference, to be held at Stockholm. It was to be 
inserted in the last paragraph of common article 2, which dealt with the material 
application of the Conventions.29 Article 2(4) read: 
 
In all cases of armed conflict which are not of an international character, especially 
cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion, which may occur in the 
territory of one or more of the High Contracting Parties, the implementation of 
the principles of the present Convention shall be obligatory on each one of the 
adversaries. The application of this Convention in these circumstances shall in no 
way depend on the legal status of the Parties to the conflict and shall have no 
effect on that status. 
 
There was an oscillation between, on the one hand, a maximalist position, aspiring for the 
application of the entire legal regime of the Geneva Conventions in internal armed 
conflicts, and, on the other hand, retaining a minimum in order to safeguard automatic 
applicability30 of the provision. This oscillation would come to characterize the whole 
process of the creation of what came to be common article 3. 
 
3.2.3. The 1949 Diplomatic Conference  
 
The text finally submitted to the Diplomatic Conference at Geneva for consideration also 
reflects the abovementioned oscillation. At Stockholm, the ICRC substituted the term 
principles with the term provisions marking a return to the effort to apply the whole 
                                                                                                                                            
1949 (Geneva, 1951), 325. (IIB) As will be seen, this will be the case in diplomatic conferences to come. See sections 
5.3.2. and 7.2.3.  
28 Insofar as it was not the text that came out of the Stockholm Conference. See Elder, 43. 
29 See Pictet, Commentary, 31. 
30 See below fn 67 and text. 
76 
 
Conventions to internal conflicts, with the addition of a condition of reciprocity31 for the 
3rd (POWs) and 4th (Civilians) Conventions.32 At the Diplomatic Conference, a Joint 
Committee of delegates was created to discuss the proposed article, then article 2(4), and, 
within that Committee, a Special Drafting Committee was further created. In the 
discussions of the Joint Committee, the problematic nature of the proposal to extend all 
of the provisions of the Conventions to internal armed conflicts was immediately 
apparent.  
The Danish delegate pointed out that the application of the Conventions to insurgents 
ZKRZHUH¶3DUWLHVWRWKHFRQIOLFW· ZRXOGDIIHFWWKHLUVWDWXV´EHFDXVHLWZRXOGREOLJDWHWKH
6WDWH WRDSSO\ LQDFLYLOZDUDOO WKHSURYLVLRQV«RILQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZµ33 Accordingly, the 
6ZLVV5DSSRUWHXURIWKH-RLQW&RPPLWWHHDVVXDJHGWKHGHOHJDWH·VIHDUVE\FODULI\LQJWKDW
´¶RQO\ FHUWDLQ VWLSXODWLRQV H[SUHVVO\ PHQWLRQHGµ ZRXOG DSSO\ ,PSRUWDQWO\ ´QHXWUDO
VWDWHVZRXOGKDYHQRREOLJDWLRQVµ34 7KH6RYLHWGHOHJDWHSURSRVHGWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI´DOO
the provisions of the Convention which involve the humane treatment of persons who 
should benefit by WKH SURWHFWLRQ RI WKH &RQYHQWLRQµ35 The dilemma between full 
application of the Conventions and application of minimum humanitarian standards, 
expressed before at Stockholm in the oscillation between provisions and principles, had 
resurfaced.  
The dilemma between applying the full provisions of the Conventions or the 
humanitarian principles had a flip side. To the extent that the former was to be 
attempted, it was necessary to stipulate the type of conflict, in which all of the provisions 
could apply. As with the criteria for the recognition of belligerency, the starting point was 
the magnitude of the conflict. Indeed, even though article 2(4) did not amount to 
                                              
31 See below 3.3.3. 
32 This important shift, as pointed out in Elder, 43, seems to have been missed by the ICRC Commentary. See 
Pictet, Commentary, 32.    
33 IIB, 36.  
34 See ibid., 36-37. The Danish Delegate returned to the issue at the next session suggesting a declaration/reservation 
VWLSXODWLQJWKDW´UHODWLRQVEHWween insurgents and parties outside the conflict...was to be decided in accordance with 
WKH JHQHUDO UXOHV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ«DQG ZDV QRW JRYHUQHG E\ WKH &RQYHQWLRQVµ Ibid., 39. This point of 
contention persisted until the last days of the negotiations in the Plenary session and the Rapporteur had to reiterate 
that the rights and duties of neutrals were not governed by the Convention but by general international law. Ibid., 
332. 
35 See ibid., 38. 
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recognition of belligerency, the link between the characteristics of the conflict and the 
actor and the justification of the application of the legal regime was dominant.  
This was apparent in the first proposal that tried to set out specific criteria for the 
application of the full Conventions. The French proposal recalled the existence of factual 
criteria related to the doctrines of recognition of belligerency and insurgency.36 The 
Greek delegate hastened to add the legal caveat that, even if those criteria were present 
and the full Conventions would be applied, there would be no effect on the legal status of 
WKH¶EHOOLJHUHQWV·37 The proposal was criticized by the Australian delegate as begging the 
question of who would decide the existence of the proposed criteria.38  In its own 
proposal, Australia referred directly to the process of recognition of belligerency, as a 
criterion for the application of the Conventions, albeit taking account of the development 
of the law of recognition and the possibility of collective recognition through the organs 
of the United Nations.39 7KH$XVWUDOLDQSURSRVDO·VUDWLRQDOH seems to have been to adapt 
the structure of the old regime to the new institutional framework. The empowerment of 
the de jure Government and the United Nations, however, was deemed problematic by 
the United States delegate.40  
In the above deliberations, certain problematic features of the old regime, and the effort 
to incorporate it in an article of automatic applicability were apparent. The decentralised 
and non-mandatory nature of the legal characterisation and application of the law was, as 
                                              
36 7KHIXOOWH[WRIWKH)UHQFKSURSRVDOLVDVIROORZV´,QDOl cases of armed conflict not of an international character 
which may occur on the territory of one or more of the High Contracting Parties, each of the Parties to the conflict 
shall be bound to implement the provisions of the present Convention, if the adverse Party possesses an organized 
military force, an authority responsible for its acts acting within a defined territory and having the means of 
REVHUYLQJDQGHQIRUFLQJWKH&RQYHQWLRQµ6HH$QQH[LQIII Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva of 1949 
(Geneva, 1951), 27. (III Final Record) 
37 IIB, 41. 
38 Ibid., 42-43. 
39 7KH$XVWUDOLDQSURSRVDOZDVDVIROORZV´,QWKHFDVHRIFLYLOZDULQDQ\SDUWRIWKHKRPHRUFRORQLDOWHUULWRU\RID
Contracting Party the present Convention (or if this goes tRRIDU´7KH3ULQFLSOHVRIWKHSUHVHQW&RQYHQWLRQµVKDOO
be applied between the Parties to the conflict, provided:  
(1) that the de jure Government has recognized the insurgents as belligerents; or 
(2) that the de jure Government has claimed for itself the rights of a belligerent; or  
(3) that the de jure Government  has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for the purposes only 
of the present Convention; or 
(4) that the dispute has been admitted to the Agenda of the Security Council or the General Assembly of the 
8QLWHG1DWLRQVDVEHLQJDWKUHDWWRLQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFHDEUHDFKRIWKHSHDFHRUDQDFWRIDJJUHVVLRQµ 
See Annex 11 in III Final Record, 27. 
40See IIB, 42. 
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discussed,41 one of the problematic features of the previous legal structure. A solution to 
this would be a structure where, once a set of characteristics relating to the actor and the 
situation had come about, the substantive rules would be automatically applicable. It 
seemed clear to the delegates that the full substantive regime of the Geneva Conventions, 
even if neutrality was not covered, could be applied only to actors with characteristics 
similar to those of a state. The assessment of these characteristics was, to a large extent, 
left either to the Government or third states. However, it was a sign of the changing, 
more institutional, times that United Nations organs were also mentioned as having a role 
in the assessment of characteristics.  
The inability to stipulate workable criteria in combination with a process for their 
assessment, in order to apply the full Conventions, led to the proposal for the application 
of minimum humanitarian standards, while avoiding the stipulation of such a process and 
criteria. This can be understood as an effort to avoid the difficulties inherent in every step 
of the previous system. Firstly, the wide applicability of the legal rules required criteria 
that did not describe situations and actors almost identical to wars between states. Since 
the criteria that the delegates had so far proposed were clearly redolent of this blueprint, 
the avoidance of such a list could allow a lower threshold to emerge. It was hoped that 
such a low threshold could more easily be automatically applicable. Finally, limiting the 
substantive applicable rules could assuage the concerns of states with respect to the status 
conferred, as the non-state armed group would not be regulated as a state in terms of the 
substantive applicable law.  
This strategy was not expressly or completely set out by any one delegate, but it provides 
a link between the obstacles so far encountered and the French proposal that followed.42 
This proposal called for the application, in all conflicts, of a set of minimum 
humanitarian standards, mentioned in the Preamble to the draft Civilians Convention.43 
The text was remarkably similar to what was to be common article 3.44   
                                              
41 Section 2.2.4. 
42 III Final Record, Annex 13, 28. 
43 The preamble can be found I Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva of 1949 (Geneva, 1951), 113. (I Final 
Record) 
44 The full text of the Preamble was as follows:  
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The vacillation between the application of the entire Conventions and the application of 
minimum humanitarian standards led to a distinction being drawn within non-
international armed conflicts. On the one hand, there would be non-international armed 
conflicts of the magnitude of international wars, where all the provisions would apply. 
On the other hand there would non-international conflicts, left undefined, where a 
minimum of humanitarian provisions would apply.45  
This distinction is reflected in the first draft of a Working Party, created in order to 
incorporate the arguments advanced in the discussions at the Diplomatic Conference into 
a workable text. The Working Party expressed what it saw as the necessary approach by 
UHSRUWLQJ WKDW WKH &RQIHUHQFH VKRXOG ´HLWKHU UHVWULFW WKH FDVHV RI FRQIOLFWV QRW RI DQ
international character to which the Conventions should apply ² or restrict the 
contractual provisions to be applied in the case of a conflict which was not of an 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO FKDUDFWHUµ46 The Working Party assembled the criteria proposed by the 
delegates for the application of the entire Conventions, while it provided for basic 
humanitarian standards to be applied to conflicts that would fail to meet the elaborate 
criteria.47 The first part of the proposal was criticised as impracticable because of its high 
                                                                                                                                            
´7KH+LJK&RQWUDFWLQJ3DUWLHVFRQVFLRXVRIWKHLUREOLJDWLRQWRFRPHWRDQDJUHHPHQWLQRUGHUWRSURWHFWFLYLOLDQ
populations from the horrors of war, undertake to respect the principles of human rights which constitute the 
safeguard of all civilization and, in particular, to apply, at any time and in all places, the rules given hereunder: 
(1) Individuals shall be protected against any violation to their life and limb 
(2) The taking of hostages is prohibited 
(3) Executions may be carried out only if prior judgment has been passed by a regular constituted court, 
furnished with the judicial safeguards that civilized peoples recognize to be indispensable 
(4) Torture of any kind is strictly prohibited. 
These rules, which constitute the basis of universal human law, shall be respected without prejudice to the special 
stipulations provided for in the present Convention in favour of protected pHUVRQVµ 
Elder, 45-46, erroneously refers to the proposal as an Italian proposal and quotes the text of the Preamble as the 
text of the proposal. 
45 This distinction is helpfully developed by the Swiss delegate in the Plenary session. See IIB, 334. 
46 Ibid., 76. 
47 The, rather lengthy, text of the draft is as follows: 
´,Q WKH FDVH RI DUPHG FRQIOLFW QRW RI DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO FKDUDFWHU RFFXUULQJ LQ WKH WHUULWRU\ RI RQH RI WKH +LJK
Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to implement the provisions of the present 
Convention, provided:  
(a) that the de jure government has recognized the status of belligerency of the adverse party, without 
restrictions, or for the sole purposes of the application of the present Convention, or 
(b) that the adverse party presents the characteristics of a State, in particular, that it possesses an organized 
military force, that it is under the direction of an organized civil authority which exercises de facto 
governmental functions over the population of a determinate portion of the national territory, and that it 
has the means of enforcing the Convention, and of complying with the laws and customs of war; 
application of the Convention in these circumstances shall in no way depend upon the legal status of the 
parties to the conflict. This obligation presupposes, furthermore, in all circumstances, that the adverse 
party declares itself bound by the present Convention, and, as is the de jure government, by the laws and 
customs of war (and that it complies with the above conditions in actual fact). 
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threshold and variety of criteria.48 Accordingly, a second Working Party resisted the 
effort to apply the entire Conventions and, reflecting the French proposal,49 provided a 
draft that, with minor changes,50 was eventually accepted in the Plenary session as 
common article 3.  
A final effort for the application of a substantial part of the Conventions was made in a 
proposal by the USSR, possibly the most ardent proponent of the application of the full 
Conventions to non-international armed conflicts among state delegates. The Soviet 
proposal focused on the humanitarian provisions of the Conventions, and would have 
extended the protection of many more provisions of the Geneva Conventions to non-
state groups.  For instance, the regime for POWs would have been applicable.51 
                                                                                                                                            
The provisions relating to the Protecting Powers shall, however, not be applicable, except in the instance of 
special agreement between the parties to the conflict. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, may offer to the parties to the conflict to undertake the duties conferred by the 
present Convention on the Protecting Powers. 
In the case of armed conflicts which do not fulfil the conditions as determined above, the parties to the conflict 
should endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the provisions of the 
present Convention, or, in all circumstances, to act in accordance with the underlying humanitarian principles 
of the present Convention. 
In all circumstances stipulated in the foregoing provisions, total or partial application of the present Convention 
VKDOOQRWDIIHFWWKHOHJDOVWDWXVRIWKHSDUWLHVWRWKHFRQIOLFWµ 
See ibid., 46-7. 
48 See the criticisms by France, the UK and the USSR in ibid., 47-48. 
49 Above fn 44. 
50 The discussion of these changes does not affect the character of the provision and is, therefore, not considered 
QHFHVVDU\ IRU WKH SUHVHQW DQDO\VLV $FFRUGLQJO\ WKH WH[W RI WKH VHFRQG :RUNLQJ 3DUW\·V GUDIW LV RPLWWHG DQG WKH
reader is referred to the text of common article 3. 
51 The Soviet Proposal was as follows:  
A. Wounded and Sick and Maritime Conventions. 
´,QWKHFDVHRIDUPHGFRQIOLFWQRWRIDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHURFFXUULQJLQWKHWHUULWRU\RIRQHRIWKH6WDWHV
Parties to the present Convention, each Party to the conflict shall apply all the provisions of the present 
Convention guaranteeing: 
 Humane treatment for the wounded and sick; prohibition of all discriminatory treatment of wounded and 
sick practised on the basis of diffeUHQFHVRIUDFHFRORXUUHOLJLRQVH[ELUWKRUIRUWXQHµ 
B. Prisoners of War Convention. 
´,QWKHFDVHRIDUPHGFRQIOLFWQRWRIDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHURFFXUULQJLQWKHWHUULWRU\RIRQHRIWKH6WDWHV
Parties to the present Convention, each Party to the conflict shall apply all the provisions of the present Convention 
guaranteeing: 
Humane treatment for prisoners of war; compliance with all established rules connected with the prisoners of 
war regime; prohibition of all discriminatory treatment of prisoners of war practised on the basis of differences of 
UDFHFRORXUUHOLJLRQVH[ELUWKRUIRUWXQHµ 
C. Civilians Convention 
´,QWKHFDVHRIDUPHGFRQIOLFWQRWRIDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHURFFXUULQJLQWKHWHUULWRU\RIRQHRIWKH6WDWHV
Parties to the present Convention, each Party to the conflict shall apply all the provisions of the present 
Convention guaranteeing: 
Humane treatment for the civilian population; prohibition on the territory occupied by the armed forces of 
either of the parties, of reprisals against the civilian population, the taking of hostages, the destruction and 
damaging of property which are not justified by the necessities of war, prohibition of any discriminatory 
treatment of the civilian population practiced on the basis of differences of race, colour, religion, sex, or 
IRUWXQHµ 
See IIB, 97-8. 
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Importantly, it omitted the legal caveat on the effect of the provision on the status of the 
SDUWLHVDV¶UHGXQGDQW·52 This was too much for the other states to accept. The UK argued 
that it would be difficult to pick which provisions would be applied and could not bring 
itself to delete the status disclaimer.53 France questioned the effect that the application of 
such extensive provisions would have on the sovereignty of the states, making particular 
reference to the issue of POW status.54 Ultimately the Soviet proposal was defeated by 9 
votes to 1.55 
The Second Working Party draft was not easily accepted. It was attacked by both the 
proponents of greater regulation and those hostile to any regulation. This occurred both 
at the Special Committee, where it was presented,56 and at the Plenary, when it was 
brought for a final vote. This was perhaps to be expected, since the draft constituted a 
FRPSURPLVHEHWZHHQWKHWZR¶H[WUHPH·SRVLWLRQVRIIXOO*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQVSURWHFWLRQ
and next to no protection.57 The USSR criticized it to the extent that it did not provide 
enough humanitarian protection.58 Mexico agreed.59 At the other end, Burma was clear 
WKDWLWDPRXQWHGWR¶LQWHUQDWLRQDOUHFRJQLWLRQRILQVXUJHQF\·HTXDWLQJWKDWWR¶UHFRJQLWLRQ
RI DJJUHVVLRQ· ,Q LWV YLHZ WKHUH ZDV FOHDUO\ QR SODFH IRU WKH &RQYHQWLRQV LQ internal 
armed conflicts.60 But there were other concerns among States forming the majority 
PLGGOHJURXQG7KH86DQG WKH8.ZHUHQRWSOHDVHGZLWKWKH WHUP¶HDFK3DUW\ WRWKH
FRQIOLFW· ZDQWLQJ WR VXEVWLWXWH LW ZLWK WKH WHUP ¶WKHVH 3DUWLHV· VWDQGLQJ IRU WKH ¶+LJK
&RQWUDFWLQJ3DUWLHV·61 The Australian delegate wanted to return to the detailed criteria of 
the first Working Party draft.62 Among these differences the Second Working Party 
                                              
52 See ibid., 98. 
53 Ibid.. 
54 Ibid., 99. 
55 Ibid., 100. 
56 The Draft was initially rejected at the Special Committee by six votes to five. See ibid.. Then, at the Joint 
Committee it was adopted for consideration at the Plenary by twenty-one votes to, six against, with fourteen 
abstentions. See Ibid., 129. 
57 As the delegate from the ICRC pointed out at the Plenary, mentioning that his organisation was in favour of the 
Stockholm proposal, but strongly urging the delegates to vote for the draft. See Ibid., 336. 
58 See ibid., 325-327. 
59 Ibid., 333. 
60 See ibid., 327-8. 
617KH,&5&GHOHJDWHUHSOLHGWKDW´WKLVZRXOGWHQGWRGLVWRUWWKHPHDQLQJRIWKRVHZKRKDGIUDPHGWKLV$UWLFOHDQG
who wished to bind not only the OHJDO *RYHUQPHQW EXW DOVR WKH LQVXUJHQWVµ 6HH ibid., 90. Later, at 93, the US 
UHWXUQHGWRWKHSRLQWE\VXJJHVWLQJWKHWHUP¶VXFK3DUW\· 
62 Ibid., 93. 
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proposal, drawing from the French one, was adopted as common article 3. The text is as 
follows: 
 
Par. 1: In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in 
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict 
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by 
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be 
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, 
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in 
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. 
Par. 2: The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by 
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present 
Convention.  
Par. 3: The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status 
of the Parties to the conflict. 
 
The four Geneva Conventions were signed by 65 states and came into force in 21 
October 1950. They have now achieved almost universal membership with 194 states 
parties.63  
                                              
63http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/%28SPF%29/party_main_treaties/$File/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf 
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3.2.4. Analysing the travaux: a move away from status? 
 
The proposal which was eventually accepted reflects the process and the issues that arose 
at the Diplomatic Conference. The specific criteria that related to the organization of the 
actor and the magnitude of the conflict, as well as the process of ascertaining their 
existence, through individual or collective recognition, were abandoned. Instead, an 
approach of non-definition was adopted. These criteria had mirrored those leading to 
recognition of belligerency, without, however, in the case of the Geneva Conventions, 
the full consequences of recognition of belligerency. Nevertheless, there remained one 
basic criterion for the application of common article 3: the existence of an armed 
conflict. The term could not be defined by the delegates as the criteria proposed in the 
debates referred to the all too familiar criteria of belligerency and would, once more, beg 
the question of their assessment. However, it was understood that, as the Swiss 
5DSSRUWHXUSXWLW´DQDUPHGFRQIOLFWDVXQGHUVWRRGLQWKLVSURYLVLRQLPSOLHVVRPHIRUP
RIRUJDQL]DWLRQDPRQJWKH3DUWLHVWRWKHFRQIOLFWµ64 
Accordingly, the necessity for the existence of certain factual criteria was not avoided. 
Indeed, it could not be avoided. What was avoided was the process of recognition, as it 
occurred under the regime of belligerency and insurgency. To the extent that there still 
had to be some kind of process of assessment for the existence of certain factual criteria 
for the application of a legal regime, then the ascription, or the perception of ascription, 
of status, could not be entirely avoided. This is the case, even if this status is temporary 
and is granted only for certain purposes. This is because, as in the case of belligerency 
and insurgency, there is a factual situation and there is an actor bearing certain 
characteristics, whose participation is deemed important enough for international law to 
SLHUFHWKHQDWLRQDOOHJDORUGHUDQGDFNQRZOHGJHWKHDFWRU·VH[LVWHQFHLQRUGHUWRUHJXODWH
                                              
64 See IIB, 335. 
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The paradigm of the status-based regime of belligerency was too potent to prevent the 
perception that the assessment would not have the status-related effects of recognition.65  
The assessment that common article 3 calls for could only be achieved through attaching 
WRWKHVLWXDWLRQWKH¶ODEHO·RI¶DUPHGFRQIOLFWQRWRIDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHU·66 Common 
article 3 seems, however, to assume automatic recognition of the existence of the factual 
FULWHULDWKDWFRQVWLWXWHDQ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·,WVHHNVWRREYLDWHWKHprocess of recognition 
but to secure its effects: the application of the substantive law that covers the actors.  
By moving away from the process of the ascription of status that occurred through the 
recognition of belligerency or insurgency, the automatic application of the legal regime 
seeks to avoid both the problems of the process of the granting of recognition and its 
consequences on the status of the non-state armed group.67 The effort to secure 
automaticity depended either on the presence of an organ that would virtually 
automatically pronounce on the existence of the criteria or the virtual elimination of 
criteria. The former, it was clear, did not exist. Even if the presence of the UN affects the 
institutional structure, it was more as a forum than as an immediate and final assessor. 
Accordingly, common article 3 strives to achieve the virtual elimination of criteria. This, 
however, is impossible to the extent that a material situation has to be recognised. 
Ultimately, the applicability of common article 3 will relate directly to the factual 
existence of implicit or explicit criteria.  
The paradox is replayed and compounded in the ICRC Commentary, which seems to 
rehearse every single criterion advanced at the Diplomatic Conference, rivalling the 
comprehensiveness of the first Working Party draft.68 +RZHYHULWVWUHVVHV´WKHVFRSHRI
                                              
65 See section 1.2. 
66 6HHRQWKHSURFHVVRIDSSOLFDWLRQRIFRPPRQDUWLFOHEHLQJDSURFHVVRI¶ODEHOOLQJ·RU¶UHFRJQLWLRQ·$5XELQ¶7KH
6WDWXVRI5HEHOV8QGHUWKH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQV·International and Comparative Law Quarterly 472, especially 
483 ff 5XELQ¶5HEHOV·. 
67 Automaticity can be defined as the activation of the relevant legal regime automatically to the extent that certain 
facts occur or a material situation exists. Central in this notion is the need to obviate the role of the government of 
the state in whose territory the conflict occurs from assessing the existence of these facts. See, for an exposition of 
this principle, Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski, and B. Zimmerman (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (ICRC/Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 1348 (Sandoz, Commentary). Automaticity, 
more generally, can also be viewed as the automatically binding nature of certain legal rules on an actor who belongs 
to the legal system which contains these rules. For the rule applied to states and, more controversially, to new states 
LUUHVSHFWLYHRIWKHLUH[SUHVVHGFRQVHQWVHH*)LW]PDXULFH¶7KH*HQHUDO3ULQFLSOHVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ&RQVLGHUHG
from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law (1957) Recueil des Cours 1, 16. 
68 Pictet, Commentary, 35-3,WFRQVLGHUVWKHVHFULWHULD´FRQYHQLHQWµ.  
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WKHDSSOLFDWLRQPXVWEHDVZLGHDVSRVVLEOH>«@6SHDNLQJJHnerally, it must be recognized 
WKDWWKHFRQIOLFWVUHIHUUHGWRLQ$UWLFOHDUHDUPHGFRQIOLFWVZLWK¶DUPHGIRUFHV·RQHLWKHU
VLGH RI WKH KRVWLOLWLHVµ EXW WKHQ LW KDVWHQV WR DGG DJDLQ ´ZKLFK DUH LQ PDQ\ UHVSHFWV
VLPLODUWRDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOZDUµ69 This formulation reflects the tension between the need 
for a low threshold guaranteeing wide applicability, and the nature of the various criteria 
used, recalling the status-based paradigm of war between states. 
Moreover, the uncertainty in the criteria has the SRWHQWLDO WR KDUP WKH DUWLFOH·V HIIHFWV
7KLVGDQJHULVUHIOHFWHGLQ3RUWXJDO·VUHVHUYDWLRQWKDW 
As there is no actual definition of what is meant by a conflict not of an 
international character, and as, in case this term is intended to refer solely to civil 
war, it is not clearly laid down at what moment an armed rebellion within a 
country should be considered as having become a civil war, Portugal reserves the 
right not to apply the provisions of article 3 in so far as they may be contrary to 
the provisions of Portuguese law in all territories subject to her sovereignty in any 
part of the world.70 
However, there is one element in common article 3, shared by the whole of the Geneva 
Conventions regime, that can potentially affect the flexibility of its application. This is the 
PRYHIURP´ZDUµWR´DUPHGFRQIOLFWµDVH[SUHVVHGLQFRPPRQDUWLFOHRIWKH*HQHYD
Conventions. This is an element of fundamental importance. It has been discussed how 
WKHFRQFHSWRIWKH¶VWDWHRIZDU·UHODWHVWRZDUDVDOHJDOLQVWLWXtion deliberately and freely 
brought about by sovereign states, as the only subjects of international law.71 The new 
language decouples the jus in bello from the sovereign prerogative to wage war. The term 
¶DUPHG FRQIOLFW· UHIHUV WR D PDWHULDO VLWXDWLRQ 7Kis material situation does have legal 
consequences, but these legal consequences follow the very existence of the facts rather 
than the law-creating capacity of the sovereign.  
This distinction significantly influences the process of application by allowing the 
drawing of OHJDOGLVWLQFWLRQVFORVHUWRWKHIDFWV$¶VWDWHRIZDU·KDVWREHHLWKHUGHFODUHG
                                              
69 Ibid., 36. 
70 See I Final Record, 351. Portugal, however, decided to withdraw its reservation upon ratification on 14 March 1961. 
See http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/NORM/663716D11E477ECFC1256402003F977C?OpenDocument. 
71 Section 2.2.4. 
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or recognised. An armed conflict merely happens.72 This reflects a shift in the competent 
assessor of the facts. It is no longer only states that can constitute the legal consequences 
of a conflict. These exist regardless. Moreover, they can be acknowledged by a third 
party, for example an international organisation,73 by focusing on the factual element of 
the situation rather than on the recognition of the situation by a state.  
The assessment of facts would then have a declarative, rather than a constitutive effect.74 
Furthermore, this assessment/declaration of the material situation can have an 
institutionalised, multilateral element, through the involvement of international 
organisations. This does not necessarily mean the absence of status as a rationale or a 
consequence of the application of the legal regime, but it is a step in the direction of the 
law of armed conflict not being an exclusively sovereign matter. 
Furthermore, this approach may be used to develop the elements of the criteria through 
practice.75 This, of course, was also the case in the old legal system. To the extent, 
however, that this practice would be influenced by the predominance of facts the hope 
was that it could lead to a more consistent definition of the threshold.  
None of this, however, necessarily means that no status is ascribed or is seen to be 
ascribed through the process of assessment. If, in the case of the automaticity of 
common article 3, the implicit existence of factual criteria and the need for recognition of 
such criteria, may potentially harm its effect, the opposite seems to happen with respect 
to the caveat that the application of the article will have no effect on the legal status of 
the parties. The question that arises is whether such a disclaimer has any effect.  
The necessity of the inclusion of the disclaimer relates directly to the effort to overcome 
the process and consequences of recognition in order to achieve automaticity of the 
obligations contained in the article. It seeks to dispel the perception of conferment of 
state-like status by the very fact that international law is applicable. This perception flows 
directly from the status-based horizontal system of regulation in the regime of 
                                              
72 )RU WKHPRYHIURP ¶ZDU· WR ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·DQG WKHFXUUHQWUHOHYDQFHRI ¶ZDU· as a legal term see Greenwood, 
¶&RQFHSW·. But see MacNair/Watts RQ WKH FRQWLQXLQJ LPSRUWDQFHRI WKH OHJDO WHUP ¶ZDU· IRU HIIHFWV RQ WKH OHJDO
position of private persons and, at 4 ff, on the use of the term even in some post 1945 treaties. 
73 This was a possibility suggested in the First Working Party Draft at IIB, 46-7. 
74 See section 1.2.1. 
75 For the importance of (state) practice in the clarification of the factual criteria inherent in common article 3 see 
Siotis, 208-9. 
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belligerency. Its survival will depend on the survival of the understanding that only state-
like entities can be regulated by the jus in bello. 
The substance and function of the disclaimer was not analyzed in depth during the 
debates, but its significance or insignificance appeared to be obvious to both the majority 
that clearly needed it and to those who opposed it. While, as seen above,76 the Soviet 
GHOHJDWHWKRXJKWLW´UHGXQGDQWµKis approach was unacceptable to the majority, which, as 
H[SUHVVHGE\WKH8.GHOHJDWH´FRXOGQRWVHHWKHLUZD\WRDFFHSWLQJWKHGHOHWLRQRIWKH
SDUDJUDSKµ77 On the other side of the spectrum, the Burmese delegate, a staunch 
opponent of the inclusion of any legal regulation of internal armed conflicts in the 
&RQYHQWLRQV YLHZHG LW DV GDQJHURXV DQG K\SRFULWLFDO ,W ZDV RQO\ ¶D EDLW· ´WKH PHUH
inclusion of this Article in an international Convention will automatically give the 
LQVXUJHQWVDVWDWXVDVKLJKDVWKHOHJDOVWDWXVZKLFKLVGHQLHGWRWKHPµ78  
Indeed, beyond the absolutes of the subject/object dualism, it seems that the legal status 
of the non-state armed group is commensurate with the regulation extended. To the 
extent that the members of the armed forces of that party, for example, are protected by 
the law and to the extent that the authorities of that party have the responsibility to apply 
the law, the party is acknowledged as an entity under international law. Accordingly, the 
status conferred may not extend as far as that conferred through belligerency, but it 
extends as far as the substantive law of common article 3.79  
The paradox pointed out by the Burmese delegate, though denied by the majority of the 
participants as well as the ICRC Commentary,80 LVFRQFHGHGHOVHZKHUHE\3LFWHW´,QWKH
interest of truth, we must nevertheless admit that when a government accepts the 
DSSOLFDWLRQRIFRPPRQDUWLFOHLWWKHUHE\DFNQRZOHGJHVWKDWWKHUHLVDQ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·
ZLWKLQ LWV IURQWLHUV DQG WKDW WKHUH LV DFFRUGLQJO\ DQRWKHU ¶SDUW\ WR WKH FRQIOLFW· ZKR
becoPHVDQHQWLW\LQKXPDQLWDULDQODZµ81 
                                              
76 See fn 52 and text. 
77 See IIB, 98. 
78 See ibid., 330. 
79 See also Siotis, 217-8.  
80 Pictet, Commentary, 43-44. 
81 Pictet, Principles, 60, fn 2. 
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This should be seen, however, in the light of a distinction drawn between the legal status, 
stricto sensu, contained in the substantive law of common article 3 and the perceived legal 
and political status, flowing from the acknowledgment of the existence of a party to the 
conflict. Such a perception of the equation of legal regulation with political status as well 
legal status under general international law, and the conflation of political and legal status, 
is commonly held by governments. It draws from the belligerency paradigm, when any 
legal regulation was closely linked to the state-like characteristics of the non-state armed 
group and its state-like potential.82 As will be seen,83 it leads to the denial of the existence 
of an armed conflict in practice. It is also reflected in the approach of the ICRC, which, 
in its humanitarian advances, often chooses not to mention common article 3, instead 
invoking general humanitarian principles, in order to not dissuade the states by referring 
to the application of the article.84 
In addressing this conflation of legal and political status, influenced as it is with the old 
regime of jus in bello, the question remains, to what extent the doctrine of recognition of 
belligerency and recognition of insurgency have survived common article 3. Firstly, it has 
to be observed that, as a matter of state practice, recognition of belligerency has now 
arguably fallen into desuetude.85 Even acts that, according to the doctrine of belligerency, 
imply such recognition have not been interpreted as recognising belligerency.86  
Nowhere, however, in the travaux préparatoires of common article 3 is it suggested that the 
article is meant to substitute the process of recognition of belligerency.87 To the extent 
that the substantive law applied through recognition of insurgency would be similar to 
the humanitarian provisions covered by common article 3, or to the law applied under 
special agreements which common article 3 exhorts, this might be the case. However, the 
                                              
82 Section 2.2.2. 
83 Section 3.4. 
84 R.-J. Wilhelm, Problèmes Relatifs A La Protection de la Personne Humaine Par Le Droit International Dans Les Conflits 
Armés Ne Présentant Pas Un Charactère International, (1972) 137 Recueil des Cours 311, 336 (Wilhelm). 
85 See Oglesby, especially at 108 ff. There are, however, exceptions. In January 2008 President Chavez of Venezuela 
suggested for the Colombian rebel group FARC to be recognised as belligerent. See 
http://www.eluniversal.com/2008/01/18/en_ing_art_chavez-proposes-to-c_18A1309641.shtml 
86 See D. Schindler, ¶7KH'LIIHUHQW7\SHVRI$UPHGFRQIOLFWV$FFRUGLQJWRWKH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQVDQG3URWRFROV·
(1979) Recueil des Cours 121, 145 ff. for examples (Schindler, Types). He mentions the case of Nigeria/Biafra, where a 
declaration of blockade was not interpreted as belligerency.  
87 Cf 7)DUHU ¶+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZDQG$UPHG&RQIOLFWV7RZDUGWKH'HILQLWLRQRI ¶,QWHUQDWLRQDO$UPHG&RQIOLFW·
(1971) 71 Columbia Law Review 37 (Farer) who argues that conflicts bearing the characteristics of belligerency should 
be considered international armed conflicts, covered by common article 2.  
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legal consequences of recognition of belligerency, and notably the activation of neutrality, 
are not fully covered by the Geneva Conventions.88 Final doubts are dispelled by 
resolution 10, adopted at the Plenary: ´7KH &RQIHUHQFH FRQVLGHUV WKDW WKH FRQGitions 
under which a Party to a conflict can be recognised as a belligerent by Powers not taking 
part in this conflict, are governed by the general rules of international law on the subject 
DQGDUHLQQRZD\PRGLILHGE\WKH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQVµ89 The existence of the Geneva 
&RQYHQWLRQVFUHDWLQJDUHJLPHRIDXWRPDWLFDSSOLFDWLRQRI¶REMHFWLYH·FULWHULDLVPRUHD
reflection of the reasons why the doctrine of belligerency has fallen into desuetude, rather 
than the cause. 
 
3.3. Defining ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFWQRWRIDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHU· 
 
3.3.1.  Intensity 
 
According to an oft-TXRWHGVWDWHPHQWRIH[DVSHUDWLRQ´>R@QHRIWKHPRVWDVVXUHGWKLQJV
WKDWPLJKWEH VDLGDERXW WKHZRUGV ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFWQRWRIDQ LQWHUQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHU· is 
that no one can say with assurance precisely what meaning they were intended to 
convey.µ90 7KH WHUPV ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW· DQG ¶QRWRIDQ LQWHUQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHU· UHIOHFW WKH
material frame of application of common article 3 against its geni proximi,91 the lower and 
upper thresholds, that of a situation not constituting an armed conflict and one 
constituting an armed conflict of an international character.  
With respect to the lower threshold a variety of factors has been advanced. At the same 
time, the inherent difficulty of defining the exact characteristics that render the situation 
within the ambit of common article 3 has often been acknowledged.92 As was the case 
                                              
88 See also fns 34 ff and text on the position of delegates on the inter-relation of common article 3 and belligerency. 
89 International Committee of the Red Cross, The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, (ICRC, 1949), 228. 
90 Farer, 43. [Italics omitted.] 
91 See, for the use of the logical categories genus proximum and differentia specifica in the definition of the concept D. 
&LREDQX ¶7KH&RQFHSWDQG'HWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKH([LVWHQFHRI$UPHGFRQIOLFWVQRWRIDQ,QWHUQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHU·
(1975) 58 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 43, 51. (Ciobanu) 
92 6HHIRUH[DPSOH&=RUJELEH ¶3RXUXQHUpDIILUPDWLRQGXGURLWKXPDQLWDLUHGHVFRQIOLWVDUPpV LQWHUQHV·
Journal du Droit International 658, 661. (Zorgbibe) 
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with belligerency and insurgency93 there are two fields of inquiry, the situation and the 
actor. These two categories can be expressed through the terms intensity and 
organisation. Indeed, it should be pointed out from the outset that the intensity and 
organisation of the violence are the two criteria that need to be satisfied, while the 
various sub-criteria or factors suggested will have an indicative nature.94 
,Q WHUPV RI LQWHQVLW\ WKHYLROHQFHPXVWEH DUPHG DQGRI ´FRQVLGHUDEOHSURSRUWLRQV LQ
ERWKGXUDWLRQDQGWKHDUHDLQYROYHGµ95 ,QFRQWUDGLVWLQFWLRQDULRWLV´RIVKRUWGXUDWLRQ
DQGORFDOFKDUDFWHUµ96 According to a 1962 Report by the International Committee of the 
5HG &URVV ,&5& ´RQH VKRXOG WDNH LQWR DFFRXQW VXFK IDFWRUV DV WKH OHQJWK RI WKH
conflict, the number and framework of the rebel groups, their installation or action on a 
part of the territory, the degree of insecurity, the existence of victims,97 the methods 
employed by the legal government to re-HVWDEOLVKRUGHUHWFµ98 Accordingly, the struggle 
PXVW KDYH ´D FROOHFWLYH FKDUDFWHUµ99  and, it has been argued, it must involve the 
government using the military rather than police forces.100 This would reflect the 
seriousness of the situation and a more pervasive disturbance of civil order, at least in 
terms of the threat the insurgents pose to the government. A riot will usually be dispersed 
by the police. The latter factor also reflects the move from national criminal law to the 
international law of armed conflict.101  
Another relevant factor is the measures that the government is forced to take in matters 
of legislation. Issuing emergency laws and decrees that would normally apply to situations 
                                              
93 Sections 2.2.2 and 2.3.2. 
94 7KLV LV UHIOHFWHG LQ WKH &RPPHQWDU\·V FKDUDFWHULVDWLRQ RI WKH ¶FULWHULD· LW XVHV DV PHUHO\ ´FRQYHQLHQWµ. The 
indicative nature of the criteria will be more clearly stated in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals. See section 
6.5. 
95 Castrén, 28. Note that the duration is a factor for the violence turning into (the legal category of) an armed 
conflict, and not that the armed conflict must be of a certain duration to fall under common article 3. The question 
of duration will be further discussed, and will pose some problems, in sections 6.5.3 and 7.4.1. 
96 Castrén, 30. See also, for a description of riots and internal tensions, Conference of Government Experts on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 24 
May ² 12 June 1971, vol. 5, 79. (Conference of Government Experts) 
97 2QWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIYLFWLPVIRUWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDQ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·VHHDOVRWKHDUJXPHQWPDGHE\WKH$OJHULDQ
Office, White Paper on the Application of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to the French-Algerian Conflict (Algerian Office: 
New York, 1960), 7. (Algerian Office) (My reference) 
98 6HHWKH5HSRUWE\ WKH,&5&53LQWR5DSSRUWHXUHQWLWOHG ¶+XPDQLWDULDQ$LG WRWKH9LFWLms of Internal 
&RQIOLFWV·DQGUHSURGXFHGLQInternational Review of the Red Cross 79, 82.  
99 See also Ciobanu, 56. 
100 See Pictet, Commentary, 36; -%RQG¶,QWHUQDO&RQIOLFWDQG$UWLFOHRIWKH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQV·Denver 
Law Journal 263, 274 (Bond). 
101 There is, however, a variety of situations where the army is brought in to deal with matters that would not, 
RWKHUZLVHTXDOLI\DV¶DUPHGFRQIOLFWV·6HHIRUH[DPSOHVMoir, 38-40. 
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of war, effecting alterations of domestic legislation, drafting, imposing extensive 
detentions etc,102 point to an equal break-down of civil order.103 Such acts by the 
government can be seen as declarative of the fact that the situation merits the legal rules 
regulating armed conflict. Inevitably, the fact that the non-state armed group has made it 
necessary for the government to resort to such dramatic administrative measures can be 
seen as reflecting its political status, or diminishing that of the government.  
The above factors determining the intensity of the conflict have two overall 
characteristics that distinguish them to some extent from the criterion of magnitude as 
used in recognition of belligerency.104 The first is that the intensity is mostly focused and 
required to occur within the territory of the state where the armed conflict occurs. The 
important factor here is that the state-actor that primarily experiences the intensity of the 
situation will be the government against which the non-state armed group is fighting,105 
and not necessarily third states. Accordingly, it is primarily the government that will need 
to acknowledge the material situation.106  
The second characteristic of this new concept of intensity is the importance of the effects 
of the conflict on human beings, and particularly civilians. This is not unrelated to the 
characteristic mentioned in the previous paragraph. While in the case of belligerency and 
insurgency magnitude related to control of territory and ports and the effects that this 
had on the interests of third states, now the situation is focused on the intensity of the 
violence in the territorial unit. Some prominent factors, such as the number of victims 
directly reflect the harm on human beings. Others, such as the territorial extent of the 
hostilities or the weaponry involved, can also be understood as relating intensity to the 
threat and harm on human beings, therefore necessitating legal rules of humanitarian 
protection.  
Importantly, one criterion used for recognition of belligerency that is not perceived as 
present in common article 3 by the literature is the effective control and administration of 
                                              
102 See Bond, 274-5.  
103 See also this factor, taken further to argue for the internationalisation of the conflict, in M. Bedjaoui, Law and the 
Algerian Revolution (Publications of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, 1961), 143-7. (Bedjaoui) 
Again, however, it can be the case that such measures are taken in a national emergency short of armed conflict. 
104 See section 2.2.2. 
105 Unless, of course, the conflict is between non-state armed groups. 
106 This is not to deny the important, if secondary, role of international organisations such as the UN. See below 
section 3.4.1. 
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territory.107 Indeed, to do so would run contrary to the very logic of the creation of 
common article 3. As was discussed in the previous chapter,108 the control of territory is 
the minimum necessary criterion and the starting point for the state-like character of the 
non-state actor. The effective control over territory was necessary for both the military 
and political viability of the actor. It was also necessary for the effect the actor had on the 
interests of third states, both when these interests were affected in that territory and 
when the territory was used as a basis for action on the open seas. As the content and 
rationale of common article 3 focus on humanitarian protection, that logic is no longer 
applicable.  
 
3.3.2. Organisation 
 
The shift in the concept of intensity does not mean that the characteristics of the non-
VWDWH JURXS DUH LUUHOHYDQW WR WKH ILQGLQJ RI DQ ´DUPHG FRQIOLFW not of an international 
FKDUDFWHUµ 7KHVH DUH H[SUHVVHG LQ WKH QHFHVVDU\ FULWHULRQ RI D FHUWDLQ GHJUHH RI
organisation of the group.109 Some degree of organisation is a logical necessity to the 
H[WHQWWKDWFRPPRQDUWLFOHVSHDNVRID¶SDUW\·WRWKHDUPHGFRnflict. It is also a practical 
necessity, to the extent that the group will have to apply the legal rules itself.  
Accordingly, in order to find the limits of the degree of organisation, and distinguish the 
level of organisation from that necessary for a pDUW\WRD¶FLYLOZDU·LQWKHROGV\VWHPRQH
can turn to a functional approach. It has been suggested that the non-state armed group 
has to be organised enough in order to put into effect the substantive provisions of 
common article 3.110 This would include both negative and positive obligations. 
$FFRUGLQJO\ WKH SURKLELWLRQ DJDLQVW ´YLROHQFH WR OLIH DQG SHUVRQµ111 DQG ´WDNLQJ RI
KRVWDJHVµ112 would necessitate the possibility of dissemination of the rules and the 
imposition of discipline on members on the group, therefore, the existence of a 
                                              
107 See, for example, *'UDSHU ¶7KH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQVRI ·  Recueil des Cours, 63, 90 (Draper); 
0RLU+RZHYHUWKLVLVLQFOXGHGLQ3LFWHW·V¶FRQYHQLHQW·FULWHULD6HH,&5&Commentary, 36. 
108 See section 2.3.2 fn 124 and text. 
109 See for example Ciobanu, 56; Zorgbibe, 665; Moir, 36-8 
110 See Draper, 90. 
111 Par. 1(a) 
112 Par. 1(b) 
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responsible command, which will guarantee respect for these rules. Perhaps more 
demanding, in terms of organisation, would be the positive obligation to guarantee a 
´UHJXODUO\FRQVWLWXWHGFRXUWDIIRUGLQJDOO WKH MXGLFLDOJXDUDntees which are recognised as 
LQGLVSHQVDEOH E\ FLYLOLVHG SHRSOHVµ113 for the passing of sentences. Perhaps even more 
importantly there should be a justice system for the imposition of discipline and 
prosecution of the violation of the rules by the fighters of the group.114  
This should not mean that when a Party cannot carry out all of the obligations, the article 
does not apply. For example, if the non-state armed group does not have the organisation 
to carry out trials and sentencing procedures observing certain standards, they should 
refrain from doing so, but the humanitarian protections of the article should nevertheless 
apply.115 Indeed, the need for a flexible approach on the applicability of the article results 
for the primacy of the humanitarian and protective rationale. It is also related, as will be 
seen in the next section, to the absence of de jure reciprocity. 
$QRWKHUIDFWRU LVDFHUWDLQ´SROLWLFDOJRDOµ116 at least one that, in terms of national law, 
might amount to high treason.117 This factor reflects the necessary turning point from 
¶FRPPRQ EDQGLWU\· WR SROLWLFDO RUJDQLVDWLRQ UHPLQLVFHQW RI WKH GHEDWHV RQ WKH OLQH
separating piracy from insurgency in the 19th century.118 The shift of focus to a political 
rather than a solely military element in the organisation of the group can revert to a 
conception of a group as a legitimate contender for status in the international system. If 
WKHDSSOLFDELOLW\RIWKHODZFDQGHSHQGRQYDULRXVDFWRUV·SHUFHSWLRQRIWKHJRDOVRIWKH
group, the extension of humanitarian protection can be unduly influenced by 
considerations of conferment of status.  
Finally, a focus on the political element can be used to refer to the political viability and 
potential for independence of the group, leading to the assessment of applicability being 
                                              
113 Par. 1(d) 
114 6HH66LYDNXPDUDQ ¶&RXUWVRI$UPHG2SSRVLWLRQ*URXSV)DLU7ULDOVRU6XPPDU\-XVWLFH"· (2009) 7 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 489. 6LYDNXPDUDQ¶&RXUWV· 
115 See Draper, 91. 
116 See also the decision Société Purfina contre la Nationale Incendie et autres by the Appeals Court of Montpellier, 24 
1RYHPEHU  XVLQJ WKLV FULWHULRQ TXRWHG LQ - 7RXVFR] ¶eWXGH GH OD -XULVSUXGHQFH ,QWHUne sur les Aspects 
,QWHUQDWLRQDX[GHO·$IIDLUH$OJpULHQQH·Revue Générale de Droit International Public 953, 967-8. (Touscoz)  
117 Castrén, 30. 
118 See also Ciobanu, 57.  
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perceived as a first step towards such goals.119 The applicability of the law will then be 
more closely related to the alteration of political and possibly legal status that the group is 
seeking through and beyond the conflict. This will introduce wide status-based 
considerations. Accordingly, the element of the political organisation and goals of the 
group should only be relevant to the extent that they contribute to its cohesion as a 
military group, leading to the existence of an armed conflict.   
 
3.3.3. $PRYHDZD\IURPWKHSDUDGLJPRI¶FLYLOZDU·DQGEHOOLJHUHQF\" 
 
,W LVQHFHVVDU\ WRGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQ WKH FRQFHSWVRI ¶FLYLOZDU· DQG ¶QRQ-international 
DUPHG FRQIOLFW· 6XFK D GLVWLQFWLRQ ZRXOG KHOS WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI WKH FRPPRQ DUWLFOH 
threshold. It would also help understand what move there has been in the structure of 
WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHJDOV\VWHPWKURXJKFRPPRQDUWLFOH¶&LYLOZDU·DVDOHJDOWHUPRIDUW
refers to the legal situation of a conflict akin to wars between states.120 It entails the 
recognition of belligerency of the non-state armed group and the application of the full 
regime of the jus in bello.  
Common article 3 imposes certain minimum humanitarian rules whereas the existence 
DQGDFNQRZOHGJHPHQWRID¶FLYLOZDU·JHQHUDWHVWKHHQWLUH legal regime of the law of war, 
including neutrality. Moreover, as pointed out, the applicability of common article 3 is 
designed to be automatic and non-reciprocal, whereas the applicability of the regime of 
belligerency is activated through the decision of the government and/or third states.  
There is a fundamental structural feature in common article 3 that contributes to the 
move away from a status-based system of applicability and opens the way for the 
development of a rationale of humanitarian protection of individuals. Common article 3 
is a vertical rule of public international law, piercing the sovereignty of the state, whereas 
the regime of belligerency adds a new actor, albeit provisionally, into a horizontal structure 
of reciprocal rules of private law writ large.121 The acceptance of this new actor was the 
                                              
119 See section 2.2.2 fns 45-48 and text. 
120 See section 2.2.2. fns 34 ff. and text. 
121 7KHWHUP¶SULYDWHODZZULWODUJH·XVHGE\7+ROODQGStudies in International Law (Longmans, 1898), 152.  
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function of the process and doctrine of recognition of belligerency and its affinity with 
the recognition of statehood. There is a crucial difference between recognising an actor 
with (potential) law-creating sovereign status and assessing the applicability of public 
international law. This nature of the doctrine and practice of recognition of belligerency 
was one reason it was not possible to move to a mandatory recognition based on 
consistent and objective criteria. Conversely, the aspirations of automaticity of common 
article 3 fit within its function as a vertical rule of public international law. 
This novel structural feature of common article 3 is expressed with relation to the issue 
of reciprocity.122 Indeed, in a horizontal system, reciprocity will be a central element of 
the existence of legal obligation. Reciprocity has been a central feature in the law of war 
at the inter-state level,123 as well as central in the concept of recognition of belligerency. 
In the Geneva Conventions, however, and specifically in common article 3, reciprocity 
does not have the same legal significance.124 
This is because, although reciprocity can have a decisive effect in treaties of a more 
synallagmatic nature, in humanitarian instruments such as the Geneva Conventions as a 
whole, its effects are limited. The former are treaties of a more contractual bilateral or 
multilateral nature, whereas the latter can be seen as normative instruments which seek 
the protection of individuals. Whereas, in the former, the breach of an obligation by one 
of the contracting parties affects the legal obligation of the other party or parties, this is 
QRWWKHFDVHZLWK´WUHDWLHVRIDKXPDQLWDULDQFKDUDFWHUµ7KHUHIRUHDOWKRXJKWKH*HQHYD
Conventions are based in reciprocity to the extent that they bind states parties to them, 
DFFRUGLQJWRFRPPRQDUWLFOHWKH\FRQVWLWXWH´WUHDWLHVRIDKXPDQLWDULDQFKDUDFWHUµ
in the sense of article 60(5) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
This means that the non-observance of its rules by one party does not lead to the 
termination of the treaty and the release of the other party from its obligations. This, 
again, relates to the structure created through the Geneva Conventions of a public law 
                                              
122 Reciprocity in this new structure, and the difference between de jure and de facto reciprocity will also help in the 
interpretation of the threshold of Additional Protocol II. See section 5.4.4. 
123 See T. Meron, Human Rights in Internal Strife: Their International Protection (Grotius Publications, 1987), 12-14, on the 
role of reciprocity in the development of the law. See also *)OHWFKHU¶7KH/DZRI:DUDQGLWV3DWKRORJLHV·
38 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 517, 522-3, who discusses this feature in relation to some aspects of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. 
124 Reciprocity can play a part, however, in ad hoc agreements between the parties to bring into force part or all of the 
Geneva Conventions, as exhorted by par. 3 of common article 3. 
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which operates vertically and independently of the horizontal relations of states.125 To the 
extent that one party is bound by such a vertical obligation, the acts of the other parties 
to the treaty do not affect the obligation. 
Nevertheless, the partiaO RYHUODSRI WKH FULWHULD IRU WKH H[LVWHQFH RI DQ ¶DUPHG FRQIOLFW·
with those for recognition of belligerency, their difference being one of degree,126 reflects 
the difficulty of moving from the old horizontal structure to the new vertical one. It also 
suggests that the paradigm of civil war between state-like entities is still present. The 
confusion is obvious ² and telling ² in the process of the creation of common article 3, as 
recorded in the travaux préparatoires, as well as in the ICRC Commentary, which 
accompanies their interpretation. The process of creation of common article 3 unfolded 
RQ D GRXEOH D[LV WKH VXEVWDQWLYH ODZ WR EH DSSOLHG WR ¶FLYLO ZDU· RU ¶QRQ-international 
DUPHGFRQIOLFWV·DQGWKHGHILQLWLRQRIWKHPDWHULDOILHOGRIDSSOLFDWLRQ 
Part of the underlying confusion is related to the initial effort to apply the whole of the 
*HQHYD &RQYHQWLRQV WR LQWHUQDO FRQIOLFWV DV ZDV VXJJHVWHG LQ WKH LQLWLDO ¶6WRFNKROP
GUDIW·127 Although it became apparent very quickly that the delegates were not willing to 
apply the full Conventions to internal conflicts,128 the proposals for the definition of 
armed conflicts reflected the criteria for belligerency. This is clearly indicated in the draft 
circulated by the first Working Party, which, for the application of the provisions of the 
Conventions, included most of the criteria suggested by individual delegations. In that 
draft there is also a distinction between a situation where the recognition has occurred 
and a situation where, although the material criteria are present, such recognition has not 
occurred. In the latter case, the caveat that the applicability of the article shall not affect 
the status of the parties is present.129  
There is, therefore, the move towards a new structure for the legal regulation, 
independent of recognition by third parties. However, it still includes the criteria 
                                              
125 6HH-GH3UHX[¶7KH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQVDQG5HFLSURFLW\·International Review of the Red Cross 25, 27. 
See also the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in Prosecutor v .XSUHVNLý Case IT-95-16-T, 3 September 1999, par. 511 
VWDWLQJWKDW´WKHGHILQLQJFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIPRGHUQLQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQLWDULDQODZLV«WKHREOLJDWLRQWRXSKROGNH\
WHQHWVRIWKLVERG\RIODZUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHFRQGXFWRIHQHP\FRPEDWDQWVµ 
126 See Zorgbibe, 664. 
127 See, for the text, Pictet, Commentary, 31. See above fn 28 and text. 
128 Although the parties to the conflict are encouraged to conclude bilateral agreements to bring into force all or part 
of the Geneva Conventions, in par. 3 of common article 3.  
129 For the full text of the first Working Party draft see above fn 47. See also IIB, 46-7. 
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applicable in the previous structure. As this was clearly incompatible with the aspiration 
of the Diplomatic Conference to create a text with automatic applicability, the suggestion 
to include such criteria was deemed impracticable.130 The criteria could only be 
abandoned, at least as far as the text of the article was concerned, by limiting the 
substantive provisions applied to internal conflicts. This process was far from linear, as 
the interchange between provisions and principles and the ensuing effort in setting the 
specific principles demonstrates. The enumeration of specific criteria was gradually 
abandoned, as new drafts131 limited the substantial provisions, leading to the creation of 
common article 3.  
It is far from certain, however, that the omission of specific criteria in the text of 
common article 3 reflects the absence of such criteria in the minds of the drafters. 
Rather, the non-GHILQLWLRQRIDQ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·VHems to be an effort to circumvent the 
all too real problems of assessment and applicability, in the absence of a neutral 
authoritative body, and to create a certain flexibility in its application, hoping that such 
flexibility will favour the widest possible applicability.132 This seems to have been the 
aspiration of the ICRC and some delegates in the drafting process.133  
As the foregoing sections have shown, this does not mean that specific criteria are absent 
LQWKHFRQFHSWRIDQ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·7KH,&5&&Rmmentary provides a useful example, 
offering a full concatenation of criteria, as included in the First Working Party draft, 
ZKLOH FKDUDFWHULVLQJ WKHP DV RQO\ ¶FRQYHQLHQW· DQG SURQRXQFLQJ RI WKH DSSOLFDELOLW\ RI
FRPPRQDUWLFOHLIDQ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·RFFurs.134 It seems that the Conference sacrificed 
the legal certainty that a definition would offer,135 in favour of the hope that practice 
would develop such a definition, one that would help the widespread applicability of 
common article 3. This, of course, assumes that a definition that would guarantee the 
                                              
130 Ibid., 49. 
131 The most important of which are the French draft and the Second Working Party draft. See, for the latter, ibid., 
83. See for the text of the draft, above, fn 44. 
132 See Draper, 87. As Farer, at 52, puts it, one possibility is that the indeterminacy of the language used served a 
dual purpose: on the one hand to allow governments to only grant limited protection to participants of such 
conflicts and, at WKHVDPHWLPH´WR LQFRUSRUDWHZLWKLQ WKH&RQYHQWLRQVDG\QDPLFHOHPHQWZKLFKZRXOGIDFLOLWDWH
WKHLUH[SDQVLRQFRLQFLGHQWZLWKWKHGHYHORSPHQWDPRQJVWDWHVRIDQHQKDQFHGVHQVHRILQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\µ 
133 Ciobanu, 49. 
134 See Pictet, Commentary, 35-38. 
135 6HH IRU H[DPSOH &LREDQX  6HH DOVR 0 +XEHU ¶4XHOTXHV FRQVLGpUDWLRQV VXU XQH UHYLVLRQ pYHQWXHOOH GHV
&RQYHQWLRQVGHOD+D\HUHODWLYHVjOD*XHUUH·International Review of the Red Cross 430, 431, arguing for a strict 
definition, because of the highly contentious nature of the different claims in the law of armed conflict. 
98 
 
wide applicability of common article 3 was politically possible, at the time of the drafting. 
The travaux préparatoires suggest otherwise.   
Accordingly, the problems stemming from the non-definition were meant to be solved in 
practice.136 To this practice we shall turn in the next section. We have seen how the 
criteria for the applicability of common article 3 both stem and move away from the 
paradigm of belligerency and how these tensions relate to the evolution of the structure 
of the international system. Through the analysis of the process of application of 
common article 3 we will see how this new structure functioned in practice. The 
structural framework of practice will be first set out, followed by an overview of the 
practice.  
 
3.4. Reluctant state practice ² Modes of acceptance of applicability 
 
3.4.1. The framework of state practice  
 
The practice of the application of common article 3 is determined by the structure of the 
legal regime. This, in turn, will influence the extent to which in the process of application 
of the article there has been a move away from considerations of ascription of status. The 
implicit existence of certain criteria, albeit undefined, necessitates a process of assessment 
and labelling.137 The question then arises who will be the assessor. According to one 
interpretation, by virtue of article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, the government in the 
territory of which the armed conflict is occurring, is under the obligation of assessing and 
pronouncing the existence of such armed conflict.138 7KLVLVEHFDXVHWKHVWDWH·VREOLJDWLRQ
´WRUHVSHFWDQGWRHQVXUHUHVSHFWµIRUFRPPRQDUWLFOHLVDFWLYDWHGDXWRPDWLFDOO\WRWKH
extent that the factual elements of an armed conflict are there.  
                                              
136 See Farer, 51.  
137 6HH5XELQ¶5HEHOV·ff. See also above, on the inevitability of a process of assessment fn 66 and text. 
138 53LQWR ¶/HV5qJOHVGX'URLW,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RQFHUQDQW OD*XHUUH&LYLOH· Recueil des Cours 451, 526 
(Pinto). 
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At the same time, third parties can also assess the existence of an armed conflict and 
often express their opinion in international fora. Nevertheless, it is the incumbent 
JRYHUQPHQW·VSRVLWLRQ WKDW LVPRVW LPSRUWDQW LQ VWDWHSUDFWLFH7KLV LV GXHERWK WR WKH
substantive law of common article 3 and to how this relates to the structure of the 
international system.  
&RPPRQDUWLFOHSURYLGHVIRUDVHWRIPLQLPXPKXPDQLWDULDQSURWHFWLRQVIRU´SHUVRQV
WDNLQJQRDFWLYHSDUW LQKRVWLOLWLHVµ; civilians and members of the armed group that are 
hors de combat. These are legal rules that need to be adhered to by the parties of the 
conflict. It is these parties and not third states that need to apply the rules. This is a 
departure from the previous legal regime of belligerency and insurgency where the law of 
neutrality, and questions of the protection of interests of third states in the territory of 
the conflict,139 directly related to legal interests of third states. 
Accordingly, third states more often take a position on the applicability of common 
article 3 in the context of international organisations, primarily the UN, to the extent that 
the legal and political mandate of these institutions allow this.  However, when states act 
within the UN, notably the General Assembly and the Security Council, the terms of the 
debate will relate more broadly to the purposes of the UN, rather than strictly to the 
DSSOLFDELOLW\ RI FRPPRQ DUWLFOH  7KH SULPDU\ WHUP ZLOO EH WKH ¶PDLQWHQDQFH RI
LQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\·DQGWKHUHIRUHZKHWKHUDVLWXDWLRQFRQVWLWXWHVD¶WKUHDW·
to these. 140  
7KH 81 KDV LQFUHDVLQJO\ FRQVLGHUHG ¶DUPHG FRQIOLFWV· DV VXFK WKUHDWV141 However, a 
transboundary element, such as the flow of refugees142 and dangers to destabilisation of 
the region,143 are commonly added factors for the internationalisation of concern. Even 
                                              
139 See sections 2.2.2. and 2.2.3. 
140 See article 1(1) of the UN Charter. 
141 T. Flores Acuña, The United Nations Mission in El Salvador : A Humanitarian Law Perspective (Kluwer Law 
InWHUQDWLRQDO   6HH DOVR2 6FKDFKWHU ¶7KH8QLWHG1DWLRQV DQG ,QWHUQDO&RQIOLFW· LQ.9HQNDWD5DPDQ
(ed.), Dispute Settlement through United Nations (Oceana, 1977), 301. 
142 An example where a finding of a threat was based on such flows of refugees is SC Resolution 688 (1991) on the 
Iraqi repression of the Kurds.  
143 $QHDUO\FDVHRIVXFKD¶VSLOORYHU·HIIHFWZDVWKHLQWHUQDOFRQIOLFWLQ&\SUXVWKHWKUHDWWRLQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFHDQG
security realised through the Turkish invasion. See SC Resolution 18  5 *RUGRQ ¶8QLWHG 1DWLRQV
,QWHUYHQWLRQLQ,QWHUQDO&RQIOLFWV,UDT6RPDOLDDQG%H\RQG·Michigan Journal of International Law 519. 
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though in many circumstances,144 in order for the situation to be of such seriousness as 
to justify the finding of a threat to international peace and security and the activation of 
Chapter VII,145 there will usually be an armed conflict unfolding, the existence of the 
latter is not a conditio sine qua non for such a finding.  
Nevertheless, the maintenance of international peace and security is not the only purpose 
RI WKH 81 ´>6@ROYLQJ LQWHUQDWLRQDO SUREOHPV RI D . humanitarian character and 
SURPRWLQJDQGHQFRXUDJLQJUHVSHFWIRUKXPDQULJKWVµDOVRILJXUHDPRQJWKHSXUSRVHV
of the organisation.146 In this context there have been resolutions both of the General 
Assembly and the Security Council that have called for the respect of international 
humanitarian law in specific cases,147 suggesting a prior determination of the existence of 
an armed conflict. Indeed, gradually, these purposes of the UN have translated in some 
relevant institutional practice. Some of this practice developed alongside the process of 
decolonisation,148 whereas other practice is related to the development of international 
criminal courts and tribunals.149 It is rare, however, especially in the first two decades of 
FRPPRQDUWLFOH·VOLIHIRUVWDWHs expressly to take a legal position on the applicability of 
common article 3 in particular conflicts. Ultimately, both with respect to the legal 
argumentation and the actual application of common article 3, the territorial government 
will be at the centre of the process of applicability. It is, accordingly, the actions and 
perceptions of territorial governments that influence the extent to which the application 
of common article 3 moves away from status-based considerations. 
Nevertheless, there is another institution more directly involved in the assessment of the 
H[LVWHQFHRIDQDUPHGFRQIOLFW7KH,&5&KDYLQJDVLWVPDQGDWH´WKHIDLWKIXODSSOLFDWLRQ
RILQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQLWDULDQODZµ150 will be directly concerned with the applicability of 
                                              
144 Two such examples are the cases of the former Yugoslavia (e.g. SC Resolution 713 (1991)) and Somalia (e.g. SC 
Resolution 733 (1991)).  
145 As well as the perceived legitimacy of such a finding. See H. McCoubrey and N. White, International Organisations 
and Civil Wars (Aldershot, 1995), 39, who discuss the difference in support that resolutions on Yugoslavia and 
Somalia received as opposed to the one on the Kurdish repression of Iraq.  
146 See articles 1(3) and 55 of the UN Charter. 
147 7KLV SUDFWLFH KRZHYHU KDV PRVWO\ GHYHORSHG DIWHU WKH HQG RI WKH &ROG :DU 6HH * 1ROWH ¶7KH 'LIIHUHQW
Functions of the SecurLW\ &RXQFLO ZLWK 5HVSHFW WR+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZ· LQ9/RZH$5REHUWV - :HOVK DQG'
Zaum (eds.) The Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (Oxford University Press, 
2008), 519. 
148 See chapter 4. 
149 Covered in chapters 6 and 7. 
150 See article 4(c) of the ICRC Statute, available at www.icrc.org. 
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common article 3. This does not mean, however, that every intervention and, 
importantly, the acquiescence of the government to such intervention, by the ICRC 
PHDQV WKH FRQFHVVLRQ WKDW WKHUH LV DQ ¶DUPHG FRQIOLFW· DQG WKDW FRPPRQ DUWLFOH  LV
applicable.151  
Firstly, the ICRC is not a judicial body and, even as a humanitarian actor, it does not 
always see its role as making legal pronouncements of that sort.152 Indeed, it is often the 
case that the ICRC will not argue in favour of its intervention on the basis of common 
article 3. The rationale behind this is to avoid a refusal by the government, stemming 
from its unwillingness to accept the existence of an armed conflict.153 Accordingly, the 
ICRC will argue for the provision of humanitarian relief, referring to general 
humanitariDQ SULQFLSOHV RU ¶SULQFLSOHV RI KXPDQLWDULDQ ODZ·154 in accordance with its 
WUDGLWLRQDO UROH DQG LUUHVSHFWLYHRI WKHH[LVWHQFHRI DQ ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·$OWHUQDWLYHO\ D
government can accept the intervention of the ICRC while explicitly stating that this does 
QRWPHDQWKDWLWKDVFRQFHGHGWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDQ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·155 
,&5&LQWHUYHQWLRQLVQRWGHWHUPLQDWLYHRIWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDQ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·RURIWKH
assessment of the government that such a conflict exists and common article 3 is 
applicable, though it can serve as prima facie evidence of an armed conflict. It is, 
however, as the relation of common article 3 with the international structure stands, the 
most relevant actor in order to observe state practice in relation to the applicability of 
common article 3.  
To conclude it is the territorial government that has the primary role in assessing the 
applicability of common article 3 in its territory, while third states and international 
organisations play, especially in the first decades after the Geneva Conventions, only a 
VHFRQGDU\ UROH ,QDGGLWLRQ WKH ,&5&·V VWDWHPHQWV FDQDOVREHXVHIXO LQ DVVHVVLQJ VWDWH
practice. It is the interrelationship of these actors that will indicate whether, in the 
process of application of the law of armed conflict, there is a move away from status 
                                              
151 The same applies vice-versa: the refusal to accept the offer does not mean there is no armed conflict. See Draper, 
91-2. 
152 See H.-3*DVVHU ¶,QWHUQDWLRQDO1RQ-International Armed Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, 
DQG/HEDQRQ·American University Law Review 911, 924. (Gasser) 
153 Wilhelm, 336. 
154 6HH*DVVHU$UJXDEO\KRZHYHU¶SULQFLSOHVRIKXPDQLWDULDQODZ·WRWKHH[WHQWWKDWKXPDQLWDULDQODZPXVWEH
applicable, can only mean the existence of an armed conflict. 
155 Bond, 271. 
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based considerations. The state practice reviewed in this chapter will confined to the first 
decades after the signing of the Geneva Conventions in 1949, and when common article 
3 was the only relevant instrument. The signing of the Additional Protocols in 1977 
added new layers of regulation, discussed in the next two chapters. 
 
3.4.2. State practice 
 
There have been some efforts to amass state practice in a more or less organised way. 
Forsythe, for example, has produced a chart where he attempts to trace the acceptance of 
applicability of common article 3 between 1949 and 1975. He finds nine cases where the 
applicability of common article 3 was accepted and twenty-RQH´SRVVLEOH VLWXDWLRQV IRU
WKHDSSOLFDWLRQµZKHUHLWZDVQRW156 While this statistic gives us a general picture of the 
frequency of the invocation of common article 3, it is important to see how the 
application or non-application of common article 3 came about and to note any tensions 
in the practice. The situations discussed below generally consist of the necessary 
minimum of intensity and organisation, although the material factors justifying this 
cannot be analysed in this space. 
The first effort to apply the Conventions was made during the civil war in Greece, in 
1946-9. Although the Geneva Conventions had not come into force, the ICRC used the 
preparatory works of the Conference in order to convince the parties to observe the basic 
humanitarian protections provided in common article 3.157 The government did not 
accept the existence of an armed conflict. A Special Commission, set up by the Security 
&RXQFLO´FRQFOXGHGWKDWWKHUHZDVQRVWDWHRIDFWXDOFLYLOZDUµDOWKRXJK´WKHVLWXDWLRQ
                                              
156 ' )RUV\WKH ¶7KH /HJDO 0DQDJHPHQW RI ,QWHUQDO :DU ² The 1977 Protocol on Non-International Armed 
FRQIOLFWV·   American Journal of International Law 272, 275-6. (Forsythe) He also adds three conflicts, the 
Congo, 1960-4, Yemen, 1963-7, and Nigeria, 1967- ZKHUH ¶WKH SULQFLSOHV· RI WKH *HQHYD &RQYHQWLRQV RU WKH
ZKROH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQVZHUHVDLGWRDSSO\)RUV\WKH·VVRXUFHVYDU\IURP,&5&5HSRUWVWRSHUVRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQ 
157 Bond, 271. 
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ERUHDQH[WUHPHO\FORVHUHVHPEODQFHWRRQHµ158 The ICRC did not succeed in persuading 
the parties to observe the Geneva Conventions.159 
Soon after that situation, however, certain armed conflicts in Latin America arguably 
constitute the first examples of the acceptance of the applicability of common article 3. 
Accordingly, in, Guatemala (1954),160 Costa Rica (1954-5), and Cuba (1958),161 the ICRC, 
¶LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK DUWLFOH  RI WKH  *HQHYD &RQYHQWLRQV RIIHUHG KXPDQLWDULDQ
VHUYLFHVZKLFKZHUHDFFHSWHGLQDOOWKUHHRIWKHVHLQVXUUHFWLRQVµ162 
In Yemen (1963-´E\-DQXDU\ERWKWKH5R\DOLVWV and Republicans had agreed to 
´UHVSHFWWKHSULQFLSOHVµRIWKH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQVRIµ163 However, the main legal 
questions with respect to Yemen related to whether the intervention of the United Arab 
Republic, in favour of the Republicans, and of Saudi Arabia, in favour of the Royalists, 
internationalised the conflict. Implicitly, however, the above statement seems to mean 
WKDWDQ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·GLGH[LVW 
Similar questions were raised with respect to the conflict in Biafra (1967-70). The Federal 
Government of Nigeria never accepted the applicability of common article 3,164 although, 
in practice, steps were taken to abide by obligations contained in common article 3 and 
the Geneva Conventions. Accordingly, camps were created for the humane treatment of 
prisoners and a Code of Conduct was issued to the Nigerian soldiers containing extensive 
rules and obligations, in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Moreover the ICRC 
ZDVLQYLWHGWRLQVSHFWWKHIDFLOLWLHV´,QJHQHUDOWKH&RGHRI&RQGXFWZDVWDNHQVHriously 
DQG HQIRUFHG E\ WKH FRPPDQGHUVµ165 When the Nigerian army was accused of 
indiscriminate bombing, it did not argue that it had no obligation to discriminate under 
common article 3 but denied the allegations and eventually managed to control its forces 
                                              
158 Castrén, 67 
159 Ibid.; SHH DOVR - &DPSEHOO ¶7KH *UHHN &LYLO :DU· LQ ( /XDUG HG The International Regulation of Civil Wars 
(Thames and Hudson, 1972), 37. 
160 The matter is not very clear, though. See, for example, Bond, 272, who argues that the ICRC intervened despite 
the non-acceptance of the applicability of common article 3. See also Siotis, 209-10.  
161 Siotis, 213.  
162 Castrén, 77-8. 
163 .%RDOV¶7KH5HOHYDQFHRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZWRWKH,QWHUQDO:DULQ<HPHQ·in R. Falk (ed.),The International Law 
of Civil War (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 303, 315. 
164 See, for example, Bond, 271. 
165 0%RWKH¶$UWLFOHDQG3URWRFRO,,&DVH6WXGLHVRI1LJHULDDQG(O6DOYDGRU·American University Law 
Review 899, 903. (Bothe¶&DVH6WXGLHV·) 
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to that effect.166 The main legal issue, again, was whether the conflict was international, 
either through the recognition of belligerency, or because of the existence of a de facto 
regime in Biafra prompting the recognition of statehood of Biafra by some states.167  
Issues of internationalisation were also raised in Korea (1950-3) and in the first phase of 
the Vietnam conflict (1946-54).  In the former, according to Castrén,168 there was a 
decision to apply common article 3 at the beginning of the conflict and by and large it 
was respected. In the latter situation both parties, but particularly France, seem to have 
hindered in practice the overview by the ICRC.169  
In the case of the conflict in the Congo (1960-4),170 the parties to the conflict, the 
Congolese government and Katanga, had a high level of organisation and even the 
control of territory.171 Belgium, the former colonial power, had ratified the Geneva 
Conventions in 1952 and, accordingly, in the view of the ICRC, the Congo was bound by 
them. The ICRC added that a notification by the newly independent state that it 
FRQVLGHUV LWVHOI ERXQG ZRXOG EH ¶DGYLVDEOH·172 The Congolese government sent a 
GHFODUDWLRQ WR WKH,&5&RQ)HEUXDU\ UHDIILUPLQJ WKH VWDWH·VDGKHUHQFH WR WKH
Geneva Conventions.173 President Tshombe, of Katanga, declared that he would adhere 
to the principles mentioned in an ICRC appeal to uphold the Geneva Conventions, and 
accepted visits by the ICRC.174 This did not prevent certain atrocities, however, such as 
the massacre of the Baluba tribe in the Kasai province.175 The Congo, in relation to the 
Katanga secession, however, was another conflict where the main legal issue was the right 
to self-determination and secession of the Katanga province. Statements and practice of 
                                              
166 Ibid. 
167 6HHIRUH[DPSOH',MDOD\H¶:DV´%LDIUDµ$W$Q\7LPHD6WDWHLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ"·American Journal 
of International Law 551. (Ijalaye) Biafra was recognised by only four states. Bothe and Wodie argue that this was not 
enough for statehood. See %RWKH ¶&DVH 6WXGLHV·, 903, also for the argument that the conflict was international 
because Biafra was a de facto regime. Contra 5 +LJJLQV ¶,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ DQG &LYLO &RQIOLFW· LQ ( /XDUG HG
International Regulation of Civil Wars (Thames and Hudson, 1972), 169, 170- +LJJLQV):RGLH ¶/D6pFHVVLRQGX
%LDIUDHWOH'URLW,QWHUQDWLRQDO3XEOLF·Revue Générale de Droit International Public 1018, 1036-8. 
168 Castrén, 70-2. 
169 Ibid., 72-3. 
170 The situation in Congo included a variety of actors and conflicts ranging from the fight against remaining Belgian 
paratroopers, fighting within government factions and, most importantly, the conflict over the Katanga secession. 
6HHJHQHUDOO\'0F1HPDU¶7KH3RVW-,QGHSHQGHQFH:DULQWKH&RQJR·in R. Falk (ed.),The International Law of Civil 
War (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 244. (McNemar) 
171 Ibid., 258. 
172 6HHWKH,&5&·VVWDWHPHQWLQInternational Review of the Red Cross 208. 
173 See (1962) International Review of the Red Cross 7. 
174 McNemar, 259-60. See also Moir, 74-8. 
175 McNemar, 265-7. 
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adherence to common article 3 by and large coincided with claims to international status. 
When the secession war was over, further rebel activities were treated as an internal 
matter and the applicability of common article 3 was not accepted.176 
A final example where the applicability of common article 3 co-existed with claims for 
the internationalisation of the conflict is the Algerian war (1954-1962), between France 
and the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN).177 Initially, for France, the 
VLWXDWLRQ FRQVWLWXWHG D ¶GRPHVWLF PDWWHU· DQG WKH LQFUHDVLQJO\ H[WHQGHG )UHQFK PLOLWDU\
DFWLRQ LQ LWV FRORQ\ FRQVWLWXWHG ¶SROLFH DFWLRQ·.178 The FLN argued, since early in the 
conflict, for the applicability of common article 3.179 By 1958 the Algerians had created a 
Provisional Government (GPRA) and, arguably, were gradually in control of certain 
areas.180 Eventually France, in 23 June 1956 by a communiqué issued by the French 
3ULPH 0LQLVWHU·V RIILFH WR WKH ,&5& DFFHSWHG ¶RQ WKH EDVLV RI FRPPRQ DUWLFOH · WR
allow it to intervene.181  
Nevertheless, at the time when France was accepting the applicability of common article 
3, the FLN was moving away from it. Accordingly, the Algerians argued that they 
possessed the status of belligerents and that such an implicit recognition had occurred. 
Their arguments were based both on factual characteristics of the conflict and the 
actors182 as well as on actions by France that granted them this status.183 By arguing for 
the application of belligerency, they excluded the application of common article 3. 
According to this argument, the status of belligerent could not coexist with paragraph 4 
of common article 3, stipulating the non-effect to the legal status of the parties to the 
conflict.184 At this point, it was in the interest of the Algerian side to argue exclusively for 
                                              
176 Ibid., 280-1. 
177 For the relevant facts see %HGMDRXL DQG WKH DUWLFOHV E\ )ORU\ FLWHG EHORZ 6HH DOVR $ )UDOHLJK ¶7KH $OJHULDQ
5HYROXWLRQ DV D &DVH 6WXG\ LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ· LQ 5 )DON HG The International Law of Civil War (The Johns 
Hopkins Press: Baltimore and London, 1971), 179. (Fraleigh) 
178 $FFRUGLQJWR)ORU\)UDQFH·VDFWLRQVZHUHLQWKHFRQWH[WRIUH-establishing order. Any extraordinary measures are 
explained as emergency rather than war measures. 0 )ORU\ ¶$OJpULH HW 'URLW ,QWHUQDWLRQDO·   Annuaire 
Français de Droit International 817, 830. (Flory (1959)) See also Algerian Office, 13 
179 6HH ( YDQ &OHHI *UHHQEHUJ ¶/DZ DQG WKH &RQGXFW RI WKH $OJHULDQ 5HYROXWLRQ·   Harvard Journal of 
International Law 37, 49. (van Cleef Greenberg) 
180 See Bedjaoui, 38-42. 
181 Ibid., 213; Siotis, 210-1. 
182 See Bedjaoui 41, 50. 
183 See ibid., 143-172. Contra Flory 831-2, Touscoz 955-7. 
184 See, for this argument, Bedjaoui, 215. The Algerian Office took a different position arguing that´LQXUJLQJLWV
application, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic is not compromising its claim for recognition of 
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the internationalisation of the conflict in order to achieve statehood. The Provisional 
Government, accordingly, took the step of ratifying the Geneva Conventions.185 It used 
this to portray itself as a subject of international law,186 although, the Swiss depository of 
the Conventions made clear that the accession to the Conventions will only have effect 
DJDLQVWVWDWHVZKLFKKDYHUHFRJQLVHG$OJHULD·VVWDWHKRRG 
The conflict ended officially with the independence of Algeria in March 1962. The 
conflict reflects the difficulties of application of common article 3, between questions of 
¶GRPHVWLF MXULVGLFWLRQ·DQGDUJXPHQWVIRUWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQRIWKHFRQIOLFW7RWKH
extent that the insurgent actor will not have achieved a political and military status which 
would threaten the incumbent government, the latter will argue for the non-existence of 
an armed conflict DQGZLOOFKDUDFWHULVH LWVPLOLWDU\HIIRUWDVD ¶SROLFHRSHUDWLRQ·. On the 
other hand, the factual characteristics that will make it necessary for the government to 
DFFHSWWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDQ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·DQGWKHDSSOLFDELOLW\RIFRPPRQDUWLFOHRIWHQ
occur at the point where the conflict is on the verge of being internationalised.  
Finally, in a variety of conflicts, common article 3 was never accepted or applied. Some 
examples are: Rhodesia(1959), Laos(1961-2), Indonesia(1966-9), Ceylon(1971), 
Bolivia(1971), Burundi(1972), the Philippines(1972-), and Angola(1973-6).187  In the cases 
of Kenya and Cyprus, Britain permitted the ICRC to visit deWDLQHHVEXWLW´PDGHLWFOHDU
WKDWWKHVHLQYLWDWLRQV«DURVHQRWIURPDQ\REOLJDWLRQXQGHU$UWLFOHEXWDVDJUDWXLWRXV
DFW RI VRYHUHLJQW\µ188 Ultimately, the dependence on the discretionary decision of the 
government for the applicability of common article 3 has rendered the relevant state 
practice fragmented and unsatisfactory.189 &DVWUpQ LVSDUWLFXODUO\GLVSLULWHG ´0DQ\ OHJDO
questions have remained confused or completely open; efforts to solve them must rely 
on logic alone or on finding support in some geQHUDOSULQFLSOHVRIODZµ190 To conclude, 
                                                                                                                                            
LWVEHOOLJHUHQWVWDWXVRURIWKHIDFWWKDWWKHFRQIOLFWLQ$OJHULDFRQVWLWXWHVDZDUµ6HH$OJHULan Office, 18. See also van 
Cleef Greenberg, 51, who notes the discrepancy.  
185 7KH$OJHULDQ*RYHUQPHQW·VFRPPXQLTXpLVUHSURGXFHGLQ$OJHULDQ2IILFH 
186 See also %RWKH ¶&DVH 6WXGLHV·, 901, who draws a parallel, in terms of achieving international status, between 
accession to the Geneva Conventions and recognition of belligerency.  
187 See Bond, 270-2; Forsythe, 276. 
188 Higgins, 183. 
189 See also, for this conclusion, Bond, 272-3; Ciobanu, 66; Moir, 86. Rubin argues that whatever success the ICRC 
has had in persuading some sides to observe the common article 3 is partly due to its ´slightµ protections. See 
5XELQ¶5HEHOV·-5. 
190 Castrén, at 78-9, refers, in addition, to questions relating to recognition of belligerency and intervention.  
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the practice discussed above shows that the central role of the territorial government 
often leads either to the denial of the applicability of the article or to its precarious 
H[LVWHQFH EHWZHHQ ¶SROLFH RSHUDWLRQV· DQG ¶LQWHUQDWLRQDO DUPHG FRQIOLFW· 7KHVH IHDWXUHV
will be further analysed below, and linked to a status-based rationale of applicability. 
 
3.4.3. Analysis of state practice 
 
The central role of the government in pronouncing the applicability and actually applying 
FRPPRQDUWLFOHVLJQLILFDQWO\DIIHFWV WKHDUWLFOH·VIXQFWLRQ,WVHHPVWKDWVWDWHVZLOOQRW
accept the applicability of common article 3 to the extent that they feel that they can quell 
the insurgency. The government will contend that the situation is an internal, police 
matter, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state, and that international law and, 
specifically the law of armed conflict, is not applicable.  
It is only when the authority of the government is already seriously threatened, that the 
application of common article 3 may occur.191 $ VHULRXV WKUHDW WR WKH JRYHUQPHQW·V
authority will mean that politically and militarily the non-state armed group is already 
perceived to have achieved a certain status. This reality will also be reinforced by 
international pressure, to the extent that the government has not managed to end the 
conflict quickly. In practice, these elements are likely to be more present in conflicts that 
include control of territory, as was the case in Congo (Katanga) or Nigeria (Biafra). 
Another element that might contribute to the threat to the government, and also to the 
international perception and pressure on the matter is the question of duration. 
Prolonged conflicts, such as Nigeria (Biafra) and the conflict in Algeria, can include a 
gradual consolidation of the organisation of the non-state armed group as well as 
mounting pressure towards the government to accept the applicability of common article 
3. 
It seems, therefore, that, although common article 3 mandates the vertical application of 
humanitarian rules depending only on a minimum of intensity and organisation, in 
                                              
191 Bond, 272-3. 
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practice the resistance of governments will have the effect that mostly conflicts that have 
reached a higher threshold will be regulated. States will not accept that the situation is not 
DQ¶LQWHUQDOPDWWHU·ERWKEHFDXVHWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIFRPPRQDUWLFOHZLOOin practice limit 
the means at their disposal, but also because in their perception the applicability of 
common article 3 would lead to the conferral of status to their opponents.  
This perception of the conferral of status is by nature somewhat vague and straddles 
deferent kinds of statuses. Indeed, the legal status strictu sensu, the aggregate of rights and 
obligations contained in common article 3, is only the starting point for this perceived 
status conferred. This narrow legal status can be understood to be conflated with the 
perception of the conferral of a wider legal status; that of an entity recognised in 
international law. If seen from the perspective of a legal system dominated by the 
paradigm of belligerency, anchored in a subject/object dualism, and the absolute 
centrality of state sovereignty, it is difficult to conceive of a narrow legal status not 
conflated with that of a state-like subject of international law. Furthermore, the 
SHUFHSWLRQRIVXFK¶UHFRJQLWLRQ·RIWKHHQWLW\WKURXJKLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZcan be linked, in 
the perception of both the government and the group, to the boosting of its political 
status.  
Moreover, while the new language of the Geneva Conventions does not include the 
concept of belligerency, the relevant distinction in the new regime is the one between 
international and non-international armed conflicts. While belligerency is still present in 
the legal discourse,192 the claims for status gradually referred to the concept of 
international armed conflict.193 Indeed, in the state practice considered above, the clear 
majority of cases where common article 3 was either explicitly or implicitly respected, 
included legal and political questions of internationalisation of the conflict, either through 
the intervention of third states, or, more importantly for the present focus of the 
discussion, because of claims to statehood.194 The tension present in the state practice is 
the one between a conflict unregulated by international law and left within the domestic 
jurisdiction of the state, and a conflict that tends to inter-national war.  
                                              
192 The term was mentioned in Algeria and Biafra, but no recognition was made. For Algeria see Bedjaoui, 140 ff. 
For Biafra see Ijalaye, 555.  
193 See chapter 4. 
194 The former include Korea, Vietnam, Yemen. The latter include the Congo, Biafra, and Algeria.  
109 
 
&RPPRQ DUWLFOH  VLWV XQHDVLO\ LQ WKLV WHQVLRQ :KLOH WKH ¶REMHFWLYH· FULWHULD IRU LWV
application were FRQFHLYHGDVWKHFULWHULDIRUWKHH[LVWHQFHRID¶FLYLOZDU·GLPLQLVKHGE\
GHJUHH LWV DSSOLFDWLRQ RFFXUUHG PRVWO\ ZKHUH WKH FRQIOLFW UHDFKHG VXFK OHYHOV RI ¶FLYLO
ZDU·7KLVLVQRWWRVD\WKDWWKHUHZDVQRDSSOLFDELOLW\RIFRPPRQDUWLFOHLQVLWXDWLRQV
where, for example, effective control of territory was not present. Nor is it to belittle the 
radical structural departure attempted by common article 3, characterised as the 
emancipation of the law of Geneva from the law of The Hague by one author.195 It is, 
KRZHYHUWRSRLQWRXWLWVXQHDV\H[LVWHQFHRQWKHJURXQGEHWZHHQ¶GRPHVWLFPDWWHU·DQG
¶LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVHGFRQIOLFW· DQGKRZWKLV UHIOHFWV WKHVWUXFWXUHRI WKH jus in bello. In this 
way, the fundamental move from a status-based to an individual-protection rationale 
attempted through common article 3, was often frustrated in practice. The precarious 
H[LVWHQFHRI WKHFRQFHSWRI ¶QRQ-LQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQIOLFW·EHWZHHQSROLFHRSHUDWLRQ
and international armed conflict is a reminder of the constant influence of status-based 
considerations in the application of a low threshold.  
 
3.5. Conclusions 
 
Common article 3 signifies a significant shift in the structure of the international legal 
system and the rationale for the regulation of conflicts involving non-state armed groups. 
It constitutes an attempt to move from a process of decentralised and optional 
conferment of status in a horizontal system of state and state-like actors, to a system of 
wide and automatic regulation for the provision of humanitarian protection, in a vertical 
system of public law. In that sense, it constitutes a fundamental structural shift from the 
previous legal regime. The combination of the narrow threshold, the aspirations of 
automatic applicability, and the explicit provision of a set of humanitarian rules for non-
international armed conflicts, point to such a fundamental structural shift from a status-
based to a humanitarian-protection rationale. 
Nevertheless, the shadowy presence of the concept of belligerency, at the time of the 
drafting, meant that the criteria that were proposed reverted to the paradigm of state-like, 
                                              
195 Siotis, 225-7.  
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status-bearing entities. In order for common article 3 to achieve wide and flexible 
applicability, an approach of non-definition was taken, together with assurances for the 
non-conferment of status and the extension of a minimum of humanitarian rules.  
The attempt to define the threshold, mainly through the doctrine and the work of the 
ICRC, points to the two main criteria of intensity and organisation. Intensity focuses 
mainly on the military mobilisation inside the territory of the state, as opposed to its 
HIIHFWV RQ WKLUG VWDWHV· LQWHUHVWV 7KH HIIHFWV RI WKH FRQIOLFW RQ LQGLYLGXDOV DUH EURXJKW
more to the forefront and this reflects the rationale of humanitarian protection. The 
criterion of organisation focuses on the military organisation of the non-state armed 
group, namely its ability to bring about the necessary intensity and apply basic 
humanitarian rules, and less so on its political organisation and prospects.  
The central role that incumbent governments played in accepting the applicability of 
FRPPRQ DUWLFOH  PHDQW WKDW LQ SUDFWLFH WKH KRSHV IRU FRPPRQ DUWLFOH ·V DXWRPDWLF
applicability were often frustrated. It was not only that governments did not care for the 
limitations on their actions imposed by the rules of common article 3. The minimum 
legal status contained in the substantive rules of common article 3 was conflated with 
conferment or acknowledgment of a wider legal status as well political and military status, 
and was often perceived by the incumbent government as a concession towards the 
political goals of the non-state armed group.  
Accordingly, the applicability of common article 3 was often conceded only when the 
non-state armed group had already achieved, both internally and internationally, a 
significant level of political or military status. The consolidation of the control of 
territory, the long duration of the conflict, or the repeated discussion of the issue in fora 
such as the UN, functioned as indications of such status, without being necessary legal 
criteria for the applicability of common article 3. 
On the side of the non-state armed groups, as seen in the example of the Algerian war, 
common article 3 was used as a first step towards achieving the status of a party to an 
international armed conflict. In that way, the paradigm of belligerency and the 
understanding that there is only room for state-like, status-bearing entities in the 
international legal system survived.  
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This understanding is at the centre of the next episode of regulation of non-state armed 
groups examined in the thesis: the applicability of the legal rules of international armed 
conflict to national liberation movements.  
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4. Chapter 4: Wars of national liberation 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters have tracked the move from the clearly status-based regime of 
belligerency and insurgency to the construction of a vertical, humanitarian-protection-
based regime through common article 3. It has been argued that, while common article 3 
constitutes a significant departure from the belligerency system, status-based 
considerations survive in the non-definition of the article as well as the process for the 
decision of its applicability. 
The next two chapters will look at the regulatory output of the multilateral diplomatic 
conference, which occurred between 1974 and 1977. The historical context is significant. 
The period of decolonisation was nearing its end and a variety of new states,1 formed 
through this struggle, were participating in the Diplomatic Conference. At the same time 
a number of wars of national liberation were still ongoing.   
These new states had gone through the process of being labelled rebels and criminals 
according to the national law of the colonial state. They were eager to change the legal 
regime in order to confer a certain status to national liberation movements and extend 
the regulation of international humanitarian law to those fighting in such conflicts. 
However, at the end of the process, even though humanitarian protection is developed in 
detail throughout the Geneva Conventions and the document that became Additional 
Protocol I, internationalisation, namely the application of the law of international armed 
conflict to a conflict,2 remained a matter of conferring status to a specific kind of actor in 
a specific set of situations.  
The outcome of the negotiations, article 1(4) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, will be 
analysed here. The first part of the chapter will deal with the negotiating process. Before 
                                              
1 %\¶QHZVWDWHV·ZKDWLVPHDQWLVVLPSO\QHZO\LQGHSHQGHQWVWDWHV)RUDJHQHUDOGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHDSSURDFKRIQHZ
states towards the old international law regime see R. Anand, New States and International Law (Vikas Publishing 
House, 1972), particularly p. 45 ff. (Anand, New States) 
2 This kind of internationalisation stricto sensu should be distinguished from internationalisation lato sensu, which refers 
to the international interest and involvement in a conflict situation. In this chapter the term internationalisation will 
refer to the former meaning, unless otherwise specified. 
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that the development of the right to self-determination, a concept central to the 
ascription of status in article 1(4), will be considered. In the discussion of the travaux 
préparatoires special attention will be paid to the debate between the proponents3 of 
internationalisation and their critics.4 The different perspectives yield different opinions 
about the actors perceived to merit the application of the full regime, about the 
circumstances in which this can happen and about the status this process confers. The 
analysis will then turn to the threshold for wars of national liberation. Here, the focus is 
on the actor to whom status is conferred and the opponents of this actor, rather than the 
material situation. Finally, the process of application, and recognition of the actor, will be 
discussed through some relevant practice as well as the process set down by article 96(3) 
of Additional Protocol I.  
 
4.2. The road to article 1(4) 
 
4.2.1. Self-determination and wars of national liberation before the Diplomatic Conference  
 
Central to the concept of wars of national liberation is the right to self-determination of 
peoples,5 as this constitutes the basic criterion for the internationalisation of armed 
conflicts and the ascription of status. It is therefore important to track its development. 
Although a full exploration of the concept and its development is development is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, some significant milestones, especially with respect to the 
FRQFHSW·VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHODZRIDUPHGFRQIOLFWZLOOEe discussed.  
                                              
3 %\ WKH WHUP ¶SURSRQHQWV· LQ WKLV FKDSWHU , ZLOO UHIHU WR D EURDG DOOLDQFH RI VWDWHV FRQVLVWLQJ PRVWO\ EXW QRW
H[FOXVLYHO\ RI ¶QHZ VWDWHV· DQG ¶WKLUG ZRUOG· VWDtes and arguing, through their delegates in the Diplomatic 
Conference, for the internationalisation of wars of national liberation.  
4 %\ WKH WHUP ¶WKH FULWLFV· , ZLOO UHIHU WR WKRVH VWDWHV ZKR WKURXJK WKHLU GHOHJDWHV RSSRVHG DQG FULWLFLVHG WKH
inclusion of wars of national liberation in the category of international armed conflicts. These were mainly western 
states as well as states, like Israel, who were directly affected by the internationalised categories 
5 See generally A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 
(Cassese,Self-Determination - &UDZIRUG ¶7KH 5LJKW WR 6HOI-Determination in International Law: Its Development 
DQG)XWXUH·LQ3$OVWRQHG3HRSOHV·5LJKWV (Oxford University Press, &UDZIRUG¶6HOI-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ·0
.RVNHQQLHPL¶1DWLRQDO6HOI-'HWHUPLQDWLRQ7RGD\3UREOHPVRI/HJDO7KHRU\DQG3UDFWLFHµ International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly  .RVNHQQLHPL ¶6HOI-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ· 5 0F&RUTXRGDOH ¶6HOI-Determination: A 
+XPDQ 5LJKWV $SSURDFK·   International and Comparative Law Quarterly  0F&RUTXRGDOH ¶6HOI-
GHWHUPLQDWLRQ· 
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Initially conceived as a political principle6 its legal evolution had, up to the time of the 
Diplomatic Conference, had led to its being widely considered a legal right.7 Against this, 
the very dynamism of the concept and the potential effects that it could have on the 
formation of states8 meant that its extent and legal consequences never ceased to be 
controversial.  
The development of the right to self-determination has been associated with the UN 
General Assembly. The two General Assembly Resolutions recognised as seminal in the 
literature9 are General Assembly Resolutions 1514 (XV)10 and 2625 (XXV).11 The latter 
contains a passage particularly relevant to the internationalisation of wars of national 
liberation:  
 
 The territory of a colony or other non-self-governing territory has, under the Charter, 
a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it; and such 
separate and distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony 
or non-self-governing territory have exercised their right of self-determination in 
accordance with the Charter 
 
The language of the Resolution points to the centrality of the question of status in 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ·V DSSURDFK WRFRORQLDOLVPDQGGHFRORQLVDWLRQ0RUHRYHU the language 
accentuates the territorial and separate nature of the colonial unit. As we shall see, these 
                                              
6 See Cassese, Self-determination, 11 ff 6HH DOVR $ :KHODQ ¶:LOVRQLDQ 6HOI-Determination and the Versailles 
SettlemenW·International and Comparative Law Quarterly 99. 
7 See ICJ, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, (1975) ICJ Reports 12; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence 
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), (1971) ICJ Reports 
6HH&UDZIRUG¶6HOI-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ·-19. 
8 See ibid., 11-12, for the argument that there is a link between the non-regulation of the creation of states by 
international law and the non-existence of a right of self-determination. 
9 See, for example, Cassese, Self-determination, 70; Wilson, 61 ff.&UDZIRUG¶6HOI-'HWHUPLQDWLRQ· 
10 UNGA Res. 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960, adopted by 89 in favour, none against, and nine abstentions. The 
resolution was eQWLWOHG ´'HFODUDWLRQ RQ WKH *UDQWLQJ RI ,QGHSHQGHQFH WR &RORQLDO &RXQWULHV DQG 3HRSOHVµ
2SHUDWLYHSDUDJUDSKRIWKHUHVROXWLRQVWDWHV´$OOSHRSOHVKDYHWKHULJKWWRVHOI-determination; by virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political statuVDQGIUHHO\SXUVXHWKHLUHFRQRPLFVRFLDODQGFXOWXUDOGHYHORSPHQWµ 
11 81*$ 5HV  ;;9  2FWREHU  HQWLWOHG ´7KH 'HFODUDWLRQ RQ 3ULQFLSOHV RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ
Concerning Friendly Relations  and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
1DWLRQVµ7KLVUHVROXWLRQPDUNHGWKHILUVWWLPHZKHQZHVWHUQVWDWHVGLGQRWDEVWDLQWKHUHVROXWLRQZDVDGRSWHGE\
consensus.  
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elements served as both an argument for the internationalisation of the conflict12 as well 
as a limitation of the categories of internationalised conflicts.13  
As far as the jus in bello is concerned, the key General Assembly Resolution, which very 
closely preceded the Diplomatic Conference was Resolution 3103.14  Invoking the UN 
Charter, the Declaration on Friendly Relations among States, and General Assembly 
Resolution 1514 (XV), the RHVROXWLRQ DIILUPHG WKDW ´>W@KH VWUXJJOH RI SHRSOHV XQGHU
colonial and alien domination and racist regimes for the implementation of their right to 
self-determination and independence is legitimate and in full accordance with the 
SULQFLSOHV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZµ15 Furthermore, referring directly to the jus in bello it 
extended the status and protections included in the international armed conflicts regime 
to combatants fighting in wars of national liberation. The Resolution proclaimed in 
operative paragraphs 3 and 4 that 
 
3. The armed conflicts involving the struggle of peoples against colonial and alien 
domination and racist regimes are to be regarded as international armed conflicts in 
the sense of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the legal status envisaged to apply to 
the combatants in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other international instruments 
is to apply to the persons engaged in armed struggle against colonial and alien 
domination and racist regimes. 
4. The combatants struggling against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes 
captured as prisoners are to be accorded the status of prisoners of war and their 
treatment should be in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions 
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949. 
 
                                              
12 This was a recurring argument in the travaux préparatoires. See, for example, the Romanian delegate at 
CDDH/I/SR 2, par. 14. 
13 Below sections 4.4.1.. 
14 UNGA Res. 3103 (XXVIII), 12 December 1973, HQWLWOHG´%DVLFSULQFLSOHVRIWKHOHJDOVWDWXVRIWKHFRPEDWDQWV
struggling against colonial and alien GRPLQDWLRQ DQG UDFLVW UHJLPHVµ. This was adopted by 82 votes in favour, 13 
DEVWHQWLRQVDQGYRWHVDJDLQVW7KLVZDVQ·WWKHILUVW*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\5HVROXWLRQDGRSWHGRQTXHVWLRQVRIZDUV
of national liberation, but it is the clearest and most forceful one. See also, for example, UNGA Resolution 2444 
(XXIII), which reiterates Resolution XXIII, adopted at the 1968 International Conference on Human Rights held in 
Teheran, and asked for fighters in wars of national liberation to be treated as prisoners of war. 
15 At operative par. 2. 
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The transformation espoused by the Resolution is clear. According to the prevailing view 
in international law16 up to that point wars of national liberation were only considered to 
be covered by common article 3, as occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties. The above Resolution can be seen as an attempt to change that, 
rather than as a change in itself. This is because General Assembly resolutions are not 
binding on member states nor are they a formal source of law. They can however be 
viewed as one factor in the development of customary law, especially if they are accepted 
by a clear majority vote.17  
Although the evolution of the right to self-determination had conferred political 
legitimacy to the struggle of colonial peoples,18 it did not lead to a corresponding 
recognition of the collective legal status of parties to international armed conflicts. The 
opposition by many, especially western, states to the resolution and the attempted legal 
change was clear. As the representative of the US put it, in his view, the resolution was 
´ZURQJLQYLUWXDOO\HYHU\SDUDJUDSKDVDVWDWHPHQWRIODZµ19  
It is important to note, however, that, with respect to the issues of POW status in 
paragraph 4 of the resolution, what it attempted to achieve as a matter of law had already 
often occurred as a matter of practice. In conflicts such as those of Algeria and Biafra 
states had grudgingly moved towards the conferment of POW status to combatants. 
Deliberately withholding the opinio juris element of customary law formation, they did so 
while refusing to concede that they did so as a matter of law.20 At the same time, the 
General Assembly had, through a variety of Resolutions on the situations in the 
                                              
16 See Sandoz, Commentary, 47. See also *'UDSHU¶:DUVRI1DWLRQDO/LEHUDWLRQDQG:DU&ULPLQDOLW\·LQ0+RZDUG
(ed.) Restraints on War: Studies in the Limitation of Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press 'UDSHU ¶:DU
&ULPLQDOLW\·Contra, even before the Diplomatic Conference, G. Abi-6DDE ¶:DUVRI 1DWLRQDO/LEHUDWLRQ DQG WKH
/DZVRI:DU·$QQDOHVG·pWXGHVLQWHUQDWLRQDOHV93.  
17 6HHDPRQJRWKHUV26FKDFKWHU¶,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZLQ7KHRU\DQG3UDFWLFH·Recueil des Cours 10, 111 ff. 
See also for a reference to the customary merits of resolution 2625 with respect to the jus ad bellum ICJ, Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), [1986] ICJ Reports 4, par. 188. 
18 Indeed, it is characteristic that even those who opposed the resolution did not criticise the aims of national 
liberation movements. See the comments by Aldrich, Representative of the US, UNGAOR, 28th session, 6th 
Committee, 1451st meeting, 1 December1973. 
19 Mr Evans (USA), UNGAOR, 28th session, 2197th plenary meeting, 12 December 1973. The resolution, however, 
did not draw criticism only from representatives of states. Scholars such as Kalshoven argued that the resolution was 
rushed through the sixth committee without much debate and constituWHG´DQHYLGHQWDWWHPSWWRSUHMXGJHWKHLVVXHV
LQ TXHVWLRQ EHIRUH WKH 'LSORPDWLF &RQIHUHQFH KDG HYHQ VWDUWHGµ 6HH ) .DOVKRYHQ ¶5HDIILUPDWLRQ DQG
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The First Session of the 
Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 20 February ² 0DUFK·Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3, 
.DOVKRYHQ¶)LUVW6HVVLRQ· 
20 See, for example, %RWKH¶&DVH6WXGLHV·, 901; Fraleigh, 195. See section 3.4.2.  
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Portuguese colonies, South Africa and Rhodesia, requested that such treatment be 
conferred.21 Resolution 3103, attempted to crystallise such state practice. However, the 
often clear position of states that the treatment of enemy soldiers was not a result of legal 
obligation points to the non-existence of the necessary opinio juris for the formation of 
custom. 
These developments show that the right of self-determination was very much at the 
centre of the political and legal international stage. On the one hand, self-determination 
had gradually been accepted as a legal right and not just as a principle for ordering the 
international system. On the other hand, the legitimation of self-determination units that 
this entailed was used to confer status upon them as a matter of law in the context of the 
jus in bello. The latter consequence remained extremely controversial and polarised states. 
,W GLG VR DW WKH ¶&RQIHUHQFH RI *RYHUQPHQW ([SHUWV· RI  DQG 22 which 
convened by the ICRC in consultation with the UN Secretary General, in preparation for 
the Diplomatic Conference.23 7KHUHDGLVFXVVLRQRI´LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQµ took place that 
dealt with three types of situations: Where the insurgent party has come to display many 
of the features of a State;24 where there is foreign intervention;25 and wars of national 
liberation. The latter was the most controversial.26 Against this background the ICRC 
called for a Diplomatic Conference, to take place in Geneva in 1974. 
 
4.2.2. The travaux préparatoires of the Diplomatic Conference  
 
                                              
21 See, for example, UNGA Resolution 2383(XXIII) and UNGA Resolution 2508 (XXIV) on Southern Rhodesia, 
UNGA Resolution 2547 (XXIV), on Southern Rhodesia, Portuguese colonies and Namibia, UNGA Resolution 
2678 (XXV) on Namibia, UNGA Resolution 2871 (XXVI) on Namibia. 
22 See section 5.2. for a fuller account of the ICRC activity in preparation for the Conference. 
23 See Conference of Government Experts, 23 ff.  6HH DOVR ) .DOVKRYHQ ¶5HDIILUPDWLRQ DQG 'HYHORSPHQW RI
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The Conference of Government Experts, 24 May ² 
 -XQH ·  Netherlands Yearbook of International Law   .DOVKRYHQ ¶([SHUWV· ) .DOVKRYHQ
¶5HDIILUPDWLRQ DQG 'HYHORSPHQW RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO +XPDQLWDULDQ /DZ $SSOLFDEOH LQ $UPHG &RQIOLFWV 7KH
Conference of Government Experts (Second Session), 3 May ²  -XQH ·   Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law 18. 
24 Conference of Government Experts, 13 ff. 
25 Ibid., 17 ff. 
26 .DOVKRYHQ¶([SHUWV· 
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The first days of the Diplomatic Conference set the tone for the entire first session. The 
topics that dominated the agenda, even before the discussion of the proposed draft 
Additional Protocols submitted to the Diplomatic Conference by the ICRC, related to 
the invitation of Guinea-Bissau and North Vietnam as well as the invitation of national 
liberation movements to participate in the proceedings, albeit without a vote.27 The 
participation of national liberation movements in international fora was a practice that 
had first developed in the UN context.28 The practice of participation of these groups 
reflected the political status that they were being accorded and their expectations that it 
be transformed into legal status. When these matters were settled, and in the limited time 
that was left in the first session,29 the topic that dominated the discussion was the 
inclusion of wars of national liberation in article 1 of Additional Protocol I, which set the 
scope of the Protocol, defining international armed conflicts. 
In its draft, the ICRC had evaded the issue of the regulation of wars of national 
liberation30 and had not included the term in Protocol I, except as a footnote in article 42. 
This dealt with the conditions to be fulfilled by combatants for the grant of POW 
status.31 The material scope of Protocol I was set simply by referring to common article 2 
of the Geneva Conventions.32 Proponents of the inclusion of wars of national liberation 
                                              
27 The national liberation movements that would be invited WRSDUWLFLSDWHZHUHWKHRQHV´UHFRJQL]HGE\WKHUHJLRQDO
LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDORUJDQL]DWLRQVFRQFHUQHGµ6HH5HVROXWLRQ,3DUWLFLSDWLRQRI1DWLRQDO/LEHUDWLRQ0RYHPHQWVLQ
the Conference, at CDDH/55. See also Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure at CDDH/2/Rev. 3. See also Kalshoven, 
¶)LUVW6HVVLRQ·-8. 
28 6HH5%D[WHU¶+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZRU+XPDQLWDULDQ3ROLWLFV"7KH'LSORPDWLF&RQIHUHQFHRQ+XPDQLWDULDQ
/DZ·Harvard International Law Journal %D[WHU¶3ROLWLFV· 
29 See ibid., 11, arguiQJWKDW´>R@QHVLQJOHLVVXHGRPLQDWHGWKH&RQIHUHQFHDQGVWRRGLQWKHZD\RIKDUGFRQFHQWUDWHG
ZRUNRQ WKH VXEVWDQFHRI LQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQLWDULDQ ODZµ)RU WKHHIIHFWVRI WKLV WR WKHGLVFXVVLRQRI$GGLWLRQDO
Protocol II section 5.3. 
30 See G. Abi-6DDE¶:DUVRI1DWLRQDO/LEHUDWLRQLQWKH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQVDQG3URWRFROV·Recueil des 
Cours 365, 374 (Abi-Saab). 
31 The proposed text was as follows: 
´,Q FDVHV RI DUPHG VWUXJJOHV ZKHUH SHRSOHV H[HUFLVH WKHLU ULJKW WR VHOI-determination as guaranteed by the UN 
&KDUWHU DQG WKH´'HFODUDWLRQRQ3ULQFLSOHVRI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZFRQFHUQLQJ)ULHQGO\5HODWLRQVDQG&R-operation 
DPRQJ6WDWHVLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKH&KDUWHURIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVµPHPEHUVRIRUJDQL]HGOLEHUDWLRQPRYHPHQWV
who comply with the aforementioned conditions shall be treated as prisoners of war for as long as they are 
GHWDLQHGµ 
32 Common article 2 reads as follows: 
 In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present Convention shall apply 
to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognised by one of them. 
 The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High 
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. 
 Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are 
parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the 
Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof. 
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in the Protocol immediately challenged the draft. The debate was conducted and largely 
concluded33 at the Committee level and during the first (1974) session of the Diplomatic 
Conference. 
The first text to be proposed was amendment CDDH/I/5, which was supported by the 
Socialist group (USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, 
Bulgaria) with the support of three African states (Algeria, Morocco and Tanzania). The 
amendment proposed the addition of a second paragraph to article 1 of the draft 
Protocol to read as follows:  
 
The international armed conflicts referred to in Article 2 common to the 
Conventions include also conflicts where peoples fight against colonial and alien 
domination and against racist regimes. 
 
The second proposed amendment, CDDH/I/11, was submitted the next day and 
supported by 15 states,34 including African states (Egypt Algeria, Libya, Sudan, Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Zaire), Asian states (Syria, Kuwait Yemen, India, Pakistan) and 
with the support of Norway, Australia and Yugoslavia. It proposed, like the previous 
amendment, the addition of a second paragraph to article 1 reading as follows:  
 
The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed struggles 
waged by peoples in the exercise of their right of self-determination as enshrined 
in the Charter of the United Nations and defined by the Declaration on Principles 
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.35 
 
                                              
33 A brief debate took place again in the discussion at the final Plenary session (1977) and in the explanations of 
vote. In addition, article 96(3), which will be discussed below, was proposed and adopted at the last Committee 
session. 
34 Abi-Saab, at 375, argues that it was a product of the non-aligned movement.   
35 Indeed a similar amendment had been proposed in the Conference of Government Experts. See Kalshoven, 
¶([SHUWV·$EL-Saab, 439 fn 19.  
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Abi-Saab, introducing the amendment as delegate for Egypt, argued that the expression 
¶ZDUVRIQDWLRQDOOLEHUDWLRQ·ZDVRPLWWHGE\WKHSURSRVHGDPHQGPHQWLQRUGHUWRDGKHUH
to the  
 
generally-DFFHSWHGOHJDOFRQFHSWVDVDIUDPHRIUHIHUHQFH«3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHWKXV
not being asked to accept something new; it was merely proposed that they should 
affirm explicitly in the field of humanitarian law what they had already accepted as 
binding law within the United Nations and within general international law.36 
 
This was a position adopted by many of the proponents of the inclusion of wars of 
national liberation.37 
On the same day, four western states (United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, West 
Germany), supported by Pakistan and Argentina, proposed an amendment 
(CDDH/I/12) suggesting a second and third paragraph to be included within Article 1, 
with the second paragraph reiterating common article 1 of the Geneva Conventions and 
the third paragraph containing a clause similar to the Martens clause.38  
 
In cases not included in this present Protocol or in other instruments of conventional 
law, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and the authority of the 
principles of international law, as they result from established custom, from the 
principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience. 
 
The Western states meant this as a counter-proposal whereas Pakistan, as a sponsor of 
CDDH/I/11, only saw it as a useful addition.39  
                                              
36 CDDH/I/SR 2, par. 8-11. 
37 See for example Yugoslavia (CDDH/I/SR 2, par. 17); Tanzania (CDDH/I/SR 2, par. 42); Romania 
(CDDH/I/SR 2, par. 53); USSR (CDDH/I/SR 3, par. 1); Norway (CDDH/I/SR 3, par. 34); Argentina 
(CDDH/I/SR 4, par. 32); FRELIMO (CDDH/I/SR 5, par. 15) 
38 6HH 7 0HURQ ¶7KH 0DUWHQV &ODXVH 3ULQFLSOHV RI +XPDQLW\ DQG 'LFWDWHV RI 3XEOLF &RQVFLHQFH·  
American Journal of International Law 78. 
39 Abi-Saab, 385. 
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What followed was a debate on the merits of regulating wars of national liberation as 
international armed conflicts. Strategically, the proponents tried to combine the 
amendments in order to achieve the necessary majority. Although it was argued by many 
that the amendments were fully compatible,40 it can be argued that there were significant 
differences between the two. Indeed, where CDDH/I/11 referred to the right of self-
determination, as defined in two major instruments, CDDH/I/5 referred to specific 
types of (oppressive) regimes. The latter criterion was significantly narrower than the 
former.41 Their fusion would, of course, lead to the narrower result, thus affecting the 
scope and the continuing application of the article.42 Indeed, western states have been 
FULWLFLVHGIRUQRWDFFHSWLQJWKHPRUH´PRGHUDWHµ&''+,DGLSORPDWLFVWDQFHWKDW
led to the eventual inclusion of the socialist group amendment.43 Nevertheless, the 
merger of the amendments led to amendment CDDH/I/41, proposed by 32 states (with 
the absence of Norway and Australia):44  
 
The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts where 
peoples fight against colonial and alien domination and against racist regimes in the 
exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United 
Nations and defined by the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
 
Finally, a group of Latin American states, suggested amendment CDDH/I/71, which 
added to CDDH/I/41 the Martens clause, as expressed in CDDH/I/12 and added a 
                                              
40 See, for example, the USSR suggesting a merger of the amendments (CDDH/I/SR 3, par. 1). Mexico 
(CDDH/I/SR. 3, par. 20) and India (CDDH/I/SR 3, par. 24) agreed. However, it can be argued that the Socialist 
amendment, by referring only to specific regimes, was more limited in scope than the non-aligned one. See below 
6HFWLRQ6HHDOVR-6DOPRQ¶/HV*XHUUHVGH/LEpUDWLRQ1DWLRQDOH·LQ$&DVVHVHHGThe New Humanitarian Law of 
Armed Conflict (Editoriale Scientifica, 1979), 55, 67 (Salmon). 
41 See Salmon, 67; $&DVVHVH¶:DUVRI1DWLRQDO/LEHUDWLRQDQG+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZ·LQ&6ZLQDUVNLHGStudies and 
Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet (Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), 320 
&DVVHVH¶/LEHUDWLRQ· 
42 See below section 4.4.5. 
43 6HH ' )RUV\WKH ¶7KH  'LSORPDWLF &RQIHUHQFH RQ +XPDQLWDULDQ /DZ 6RPH 2EVHUYDWLRQV·  
American Journal of International Law )RUV\WKH¶2EVHUYDWLRQV· 
44 The absence of Norway and Australia reflected their opposition to the inclusion of specific regimes in article 1(4).  
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slight modification of the languDJH RI &''+, UHSODFLQJ ¶DOLHQ GRPLQDWLRQ· ZLWK
¶DOLHQRFFXSDWLRQ·45  
The last western attempt was to suggest the creation of an inter-sessional group in order 
to work on a more precise definition of wars of national liberation.46 This was opposed 
by the proponents of the amendments, since they felt that they should capitalise on the 
apparent majority. It was finally defeated as the chairman considered the proposal to go 
beyond the scope of the discussion of article 1. The article, in the form of CDDH/I/71, 
achieved, at committee level, a majority of 70 votes in favour, 21 against, with 13 
abstentions. Three years later, at the plenary level, the result was even clearer: 87 in 
favour, 1 against, 11 abstentions.47 As a consequence, Article 1(4) reads as follows:  
 
The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts in which 
peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against 
racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
 
4.3. The difference in perspective: an analysis of the arguments and counter-
arguments for internationalisation. 
 
The long and intense debate summarised above was about the appropriate criteria for the 
extension of the full regime of international humanitarian law. The internationalisation of 
the armed conflict through the application of this regime was seen, by both proponents 
and critics, as a question involving status. The main difference between the two groups of 
states pertained to the kind of actor that would be bestowed with such status. In the 
present sub-section, there will be an analysis of the arguments of the delegates in order to 
                                              
45 This was thought to reflect the political sensitivities of their continent, as many governments were accused of 
EHLQJXQGHU¶DOLHQGRPLQDWLRQ·6HH$EL-Saab, 396. See below, section, for further discussion. 
46 &''+,7KLVZDVEURXJKWIRUWKE\&DQDGDVXSSRUWHGE\1HZ=HDODQG´SURSRVLQJWKDWDZRUNLQJJURXS
EHVHWXSWRVWXG\WKHSUREOHPLQGHSWKEHIRUHWKH'LSORPDWLF&RQIHUHQFHUHVXPHGLQµ6HH&''+,65
par. 2. 
47 CDDH/SR/36. 
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understand how this debate and its outcome fit with the developing legal regime and the 
themes explored in this thesis.  
While critics wanted internationalisation and status to remain a result of formal 
statehood, proponents argued for the substantive legal right of self-determination to be a 
criterion of equal value. Around this main difference in perspective, the representatives 
of states (and some national liberation movements) used distinctions like political/legal 
criteria, objective/subjective criteria, international/non-international armed conflicts. 
These distinctions overlap and are often conflated. For example, the reference to a 
criterion for internationalisatiRQ DV ¶SROLWLFDO· UDWKHU WKDQ ¶OHJDO· FDQ RYHUODS ZLWK LWV
FKDUDFWHULVDWLRQDV ¶VXEMHFWLYH· UDWKHU WKDQ ¶REMHFWLYH·7KLV LQ WXUQ could be viewed to 
lead to the concept of just wars and, therefore, discrimination in the application of the jus 
in bello. This confusion was probably aided by the polarisation of the participants,48 and 
the poor grasp of legal concepts by some participants.49 These concepts will be 
considered here in order to understand the position of states with respect to when and to 
whom status will be ascribed through legal regulation. 
 
4.3.1. The nature of the criteria 
 
A central feature in the approach of the critics was their argument that the 
internationalisation of wars of national liberation was based on criteria that were of a 
political, vague, or subjective nature.  
The accusation that the concept of self-determination is vague, in itself as opposed to in 
its specific formulation in the article, was a common phenomenon at the Diplomatic 
Conference.50 The argument of many western critics was that a concept which is not 
clearly defined would not fit into a technical, objective legal system and would limit legal 
                                              
48 See )RUV\WKH ¶2EVHUYDWLRQV· ZKRTXRWHVGHOHJDWHV UHFRJQLVLQJ WKDW WKHRSSRVHG JURXSVZHUH ´WDONLQJSDVW
HDFKRWKHUµ 
49 Ibid. 
50 6HH IRU H[DPSOH WKH86 &''+,65 SDU  VSHDNLQJRI WKH YDJXHQHVVRI ´SROLWLFDO FRQFHSWVµ ,UHODQG
(CD'+,65  SDU  DUJXLQJ WKDW ´>D@Q\ VHSDUDWLVW PRYHPHQW DQ\ EDQG RI DUPHG FULPLQDOV LQ D FRORQLDO
WHUULWRU\ PLJKW FODLP WR EH HQJDJHG LQ DQ DUPHG VWUXJJOH LQ IXUWKHUDQFH RI WKHLU SHRSOH·V ULJKW WR VHOI-
GHWHUPLQDWLRQµ*UHHFH &''+,65SDU Italy (CDDH/SR 36, par. 60); UK (CDDH/I/SR 36, par. 83) 
DUJXLQJWKDWWKHDUJXPHQWZDV´FDVWLQSROLWLFDOUDWKHUWKDQOHJDOWHUPVµ 
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protection.51 This perceived shortcoming does not, however, necessarily rely on a 
political/legal distinction. Legal concepts can be clear or unclear. As Abi-Saab put it, self-
determination had been developed through legal instruments and could be interpreted in 
the same way other legal concepts are interpreted;52 LW ZDV QRW OHVV ¶OHJDO· WKDQ RWKHU
concepts used.53 Rather the approach disqualifies a legal concept by naming it political. 
This was seen as disingenuous by many proponents of the amendments who accused the 
critics of unjustified legalism.54 
A related criticism was that self-determination was a subjective criterion, compared to 
other criteria for characterising a conflict. More specifically, it was based on viewing 
criteria like the existence of the right to self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQDV¶VXEMHFWLYHFRQFHSWV·UDWKHU
WKDQ¶REMHFWLYHIDFWV·OLNHWKHPDJQLWXGHDQGLQWHQVLW\RIWKHFRQIOLFWRU the existence of 
state borders, within which a conflict was occurring. This distinction, as expressed by the 
critics, overlapped with the political/legal distinction. As the delegate for Switzerland put 
LW´>L@WZRXOGEHGDQJHURXVDQGDJDLQVWWKHVSLULW of humanitarian law, to classify armed 
conflicts on the basis of non-objective and non-OHJDO FULWHULDµ55 The delegate from the 
Pan-$IULFDQLVW&RQJUHVV3$&UHWRUWHGWKDWWKHGHEDWHGFRQFHSWV´ZRXOGEHGHILQHGLQ
the same way as definitions had been arrived at in the case of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and the earlier Conventions. In other words, the work would be done by 
OHJDOH[SHUWVDQGGLSORPDWLVWVµ56  
There are two interrelated jurisprudential arguments here. The first one is that the 
internationalisation of the conflict should be based on objective facts that are 
immediately recognisable, rather than on the existence of legal rights, the identification of 
which could delay the application of the Protocol. In that respect, this argument is related 
to the criticism of vagueness discussed above: A legal concept will usually be vaguer or 
                                              
51 6HHDOVR%D[WHU¶3ROLWLFV·-6. 
52 This point was made by the delegate from the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), at CDDH/I/SR 6, par. 14. 
53 See Abi-Saab, 380. 
54 See the statement by the delegate from Tunisia at CDDH/I/SR 36, par. 125. 
55 CDDH/I/SR 3, par. 13. Canada (CDDH/I/SR 3, par. 16) agreed. So did the Netherlands, at CDDH/I/SR 3, 
par. 45. See also comments by France (CDDH/I/SR 2, par. 49) and the US (CDDH/I/SR 2, par. 51) complaining 
WKDWWKHFULWHULDZRXOGGHSHQGRQWKH´SROLWLFDOPRWLYDWLRQRUVXEMHFWLYHMXGJPHQWRIRQHRIWKHSDUWLHVµ 
56 CDDH/I/SR 6, par. 14. See also Abi-Saab, 380, arguing that the amendments were not referring to the 
´LQWHQWLRQVRIOLEHUDWLRQPRYHPHQWVEXWWRWKHLUREMHFWLYHVLWXDWLRQDQGZKHWKHULWZDUUDQWVWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH
principle of self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQRUQRWµ 
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more difficult to assess than material facts.57 The second is that one should not, in 
ascribing legal status, look into the motivations of the actor in the particular situation. 
Instead, focus should rest on the objective characteristics of the conflict. The retorts by 
the delegate from PAC and Abi-Saab address the latter argument, but do not fully 
address the former. 
The assessment of the existence of a legal right can reasonably, albeit not necessarily, be 
expected to be more complex than the assessment of the existence of material facts, such 
as intensity and organisation. The process will be further complicated if the powerful 
legitimating effects ²and, indeed, the de-legitimation of the colonial, racist, alien regime³
of the internationalisation of the conflict are taken into account.58 Such (de-)legitimation 
leads to considerations of status playing a central role in the assessment of applicability by 
any actor, whether this is the de jure government, third states or international 
organisations. 
Ultimately, it is possible to identify similarities between a process of applying the law to 
facts which results in the conferment of legal status and belligerency. Although in the 
case of belligerency the criteria were based on the state-like organisation of the actor and 
the intensity of the conflict, underlying this substantive difference was the fact that both 
cases involve a process of recognition59 that ends in the ascription of state-like legal 
status. Furthermore, the very logic of applying the jus in bello is often linked to the 
HYHQWXDO UHFRJQLWLRQRI WKH JURXS·V VWDWHKRRG60 Such a system is a departure from the 
aspirations of the automatic application of the law and the regulation of the conflict for 
reasons of protection rather than status. These criticisms, therefore, contain a valid point: 
formal criteria requiring intensity and organisation are easier to apply than criteria based 
on substantive legal rights.   
However, there was more than concern about the efficacy of the legal regime and the 
DXWRPDWLFLW\ RI LWV DSSOLFDWLRQ EHKLQG WKH FULWLFV· DUJXPHQWV 7KHUH ZDV D IXQGDPHQWDO
preference for the status quo as regards the ascription of status. The formal criteria 
                                              
57 7KLVLVUHODWHGWRWKHFULWLTXHWKDWODZFDQQRWEHHQWLUHO\¶REMHFWLYH·DQG¶QHXWUDO·6HH58QJHU¶7KH&ULWLFDO/HJDO
6WXGLHV 0RYHPHQW·   Harvard Law Review 563; M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 16 ff.  
58 See below section 4.4. 
59 For this process see below section 4.5. See also sections 1.2. and 2.2.2-2.2.4. 
60 See section 2.2.6. Nevertheless, statehood is not the only outcome. See below fn 112 and text. 
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employed in the regulatory status quo were not limited to the intensity and magnitude of 
the conflict; they included a criterion relating to the location of a conflict. It was argued 
that conflicts taking place within the territory of a High Contracting Party,61 without the 
intervention of another state, cannot be internationalised. International armed conflicts 
were those that pitted at least two recognised states against each other. In such a case, the 
SURFHVVRIDVFULSWLRQRIVWDWXVKDVDOUHDG\RFFXUUHG7KH¶IRUPDODQGREMHFWLYH·FULWHULRQ
of statehood is the result of a process of recognition. Such a process is not purely factual, 
but includes legal concepts. It is, however, already completed and it represents the status 
quo. This status quo, perceived as formal and objective by the critics, was threatened by 
the internationalisation of wars of national liberation. 
 
4.3.2. The separation between international and non-international armed conflicts  
 
This concern was at the centre of another criticism advanced by the opponents of the 
amendments. This was that the internationalisation of wars of national liberation would 
undo the system of the jus in bello which was based on the separation between 
international and non-international armed conflicts.62 The brunt of the argument related 
to the compatibility of the Geneva Conventions with the organisational structure of 
states alone, and the alleged inability of national liberation movements to comply with the 
Geneva Conventions. This will be discussed in the next section.  
First the observation should be made that, although the critics referred to the 
incompatibility of the Geneva Conventions with non-state actors they very rarely used 
the terms inter-state and non-inter-state.63 It is argued that the language used signifies the 
limits of an approach which refers to objective and formal criteria for 
internationalisation. To the extent that the primary status-bearing unit, as reflected in the 
FULWLFV· ODQJXDJH LV WKHQDWLRQ-state rather than merely the state, it is a very thin line in 
                                              
61 As per common article 3. 
62 See the comments by the delegate for Italy (CDDH/I/SR 3, par. 37). 
63 One example can be found in FraQFH·V VWDWHPHQW &''+,65  SDU  UHIHUULQJ KRZHYHU WR WKH
distinction between non-inter-state conflicts considered as wars of national liberation and conflicts coming under 
Additional Protocol II. 
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extending status through international legal regulation to non-state entities bearing 
national characteristics and struggling for state status.  
Furthermore, and more tangibly, the example of resistance movements, which, under 
paragraph 2 of common article 264 of the Geneva Conventions are covered by the legal 
regime applicable to international armed conflicts, supports this argument.65 The 
difference between resistance movements and national liberation movements, at least 
using the historical examples from which this regulation has sprung, is that resistance 
movements possessed statehood before occupation, whereas national liberation 
movements often aspired to one. In structural terms, it is restoration not revolution. In 
relation to colonialism, this is a rather formalistic and myopic argument: It assumes that 
colonies had no existence or status whatsoever before their colonisation. The counter-
argument is that colonial people, possessing a separate status,66 can and should be treated 
similarly.67 Accordingly, even if the Geneva Conventions system could support such an 
DUJXPHQW¶QHZVWDWHV·DFFXVHGLWVSURSRQHQWVRIOHJDOLVPLQVXSSRUWRIFRORQLDOSROLFLHV68 
In conclusion, the argument which is based on the separation of international and non-
international armed conflicts can be broken into two parts. One part refers to the legal 
status of a state, a formal status which renders it able to wage war in the legal sense. As 
IDUDVWKLVDUJXPHQWLVFRQFHUQHGLWLVDUJXHGWKDWWKHFRQFHSWRI¶QDWLRQ·SOD\VDFHQWUal 
UROH LQ WKH FULWLFV· XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH VWDWH-structure, as the use of the terms 
¶LQWHUQDWLRQDO· DQG ¶QRQ-LQWHUQDWLRQDO· EHWUD\ ,W LV WKLV FHQWUDOLW\ RI WKH FRQFHSW RI WKH
national that the proponents evoke in order to achieve the legal status of states with 
respect to the jus in bello. To the extent that this concept is already present in the legal 
system, and that both critics and proponents share the understanding that it is central, the 
arguments made by western states on the destabilising effects of the introduction of 
substantive criteria for internationalisation can be seen as self-serving.  
                                              
64 See also article 4(A)(2) of Geneva Convention III. 
65 See Egypt at CDDH/I/SR 5, par. 8. See also Salmon, 74. 
66 As General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) affirmed. 
67 Indeed, see Bedjaoui, 59 ff who draws a parallel between the Algerian revolution with the French resistance against 
the Nazis. By doing so he affirms both the separate status of the Algerian people against the occupiers and the 
democratic legitimation of the struggle. 
68 See Tunisia at CDDH/I/SR 36, par. 125. 
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The second part of the argument on the distinction between international and non-
international armed conflicts relates to the actual capacity of non-state actors to abide by 
the obligations imposed by the legal regime regulating international armed conflicts. We 
shall now turn to this argument. 
 
4.3.3. Guerrilla war and absence of reciprocity 
 
A final criticism of proposals to apply the whole system of the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocols to national liberation movements was that there is a fundamental 
absence of de facto reciprocity between the parties because of the nature and level of 
organisation of national liberation movements that would lead to the non-application and 
observance of the Conventions and Protocols. As Baxter put it, the extension of the legal 
UHJLPH WR ZDUV RI QDWLRQDO OLEHUDWLRQ ZRXOG HYHQWXDOO\ FDOO ´IRU DQ DUWLFOH-by-article 
analysis of the over 400 articles of the Geneva Conventionsµ DV ZHOO DV WKRVH RI WKH
Protocol eventually adopted.69 This is because a regular feature of national liberation 
movements was their use of guerrilla warfare.  
It was argued that some of the rules in the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I call for 
the existence of a level of organisation that cannot be possessed by national liberation 
movements. The extensive obligations pertaining to POWs, for example the obligation to 
keep them in separate camps away from the battle zone and to indicate the position of 
these camps70 for monitoring of humanitarian rules of protection, are incompatible with 
the nature of guerrilla warfare. This is because control of territory is fluid and effective 
control over territory often non-existent.71 Furthermore, national liberation movements 
tended not to possess anything approaching a judicial system, necessary to carry out the 
elaborate system of Geneva Convention III RQ ´SHQDO DQG GLVFLSOLQDU\ VDQFWLRQVµ72 
                                              
69 %D[WHU¶3ROLWLFV· 
70 See for example article 23 of Geneva Convention III. 
71 Indeed, Salmon, at 73, offers an example where this obligation was not observed. In the case of Vietnam the 
Vietcong did not indicate the position where they kept American POWs for fear of attack by American 
commandoes. 
72 See part III of Geneva Conventions III, articles 82-108. On the difficulties when guerrilla groups have to abide by 
judicial rules, even with respect to the much more limited rules of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II see 
6LYDNXPDUDQ¶&RXUWV·. 
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Thus, according to Israel, to the extent that the rest of the articles were not re-written 
and national liberation movements did not possess such features as courts and tribunals 
´>Z@KDW UHPDLQHG ZHUH REOLJDWLRQV ZLWKRXW DQ\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ D V\VWHP
ZKLFKFRXOGQRWZRUNµ73 
This is a potent criticism. De facto reciprocity is an important element of the Geneva 
Conventions system.74 If a state thinks that the national liberation movement will not be 
able to abide by its obligations, considering also the legitimation of the national liberation 
movement through the application of the Conventions, there will be very little incentive 
for the state to ratify the Protocol or apply it in practice.  
This does not automatically disqualify a national liberation movement from the system, 
however, as a distinction can be made. Lack of organisation does not necessarily flow 
from the non-state nature of the actor. Rather it can be related to the method of the 
hostilities.75 It is a question of whether the hostilities include guerrilla warfare and how a 
specific national liberation movement is organised and conducts its operations. 
Therefore, the question of compatibility of wars of national liberation with the Geneva 
Conventions system can be approached either in relation to the non-state status of the 
party or in relation to the nature of hostilities. The two can and should be separated: 
Identifying the absence of reciprocity with the non-state nature of the actor can lead to a 
rigid identification of reciprocity with status, rather than actual ability to implement. 
Accordingly, even if in practice most national liberation movements used some form of 
guerrilla warfare because of the fundamental asymmetry between them and their state-
enemy, it would be possible to address the issue by focusing on the method of the 
hostilities and the actual ability to implement, rather than the nature of the actors. Again 
the example of resistance movements in common article 2 is apposite. They constituted 
an armed group the material conditions of which were similar to those of many national 
liberation movements, yet they are considered parties to international armed conflicts.76 
                                              
73 CDDH/I/SR 36, par. 63. See also G. 'UDSHU ¶7KH ,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ DQG (QIRUFHPHQW RI WKH *HQHYD
&RQYHQWLRQVRIDQGWKH7ZR$GGLWLRQDO3URWRFROVRI·  Recueil des Cours 1, 48, for extended 
criticism. 
74 See section 5.4.4.  
75 This was an argument made by the delegate from the FRELIMO national liberation movement, at CDDH/I/SR 
5, par. 18. See also Salmon, 73. 
76 See Abi-Saab, speaking for Egypt, CDDH/I/SR 5, par. 8. 
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On this basis, if resistance movements can be seen as parties to international armed 
conflicts then why not national liberation movements?77  
Reasons against the analogy can only be found if one approaches the matter as a question 
of status. To include resistance movements in the system means that the international 
community is not yet ready to assume the loss of the status of the state to which the 
resistance movement belongs. The regulation allows them to be considered as states, as 
far as the jus in bello is concerned, and while they are resisting. Conversely, in the case of 
national liberation movement the opponents of their inclusion were not ready to assume 
their state status, even in only jus in bello terms.  
Salmon mentions paragraph 3 of common article 3, which encourages the parties to a 
non-LQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQIOLFWWREULQJLQWRIRUFH´E\PHDQVRIVSHFLDODJUHHPHQWDOO
RU SDUW RI WKH RWKHU SURYLVLRQVµ RI WKH *HQHYD &RQYHQWLRns. He argues that if it is 
envisaged that the whole of the Conventions could apply in a common article 3 conflict 
they could surely apply to wars of national liberation.78 The answer to this argument, 
however, is straightforward and relates directly to the VWDWHV·SHUFHSWLRQRIWKHH[LVWHQFH
of de facto reciprocity leading to the adoption of a legal obligation. If a state agrees to 
DSSO\´DOORUSDUWRIµWKH&RQYHQWLRQVLWZLOOPHDQWKDWLWEHOLHYHVWKDWWKHQRQ-state actor 
will be able to abide by these obligations.79 The argument, however, is apposite in 
reminding us that it is the characteristics of the conflict and the actor rather than the state 
or non-state status that will determine the applicability of the Conventions.80 
In conclusion, the argument on the absence of reciprocity is the most potent argument 
against the inclusion of wars of national liberation in the Geneva Conventions system or, 
rather, against including them without stipulating certain criteria that would justify the 
expectance of de facto reciprocity.81 This reflects the fundamental difference between 
regulating state and non-state armed groups. In the case of non-state armed groups in 
relation to common article 382 and, as will be seen,83 Additional Protocol II the 
                                              
77 Salmon, 80. 
78 Ibid., 77. 
79 See on earning the assumption of de facto reciprocity section 5.4.4. 
80 Which brings us to the question of the existence of criteria for the organisation of the actor and the intensity of 
the conflict. These will be discussed below in section 4.4.6.  
81 6HHDOVRIRUWKLVDUJXPHQW.DOVKRYHQ¶)LUVW6HVVLRQ·-3. 
82 Section 3.3.2. 
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substantive contents of the legal regulation in fact influenced the characteristics of the 
actor which would lead to the expectance of de facto reciprocity. In the case of states it is 
assumed that they will be able to abide by their obligations because of their formal status 
of statehood.84  
 
4.3.4. Conclusion 
 
The debate over what kind of conflicts will be regulated by the full regime of the Geneva 
Conventions and Protocols was predominantly a debate about the ascription of status. 
7KHUDWLRQDOHEHKLQGWKHSURSRQHQWV·DUJXPHQWVZDVOHVV one of extending humanitarian 
protection and more one of equating the status of non-state self-determination units to 
that of states. The debate was intense and polarised and the various arguments used were 
often conflated. The difference in perspective, as analysed above, was that while critics of 
internationalisation favoured the status quo in the ascription of status, the proponents 
argued for, and achieved, the equation in the jus in bello of the substantive right to self-
determination with the formal status of statehood.  
Among the various criticisms, it has been argued that the most potent one is the potential 
lack of reciprocity, which, together with the legitimating effect on the non-state armed 
group, can seriously affect the applicability of the Protocol. Even if the paradigm of a 
national unit worthy of external self-determination is perceived to be the basis of the 
state system, this substantive element will have to be complemented by the necessary 
formal structure and organisation. National liberation movements claim to partake in the 
legal status of states, in the context of the jus in bello, on the basis of the existence of the 
substantive national element. To the extent, however, that the formal, structural 
organisation that commonly exists in states is not guaranteed for the application of the jus 
in bello, their claim is potentially problematic.  
                                                                                                                                            
83 Section 5.4.4. 
84 Even if in some cases, as are those of micro-states, arguably, the degree of their organisation and the means at 
their disposal for applying the Conventions would not be very different from those possessed by some national 
liberation movements. See Salmon, 72, using the example of Danzig, and the Holy See, and arguing that if the 
Geneva Conventions could apply to them they could surely apply to national liberation movements.  
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On the other hand, the counter-position of critics, focusing on the existence of formal 
criteria of effectiveness and state status, is tempered and relativised to the extent 
substantive criteria of nationhood influence and legitimise the formal structures of the 
state system. It is argued then that despite the difference in perspective, borne out of the 
differing historical and geopolitical position of proponents and critics, there is an 
underlying point of convergence. This is the concept of a national unit perceived as 
worthy of collective legal status. This is, as will be seen below, the unit that is conferred 
status through legal regulation.  
What follows is an analysis of article 1(4) in order to determine the kind of entity that is 
regulated and how this development fits in the Geneva Conventions system.  
 
4.4. The definition of wars of national liberation. 
 
4.4.1. $FWRUV¶3HRSOHV·DQGWKHLU2SSRQHQWV 
 
Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I specifies that the protocol applies to 
´SHRSOHV«ILJKWLQJ DJDLQVW FRORQLDO GRPLQDWLRQ DQG DOLHQ RFFXSDWLRQ DQG DJDLQVW UDFLVW
regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination as enshrined in the Charter of 
the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
)ULHQGO\5HODWLRQV«µ$FFRUGLQJO\WKHFRQIOLFWVFRYHUDVXE-category of the right to self-
GHWHUPLQDWLRQ ,Q WKLV SDUW WKH ¶VHOI· LWV FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DQG LWV RSSRQHQWV ZLOO EH
discussed. The section will seek to show how the ascription of status was central in the 
definition of the actors and the situation included in the Protocol. 
 
4.4.1.1. 7KH¶VHOI·¶3HRSOHV· 
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,W LV QRWRULRXVO\ GLIILFXOW WR SUHFLVHO\ GHILQH D ¶SHRSOH·85 Indeed, this was one of the 
criticisms mounted against the inclusion of wars of national liberation in the Protocol.86 
This is conceded by the ICRC Commentary, which nevertheless goes on to provide a set of 
helpful criteria : 
 
[A]part from a defined territory, other criteria could be taken into account such as 
that of a common language, common culture or ethnic ties. The territory may not be 
a single unit geographically or politically, and a people can comprise various linguistic, 
cultural or ethnic groups. The essential factor is a common sentiment of forming a 
people, and a political will to live together as such. Such a sentiment and will are the 
result of one or more of the criteria indicated, and are generally highlighted and 
reinforced by a common history. This means simultaneously that there is a bond 
between the persons belonging to this people and something that separates them 
from other peoples: there is a common element and a distinctive element.87 
 
7KH DERYH HOHPHQWV H[SODLQ KRZ WKH ¶VHOI· LQ WKH ¶VHOI-determinaWLRQ RI SHRSOHV· LV
constituted. It is a group that has a set of common substantive characteristics which 
distinguish it, and separate it, from other groups. Moreover, there is often a territorial 
element to both commonality and separateness of the group. Finally, there is an element 
of self-identification.88  
However, QRW DOO ¶SHRSOHV· DV GHILQHG DERYH DUH DVFULEHG WKH VWDWXV RI SDUWLHV WR DQ
international armed conflict. TKH ¶SHRSOH· ZKRVH DUPHG VWUXJJOHV DUH LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVHG
form a narrower category. The category is narrowed in two ways: through the reference 
to specific opponents89 and through the reference to the UN Charter and the Declaration 
                                              
85 6HH &UDZIRUG ¶6HOI-'HWHUPLQDWLRQ·  2Q WKH IXWLOLW\ RI WKH VHDUFK for an objective definition of the term 
¶SHRSOHV· DQG KRZ WKLV UHIOHFWV WKH OLPLWDWLRQV RI D ¶SHRSOHV· DSSURDFK WR WKH ULJKW WR VHOI-determination see 
0F&RUTXRGDOH¶6HOI-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ·-868.  
86 See for example the comment by the delegate from Spain, e[SODLQLQJKLVVWDWH·VDEVWHQWLRQDWWKH3OHQDU\YRWLQJDW
CDDH/I/36, Annex. 
87 Sandoz, Commentary, 52. These criteria are also reflected in the Final Report and Recommendations of an 
International Meeting of Experts on the Further Study of the Concept of the Right of People for UNESCO, SNS²
89/CONF.602/7, 22 February 1990. 
88 )RUWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ´VXEMHFWLYHµDQG´REMHFWLYHµLQLGHQWLI\LQJWKHXQLWZLWKUHVSHFWWRVHOI-determination 
VHH1%HUPDQ¶6RYHUHLJQW\LQ$EH\DQFH6HOI-determination and InternDWLRQDO/DZ·Wisconsin International 
Law Journal %HUPDQ¶$EH\DQFH·. 
89 This will be discussed in the next section. 
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on Friendly Relations.90 Whereas the latter limits the peoples to those with the right to 
external self-determination,91 the former further limits the category to more specific 
situations.  
7KH'HFODUDWLRQRQ)ULHQGO\5HODWLRQVSURKLELWV´DQ\DFWLRQZKLFKZRXOGGLVPHPEHURU
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal 
rights and self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ RI SHRSOHV«µ92 Accordingly, peoples are considered to 
have the right to external self-determination, either as a colony or, outside the colonial 
context, if their right to internal self-determination is severely and systematically 
violated.93  
The focus on groups that have the right to external self-determination places some focus 
RQWKHWHUULWRULDOHOHPHQW,QGHHGWKLVLVUHIOHFWHGLQWKH´VHSDUDWHDQGGLVWLQFWµWHUULWRULDO
status that colonial territories have, according to the same Resolution.94 Moreover, in 
some cases of so-FDOOHG ¶VDOW ZDWHU· FRORQLDOLVP95 there is an already conspicuous 
separateness between the colonised and the colonialists. Therefore, the closest that one 
gets conceptually to the paradigm of colonialism, the most prominent the territorial 
element can be seen.96  
Accordingly, if article 1(4) determined its scope using only the Charter and Declaration 
RQ)ULHQGO\5HODWLRQVWKH¶VHOI· and the internationalisation of armed conflicts would be 
WUDFHG LQ D FRQFHSWXDO FRQWLQXXP VWDUWLQJ IURP WKH FODVVLFDO FDVHV RI ¶VDOW-ZDWHU·
colonialism and following through to the lawful exercise of external self-determination. 
Indeed, this was the content of the amendment proposed by 15 states.97 In this case 
DUWLFOH·VHIIHFWZRXOGKDYHKDGDFRQWLQXRXVHIIHFWH[WHQGLQJ WKH OHJDO UHJLPHDQG
status to self-determination units beyond the period of decolonisation. The merger of the 
                                              
90 See 6FKLQGOHU¶7\SHV·, 137-8.  
91 For the distinction between internal and external self-determination see Cassese, Self-determination, 67 ff.  
92 UNGA 2625 (XXV), under (e).  
93 6HH&UDZIRUG¶6HOI-'HWHUPLQDWLRQ·ffLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH&DQDGLDQ6XSUHPH&RXUW·VRSLQLRQRQWKHULJKWRI
Quebec to secede.  
94 Above fn 14 and text. 
95 7KH¶VDOWZDWHU·EHLQJWKHVHDWKDWVHSDrates the colonised people from their colonisers.  
96 6HH:LOVRQ.RVNHQQLHPL¶6HOI-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ· 
97 CDDH/I/11. 
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amendments, however, and the addition of the socialist amendment,98 limiting the 
internationalisation to struggles against certain opponents, has arguably affected the 
article in more than one way.  
 
4.4.1.2. The opponents: colonialists, racists and alien occupiers 
 
According to ArticOH  FRQIOLFWV DUH LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVHG ZKHQ SHRSOHV ´ILJKW DJDLQVW
FRORQLDO GRPLQDWLRQ DQG DOLHQ RFFXSDWLRQ DQG DJDLQVW UDFLVW UHJLPHVµ In making the 
internationalisation of the conflict dependent on the specification of the opponent, 
several effects are apparent. First of all it reflects a conception of self-determination 
GLUHFWO\ OLQNHGZLWK WKHHOHPHQWRI ¶VXEMXJDWLRQ· SURPRWLQJDQ ¶HTXDOLW\ WKHRU\·RI VHOI-
determination,99 where the exercise of the right is against an oppressor in order to right a 
wrong and restore a balance. ,QGHHG¶ULJKWLQJWKHZURQJ·FDQEHXQGHUVWRRGDVFHQWUDOLQ
the conferment of status to the non-state armed group. The conferral of the legal status 
of a party to an international armed conflict is meant to boost what is viewed as a 
struggle against the historical injustice perpetrated by a specific set of states/adversaries. 
Moreover, by sanctioning the characterisation of certain states as opponents in a legal 
instrument, the applicability of the Protocol is affected.  
The firsWFDWHJRU\¶FRORQLDOGRPLQDWLRQ·LVZLGHO\YLHZHGWREHWKHHDVLHVWWRGHILQHDQG
the more uncontroversial.100 7KH VHSDUDWHQHVV DSSOLHV QRW RQO\ WR WKH ¶VHOI· WKH
VXEVWDQWLYHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVWKDWIRUPWKHHQWLW\WKH¶SHRSOH·EXWLWDOVRDSSOLHVVSHFLILFally 
WRWKHVWDWXVRIWKHFRORQ\´DVWDWXVVHSDUDWHDQGGLVWLQFWIURPWKHWHUULWRU\RIWKH6WDWH
DGPLQLVWHULQJ LW«µ DV WKH  'HFODUDWLRQ SXW LW101 In any case, at the time of the 
Diplomatic Conference the only salt-water colonial power which had not yielded to the 
wave of decolonisation of the 1960s was Portugal. By the time the Protocol was signed at 
                                              
98 CDDH/I/5. 
99 6HH%HUPDQ¶$EH\DQFH·GHILQLQJ¶HTXDOLW\WKHRULHV·DVWKRVH´ZKLFKYLHZWKHULJKWRIVHOI-determination as the 
riJKWRIDGRPLQDWHGSHRSOHVWRDFKLHYHHTXDOLW\LQUHODWLRQWRWKRVHZKRGRPLQDWHWKHPµ6HHDOVRDWTXRWLQJ
W. Ofuatey-.RGMRHIRU´WKHLPSRUWDQFHRI´VXEMXJDWLRQµDVDQHOHPHQWRIWKHGHILQLWLRQRIWKHJURXSVHQWLWOHGWR
WKHULJKWµ 
100 See Sandoz, Commentary, 55; Wilson, 167; Abi-6DDEZKRFRQVLGHUVLW´VHOI-HYLGHQWµ 
101 UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV). 
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the final Plenary session the Portuguese dictatorship had fallen and the new regime had 
abandoned its colonial wars. 
7KHRWKHUWZRFDVHV¶DOLHQRFFXSDWLRQDQGUDFLVWUHJLPHV·VKDUHWKHFRQFHSWXDOQXFOHXV
of the domination of one people by another, often a minority. Abi-Saab uses the example 
RI ¶FRORQLHV RI VHWWOHPHQW· ZKHUH ´a group of people [are] emigrating and settling in 
DQRWKHUFRXQWU\«>DQG@«WKHFROonies of settlement are established to the detriment of 
local populationsµ102  
While the focus of this explanation is on the subjugation, there is an element of 
¶DOLHQQHVV·RUVHSDUDWHQHVVREYLRXVKHUH7KHWHUP¶UDFLVW·VSHFLILHVWKHVHSDUDWHQHVVERWK
with UHVSHFW WR WKH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ WKH ¶SHRSOHV· DQG ZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKH W\SH RI
subjugation, which is based on racial discrimination.  
7KHWHUP¶DOLHQRFFXSDWLRQ·LVEURDGHUPRUHG\QDPLFDQGSRWHQWLDOO\PRUHSUREOHPDWLF
The original term used, in both CDDH/I/11 and the first consolidated amendment, 
&''+, ZDV ¶DOLHQ GRPLQDWLRQ· 7KLV UHIOHFWHG WKH PRUH VXEVWDQWLYH TXHVWLRQ RI
subjugation and denial of self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ E\ D ¶SHRSOHV· ¶DOLHQ· WR WKH WHUULWRU\ 7KLV
ZDVFKDQJHG WR ¶DOLHQRFFXSDWLRQ· DIter a request by Latin American states, who feared 
WKDW WKH WHUP ¶DOLHQGRPLQDWLRQ· EHFDXVHRI WKH VSHFLILF VHQVLWLYLWLHV LQ WKH DUHDZRXOG
have a destabilising effect on many regimes.103 The ICRC Commentary specifies further 
WKDW WKHH[SUHVVLRQ´FRYHUVFDses of partial or total occupation of a territory which has 
QRW\HWEHHQIXOO\IRUPHGDVD6WDWHµ104  
This interpretation, although it seems specifically tailored for the case of Palestine, has 
WKH PHULW RI IXUWKHU GLVWLQJXLVKLQJ WKH WHUP ¶DOLHQ RFFXSDWLRQ· IURP ¶EHOOLJHUHQW
RFFXSDWLRQ· LQZKLFKE\YLUWXHRIFRPPRQDUWLFOHWKHFRQIOLFWZRXOGEHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
and, therefore, the new term would be redundant. Indeed, the term has been perceived as 
FRPSOHPHQWDU\ WR WKH FRQFHSW RI ¶EHOOLJHUHQW RFFXSDWLRQ· DSSlicable in cases where 
common article 2 application is not clear or uncontroversial.105  
                                              
102 Abi-6DDE6HHDOVR6FKLQGOHU¶7\SHV·ZKRLQFOXGHVLQWKHFDWHJRU\RI¶FRORQLHVGHSHXSOHPHQW·DVZHOO
as racist regimes) the cases of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South West Africa/Namibia. 
103 This lead to their submission of the compromised amendment CDDH/I/71. 
104 Sandoz, Commentary, 54. 
105 6HH6FKLQGOHU¶7\SHV·for examples. 
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Moreover, the ICRC Commentary reiterates the distinction between a case where the 
status of the actor was already there and where it is legitimately developing, as was the 
case in the distinction between wars of national liberation and resistance movements.106 
)LQDOO\ LW PLWLJDWHV WKH FRQIXVLQJ HIIHFWV RI WKH WHUP ¶RFFXSDWLRQ· 6XEMXJDWLRQ ZKLFK
ZDVWKHFRQFHSWEHKLQGWKHRULJLQDOWHUP¶GRPLQDWLRQ·VXUYLYHVLQWKHWHUP¶RFFXSDWLRQ·
As Abi-6DDE SXWV LW ´>W@KH LPSRUW RI WKLV HSLVRGH RI OHJLVODWLYH KLVWRU\ LV WKDW ´DOLHQ
RFFXSDWLRQµLQ$UWLFOHSDUDJUDSKKDVWKHVDPHPHDQLQJDV´DOLHQGRPLQDWLRQµLQWKH
8QLWHG 1DWLRQV UHVROXWLRQV QDPHO\ FRORQLHV RI VHWWOHPHQWµ107  Although Abi-Saab is 
surely ULJKWWROLQNEDFNWRWKHFRQFHSWRI¶GRPLQDWLRQ·, it might be considered to be too 
restrictive an interpretation to stick to the mechanics of the colonies of settlement. Since 
this form of establishment of domination is not strictly referred to in the text this might 
be a case where a broader interpretation of the article is possible. Such an interpretation 
could move beyond the specific historical examples that have influenced the wording of 
the article. 
)LQDOO\ WKH FDVH RI ¶UDFLVW UHJLPHV· KDG DV LWV KLVWRULFDO SDUDGLJP WKH 6RXWK $IULFDQ
DSDUWKHLG 7KH VHSDUDWHQHVV RI ¶VHOYHV· LI MXVW ¶UDFLDO VHOYHV·108 is present and so is the 
issue of subjugation, since the racist element constitutes the regime. The regime element 
also calls foUDQLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQRIUDFLVPDUHJLPHZKHUH´UDFLDOGLVFULPLQDWLRQLVSDUW
RIWKHRIILFLDOSROLF\RIWKHJRYHUQPHQWµ109 
Accordingly it can be seen that the formulation of the article was informed by specific 
historical circumstances, namely the situations in the Portuguese colonies, South Africa 
and Israel. Furthermore, the three examples can be reduced conceptually to an element of 
subjugation and separateness. The separateness can further be broken down to more 
FRQVSLFXRXVFDVHVRI ¶VDOW-ZDWHU·FROonialism, where it is accentuated by geography, and 
VFKHPDWLFDOO\OHVVFOHDUIRUPVRIVXEVWDQWLYHVHSDUDWHQHVVZLWKRQH¶VHOI·VXEMXJDWLQJWKH
RWKHU ¶VHOI·:KLOH WKH ODWWHUFDVHDVH[SUHVVHG LQ WKHWHUP¶DOLHQRFFXSDWLRQ·VHHPV WKH
                                              
106 See above section 4.3.2. 
107 Abi-Saab, 395.  
108 As Sandoz, Commentary, DW  SRLQWV RXW WKLV VLWXDWLRQ GRHV QRW QHFHVVDULO\ LPSO\ ´WKH H[LVWHQFH RI WZR
FRPSOHWHO\GLVWLQFWSHRSOHVµEXWLWFDQalso PHDQ´DULIWZLWKLQDSHRSOHZKLFKHQVXUHVKHJHPRQ\RIRQHVHFWLRQLQ
DFFRUGDQFHZLWKUDFLVWLGHDVµ 
109 M. Bothe, K. Partsch, W. Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 50. 
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most malleable, the historical specificity of the article renders it difficult to use beyond its 
context. This does not mean that it is not possible to interpret the article as applicable 
beyond the context of colonialism but it helps explain why this has not occurred.110 
These sections have tried to show what kind of entity the states that supported the 
DUWLFOH·VIRUPXODWLRQWKRXJKWPHULWHGWKHDVFULSWLRQRIVWDWXVRIDSDUW\WRDQLQWHUQDWLRQDO
DUPHGFRQIOLFW7KHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVGLVFXVVHGERWK¶SHRSOHV·DQGWKHLURSSRQHQWVreflect 
the logic behind the ascription of status. The entity on which status is conferred shares 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI D ¶SHRSOH· WKDW DGGLWLRQDOO\ KDV EHHQ VXEMXJDWHG ,W VHHPV IURP WKH
DUWLFOH·V IRUPXODWLRQ WKDW VWDWXVZDV LQWHQGHGIRUDQDUURZKLVWRULFDl category of actors, 
very much linked with the context of colonialism. The group is invested with the status 
of a state with respect to the jus in bello. In the clear majority of cases in the context of 
decolonisation such status could be understood to lead to the eventual statehood of the 
self-determination unit.111 As opposed to the doctrine of belligerency, in wars of national 
liberation internationalisation is attempted based on a substantive right, rather than on 
material features that resemble statehood. Accordingly, the territorial element in article 
 DFFHQWXDWHV WKH ¶VHSDUDWHQHVV· RI WKH XQLW DQG UHIOHFWV WKH H[DPSOHV RI ¶VDOW-ZDWHU·
colonialism, rather than points to capacity to wage war.  
:KLOH WKH FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI WKH ¶SHRSOHV· DQG WKHLU RSSRnents help account for the 
centrality that the ascription of status had in the drafting of article 1(4), they do not 
suffice to determine the necessary threshold. Indeed, the absence of the definition of the 
necessary intensity and organisation, as we will see in the next section, also reflects the 
centrality of status in the logic of the article. 
 
                                              
110 See below section 4.6. For a statement to that effect after the Protocol came in force see SchLQGOHU¶7\SHV·
2QWKH¶RXWGDWHG·QDWXUHRIWKHVSHFLILFIRUPXODWLRQRIDUWLFOHWRGD\VHH1+LJJLQVRegulating the Use of Force in 
Wars of National Liberation: The Need for a New Regime ² A Study of the South Moluccas and Acceh (Martinus Nijhoff, 2010), 
231. (N. Higgins) 
111 7KHUHZHUH KRZHYHU H[FHSWLRQV 6HH50F&RUTXRGDOH ¶5LJKWVRI 3HRSOHV DQG0LQRULWLHV· LQ' 0RHFNOL 6
Shah, and S. Sivakumaran (eds.), International Human Rights Law 2[IRUG 8QLYHUVLW\ 3UHVV    ´For 
example, the British and the Italian Somaliland colonies joined into one state of Somalia, part of the British colony 
of Cameroon merged with the French colony of Cameroun to form the new state of Cameroon and the remaining 
part joined with the existing state of Nigeria, and Palau and a number of other Pacific Ocean islands formed a free 
association with the USA (that is, they had general self-government but their foreign affairs and defence were 
FRQWUROOHGE\WKH86$µ 
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4.4.2. Intensity and Organisation 
 
¶3HRSOHV· FRQVWLWXWH WKH HQWLW\ WR ZKLFK WKH ULJKW RI VHOI-determination can be granted. 
The existence of a people is therefore a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for legal 
capacity and status to wage war. The actual waging, however, and the material elements 
that are relevant to the law in strict relation to the armed conflict, is done by national 
liberation movements. These, like governments in the case of states, represent and organise 
WKHSHRSOHWKH¶VHOI·:KLOHWKH¶SHRSOH·is the group that is seen to be entitled to status in 
order to achieve self-determination and statehood, with respect to the jus in bello national 
liberation movements are accorded with this status. Moreover, it is national liberation 
movements that bring the claim for self-determination to the (international) political 
sphere.112  
Accordingly, the characteristics of national liberation movements are important in 
ascertaining whether the specific actors are acting in the exercise of the right of self-
GHWHUPLQDWLRQRID¶SHRSOH·DVVXPLQJWKDWWKHUHLVD¶SHRSOH·7KH\DUHDOVRLPSRUWDQWWR
the extent that their quality and capacity are relevant for the application of the jus in bello. 
This, in turn, relates to the necessity, if any, for a certain level of organisation of the actor 
and intensity of the conflict.  
Article 1(4) is silent on the matter and with good reason. As General Assembly 
Resolution 1514 put LW ´,QDGHTXDF\ RI SROLWLFDO HFRQRPLF VRFLDO RU HGXFDWLRQDO
SUHSDUHGQHVVVKRXOGQHYHUVHUYHDVDSUHWH[WIRUGHOD\LQJLQGHSHQGHQFHµ7RWKHH[WHQW
that the rationale behind the article is substance over form, and because of the 
exacerbation of this rationale through the polarization of the debate, the 
internationalisation of the conflict is a matter of status emanating from a right and not 
from material facts.113 To be more precise WKH¶IDFWV·WKDW OHDGWRWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH
article are the existence RID ¶SHRSOH·DQGWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDQDXWKRULW\UHSUHVHQWLQJWKLV
                                              
112 6RPHZULWHUVFRQVLGHU´REWDLQLQJDFFHVVWRWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDODUHQDµDVDQHFHVVDU\OHJDOSUHFRQGLWLRQIRUDVVHUWLQJ
a claim to self-determination. See W. Ofuatey-.RGMRHTXRWHGLQ%HUPDQ¶$EH\DQFH· 
113 According to Abi-6DDEWKHUHTXLUHPHQWIRUD¶KLJK-LQWHQVLW\FRQIOLFW·ZRXOGJR´DJDLQVWWhe whole approach of 
the Conventions, which defines the international armed conflict not as a function of the degree of intensity of 
KRVWLOLWLHVEXWLQWHUPVRILWVSDUWLHVDQGWKHW\SHRIUHODWLRQVH[LVWLQJDPRQJWKHPµ6HH$EL-Saab, 413-4. 
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people. These facts would determine the existence of the legal right, which would 
internationalise the conflict.  
This does not mean that there is no requirement relating to the intensity of violence. The 
YHU\ XVH RI WKH WHUP ¶DUPHG FRQIOLFW· VXJJHVWV D PLQLPXP  The UK declared upon 
signature that it ´FRQVLGHUHG«WKDWWKHWHUP´DUPHGFRQIOLFWµ«LPSOLHGRILWVHOIDFHUWDLQ
level of intensity of fighting which must be present before the Conventions or the 
3URWRFROZRXOGDSSO\ LQDQ\VLWXDWLRQµ114 This poses the question as to what would be 
WKHH[DFWWKUHVKROG6SHFLILFDOO\ZKHWKHUWKHWKUHVKROGZDV¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW· tout court, or 
an Additional Protocol II armed conflict.115 The latter would entail some proto-state 
formal requirements, such as control of territory, to complement the substantive right 
FRQWDLQHG LQ WKHDUWLFOH 7KH8.GHOHJDWH UHTXLUHG WKDW ´WKHDUPHGFRQIOLFWV WRZKLFK
Protocol I would apply could not be of less intensity than those to which Protocol II 
ZRXOG DSSO\ +LV GHOHJDWLRQ ZRXOG DFFRUGLQJO\ LQWHUSUHW WKH WHUP ´DUPHG FRQIOLFWµ DV
XVHGLQ3URWRFRO,LQWKDWVHQVHµ116 Australia expressed a similar position in explaining its 
(positive) vote on the article ´understanding [...] that Protocol I will apply in relation to 
DUPHGFRQIOLFWVZKLFKKDYHDKLJKOHYHORILQWHQVLW\µ117 
Nevertheless, it seems that the above declarations cannot alter the logic of the article as 
discussed above. There seem to be no requirements apart from the existence of an armed 
conflict. At the time of the drafting of article 1(4) the threshold of Additional Protocol II 
had not been finalised and, in any case, the threshold of Additional Protocol II did not 
DIIHFWWKHWHUP¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·DVSHUFRPPRQDUWLFOH118 Accordingly, the requirements 
seem to be different from those of article 1 of Additional Protocol II, especially the 
absence of a requirement of effective control of territory.119 The existence of an armed 
FRQIOLFWZRXOG PHDQ WKH H[FOXVLRQRI ´VLWXDWLRQVRf internal disturbances and tensions, 
inter alia ULRWV LVRODWHG DQG VSRUDGLF DFWV RI YLROHQFHµ DV DUWLFOH  RI $GGLWLRQDO
Protocol II stipulates.  
                                              
114 CDDH/I/36, par. 87. 
115 2QWKHODWWHU·VWKUHVKROGVHHVHFWLRQ 
116 CDDH/I/36, par. 88. 
117 CDDH/I/36, Annex. 
118 See section 4.3.3.  
119 See also 6FKLQGOHU¶7\SHV·:LOVRQ-6; Sandoz, Commentary, 55. 
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Another criterion seems more in agreement with the logic of the article. To the extent 
that the national liberation movement represents the people and organises their struggle 
for self-determination it has to be both representative and organised. The issue of 
representation will be discussed below in the context of the application of the Protocol 
and the recognition of a national liberation movement as representative.120 The criterion 
of organisation this can be considered from two points of view. One is organisation as 
contributing to the representative nature of the national liberation movement. The 
second is organisation as a faculty for applying the rules of the Protocol. This is the only 
material criterion retained related to de facto reciprocity. This form of reciprocity, as will 
be discussed, is very important for the ratification and actual application of the 
Protocol.121 
,WLVFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIWKH´VXEVWDQFHRYHUIRUPµDSSURDFKIRUWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQRI
wars of national liberation that there are no material organisational characteristics 
stipulated in article 1(4). Elsewhere, the Protocol provides some guidance where the 
conferment of legal status is linked to a particular form of organisation. Article 43 of 
Protocol I stipulates the criteria for POW status. However, it should be remembered that 
the organisational criteria for POW status would not necessarily be the same as for other 
aspects of the Protocol.122 On the other hand, the logic of article 43 is that privileged 
combatancy will be recognised for individuals who fight within an organised group, 
which is sufficiently well structured in order to participate in international armed conflict. 
If the combatant group is properly organised then the legal status of the entity123 is 
translated into legal protections for individual combatants.  
The criteria for privileged combatancy can be deduced from the organisational 
characteristics that are assumed to exist in an organised entity such as a state. Their 
                                              
120 Section 4.5. 
121 See section 5.4.4. The function of the criteria for organisation as interpreted in the context of common article 3 is 
in relation to the obligations imposed by that article and do not suffice for the existence of de facto reciprocity in the 
context of Additional Protocol I and the Geneva Conventions. 
122 A full analysis of criteria for privileged combatancy is not possible in this space. See for the regime in both the 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I Pictet, Commentary, 50 ff.*'UDSHU¶7KH6WDWXVRI&RPEDWDQWVDQG
The Question of GuerrillD:DUIDUH·British Yearbook of International Law 173; Dinstein, 27 ff.5%D[WHU¶7KH
3ULY\&RXQFLORQWKH4XDOLILFDWLRQRI%HOOLJHUHQWV· 63 American Journal of International Law 290; Meyrowitz; N. 
%HUPDQ ¶3ULYLOHJLQJ &RPEDW" &RQWHPSRUDU\ &RQIOLFW DQG WKH /HJDO&RQVWUXFWLRQ RI :DU·, 43 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law (2004-2005), 1 %HUPDQ¶3ULYLOHJLQJ· 
123 For the distinction between the legal status of the entity and that of a specific military or para-military group See 
Meyrowitz, 878.  
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detailed stipulation, in article 4 of Geneva Convention III as well as article 43 of Protocol 
I, is necessitated by the inclusion of less organised units in the war effort of the state. 
Accordingly, it seems that the necessary characteristics for the acts of the individuals are 
to be deduced from the organisational characteristics of the state. In this case, however, 
the use of the criteria works the other way around. The necessary organisation of the 
national liberation movements is deduced from the criteria stipulated. Therefore, as 
article 43 stipulates, it is necessary that the national liberation movement possesses a 
´UHVSRQVLEOHFRPPDQGµDEOHWRHQIRUFHDQ´LQWHUQDOGLVFLSOLQDU\V\VWHPZKLFKinter alia, 
shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed 
FRQIOLFWµ124 
The fact that very little was stipulated in article 1(4) with respect to the intensity of the 
conflict or the military organisation of the actor shows that the legislative focus was 
missing. The status conferred by the application/applicability of the jus in bello regime was 
a step towards the exercise of external self-determination, usually through statehood. 
Accordingly, a very important aspect of the actor was political organisation and 
representativeness. This can also be seen to reflect the kind of status that the proponents 
wanted to confer to national liberation movements. It was at the same time the state-like 
legal status of a party to an international armed conflict and the political status of an 
HQWLW\ ILJKWLQJ IRU D ¶SHRSOH· DJDLQVW D VHW RI DGYHUVDULHV Political, rather than simply 
military, organisation and representativeness would contribute to the success of the 
struggle for decolonisation and the eventual external self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQRI WKH ¶SHRSOHV·
concerned. These aspects, crucial in the conferment of status, are analysed in the next 
section, which looks at the application of the Protocol. 
 
4.5. Recognition of the national liberation movement and application of Protocol I 
 
The application of the jus in bello regime to non-state armed groups is fundamentally a 
process of recognition. The Geneva Conventions, through common article 3, attempted 
a departure from the decentralised and unreliable process of recognition of belligerency 
                                              
124 See also above, section 4.3.3. 
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and insurgency and required the automatic applicability of the law to the extent that the 
fact of an armed conflict existed.125 As we have seen, in practice, this did not and could 
not obviate the need for a process of assessment of the existence of those facts. To the 
extent that the application of international legal regulation of the conflict was viewed as a 
question of status this assessment was complicated.126 This led to the application of 
common article 3 being caught up in the tension between police operations and 
international armed conflict.127  
In the case of wars of national liberation, the process of assessment was more complex 
still. The demonstration of the existence of an armed conflict had to be supplemented by 
necessity demonstration of the existence of a national liberation movement representing 
a people. At the same time, both the extension of the entire legal regime of the Geneva 
Conventions and Protocols and specifically rules providing legal status and protections 
linked with such status, make this process even more linked to status. The clear link 
between recognising a self-determination unit struggling for decolonisation and the 
eventual statehood of that unit serves to draw the assessment of facts and law more 
towards a process of recognition. Finally, such recognition does not result in the 
automatic application of the law. A process of accession, through a unilateral declaration 
has been put in place in article 96(3). These two phases of applicability, the recognition of 
a national liberation movement and the accession through article 96(3), will now be 
discussed. 
 
4.5.1. Recognition of national liberation movements: actors, process and criteria 
 
Article 1(4) is silent as to the process, actors or criteria for the recognition of the 
existence of a national liberation movement. During the Diplomatic Conference there 
were those that argued for the inclusion, as a criterion for the applicability of the 
Protocol, of the prior recognition of the national liberation movement by the appropriate 
regional organisation. Thus Turkey, in a proposed amendment, stated that:  
                                              
125 See section 3.2.4 fn 67 and text. 
126 See section 3.4. 
127 See section 3.4.2-3. 
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  The present Protocol shall also apply to armed conflicts waged by the national 
liberation movements recognised by the regional intergovernmental organisation 
concerned128 
 
Although this did not attract support129 Turkey reiterated this proposal during the 
debates at committee and plenary level.130 Indeed, Turkey was not alone. Indonesia, in is 
explanation of vote, undHUVWRRGWKDWWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHDUWLFOHZRXOGEH´OLPLWHGRQO\
to those liberation movements which have already been recognised by the respective 
UHJLRQDO LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDO RUJDQLVDWLRQV FRQFHUQHGµ WKXV HQGHDYRXULQJ ´WR LQVHUW DQ
element of objectiveness in evaluating whether a movement can be regarded as a 
OLEHUDWLRQPRYHPHQWRUQRWµ131 These statements reflected the need to identify a process 
and a relevant actor in order to apply the legal rule. It was thought that the ensuing 
¶REMHFWLYHQHVV·ZRXOGVerve the applicability of the article. Moreover, the use of the law of 
armed conflict in the conferment of status could be controlled through regional 
structures.   
The absence of any mention of regional organisations in the article, however, and the lack 
of support for the Turkish amendment indicate that there is no such formal criterion to 
be satisfied. The reasons for the lack of support of such an amendment are unclear. One 
explanation could be an aversion, on the side of the proponents of internationalisation, to 
fora where such status could have been denied or granted to states that had emerged 
from decolonisation. This, however, does not seem fully convincing as, in practice, 
regional organisations, such as the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), tended to 
support movements fighting against (European) colonial states, while withholding such 
support from movements fighting against newly independent states.132 To the extent that 
the nucleus of the rationale behind the article was anti-colonial, for instance excluding 
                                              
128 CDDH/I/42 
129 See See Abi-Saab, 440, fn 47. 
130 See CDDH/I/SR 5, par. 43. See also the Turkish explanation of vote, at CDDH/I/36, par. 55: ´,QLWVYLHZWKH
article applied to armed conflicts recognised by regional intergovernmental organisations such as the League of Arab 
6WDWHVRUWKH2UJDQLVDWLRQRI$IULFDQ8QLW\ZKLFKZHUHXQLYHUVDOO\DQGZLGHO\DFFHSWHGµ 
131 CDDH/I/36, Annex.  
132 See, on the approach of the OAU, 2 .DPDQX ¶6HFHVVLRQ DQG WKH 5LJKW RI 6HOI-Determination: an O.A.U. 
'LOHPPD·The Journal of Modern African Studies 355 (Kamanu).  
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conflicts for self-determination in African states, this was reflected in the practice of 
recognition by regional organisations.133 Relevant examples in this respect include 
Katanga,134 Biafra135 and Western Sahara136 could be used in that respect.  
Another explanation could be that the drafters wanted to stress, at least on a rhetorical 
level, that whether a group was a national liberation movement should be clear and self-
evident. This reflects the approach of the proponents in considering the national 
liberation movement status a matter of undeniable natural right.137 This explanation does 
not, however, solve the problem. The refusal to identify a process and actor does not 
mean that there is no need for one.  
A solution could only be found if it is understood that the identification of a national 
liberation movement is not strictly a matter of the jus in bello. Indeed, the legal status of 
¶QDWLRQDOOLEHUDWLRQPRYHPHQW·FDQEHFRQIHUUHGLQDVHWWLQJRWKHUWKDQDZDURIQDWLRQDO
liberation. This means that recognition could be conferred within other legal structures. 
This seems to reflect the function of the status conferred as operating beyond the 
relatively narrow bounds of the specific rules of the Protocol and Conventions. It 
contains a suggestion of wider legal status as a subject, at least, of the jus in bello in general. 
This is suggested by the participation of national liberation movements in international 
organisations138 and their participation (recognised by regional organisations) in the 
Diplomatic Conference, as discussed above.139   
In both these fora the representativeness and effective organisation of the national 
OLEHUDWLRQPRYHPHQWZHUHFUXFLDO7RWKHH[WHQWWKDWLWZDVFRQVLGHUHGWKDWWKH¶SHRSOH·
needed to be represented in these fora by virtue of the importance and legitimacy of their 
struggle for self-determination, the question to be asked was who would represent them 
effectively and legitimately. Both the organisations to which this decision was delegated 
                                              
133 See section 4.5.1. 
134 See 5/HPDUFKDQG¶7KH/LPLWVRI6HOI-Determination: The Case RIWKH.DWDQJDQ6HFHVVLRQ·American 
Political Science Review 404.  
135 6HH):RGLH¶/D6pFHVVLRQGX%LDIUDHWOH'URLW,QWHUQDWLRQDO3XEOLF·Revue Générale de Droit International 
Public 1018.  
136 6HH7)UDQFN¶7KH6WHDOLQJRIWKH6DKDUD·American Journal of International Law )UDQFN¶6DKDUD·-
1DOGL¶7KH2$8DQGWKH6DKDUDQ$UDE'HPRFUDWLF5HSXEOLF·Journal of African Law 1DOGL¶6DKDUD· 
137 CDDH/I/SR 5, par. 15 for the argument of the representative of liberation movement for Mozambique 
)5(/,02DUJXLQJWKDW´XQOHVVZH·UH3RUWXJXHVHµWKHFRQIOLFWLVDQLQWHUQDWLRQDORQH6HHDOVRSalmon, 70. 
138 See, for example, General Assembly Resolution 3237 (XXIX) of 1974 granting observer status to the PLO. 
139 Section 4.2.2. 
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and the criteria used to make it were chosen to address the representative and 
organisational effectiveness and legitimacy of the movement. 
As demonstrated by the process of deciding which national liberation movements were 
to participate in the workings of the Diplomatic Conference, the movements considered 
to possess the requisite qualifications were the ones already recognised by the relevant 
regional organisation. Indeed, this was decided in accordance with the precedent practice 
in the context of the UN. The UN, in granting observer status, to national liberation 
movements in the General Assembly140 or in other bodies,141 eventually142 delegated the 
decision making to the appropriate regional organisations, most notably the OAU. This 
was done for both technical and broader political reasons. Regional organisations were in 
closer proximity to, and could more easily visit, the area where the struggle was taking 
place. They were considered better able to assess the situation. On a broader political 
level, it can be argued that regional organisations, primarily the OAU, were given the 
authority to manage (and limit) the process of decolonisation. In that sense, the UN 
deferred to the organisations that had more interest and more knowledge to make the 
appropriate decisions.  
Indeed, the OAU dispatched missions in areas where struggles of self-determination were 
taking place and developed the use of factors for deciding which organisation it was to 
include in its forum. Such factors were not stipulated from the beginning as set criteria 
but gradually developed through practice. These can be categorised as criteria relating to 
the representative nature of the national liberation movement and its efficiency in 
conducting the struggle.143 These criteria were not limited to the armed struggle but were 
more broadly addressed to the capacity of the movement to generate and organise the 
support144 of the people. This was not necessarily related to the political form of 
                                              
140 6HH&/D]DUXV¶/H6WDWXWGHV0RXYHPHQWVGH/LEpUDWLRQ1DWLRQDOHjO·2UJDQLVDWLRQGHV1DWLRQV8QLHV·
20 Annuaire Français de Droit International 173, 190 ff (Lazarus).  
141 The first body to choose representatives was the Economic Commission for Africa. See Wilson, 139. For other 
examples see Lazarus, 184 ff.   
142 The initial approach adopted by the Economic Commission for Africa when considering the issue of Angola, 
Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and South West Africa, was to consult the African governments. See Wilson, 139.  
143 See the declaration by M. Sahnoun, Secretary for Political Affairs of the OAU, in Lazarus, 180.  
144 6HH06KDZ¶7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO6WDWXVRI1DWLRQDO/LEHUDWLRQ0RYHPHQWV·Liverpool Law Review 19, 23. 
According to Shaw, the lack of support was the reason why the OAU in 1964 withdrew the recognition it had 
extended to the FNLA in Angola the previous year.  
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government that was to be expected by the organisation.145 It was related more strongly 
to the effectiveness of conducting the struggle of the people, militarily and politically. 
Indeed, the effectiveness of the political and military struggle and the representativeness 
of the movement can be seen as the two main, and mutually reinforcing, criteria. This is 
concisely put by Abi²6DDE ´D FHUWDLQ GHJUHH RI FRQWLQXHG HIIHFWLYHQHVV FUHDWHV D
SUHVXPSWLRQRIUHSUHVHQWDWLYHQHVVµ146 
The mediation of the OAU as a recognising agent, however, was not always considered 
successful or uncontroversial. For instance, the OAU would not grant recognition to 
movements fighting for self-determination against an African state. This was clear in the 
cases of Biafra147 and Western Sahara.148 Finally, although the OAU played an important 
role in identifying the most representative actors within struggles for self-determination 
in the continent, the role of regional organisations outside Africa was less prominent. 
Almost no national liberation movement outside Africa has been recognised by such an 
organisation or by the UN. This may have been because there was no relevant regional 
organisation or because the groups claiming to national liberation movements were not 
recognised by the relevant regional organisation, no national liberation movement outside 
Africa has been recognised by such an organisation or by the UN. The sole exception to 
this is the PLO which has been recognised by the League of Arab States149 and the 
UN.150  
This tends to support the conclusion that the regional organisations are not necessarily 
the solution in deciding which actor is a national liberation movement.151 Moreover, the 
non-inclusion of regional organisations as formal decision makers in article 1(4) reflects 
the fact that the recognition of a national liberation movement is not strictly a matter of 
the jus in bello. Accordingly, the status conferred, both legal and political, was not 
understood to be confined to the jus in bello. Indeed, the practice had developed 
                                              
145 See Lazarus, 180.  
146 Abi-Saab, 413. 
147 See, for example, Kamanu, 362, who discusses and criticises the argument that the Biafran secession was 
FRQVLGHUHGWREH´LQFRPSDWLEOHZLWKWKHJRDORI$IULFDQXQLW\µ 
148 6HHIRUDKLVWRULFDOQDUUDWLYH)UDQFN¶6DKDUD· See also Wilson, 113 ff.  
149 This occurred in a meeting in Rabat, Morocco, in 1974. 
150 See UNGA Resolution 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974. 
151 See also, for this point, Salmon, 84. However, those recognised by regional organisations and/or the UN will be 
SUHVXPHGWRFRQVWLWXWHVXFKDXWKRULWLHV6HH6FKLQGOHU¶7\SHV· 
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independently and before wars of national liberation were included in the lex lata of the 
jus in bello7KHSUDFWLFHZDVPRUHDERXWZKRUHSUHVHQWVWKH¶SHRSOH·DQGFDUULHVLWVFODLP
to external self-determination. 
Uncertainty about the role of regional organisations is another reminder of the 
incompletely legalised process of recognition, both in terms of the recognising actors and 
the criteria used. The predominance of status in the process of recognition means that 
the criteria remain vague and malleable and the recognising actors vary depending on the 
political circumstance. These characteristics of the recognising process can be 
incompatible with a legal system aspiring for automatic vertical applicability aimed at 
individual protection. 
Moreover, it can also be concluded that regional organisations, particularly the OAU, did 
play an important role in determining the internationalisation of the conflict. They 
decided on the claims to self-determination and the organisations who made them in 
processes that could lead to the recognition of a national liberation movement. The 
limitation of this role is that it was very closely linked to a historical circumstance, that of 
decolonisation and particularly in Africa. This does not mean that the practice cannot 
adapt to other self-determination conflicts, but it reflects the particular circumstances of 
the practice and of the creation of article 1(4). Ultimately, the practice of recognition 
suggests a return of a decentralised approach of ascribing wide legal and political status, 
very closely linked to specific historical circumstances.  
 
4.5.2. Application through accession: article 96(3) 
 
The process of recognition described above, however, is not the only departure from a 
system of vertical and automatic application of the law. A further requirement is 
stipulated in article 96(3) of the Protocol. This accentuates the gradual and horizontal 
process of applicability of the legal rules to wars of national liberation. The article 
requires a unilateral declaration of accession to the Protocol and the Geneva Conventions 
by the national liberation movement. The text of article 96(3) is as follows:  
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 3. The authority representing a people engaged against a High Contracting Party in an 
armed conflict of the type referred to in Article 1, paragraph 4, may undertake to 
apply the Conventions and this Protocol in relation to that conflict by means of a 
unilateral declaration addressed to the depository. Such declaration shall upon its 
receipt by the depository, have in relation to that conflict the following effects:  
(a) the Conventions and this Protocol are brought into force for the said authority 
as a Party to the conflict with immediate effect; 
(b) the said authority assumes the same rights and obligations as those which have 
been assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Conventions and this 
Protocol; and 
(c) the Conventions and this Protocol are equally binding upon all Parties to the 
conflict. 
 
This serves a dual purpose. The first is to assuage the fears of the critics about the 
discriminatory application of the law.152  Indeed, this was part of a general criticism that 
the internationalisation of wars of national liberation followed the logic of the doctrine of 
just and unjust wars.153 Part of this doctrine154 was that the jus in bello did not bind the just 
party as it had a free hand to achieve its just aims.155 This was expressed as a fear by many 
delegations,156 HYHQ WKRXJK LW ZDV QRW SDUW RI WKH SURSRQHQWV· UDWLRQDOH157 for 
internationalisation.158 Paragraphs (b) and (c) clearly state the equality of rights and 
obligations dispelling both fears and hopes of the relativisation of jus in bello obligation 
according to a just war doctrine. Such a stipulation was initially proposed informally by 
                                              
152 See Abi-Saab, 405-6; Wilson, 168. 
153 See for the criticism for example CDDH/I/SR 4, par. 40 (Netherlands); CDDH/I/SR 5, par. 22 (Denmark). 
This criticism was also taken up in the literature, sometimes by writers who were members of the delegations at the 
Conference. See for example, %D[WHU¶3ROLWLFV·6HHDOVR'UDSHU¶:DU&ULPLQDOLW\·'*UDKDP¶7KH
Diplomatic Conference on the Law of War: a Victory for Political Causes and a Return to the Just War Concept of 
WKH(OHYHQWK&HQWXU\·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Washington and Lee Law Review 25. 
154 )RUWKHGRFWULQHRIMXVWZDUVVHH-YRQ(OEH¶7KH(YROXWLRQRIWKH&RQFHSWRI-XVW:DULQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ·
(1939) 33 American Journal of International Law 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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Journal of International Law $1XVVEDXP¶-XVW:DU² $/HJDO&RQFHSW"·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Michigan Law Review 453. 
155 See Neff, War, 64 ff. and 73 ff. 
156 See, for example, the delegate from Denmark at CDDH/I/SR 5, par. 22.  
157 See, for example, CDDH/I/SR 5, par. 8 (Egypt); CDDH/I/SR 4, par. 45 (Norway). See also Salmon, 78. 
158 But see, for the rather isolated Chinese view, CDDH/I/SR 12. China had already quite forcefully spoken in 
WHUPVRI MXVWXQMXVW 6HH&''+,65 SDU  6HH DOVR1)DULQD ¶7KH$WWLWXGHRI WKH3HRSOH·V5HSublic of 
&KLQD·LQ$&DVVHVHHGThe New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (Editoriale Scientifica, 1979), 445. 
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the delegate of West Germany, Partsch.159 However, it was dismissed by western states 
who were not yet resigned to the inclusion of wars of national liberation. By the last 
session of the Diplomatic Conference, it was clear that article 1(4) would remain in 
Additional Protocol I. After informal negotiations in a working party, Norway proposed 
an amendment to add a third paragraph to article 96 (then, article 84). The amendment 
was not referred to a working group and was adopted without debate, as it was judged 
WKDWLW´UHVXOWHGLQDGHOLFDWHO\EDODQFHGFRPSURPLVHZKLFKWKHVSRQVRUVGLGQRWZLVKWR
MHRSDUGLVHµ160 At the end of the Diplomatic Conference it was renumerated to article 
96(3). 
Article 96(3) has a second purpose that aims to reconcile the regulation of national 
liberation movement with the structure of the Geneva Conventions. National liberation 
movements are formally brought within the Geneva Conventions system through a 
formal statement of their willingness to be bound. This can be juxtaposed to the structure 
that applies to the regulation of states. This is exemplified by two legal issues. The first is 
that, unlike the legal position in relation to states, there is no provision that stipulates that 
even if the national liberation movement has not acceded to the Protocol but, as a matter 
of fact, accepts and observes the rules of the Protocol and the Conventions, the state will 
be bound by these rules.161 At the same time, as long as the national liberation movement 
has not acceded to the Protocol, the applicable law would be common article 3 or 
Additional Protocol II, unless it is accepted that national liberation movements are 
¶SRZHUV· DVSHr common article 2,162 or that they are international armed conflicts as a 
matter of custom.163 This means that a national liberation movement is treated as such 
with respect to the jus in bello only after making an article 96(3) declaration. 
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 *HQHYD 3URWRFROV· LQ $ 'HOLVVHQ DQG * 7DQMD HGV Humanitarian Law of 
Armed Conflict Challenges Ahead, Essays in Honour of Frits Kalshoven (Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), 93, 111-2 (Greenwood, 
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 ,QIDYRXUVHH&DVVHVH¶/LEHUDWLRQ·Abi-Saab, 372. 
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This relates to the continuing importance of the existence of de facto reciprocity.164 The 
substantive right of self-determination does not suffice for national liberation movements 
to be treated as states with respect to the jus in bello. Between the presumption that a state 
is able to abide by its obligations and the need for an armed group to satisfy certain 
material criteria that correlate to its ability to carry out its obligations, a prospective 
national liberation movement will not be automatically presumed to be able to apply the 
rules. This will only be presumed after both the recognition of the group as a national 
liberation movement165 and a declaration of its willingness and ability to be bound. In 
terms of reciprocity, this marks a difference between articles 96(2) and 96(3). Despite the 
existence of criteria that stem from the minimum of the existence of an armed conflict,166 
as per common article 3, and certain organisational characteristics, as per articles 43 and 
44, a national liberation movement which is accepted as an authority through the process 
of recognition described above will be presumed to offer de facto reciprocity once it has 
made the relevant declaration. 
The fear that national liberation movements, frequently waging guerrilla warfare, will be 
unable to abide by the extensive legal rules contained in the Geneva Conventions and 
Protocols was never entirely quelled. In order to examine this, we will now turn to the 
actual application of the Protocol to wars of national liberation.  
 
4.6. The (non-)application of article 1(4) 
 
The effect of article 1(4) has been minimal. Armed groups, whether recognised as 
national liberation movements or not, have issued declarations of acceptance of all or 
some of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions even before the Protocol was agreed. 
It is therefore hard to maintain that the Protocol has had a great effect on the making or 
                                              
164 See section 5.4.4. 
165 Indeed, a 96(3) declaration does not suffice to validate the particular group as an authority as per article 1(4). See 
the declarations, upon ratification, by Canada (1991) and South Korea (1982), also pointing out the role of regional 
organisations, available at http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/ 
downloads/edazen/topics/intla/intrea/depch/warvic/note95.Par.0002.File.tmp/mt_070319_gennotif910116_e.pdf 
and http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/intla/intrea/depch/ 
warvic/note85.Par.0008.File.tmp/mt_070207_notif820301_e.pdf 
166 See above section 4.4.2. 
152 
 
reception of such declarations. An example of a declaration pre-dating the Protocol was 
that of the Algerian Provisional Government in 1960.167 Such claims, both before and 
after the Protocols were finalised, can be seen as an attempt to claim the status of parties 
to international armed conflicts through declarations of respect of the Geneva 
Conventions and Protocols.168 Some of these declarations were broader than others. For 
example, the ANC, declared that 
 
Whenever practically possible, the African National Congress of South Africa will 
endeavour to respect the rules of the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
for the victims of armed conflicts and the 1977 additional Protocol I relating to the 
protection of victims of international armed conflicts.169   
 
The first three words of the declaration offered reasons for questioning its validity.170 
Other declarations were more specific. For example, SWAPO proclaimed on 15 July 
1981 that  
 
It intends to respect and be guided by the rules of the four Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949 for the protection of the victims of armed conflicts and the 1977 
additional Protocol relating to the protection of victims of international armed 
conflicts (Protocol I).171 
 
                                              
167 See section 3.4.4. For the communiqué ratifying the Geneva Conventions see Algerian Office, 85. See, on the 
legal effects of this ratification Bedjaoui, 181 ff.  
168 Even though in some of these cases the territorial government had not ratified Protocol I. For the declarations 
from Polisario (1975), the parties in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (1977), EPLF (Eritrea) (1977), FROLINAT (Chad) 
(1978), Abbo Liberation Front (Somalia) (1979), FLSN (Nicaragua) (1979), ANC (South Africa) (1980), UNITA 
(Angola) (1980), SWAPO (1981), ANLF (Afghanistan) (1981), MNLF (Philippines) (1981) see the ICRC Annual 
Reports of these years. 6HHDOVR:LOVRQ'3ODWWQHU¶/D3RUWpH-XULGLTXHGHV'pFODUDWLRQVGH5HVSHFWGX'URLW
International Humanitaire qui Émanent de Mouvements en Lutte dans un Conflit Armp· Revue Belge de 
Droit International 298, 298 fn 2 (Plattner); N. Higgins, 118 ff. It is important to note that virtually all such declarations 
occurred in the years immediately before or after the drafting of Protocol I. 
169 Declaration of 28 November 1980. The text is reproduced in Plattner, 303. 
170 See -'XJDUG ¶7KH7UHDWPHQWRI5HEHOV LQ&RQIOLFWV RI D'LVSXWHG&KDUDFWHU7KH$QJOR-Boer War and the 
¶$1&-%RHU:DU·&RPSDUHG·Netherlands International Law Review 447, 452. 
171 The text is reproducHGLQ3ODWWQHU)RUDQHDUOLHUGHFODUDWLRQE\6:$32VHHDOVR-'XJDUG¶6:$32 : The 
-XVDG%HOOXPDQGWKH-XVLQ%HOOR·South African Law Journal 144, 152. 
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Although, to the extent that such declarations signify willingness to comply with the rules 
and may convince the adversary to do the same, they are both practically and normatively 
important, they were not the result of the application of articles 1(4) and 96(3) of 
3URWRFRO,$V*UHHQZRRGSXWV LW´>Q@RGHFODUDWLRQXQGHU$UWLFOHKDVVXFFHVVIXOO\
EHHQGHSRVLWHGµ172 The reasons can vary. In some cases, it can be an issue of formally 
recognising a group as a national liberation movement. Ultimately, however, it was a 
question of the states being involved in such conflicts not having ratified the Protocol. It 
can be argued that the language used to formulate article 1(4) is partly to blame. As the 
delegate for IVUDHOSXWLWZKHQH[SODLQLQJKLVVWDWH·VQHJDWLYHYRWH 
 
paragraph 4 had within it a built-in non-applicability clause, since a party would have 
to admit that it was either racist, alien or colonial ² definitions which no State would 
ever admit to. By including such language, the Conference had, to his regret, ensured 
that no State by its own volition would ever apply the article.173   
 
These terms accentuate the subjugation suffered by the peoples seeking self-
determination. They reflect the activation of external self-determination because of the 
clear denial of self-determination within the existing internal structure. However, they 
also link article 1(4) to the specific historical period of decolonisation and to a struggle of 
DSDUWLFXODUVHWRI¶SHRSOHV·against a set of governments. Article 1(4) is meant to confer 
VWDWXV RQ D SDUWLFXODU VHW RI DFWRUV :LWK WKH SRVVLEOH H[FHSWLRQ RI WKH WHUP ¶DOLHQ
RFFXSDWLRQ· DV GLVFXVVHG DERYH174 which can allow for broader interpretative use, the 
article narrows down its own applicability both in law and in practice. The narrow focus 
on the conferral of status to a set of actors, it is argued, has fatally limited the applicability 
and actual application of article 1(4). 
 
4.7. Conclusions 
 
                                              
172 *UHHQZRRG¶3URWRFROV· 
173 CDDH/I/SR 36, par. 61.  
174 See above fns 107-109 and text. 
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Article 1(4) was debated and created at a moment in time that has marked it indelibly. 
The central stake seemed to be the legitimation, through the conferral of status of 
participants to international armed conflicts, of the entities that had emerged and were 
emerging through the process of decolonisation. Although it nominally extended the full 
protective regime of international humanitarian law to some situations, it has been argued 
that the article fails to contribute significantly to the development of the legal regime. At 
the same time, because of its exclusive focus on the conferral of status, it can be seen as 
moving away from the legal structure that was initiated with common article 3.  
Article 1(4) was seen as posing a threat to the structure of the Geneva Conventions by 
internationalising conflicts where not all participants were states. Prima facie it reflects a 
revolutionary shift in the criteria for the conferment of status. In addition to the formal 
criterion of statehood, and the level of organisation that this is presumed to entail, the 
substantive right to external self-determination confers the status of participant to an 
international armed conflict.  
This chapter has attempted to show that such a shift was actually more limited. There 
were substantive assumptions shared between critics and proponents on the centrality of 
WKHFRQFHSWRIWKH¶QDWLRQ·ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQLQWHUQDWLRQDODQGQRQ-
international armed conflicts. Moreover, the polarisation of the debate and the historical 
examples that served as blueprints led to the narrowing down of the scope of article 1(4) 
and to the non-ratification of the Protocol by many affected states. Indeed, the inclusion 
of a specific set of opponents in the definition reflects the function of the article as 
conferring status and legitimacy to a specific set of actors in a specific situation. The non-
application of article 1(4) in practice reflects this.  
This can also be seen in the threshold of article 1(4) as well as in the process of 
recognition of national liberation movements. The threshold focuses on the actor and 
not on the situation. The intensity of the violence, leading to a situation of armed conflict 
meriting humanitarian regulation, is not addressed by the article. Moreover, while the 
mutually reinforcing criteria of political representativeness and efficiency in conducting 
the struggle for self-determination developed in practice, their application depended on 
the practices and politics of mostly regional organisations, particularly the OAU. This 
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reinforced the historical limitations reflected in the language of the article, with the result 
that groups fighting for self-determination outside the colonial context were not 
recognised.  
Finally, the predominance of the status-based rationale in the debate on the 
internationalisation of wars of national liberation reflects and reinforces the 
understanding that the law of armed conflict either regulates states and state-like entities 
or does not apply. It reflects the understanding that the question of legal regulation of 
conflict is a zero-sum game of conferral of status between the government and the non-
state armed group. Indeed, once the proponents extended regulation through article 1(4) 
to a very limited category of non-state armed groups, there was little zeal to develop the 
regulation of non-international armed conflict.  The result was Additional Protocol II and 
this is discussed in the next chapter.    
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5. Chapter 5: Additional Protocol II 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The fundamental structural shift attempted in common article 3 offered, for the first 
time, a legal means to apply humanitarian protection irrespective of the state-like nature 
of the non-state armed group. The non-definition of the threshold allowed flexible and, 
therefore, potentially wide applicability of the legal rules and these provided a set of 
fundamental humanitarian protections. However, the lingering perception that regulation 
of armed conflicts has implications for the status of the actors, and that regulation can 
only be extended to state-like entities that have already achieved a certain political status, 
meant that an armed conflict as per common article 3 existed precariously between the 
polar extremes of police operations and international armed conflicts.1 The system 
remained mostly decentralised and the absence of a third-party to authoritatively decide 
ZKHWKHU FRPPRQ DUWLFOH  DSSOLHG PHDQW LQ SUDFWLFH WKDW WKH LQFXPEHQW JRYHUQPHQW·V
practice was central in the applicability of the article.2 This led to a status-centred and 
narrow application. Finally, common article 3 had provided only basic humanitarian 
protections as part of the agreed formula.  
This chapter will analyse the next, chronologically, international instrument attempting to 
address these issues, the 1977 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. There 
will be an overview of the run-up to the Diplomatic Conference, and the tentative 
initiatives preparing the ground. There will then be a detailed presentation and analysis of 
the travaux préparatoires of the 1974-7 Diplomatic Conference, where the stance of 
different actors will be related to the eventual result. An analysis of the new threshold will 
be followed by a brief review of state practice The central question will be whether 
Additional Protocol II moves further away from or develops the status-based rationale 
surviving alongside common article 3.  
 
                                              
1 Section 3.4.3. 
2 Section 3.4.1. 
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5.2. The period before the Diplomatic Conference and the role of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the international political environment before the 
Conference was dominated by the process of decolonisation.3 At the same there were 
also efforts for the development of humanitarian protection in conflicts. The Tehran 
International Conference on Human Rights requested the General Assembly to ask the 
Secretary General to VWXG\ZKHWKHU´DGGLWLRQDOKXPDQLWDULDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRQYHQWLRQVRU
SRVVLEOH UHYLVLRQRI H[LVWLQJ FRQYHQWLRQVµ IRU WKHEHWWHUSURWHFWLRQRIKXPDQ ULJKWV LQ
armed conflicts were needed and how they might be developed.4 The General Assembly 
acted on the request,5 leading WRWKUHHUHSRUWVE\WKH6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDORQ¶KXPDQULJKWV
LQDUPHGFRQIOLFWV·6  
The Red Cross responded to these developments by calling its XXIst International 
&RQIHUHQFHZKLFKDVNHGWKH,&5&´WRGUDIWQHw rules, to consult governmental experts 
on these proposals, to submit them to governments for comments, and, if desirable, to 
UHFRPPHQGWKHFRQYHQLQJRIDGLSORPDWLFFRQIHUHQFHWRDGRSWQHZOHJDOLQVWUXPHQWVµ7 
This included the regulation of non-international armed conflicts. As seen in Chapter 3,8 
the shortcomings of common article 3 had been gradually articulated,9 and the ICRC was 
conscious that there was a need to develop the legal regime.10  
The ICRC had developed a strategy with the goal of defining common article 3.11 It 
wanted to assert its automaticity,12 and stretch its applicability downwards in the scale of 
                                              
3 Section 4.1. 
4 Resolution XXIII, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, UN Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 (1968), 18. 
5 General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XIII), 16 December 1968. 
6 Respectively of 1969, 1970, and 1971. See UN Doc. A/7720 (1969) ; UN Doc. A/8052 (1970) ; UN Doc. A/8370 
(1971).  
7 Resolution XIII, Reaffirmation and Development of the Laws and Customs applicable in Armed Conflicts, XXIst International 
Conference of the Red Cross, Istanbul, September 1969. See also %D[WHU¶3ROLWLFV·, 6.  
8 Section 3.3.2 
9 See, for a summary exposition of these problems, albeit from a later date, G. Abi-6DDE¶1RQ-International Armed 
&RQIOLFWV· LQ81(6&2 International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law (UNESCO and Martinus Nijhoff, 1988) 217, 
225 (Abi-6DDE¶&RQIOLFWV·6HHDOVRIRUWKHLQDGHTXDF\RIWKHVXEVWDQWLYHODZRIFRPPRQDUWLFOH%D[WHU¶3ROLWLFV·
8. 
10 See, for example, for an early call to apply the wider regime of humanitarian law to non-international armed 
conflicts by legal advisers to a national Red Cross society, % -DNRYOMHYLý DQG - 3DWUQRJLý ¶7KH 8UJHQW 1HHG WR
Apply the Rules of Humanitarian Law to so-FDOOHG,QWHUQDO$UPHG&RQIOLFWV·International Review of the Red 
Cross 259. 
11 Abi-6DDE¶&RQIOLFWV· 
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intensity, possibly covering internal disturbances that had not previously been considered 
¶DUPHG FRQIOLFWV· This would have the effect of widening the applicability of 
humanitarian protection. Although the non-GHILQLWLRQRIDQ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·LQFRPPRQ
article 3 had provided for flexibility, the automatic application of the legal regime needed 
¶REMHFWLYH· FULWHULD13 ,I ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·ZDV FOearly defined, it was thought, it would be 
more difficult for states to deny the applicability of the legal regime.14 The ICRC also 
ZDQWHGWRNHHSWKHWKUHVKROGRIDQ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·DVORZDVSRVVLEOHLQRUGHUWRFRYHUD
wide spectrum of situations.  
These objectives were pursued by setting up two Commissions which produced Reports 
on the protection of victims of internal armed conflicts in 195515 and 1962.16 The latter 
&RPPLVVLRQ VWDWHG XQHTXLYRFDOO\ WKDW ´WKH H[LVWHQFH RI DQ DUPHG FRQIOLFW ZLWKLQ WKH
meaning of article 3, cannot be denied if the hostile action, directed against the legal 
government is of a collective character and consists of a minimum amount of 
RUJDQLVDWLRQµ17 This statement confirmed the direction the ICRC wanted to take. These 
efforts were furthered through the XXth Conference of the Red Cross held in Vienna in 
196518 and the report of a group of experts in February 1969, laid before the XXIst 
International Conference in Istanbul.19  
Eventually, the ICRC felt that the time was ripe for a QHZWUHDW\,QSUHSDUDWLRQ´DIWHU
due consultation with the Secretary General of the United Nations, [it] took the initiative 
of calling a meeting which would be something between a mere consultation of experts 
and a conference of Government representatives: it convened a conference of 
*RYHUQPHQWH[SHUWVµ20 This was held in Geneva, in two sessions, in 1971 and 1972. The 
                                                                                                                                            
12 See section 3.2.4. fn 67 and text.. See also Sandoz, Commentary, 1348.  
13 See section 3.2.4. 
14 See Wilhelm, 340. 
15 See 09HXWKH\¶/HV&RQIOLWV$UPpVGH&DUDFWqUH1RQ,QWHUQDWLRQDOHWOH'URLW+XPDQLWDLUH·LQ$&DVVHVHHG
Current Problems of International Law (Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore, 1975) 179, 186-7, for discussion. 
16 See WKH5HSRUWE\ WKH,&5&53LQWR5DSSRUWHXUHQWLWOHG ¶+XPDQLWDULDQ$LG WRWKH9LFWLPVRI,QWHUQDO
&RQIOLFWV·DQGUHSURGXFHGLQInternational Review of the Red Cross 79.  
17 See ibid, 82.     
18 See .DOVKRYHQ¶([SHUWV·, 70 . 
19 6HH5HSRUWE\WKH,&5&HQWLWOHG¶3URWHFWLRQRI9LFWLPVRI1RQ-,QWHUQDWLRQDO$UPHG&RQIOLFWV·0D\6HH
DOVR.DOVKRYHQ¶([SHUWV·$EL-6DDE¶&RQIOLFWV·-6. 
20 .DOVKRYHQ¶([SHUWV·-2. 
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Conference agreed that the Experts would not bind their governments and that they 
ZRXOGQRWWDNHGHFLVLRQVRUYRWHH[FHSW´SXUHO\DVDQLQGLFDWRU\PHDVXUHµ21 
The ICRC approached the Conference with bold aspirations, proposing a single, unified 
Protocol which would deal with international as well as non-international armed conflicts. 
Very quickly, however, this effort was defeated and a second Protocol was subsequently 
proposed by the ICRC.22 Furthermore, it was agreed that common article 3 was 
unsatisfactory, because of the limits in its substantive law and the non-existence of a 
process to determine its applicability, but there was no agreement on how to remedy its 
defects.  
In terms of the substantive applicable law, three approaches were possible: to do away 
with the distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts; to 
extend the category of international armed conflicts; and/or to develop the rules for non-
international armed conflicts. The first option had already been defeated.23 The second 
option was the internationalisation of wars of national liberation.24 As far as the category 
of internal armed conflicts was concerned, the ICRC focused on the third option. This 
required a definition of the relevant threshold, the existing one in common article 3 being 
unsatisfactory.  
In setting a functioning structure for non-international armed conflicts, it was necessary 
both to define a non-international armed conflict, setting the threshold clearly, and to 
find mechanisms to determine that the threshold had been reached. It was thought that 
this two-pronged approach would increase the possibility of applying the legal regime.25 
7KH IRUPHU HIIRUW GLG QRW SURYLGH KRZHYHU DQ\WKLQJ RWKHU WKDQ ´D OLPLWDWLYH
enumeration of specific situations, defined as accurately as possible in terms of objective 
                                              
21 Ibid., 72-3. 
22 Ibid., 75. The ICRC did not give up, though. In an annex, it tried to provide the integral application of the Geneva 
&RQYHQWLRQV LQFDVHVZKHUH´WKH ¶UHEHOV·SRVVHVVDKLJKGHJUHHRIRUJDQLVDWLRQDQGH[HUFLVH effective control over 
part of the national territory, as well as (though with some qualifications) to cases of internal armed conflict with 
RSHUDWLRQDOPLOLWDU\LQWHUYHQWLRQE\DIRUHLJQSRZHUµ6HHConference of Government Experts, 14 ff. This was not 
accepted and was omitted from the draft presented at the Diplomatic Conference. Another effort was a 
´'HFODUDWLRQRIIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWVRIWKH LQGLYLGXDO LQWLPHRI LQWHUQDOGLVWXUEDQFHVRUSXEOLFHPHUJHQF\µZKLFK
reproduced and developed common article 3. This was also not popular. See Abi-6DDE¶&RQIOLFWV·-6. 
23 The only delegation that opposed, for humanitarian reasons, a distinction between international and non-
LQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQIOLFWVZDVWKH1RUZHJLDQRQH6HH.DOVKRYHQ¶([SHUWV· 
24 See section 4.2.1 fn 26 and accompanying text. 
25 6HHIRUWKH,&5&·VSURSRVDOVRQWKHPHFKDQLVPVWRDVVHVVZKHWKHUWKHWKUHVKROGKDVEHHQPHW&RQIHUHQFHRI
Government Experts, 41 ff. 6HHDOVRIRUDQDQDO\VLVRIERWKWKHVHRSWLRQVDQGWKH,&5&·VDSSURDFK:LOhelm, 340. 
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FKDUDFWHULVWLFVµ. As regards the establishment of mechanisms to determine the threshold, 
it was decided that states would not be willing to confer the power of assessment to any 
third body.26  
Although the Conference of Experts was not meant to yield any results, their experience 
was instructive in testing how far states would be prepared to go in extending the legal 
regime to non-international armed conflicts.  
 
5.3. The Diplomatic Conference, 1974-1977  
 
5.3.1. Main Issues and ICRC strategy 
 
The two Conferences of Government Experts had prepared the ground for a Diplomatic 
Conference which, it was hoped, would resolve remaining disagreements and produce 
legally binding instruments. In preparation for the Diplomatic Conference, the ICRC 
produced two Draft Protocols in June 1973. One dealt with international and one with 
non-international armed conflicts. They were followed by a Commentary in October 
1973.  
The ICRC aimed at increasing the extent of humanitarian protection in non-international 
armed conflicts. Its strategy consisted of three main facets: to extend the substantive law 
to be applied in non-international armed conflicts, particularly by including provisions 
concerning the means and methods of war; to more broadly and clearly define the 
material scope of application and to maintain the separate existence of common article 
3.27 The last goal was very closely related to the scope of the Protocol. The ICRC 
considered the scope to be the key to the Protocol28 in order to guarantee a 
correspondingly wide application of the legal regime. At the same time, however, the 
                                              
26 It was ultimately conceded that, in the present circumstances, it was very hard to conceive of such an independent 
ad hoc ERG\6HHIRUWKHFRQFOXVLRQ&RQIHUHQFHRI*RYHUQPHQW([SHUWV.DOVKRYHQ¶([SHUWV·-9; Wilhelm, 
342. 
27 See Moir6-XQRG¶$GGLWLRQDO3URWRFRO,,+LVWRU\DQG6FRSH·-1984) 33 American University Law Review 
29, 33 (Junod). 
28 Moir, 91. 
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substantive provisions would have to be developed. It was thought that the independent 
existence of common article 3 would allow it to further widen itself scope through 
SUDFWLFH LQFOXGLQJ FDVHV RI LQWHUQDO GLVWXUEDQFHV LQ D ZLGHU GHILQLWLRQ RI DQ ¶DUPHG
FRQIOLFW·29  
Accordingly, the approach of the ICRC in delineating of the scope of the draft Protocol 
II was two-fold. On the one hand, it set the upper threshold, by defining the relation of 
draft Protocol II with international armed conflicts contained in draft Protocol I. On the 
other haQG LW WULHG WR GHILQH ¶QRQ-LQWHUQDWLRQDO DUPHG FRQIOLFWV· ERWK SRVLWLYHO\ DQG
QHJDWLYHO\$FFRUGLQJWRWKHGUDIWWKHPDWHULDOILHOGRI3URWRFRO,,UHODWHG´WRDOODUPHG
FRQIOLFWVQRW FRYHUHGE\$UWLFOH >RI WKH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQV@«WDNLQJSODFHEHWZHHQ
aUPHG IRUFHV RU RWKHU RUJDQLVHG DUPHG JURXSV XQGHU UHVSRQVLEOH FRPPDQGµ DQG
H[FOXGHG´LQWHUQDOGLVWXUEDQFHVDQGWHQVLRQVinter alia, riots, isolated and sporadic acts of 
YLROHQFHDQGRWKHUDFWVRIDVLPLODUQDWXUHµ30 
Despite this preparation, the beginning of the Conference did not address these matters. 
Apart from the invitation of national liberation movements, the most contentious issue 
to be dealt with31 was the status of wars of national liberation as international armed 
conflicts.32 As seen in the prevLRXVFKDSWHUWKH´LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQµRIZDUVRIQDWLRQDO
liberation through their inclusion in Protocol I meant conferring the status of parties to 
international armed conflicts on national liberation movements and their members. This 
left a significant majority of new states uninterested or even hostile towards the 
development of the law regulating other internal conflicts. The drive of new states to 
                                              
29 Abi-6DDE¶&RQIOLFWV·-30. 
30Draft Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, And Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, article 1. See Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Geneva, 1974-1977), vol. 1, 
33. The full text of the article 1 of the draft Protocol submitted by the ICRC is as follows: 
Article 1. ² Material field of application 
1. The present Protocol shall apply to all armed conflicts not covered by Article 2 common to the Geneva 
Conventions of August 12, 1949, taking place between armed forces or other organized armed groups 
under responsible command. 
2. The Present Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, inter alia riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature. 
3. The foregoing provisions do not modify the conditions governing the application of Article 3 common to 
the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. 
See also .DOVKRYHQ¶)LUVW6HVVLRQ·, 6 . 
31 See section 4.2.2.  
32 Kalshoven, ¶)LUVW6HVVLRQ·-1. 
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internationalise wars of national liberation was in stark contrast with their unwillingness 
to extend international law to internal conflicts not qualifying as wars of national 
liberation. This is because, as discussed in the previous chapter,33 the primary factor in 
extending or not the application of the law was status, rather than individual protection. 
This proved to be fatal for the material field of application, as well as for Protocol II as a 
whole. 
 
5.3.2. The negotiating positions of states 
 
The negative stance of a majority of new states from Asia and Africa first manifested 
itself in the discussions of the ICRC draft. Forsythe separates states into four categories: 
the maximalists (Sweden, Norway, the Holy See, and others); the moderates (most 
Western states, the USSR, Socialist states); the minimalists (some Third World34 states 
such as Ghana); and the monkey-wrenchers (especially India).35 As Forsythe puts it:  
 
The maximalists were the pure humanitarians who desired extensive law on internal 
ZDU DW WKH H[SHQVH RI FODLPV WR QDWLRQDO VRYHUHLJQW\«7KH PRGHUDWHV ZHUH WKH
delegations which sought to resolve humDQLWDULDQLVPZLWKQDWLRQDOVRYHUHLJQW\«7KH
minimalists were those who gave priority to claims to national sovereignty and 
domestic jurisdiction at the expense of humanitarianism, without rejecting the latter 
DVDEDVLVIRUODZ«7KHPRQNH\-wrenchers were thoVHSUHSDUHGWR´WKURZDPRQNH\-
ZUHQFKµLQWRHIIRUWVWRGHYHORS3URWRFRO,,36 
 
7KH XOWLPDWH FRPSURPLVHV HPHUJHG DV WKH ¶PRGHUDWHV· JUDGXDOO\ PRYHG WRZDUGV WKH
¶PLQLPDOLVW·SRVLWLRQV 
                                              
33 See, for this conclusion, section 4.3.4. 
34 The term was used at the time to denote states that did not belong to either of the two major political camps then 
LGHQWLILHGWKH´)LUVW:RUOGµRILQGXVWULDOLVHGFDSLWDOLVWVWDWHVRUWKH ´6HFRQG:RUOGµRIVRFLDOLVWFRPPXQLVWVWDWHV
In this way it is used in this text irrespective of its continuing validity. For the term and the possible usefulness in its 
XVH WRGD\ VHH $ $QJKLH DQG % &KLPQL ¶7KLUG :RUOG $SSURDFKHV WR ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ and Individual 
5HVSRQVLELOLW\LQ,QWHUQDO&RQIOLFWV·Chinese Journal of International Law 77, 78 (Anghie and Chimni). 
35 See also Junod, 33. 
36 Forsythe, 280-1. The latter expression presumably means that they were trying to undermine the Protocol. 
163 
 
The draft was attacked on many levels and in many fora. The Diplomatic Conference 
organised itself into Committees and Plenary sessions. Generally, in the Committees the 
material field of application was significantly narrowed, whereas the substantive 
provisions were extended, while in the Plenary the narrow scope was retained, but the 
substantive provisions were drastically cut, as shown below.  
The states which were keen on developing Protocol II wanted to avoid scheduling the 
draft for consideration at the end of the Conference, which would have risked it not 
being discussed at all because of lack of time. Accordingly, they achieved the adoption of 
a procedural rule stating that the two draft Protocols would be negotiated together at the 
committee level.37 ´7KLV SURFHGXUH UHVXOWHG LQ WKH DGRSWLRQ DW WKH FRPPLWWHH OHYHO RI
quitHGHWDLOHGUXOHVIRU3URWRFRO,,RIWHQSDWWHUQHGRQWKRVHIRU3URWRFRO,µ38  
 
5.3.3. The Discussion at the Committee Level: Narrowing the Scope 
 
A concerted effort was waged at the Committee level to narrow the scope of the 
Protocol. Immediately after the ICRC revealed its proposal for the scope of the article,39 
many states expressed misgivings with the proposed formula and approached article 1 as 
a chance to criticize the whole of the Protocol.40 Furthermore, the formulation of article 
141 was attacked from two sides through a variety of amendments. The more radical 
suggestion was the stipulation that the government of the High Contracting Party was the 
only party fit to assess the existence of the criteria provided and, therefore, the 
                                              
37 See CDDH/I/SR.1. The rule was adopted by 46 votes to 9, with 8 abstentions. It is interesting that states that 
throughout the negotiations were hostile to the very existence of Protocol II argued for the separate discussion of 
the Protocols with the argXPHQW WKDW WKH 'LSORPDWLF &RQIHUHQFH ZRXOG WKHQ EH DEOH WR ´DW OHDVW FRPSOHWH
FRQVLGHUDWLRQRIGUDIW3URWRFRO,µ6HHWKHVWDWHPHQWRIWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRI,QGLDDQG$OJHULDDW&''+,65
par. 10. 
38 Junod, 33. 
39 CDDH/I/SR. 22, par. 11-16. 
40 The first state to do so was Argentina, arguing that it was unrealistic and infringed upon state sovereignty. 
&''+,65SDU2QHRIWKHPRVWIRUFHIXOFULWLFVRIWKHZKROHSURMHFWZDV,QGLD,QGLD·VGHOHJDWHVDLGWKDW
´LI QDWLRQDO OLEHUDWLRQ PRYHPHQWV ZHUH LQcluded under article 1, the application of draft Protocol II to internal 
disturbances and other such situations would be tantamount to interference with the sovereign rights and duties of 
States. The definition of non-international armed conflicts was still vague and no convincing arguments had been 
put forward to justify the need for draft Protocol II, the provisions of which would not be acceptable to his 
GHOHJDWLRQµ6HH&''+,65SDU 
41 For the text of the draft article see fn 31 above. 
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application of the legal regime.42 This effort would have undermined everything that the 
Protocol strove to achieve and was effectively resisted.43 However, the insistence of a 
variety of states on this point, at both Committee and Plenary level, created pessimism 
for the application of the Protocol in practice.44  
Article 1 was attacked successfully on another front. A variety of criteria narrowing the 
scope of the article were proposed through amendments.45 The criteria ranged from the 
Spanish attempt WR LQWHUSUHW WKH UHTXLUHPHQW RI ¶UHVSRQVLEOH FRPPDQG· VR WKDW LW LV
´HIIHFWLYHO\H[HUFLVHGLQVXFKDZD\DVWRJXDUDQWHH>WKH¶LQVXUJHQWV·@UHDGLQHVVDQGDELOLW\
WRREVHUYH DQG HQIRUFH >WKH3URWRFRO@µ46 to the enumeration of detailed criteria by the 
delegation of Pakistan.47 The criteria proposed had the effect of significantly narrowing 
the scope of the Protocol by introducing a threshold approximating the one used in the 
ROGHUGRFWULQHRIUHFRJQLWLRQRIEHOOLJHUHQF\&ULWHULDVXFKDVWKH´SURORQJHGSHULRGµRI
the conflict48 required the conflict to evolve before the legal regime could be applicable.49 
,PSRUWDQWO\WKHRFFXSDWLRQRID´VXEVWDQWLDOµ50 RU´QRQ-QHJOLJLEOHµ51 part of the territory 
reverted to the paradigm of insurgents of a proto-state quality.52  
                                              
42 See, for example the amendment of Romania of 12 March 1974 (CDDH/I/30) adding the clause, at the end of 
SDUDJUDSK´LQFDVHVZKHUHWKH6WDWHRQZKRVHWHUULWRU\WKHHYHQWVDUHWDNLQJSODFHUHFRJQLVHVWKHH[LVWHQFHRIWKH
conflict, its character and its constLWXHQWHOHPHQWVµ 
43 See, for example, the critique by Mongolia, at CDDH/I/SR. 23, par. 49-55, quoted below. See fn 57-60 and text. 
44 See Forsythe, 285. See fns 65 and 69 below on similar attempts. 
45 This was the case especially with the amendments proposed by Pakistan (CDDH/I/26), Indonesia 
(CDDH/I/32), Spain (CDDH/I/33), Brazil (CDDH/I/79). At odds with these amendments was the one proposed 
by Norway (CDDH/I/218), which identified the material field of application of Additional Protocol II with that 
common article 3 deleting all criteria. 
46 CDDH/I/33 
47 &''+, $FFRUGLQJ WR WKH 3DNLVWDQL DPHQGPHQW WKH 3URWRFRO ZRXOG EH DSSOLFDEOH LQ WKH FDVH WKDW ´D
Organized armed forces engage in hostile acts against the authorities in power and the authorities in power employ 
their own armed forces in response; (b) the hostilities are of some intensity and continue for a reasonable period of 
time; (c) the armed forces opposing the authorities in power occupy a part of the territory of the High Contracting 
Party; (d) the armed forces opposing the authorities in power are represented by a responsible authority and declare 
their intention of observing the humanitarian rules laid down in Article 3, common to the Geneva Conventions, and 
LQWKHSUHVHQW3URWRFROµ 
48 See also the amendment by Indonesia, CDDH/I/30. 
49 While duration of the violence can be seen as a factor contributing to intensity as a criterion for common article 3, 
duration of the conflict can be a factor leading in practice to the acceptance of applicability by the incumbent 
government. In the latter case, usually the non-state armed group has already achieved a level of political status, 
which in practice can translate into international pressure. Thus the government does not have much to lose by 
applying common article 3. See sections 3.3.1 and 3.4.3. In addition, the effect of this proposal would be to turn 
duration into a criterion, rather than an indicative factor. See further, on the confusing manifestations of the concept 
of duration, sections 6.5.3 and 7.4.1. 
50 CDDH/I/30 (Indonesia) 
51 CDDH/I/79 (Brazil) 
52 See, on the importance of the control of territory as the starting point of proto-state status, section 2.3.2 fn 123 
and text and 3.3.1. 
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A variety of states, including western states, argued that the stipulation of additional 
criteria would complicate matters rather than provide a clearer definition.53 A particularly 
articulate critique came from the delegate of Mongolia. She criticized some of the 
amendments proposed. She doubted whether the efforts of Pakistan and Brazil to define 
non-LQWHUQDWLRQDO DUPHG FRQIOLFWV ZHUH XVHIXO ,W ´ZDV QRW FOHDU ZKR ZRXOG GHFLGH
whether or not the forces hostile to the Government exerted continuous and effective 
control over a non-negligible part RI WKH WHUULWRU\µ DV WKH %UD]LOLDQ DPHQGPHQW54 
proposed. The same applied to the Indonesian amendment55 that referred to ´D
SURORQJHG SHULRGµ 7KH 3DNLVWDQL VXJJHVWLRQ56 that the government should assess the 
criteria begged the question what was going to happen to the victims of the conflict until 
then.57 Furthermore, the delegation of Egypt, which was influential among Third World 
states,58 opposed the efforts to introduce control of territory as a criterion, as it would 
exclude most cases of armed conflicts aQG ´VHYHUHO\ OLPLW LWV UHDO VLJQLILFDQFH DQG
XVHIXOQHVVµ59 7KH8.DJUHHG WKDW´LI WKH OHYHORIDSSOLFDWLRQZDVVHW VRKLJKWKDWRQO\
WKH¶FODVVLFDO·FLYLOZDUZDVFRYHUHG3URWRFRO,,ZRXOGEHXVHOHVVLILWZDVVHWVRORZWKDW
it covered police action against sporadic criminal or terrorist acts, it was unlikely to be 
DFFHSWHGE\6WDWHVµ60  
Nevertheless, Working Group B, which dealt with the matter,61 eventually produced a 
report in which the criterion of territorial control was added.62 This was eventually 
accepted by consensus, without a vote.63 States who wanted a wider scope accepted this 
as a compromise. On the one hand, this seemed to fit with the more extensive approach 
in terms of substantive law, which was taken in the Committees. On the other hand, it 
was clear by then that there were a large number of states that were either outspoken 
                                              
53 See CDDH/I/SR. 23, par. 10 (Austria), par. 21 (New Zealand), par. 31.(Germany), par. 41 (Netherlands). See also 
CDDH/I/SR. 24, par. 7 (Yugoslavia) and par. 25 (Algeria). 
54 CDDH/I/79 
55 CDDH/I/32 
56 CDDH/I/26 
57 &''+,65SDU7KH8.VXJJHVWHGWKDW0RQJROLD·VSRLQWVVKRXOGEHGLVFXVVHGLQWKH:RUNLQJ*URXS  
58 See Forsythe, 278. 
59 CDDH/I/SR. 24, par. 32.  
60 CDDH/I/SR. 24, par. 37. 
61 7KH :RUNLQJ *URXS·V GHOLEHUDWLRQV ZHUH LQIRUPDO DQG DUH QRW LQFOXGHG LQ WKH RIILFLDO YROXPHV RI WKH travaux 
préparatoires . 
62 6HH5HSRUWWR&RPPLWWHH,RQWKH:RUNRI:RUNLQJ*URXS¶%·&''+,5HYQRWLQJ%UD]LO·VLQVHUWLRQ
WKDWWKH+LJK&RQWUDFWLQJ3DUW\PXVWUHFRJQLVHWKHH[LVWHQFHRIWKHFULWHULDQRWLQJWKDWLWZDVVXSSRUWHGE\¶VRPH
GHOHJDWLRQV·5RPDQLDDJUHHGZLWK%UD]LO6HH&''+,65, par. 9.  
63 CDDH/I/284, p. 20. 
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against the very existence of a second Protocol, or were prepared to do anything to limit 
its effectiveness to the point of non-existence. The proposal for a sentence stipulating 
that only the state would be competent to assess the criteria would certainly have had that 
effect. 
Still, the consensus hid widespread dissatisfaction. States with maximalist aspirations, like 
Norway,64 expressed their disappointment in the formula accepted.65 Third World states 
argued that they had agreed to the article only in the spirit of cooperation, and some 
states were very outspoken on their criticism of the whole project.66 For instance, Iraq 
DUJXHG WKDW FRPPRQ DUWLFOH  ´ZDV QRW \HW JHQHUDOO\ DFFHSWHG RU DSSOLHGµ DQG WKDW WR
GLVFXVV IXUWKHUDUWLFOHVZDVQRWD´GHYHORSPHQWRIKXPDQLWDULDQ ODZ LWZDVUDWKHUD
FRPSOLFDWLRQµ 7KH GHOHJDWH DVNHG IRU D ´FRPSOHWH UHDVVHVVPHQWµ DQG VDLG WKDW VWDWHV
´VKRXOGQRWEHLQWRRJUHDWDKXUU\µ67 Nor were western states happy with the result, but, 
since they had no vital interest in the widening of the scope of the Protocol they had 
gradually adopted an attitude of resignation and viewed the result as a necessary 
compromise.68  
The goals of the ICRC were set back on another level as well. At the end of the negative 
part of the definition of the scope of application69 LWZDVVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKHSKUDVH¶DVQRW
EHLQJDUPHGFRQIOLFWV·ZRXOGEHDGGHG2QWKHRQHKDQGWKLVILWZLWKWKHFOHDUJRDORI
maintaining the separate field of applicability of common article 3, which was also 
H[SUHVVHGWKURXJKWKHSKUDVH´ZLWKRXWPRGLI\LQJLWVH[LVWLQJFRQGLWLRQVRIDSSOLFDWLRQµ
at the beginning of paragraph 1. The ICRC had initially proposed that a separate field of 
application should be maintained for common article 3 in order to be able gradually to 
                                              
64 CDDH/I/SR. 29, par. 42. 
65 See CDDH/I/SR. 29, par. 14 (Netherlands), par. 24 (Italy). In any case, WKH ODWWHU·V delegate pointed out the 
REMHFWLYH QDWXUH RI WKH FULWHULD DQG VDLG WKDW ´WKH DSSOLFDELOLW\ RI WKH 3URWRFRO ZRXOG«LQ QR ZD\ GHSHQG RQ
recognition RIWKHH[LVWHQFHRIWKHFRQIOLFWE\DQ\RQHµSDU6HHDOVRSDU*'5 
66 ,QGLD·VGHOHJDWHDVXVXDOPDGHFOHDUWKDWKLVGHOHJDWLRQZDVQRWKDSS\ZLWKWKHFRPSURPLVH+HZDUQHGWKDWKH
would return to the relevant issues at the Plenary. In addition, he expressed his full agreement with the delegations 
of Brazil and Romania on the government being the only capable to assess the applicability of the Protocol. See 
CDDH/I/SR. 29, par. 15. Indeed, the Indian delegation reiterated this point in the Plenary. Indonesia (par. 20), Iran 
(par. 36) and Burundi (par. 41) agreed with Brazil and Romania and would have voted for their proposals if they 
were put to a vote.  
67 CDDH/I/SR. 29, par. 17. 
68 6HH&/\VDJKW¶7KH$WWLWXGHRI:HVWHUQ&RXQWULHV·LQ$&DVVHVH(ed.) The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict 
(Editoriale Scientifica, 1979), 349, 384. 
69 3DUDJUDSKRIWKH,&5&GUDIWVWLSXODWHGLWLVUHPLQGHGWKDW´>W@he Present Protocol shall not apply to situations 
of internal disturbances and tensions, inter alia riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar 
QDWXUHµ 
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develop it downwards widening its scope. This separation became a necessity when the 
higher threshold of article 1 was adopted.70 Efforts by some states to argue for an 
identical threshold for Protocol II and common article 3,71 or the deletion of the 
reference to common article 3 as unnecessary72 failed. 
This failure is to be welcomed. The success of these proposals would have meant that the 
narrow scope of Protocol II would have affected the scope of application of common 
article 3. To the extent that their separation would not be explicit, it would have allowed 
the argument that their scope was identical and that the more detailed criteria of article 1 
of Protocol II constituted a VSHFLILFDWLRQ RI WKH WHUP ¶DUPHG FRQIOLFW QRW RI DQ
LQWHUQDWLRQDO FKDUDFWHU· LQ FRPPRQ DUWLFOH  2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG KRZHYHU WKH FOHDU
VWLSXODWLRQ WKDW WKH ´VLWXDWLRQV RI LQWHUQDO GLVWXUEDQFHV DQG WHQVLRQVµ ZHUH QRW DUPHG
conflicts, to the extent that it DIIHFWV WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI DQ ¶DUPHG FRQIOLFW· EH\RQG WKH
Protocol, hindered the development of common article 3 downwards and the widening 
of its scope to include such instances.73  
 
5.3.4. The Plenary: Paring Down the substance 
 
When the draft Protocol reached the Plenary it bore little resemblance to the ICRC draft 
proposed at the beginning of the Diplomatic Conference. Its scope was narrow and the 
substantive provisions wide. The procedural approach of discussing the two Protocols in 
parallel had led to an ambitious Protocol. This was because of the higher percentage of 
western delegations ² ZKLFK WHQGHG WR EH HLWKHU ¶PD[LPDOLVWV· RU ¶PRGHUDWHV· - in the 
Committees, and the possibility of adopting articles by majority rather than consensus.74 
It was very clear, however, that this would not be accepted in the plenary.  
                                              
70 See also CDDH/SR.49, 59, 67 (Mexico). 
71 CDDH/I/SR. 23, p. 13 (GDR). 
72 CDDH/I/SR. 23, par. 12 (Romania). 
73 Abi-6DDE¶&RQIOLFWV·-30. 
74 ) .DOVKRYHQ ¶5HDIILUPDWLRQ and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed 
Conflicts: The Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 1974-3DUW,&RPEDWDQWVDQG&LYLOLDQV· Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law 107, 110-.DOVKRYHQ¶&RPEDWDQWV· 
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$W WKH VWDUW RI WKH SOHQDU\ VHVVLRQ WKH 3UHVLGHQW RI WKH &RQIHUHQFH DGPLWWHG ´PDQ\
FRQWDFWVDQGPHHWLQJVRIJURXSVKDGWDNHQSODFHµVLQFHWKHODVWPHHWLQJ´IURPZKLFKLW
would appear that there had emerged a general wish to reach agreement on a simplified 
YHUVLRQRIGUDIW3URWRFRO,,µ75 Pictet, speaking for the ICRC, appealed in favour of the 
humanitarian protection rationale, while trying to assuage the status-based concerns of 
the delegates. He asked the delegates to not extinguish the hopes of the victims of 
FRQIOLFWVDQG´VWLIOH>3URWRFRO,,@IURPLWVELUWKµ+HDVVXUHGWKHGHOHJDWHVWKDW3URWRFRO
II contained protections for state sovereignty and states that had misgivings could wait 
before ratifying it.76  
The prospect of having no Protocol led the Pakistani delegation, using previous 
suggestions made by the Canadian delegation,77 and in consultation with other 
delegations, to propose a simplified draft Protocol that could be accepted by the states 
present. This draft did not affect article 1, namely the material scope of the Protocol, as 
this had already been narrowed at Committee level. It introduced, however, radical 
changes in the substantive rules contained in the Protocol. The number of articles was 
reduced from 48 to 27.  
The Pakistani draft all but eliminated provisions that dealt with means and methods of 
ZDUIDUH )XUWKHUPRUH LW FRPSOHWHO\ HOLPLQDWHG WKH SKUDVH ¶SDUWLHV WR WKH FRQIOLFW·
including from article 3 which repeated the caveat present in common article 3 that the 
3URWRFROKDG´QRHIIHFWRQWKHOHJDOVWDWXVRIWKHSDUWLHVWRWKHFRQIOLFWµ78 It was thought 
WKDWWKHYHU\PHQWLRQRIWKHWHUP¶SDUWLHV·PLJKWVXJJHVWWKHFRQIHUPHQWRIVRPHVWDWXV
WR WKH JURXS $V D UHVXOW WKH 3URWRFRO ´>read] like a series of injunctions addressed 
H[FOXVLYHO\ WR JRYHUQPHQWVµ79 This, however, does not affect the legal nature of the 
obligations nor the limited legal status conferred on the parties.80 The effort to eliminate 
                                              
75 CDDH/SR.49, par. 1. 
76 CDDH/SR.49, par. 6. 
77 &DQDGD IURP WKH EHJLQQLQJ RI WKH &RQIHUHQFH KDG EHHQ YHU\ DUWLFXODWH DUJXLQJ IRU D ¶VPDOO· RU ¶VLPSOLILHG·
3URWRFRO,, ,W·VUDWLRQDOHIRUSURSRVLQJDVPDOO$GGLWLRQDO3URWRFRO,,VXSSOHPHQWLQJFRPPRQDUWLFOHFRuld be 
summarised as follows: the provisions must be agreeable to all SDUWLHVWRWKHFRQIOLFWWKH\´must be well within the 
perceived capacLW\ RI HDFK SDUW\ WR DSSO\ WKHPµ; the Protocol should not affect state sovereignty and the 
responsibility of the govHUQPHQW WR PDLQWDLQ ODZ DQG RUGHU RU IDFLOLWDWH RXWVLGH LQWHUYHQWLRQ ´1RWKLQJ LQ WKH
3URWRFROVKRXOGVXJJHVWWKDWGLVVLGHQWVPXVWEHWUHDWHGOHJDOO\RWKHUWKDQDVUHEHOVµ&'++ 
78 On the effects of this caveat in common article 3 see 3.2.4 fns 78 ff and text. See also section 8.3. 
79 Abi-6DDE¶&RQIOLFWV· 
80 Ibid. For a discussion of how the very applicability of legal rules entails a commensurate legal status, disclaimers 
notwithstanding, see section 3.2.4 fns 78 ff and text as well as section 8.3 below. 
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anything that could suggest interference with the sovereignty of the state was so thorough 
WKDWWKHZKROHRI3DUW9,,RIWKH'UDIWZKLFKUHODWHGWRWKH´([HFXWLRQRIWKH3URWRFROµ, 
and the role of the ICRC in providing humanitarian assistance was dropped.81 Finally, 
another rule lost was the prohibition of the death penalty before the end of the conflict,82 
a rule perceived to limit the freedom of the state to repress the insurgency.   
In making the case for his proposal the Pakistani delegate, Judge Hussain, expressed the 
feelings of many dHOHJDWHVZKHQKHVDLGWKDW´WKHUHZDVFRQVLGHUDEOHGLVVDWLVIDFWLRQZLWK
the length of the text as well as with the fact that it ventured into domains which they 
FRQVLGHUHG VDFURVDQFW DQG LQDSSURSULDWH IRU LQFOXVLRQ LQ DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQVWUXPHQWµ83 
His elaboration of the rationale behind the Pakistani proposal merits quotation in its 
entirety: 
  
It was based on the following theses: its provisions must be acceptable to all and, 
therefore, of obvious practical benefit; the provisions must be within the 
perceived capacity of those involved to apply them and, therefore, precise and 
simple; they should not appear to affect the sovereignty of any State Party or the 
responsibility of its Government to maintain law and order and defend national 
unity, nor be able to be invoked to justify an outside intervention; nothing in the 
Protocol should suggest that dissidents must be treated legally other than as 
rebels; and, lastly, there should be no automatic repetition of the more 
comprehensive provisions, such as those on civil defence, found in Protocol I.84  
 
The Pakistani proposal met with support. Egypt, a delegation that worked hard to gain 
DJUHHPHQW RQ D 3URWRFRO DGPLWWHG WKDW 3DNLVWDQ·V SURSRVDO ZDV ´GHVHUYLQJ RI
JUDWLWXGHµ85  
Other delegations were less supportive. The USSR suggested that the Conference 
´VKRXOG DELGH E\ LWV GHFLVLRQV DQG VWXG\ WKH 3DNLVWDQL WH[W DV D VHULHV RI SURSRVHG
DPHQGPHQWVµUDWKHUWKDQDVWKHGUDIWRQZKLFKWRYRWH7KH8665´ZDVQRWRSSRVHGWR
                                              
81 6HHIRUDFULWLTXH.DOVKRYHQ¶&RPEDWDQWV·. 
82 See Forsythe, 282-3. 
83 CDDH/SR.49, par. 10. 
84 CDDH/SR.49, par. 11. 
85 Canada also pledged its support. See CDDH/SR.49, par. 17. 
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a simplified draft per seµEXW WKRXJKW WKH3DNLstani draft had some deficiencies and the 
Conference should not distance itself from the spirit of the draft Protocol II.86 This 
approach signified the retaining of the importance of the result from the Committee level 
and a tactical effort to resist some of the changes. The President of the Conference took 
the same view and this procedure was adopted.87 The changes suggested through the 
Pakistani draft, however, were adopted. 
Article 1, unchanged by the Pakistani draft, was adopted as it stood in the Committee 
draft, but only with 58 votes in favour, 5 against, and 29 abstentions.88 The new threshold 
stipulated that the Protocol was applicable in armed conflicts 
 
in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident 
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to 
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this 
Protocol. 
 
The result was very far from a cRQVHQVXV$V0H[LFR·VGHOHJDWHSXWLW´LWZRXOGEHWUXHU
WRVD\ WKDW WKHUHKDGEHHQDSSURYDOE\ WKHPDMRULW\DQGVLOHQFHRQ WKHSDUWRIRWKHUVµ
Displaying little faith in the humanitarian protection function of Protocol II, he stressed 
the importance of pUHVHUYLQJFRPPRQDUWLFOH·VILHOGRIDSSOLFDWLRQ89 A variety of states 
were not pleased with the result. In the discussions at the Plenary and in the written 
explanations of votes, various misgivings were expressed. Some states were unhappy 
about the narrow scope of the article and the practical problems this would mean for its 
application.90 Others, however, made sure to state that they were still very concerned 
about the effects of the Protocol on their sovereignty. They believed that for 
                                              
86 CDDH/SR.49, par. 18-20. 6HHIRUWKH8665·VSRVLWLRQ'&LREDQX¶7KH$WWLWXGHRIWKH6RFLDOLVW&RXQWULHV·LQ
A. Cassese (ed.) The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (GLWRULDOH6FLHQWLILFD&LREDQX¶6RFLDOLVW· 
87 CDDH/SR.49,par. 21-36. 
88 CDDH/SR.49, par. 65. 
89 CDDH/SR.49, par. 49-50. 
90 See for exaPSOH1RUZD\·V VWDWHPHQWZKRDEVWDLQHG LQ WKHYRWLQJEHFDXVHDUWLFOH·V´KLJK WKUHVKROGZRXOGVR
ZHDNHQ3URWRFRO,,DVWRPDNHLWVXWLOLW\IRUKXPDQLWDULDQSURWHFWLRQGRXEWIXOµ6HH&''+65SDU$OVR
Cameroon thought that the territorial control criterion would create an incentive to insurgents to control such 
territory. See CDDH/SR.49, Annex. 
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international law to apply directly to internal armed conflicts was an 
´LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQµRI WKH VLWXDWLRQ91 and a violation of state sovereignty.92 This very 
clearly expressed the attitudes of states towards the effort as a whole and several states, 
although they voted yes in a spirit of cooperation93 kept that in mind at the ratification 
stage.  
Finally, and notably, Colombia led a last minute effort to bring back an amendment 
stating that the High Contracting Party was the only one to assess the existence of the 
objective criteria and the applicability of the Protocol. Its amendment asked for the 
LQVHUWLRQRIWKHSKUDVHWKDW´WKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKHFRQGLWLRQV«VKDOOEHDPDWWHUIRU
WKH6WDWHLQZKLFKWKHFRQIOLFWRFFXUVµ94 Although it was explained that the amendment 
had already been proposed and defeated at Committee level, the suggestion found 
support from a variety of delegations. Some of those argued that they could not vote in 
IDYRXUZLWKRXWWKHDFFHSWDQFHRI&RORPELD·VSURSRVDO95 More worryingly some who had 
voted in favour of the article, unequivocally stated that this was their understanding of 
WKH 3URWRFRO DQG LI &RORPELD·V DPHQGPHQW KDG EHHQ SXW WR D YRWH WKH\ ZRXOG KDYH
voted for it.96 This stance reflected an opposition by a significant minority to basic 
structural features of both Additional Protocol II and common article 3. Moreover it fits 
with an overall perception that the applicability of international law, especially with a low 
threshold and extensive humanitarian protections, constituted an unacceptable ascription 
of status to the armed groups and a commensurate affront to state sovereignty. This 
stance, as reflected in the result, will be analysed below. 
                                              
91 6HH&''+,65SDU*'56HHDOVR&LREDQX¶6RFLDOLVW· 
92 6HH WKH ,QGLDQGHOHJDWH·V FRPPHQWVZKR also argued that common article 3 was drafted and used in order for 
FRORQLDO SRZHUV WR FODLP WKDW ZDUV RI QDWLRQDO OLEHUDWLRQ ZHUH ¶LQWHUQDO FRQIOLFWV· XQGHU WKDW DUWLFOH 6HH
CDDH/SR.49, par. 76-8. See also, for the latter point, Anghie and Chimni, 88. 
93 See, for example, the statement of Saudi ArDELD H[SODLQLQJ WKDW WKH\ YRWHG LQ IDYRXU ¶SXUHO\ IRU KXPDQLWDULDQ
UHDVRQV·6HHCDDH/SR.49, par. 59, 70. 
94 6HHIRUWKHGLVFXVVLRQRI&RORPELD·VHIIRUWDWWKLVWLPH&''+65SDU-56. 
95 See, for example, Chile, who voted against, at CDDH/SR.49, par 48. Most, however, abstained. One was, 
naturally, Colombia. Its delegate stated that Colombia abstained because nobody answered its question, namely, who 
would assess and determine whether the threshold was met. In addition it could not accept that the insurgents could 
EH ERXQG E\ WKHVH REOLJDWLRQV .HQ\D DQG %UD]LO DEVWDLQHG DV LW ZDV XQHDV\ DW WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI ¶H[WUDQHRXV
VXEMHFWLYH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ·JLYHQE\ WKHFULWHULRQRI WHUULWRULDO FRQWURO%UD]LO KDG LW LV UHFDOOHG H[SUHVVHG WKH VDPH
opinion in the Report of the Working Party that contained the definition of the threshold. See above fn 62. The 
Philippines and Tanzania would have voted yes only if the Colombian amendment was accepted. See 
CDDH/SR.49, Annex. 
96 In this spirit, Saudi Arabia voted yeV ¶IRU SXUHO\ KXPDQLWDULDQ UHDVRQV DQG ZLVKHG WR PDNH LW FOHDU WKDW DQ\
definition of the terms of the article was solely the concern of the State on whose territory the armed conflict was 
taking place. Decision by any other country would constitute interference in the domestic affairs of the State 
FRQFHUQHGµ6HH&''+65SDU7KH8QLWHG$UDE(PLUDWHV·GHOHJDWHDWSDUIXOO\FRQFXUUHG 
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5.3.5. The Result: a lop-sided Protocol 
 
The result was the defeat of the efforts, by the ICRC and many states, to develop 
international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflicts. This is not 
to say that there is nothing of value in Additional Protocol II. It develops certain 
fundamental humanitarian guarantees contained in common article 3,97 and contains 
certain principles of the law relating to means and methods of warfare, such as the 
protection of civilians.98 The latter is of particular importance as it demonstrates a link 
between the law of humanitarian protection and the rules that refer more directly to the 
conduct of military strategy, a distinction also known as Geneva versus Hague law.99   
In any case, the reduction of articles from 47 in the draft adopted by Committee I, to 28 
in total, corresponds to a drastic curtailment of substantive rules. Although, in the 
opinion of some authors little was lost because nothing revolutionary was there in the 
first place.100 The elimination of certain rules, however, such as the prohibition of the 
death penalty before the end of the conflict and the rights of the ICRC and other relief 
organizations to visit and provide assistance, can be considered important.101  
If this is coupled with the high threshold adopted in article 1, the picture that emerges is 
RQH RI D SDUWLFXODUO\ ¶ORS-VLGHG·102 instrument. The material field of application 
corresponds to non-international armed conflicts of the greatest magnitude, where an 
armed group is in control of territory. This approximates the material situations that, 
XQGHU WKH ¶FODVVLFDO· ODZ RI ZDU FRUUHVSRQGHd to the concept of belligerency, the 
                                              
97 Parts II and III of the Protocol develop the protection of common article 3. See, for an analysis, Abi-Saab, 
¶&RQIOLFWV·-5. 
98 7KLVLVDWWHPSWHGWKURXJK3DUW,9RIWKH3URWRFRO$OWKRXJKWKHWHUP¶FRPEDWDQWV·ZDVQRWLQFOXGHGIURPIHDULW
ZLOOFRQIHUVWDWXVWKHSURWHFWLRQLQDUWLFOHRIWKRVHZKRGRQRW´WDNHSDUWLQKRVWLOLWLHVµLQWURGXFHVWKHSULQFLSOH  
of distinction. See Abi-6DDE¶&RQIOLFWV·-6. 
99 The appellations follow the main treaties dealing with the respective subject matters. See, for the distinction, F. 
Kalshoven, The Law of Warfare (A.W. Sijthoff, 1973), 26; H. McCoubrey and N. White, International Law and Armed 
Conflict (Aldershot, 1992), 217 ff (McCoubrey and White). It is reminded, see 3.4.3. fn 194 and text, that Siotis, 225, 
understood common article 3 as the emancipation of the law of Geneva from the law of the Hague. It could be 
argued that the accentuation of the humanitarian rationale in regulating means and methods is a step towards 
asserting Geneva-related protective rationale. 
100 See, for example, Moir, 94-5. 
101 Forsythe, 282-3. 
102 The term belongs to Frits Kalshoven. See Kalshoven¶&RPEDWDQWV· 
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recognition of which activated the totality of the laws of war. It is difficult not to think 
that the combination of the high threshold and the limited substantive provisions in 
Additional Protocol II constitutes a regression of international humanitarian law. 
Conceptually, it represents an assertion of the still surviving status-based paradigm of 
state-like entities, and without the applicability of the full legal regime.103  
Furthermore, the automaticity of application, although forcefully argued by the ICRC and 
some states,104 did not seem to meet the acceptance of a variety of states. This was not 
promising for the application of the Protocol, although it does not have any effect de lege 
lata. The reiteration of the understanding that only the government could assess the 
applicability of the Protocol, that third states would be interfering if they opined on its 
applicability, coupled with the hostility towards the offer of humanitarian services by the 
ICRC105 showed the extreme sensitivity of the new states taking this position. Indeed, any 
application of international law in their territory, through obligations imposed upon the 
JRYHUQPHQW ZDV YLHZHG DV D IRUP RI LQWHUIHUHQFH 7KH RQO\ ´LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQµ
acceptable was the stricto sensu internationalisation of wars of national liberation.106 
This approach was informed by a status-based rationale for applicability of the jus in bello. 
The application of the full regime of international law, or even a regime more extensive 
than minimal humanitarian protections, could not be divorced from the perception of 
conferment of status to the insurgent party. Such status is not the strictly legal status 
which is co-extensive to the specific applicable rules.107 Indeed, it is characteristic that the 
caveat on the effect of Protocol II to the legal status to the parties to the conflict was 
GURSSHGIURPDUWLFOHEHFDXVHLWZDVIHDUHGWKDWWKHYHU\PHQWLRQRIWKHWHUP¶SDUWLHV·
was problematic.108 The perceived status conferred is the status of a (potentially) 
                                              
103 See below section 5.4. 
104 See CDDH/I/SR. 29, par. 24. 
105 6HH.DOVKRYHQ¶&RPEDWDQWV·-5. 
106 A statement by the Indian delegation at the Plenary is indicative of the stark contrast between these two forms of 
internationalisation as perceived by some Third World countries: It expressed doubts that Additional Protocol II 
ZDV HYHQQHFHVVDU\ WR WKH H[WHQW WKDW QDWLRQDO OLEHUDWLRQPRYHPHQWVKDGEHHQ LQFOXGHG LQ3URWRFRO , ´VLQFH DQ\
other conflict taking place within the territory of a sovereign State would be an internal conflict, and any 
international instrument designed to regulate non-international conflicts might in actual application impede the 
VHWWOHPHQWRIWKHFRQIOLFWDQGOHDGWRH[WHUQDOLQWHUIHUHQFHµ6HH&''+65SDU 
107 See section 3.2.4 fns 78 ff and text; 5.3.4 fn 78-80 and text; See also section 8.3. 
108 Abi-6DDE¶&RQIOLFWV· 
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sovereign entity. It is the political status leading to the only international legal status 
understood according to this rationale, that of the sovereign subject of international law.  
Accordingly, in terms of the extent of regulation, for the states adopting this approach, it 
was either everything or next to nothing. Either the regulated group is a quasi-sovereign 
RU WKH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI DQ\ OHJDO SURWHFWLRQV LV DW WKH JRYHUQPHQW·V GLVFUHWLRQ 7KLV LV
reminiscent of the vanishing ground between police operations and international armed 
conflict in the application of common article 3.109 The only change achieved through the 
Diplomatic Conference was one within the rationale of conferring status; that peoples 
fighting a war of national liberation were propelled, through legal fiction and for the 
duration of their struggle, to sovereign status. This was because of their collective 
substantive legal right to external self-determination.110  
It is hard to deny that the rules of non-international armed conflicts were, at the time, 
perceived to affect mostly Third World states and to impose obligations on their 
governments without giving them much in return. The new states that had emerged 
through the process of decolonisation often consisted of plural communities with 
conflicting interests and were accordingly defensive of the unitary character of their 
state.111 Beyond the historical specificities of the time, however, this attitude directly 
relates to the perceived absence of reciprocity in non-international armed conflicts.112 
According to Condorelli, who was present at the negotiations,113 no state in Geneva was 
ready to accept that the insurgents would be bound by the obligations and, therefore, 
have international status. Accordingly, the obligations were viewed as essentially unilateral 
and, because of the all too real problems of Third World states in maintaining political 
stability, generated hostility towards these rules.114  
                                              
109 See sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4. 
110 See chapter 4. 
111 / &RQGRUHOOL ¶/HV 3D\V $IUR-$VLDWLTXHV· LQ $ &DVVHVH HG The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict 
(GLWRULDOH6FLHQWLILFD&RQGRUHOOL¶$IUR-$VLDWLTXHV· 
112 In this context, the statement of the delegate from Nigeria is interestiQJ+HDUJXHG WKDW3URWRFRO ,,´ZDVQRW
ODZµ EHFDXVH´law implied reciprocal obligations betweHQ6WDWHV3DUWLHVµ. He continued that, initially, Protocol II 
KDG EHHQ ¶GHVLJQHG WR GHDO ZLWK LQWHUQDWLRQDO DQG TXDVL-LQWHUQDWLRQDO VLWXDWLRQV· ZKLFK ZHUH QRZ FRYHUHG E\
Protocol I and the provisions of Protocol II that infringed the sovereignty of the state were a hang-over from this 
initial purpose. Cameroon concurred. See CDDH/SR.49, par. 22- 6HH RQ FRPPRQ DUWLFOH ·V GHSDUWXUH IURP
reciprocity in the law of armed conflict, 3.3.3 also below section 5.4.4. 
113 As was the case with other academic commentators such as Forsythe, Draper, Partsch etc. 
114 &RQGRUHOOL¶$IUR-$VLDWLTXHV· 
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This led to an instance of particular conceptual polarisation in the perception of many 
new states of state sovereignty and non-intervention on the one hand and humanitarian 
protections on the other. Furthermore, the perception of state sovereignty as absolute 
and unitary and the deep suspicion against anything that could be perceived as 
interference and intervention was a particularly stark characteristic of the first generation 
of Third World politicians and even scholars.115 This solidified the alliance of Third 
World states, including Asian, African and Latin American states116 and, importantly, was 
not opposed vigorously by the states that, nominally, wanted a more expansive Protocol 
II.  
7KH ¶*UHDW 3RZHUV· GLG QRW KDYH SDUWLFXODUO\ YLWDO LQWHUHVWV DW VWDNH ´XOWLPDWHO\ LW ZDV
only a question of mitigating the suffering of the people RI7KLUG:RUOGFRXQWULHVµ.117 
Their approach was marked by resignation, accommodation and, ultimately, complicity. 
The prospect of non-ratification of the Protocol by the majority of states provided a 
conclusive argument for resignation.118 In view of all these factors, the Pakistani draft was 
YLHZHG DV D FRPSURPLVH E\ DOPRVW DOO RI WKH GHOHJDWHV &RQGRUHOOL·V FRQFOXVLRQ LV
disheartening: the consensus achieved in the end was a consensus for the non-
development of international humanitarian law, and for the legitimisation of inhuman 
practices in non-international armed conflicts.119 
In order fully to assess the nature and effect of Protocol II, however, one needs to clarify 
the characteristics of the material situation and of the actors involved, which article 1 
requires in order for the Protocol to be applicable. Once this is attempted, the effect, if 
any, of the Protocol will be examined in practice. 
 
5.4. The threshold 
 
                                              
115 For a distinction between the first generation of Third World scholars and a more recent tendency to criticize the 
formation and practice of Third World states see Anghie and Chimni, 82-3. 
116 $OWKRXJKWKHODWWHUZHUHQRW¶QHZ·WKH\VKDUHGPDQ\SHUFHSWLRQVDQGSROLWLFDOJRDOVZLWKWKHGHFRORQL]HGVWDWHV
of Africa and Asia. See Anand, New States, 4. 
117 &RQGRUHOOL¶$IUR-$VLDWLTXHV·, 389. The translation is mine. 
118 Ibid. In this respect their timidity was rewarded. As of 10 June 2010 165 countries have ratified Protocol II, 
although, with certain notable exceptions, such as the US, Israel, Turkey, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Iran, Iraq, 
India and Eritrea. 
119 Ibid., 390. 
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5.4.1. Introduction 
 
An armed conflict covered by Protocol II will occur, according to art. 1(1), 
  
in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident 
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, 
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol. 
  
$VKDVEHHQQRWHGWKH3URWRFRO´GHYHORSVDQGVXSSOHPHQWVµFRPPRQDUWLFOHZLWKRXW
KRZHYHU´PRGLI\LQJLWVH[LVWLQJFRQGLWLRQVDQGDSSOLFDWLRQµ7KHH[SOLFLWLQGHSHQGHQFH
of Protocol II from FRPPRQ DUWLFOH  ERWK ´FRQVWLWXWHV RQH RI WKH EDVHV RI WKH
FRPSURPLVHµ120 and allows the definition of the criteria of article 1 to develop 
independently from common article 3. 
There are, however, commonalities as well as divergence. Both common article 3 and 
Protocol II necessitate a degree of organisation high enough for the application of the 
substantive rules. In the present section there will be an attempt to define the terms used 
in article 1 of Protocol II, followed by a consideration of the question whether the 
changes introduced by Protocol II in relation to common article 3 qualitatively affect the 
nature of the legal structure or merely quantitatively develop the threshold of common 
article 3. A qualitative difference would be a reversion to a horizontal structure, based on 
reciprocity and a certain equality of status, whereas a quantitative difference would retain 
the basic, vertical, structure introduced through common article 3. 
 
5.4.2. 7KH¶SDUWLHVWRWKHFRQIOLFW· 
 
7KH ¶SDUWLHV WR WKH FRQIOLFW· UHJXODWed by Protocol II, although the term was explicitly 
HUDVHG LQ WKHILQDOSOHQDU\VHVVLRQDUHJRYHUQPHQW´DUPHGIRUFHVµDQGGLVVLGHQWDUPHG
                                              
120 To the extent that many state would not have accepted the Protocol if it was to narrow the applicability of 
common article 3. See Sandoz, Commentary, 1350. 
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IRUFHVRU´RUJDQLVHGDUPHGJURXSVµ7KLV OHDYHVRXWFRQIOLFWVEHWZHHQQRQ-state armed 
groups, a rather important omission, which has drawn severe criticism from 
commentators.121 Apparently at the Diplomatic Conference this was considered to be 
only a theoretical example with little practical significance.122 Practice has shown, 
however, that the omission was significant123 and, given the predominance of the notion 
of sovereignty and the attachment of formal sovereignty exclusively to the government, 
WKHRPLVVLRQFDQEHVDLGWRUHIOHFWWKH¶RQH-WUDFNPLQG·DSSURDFKRIPDQ\GHOHJDWLRQV 
7KH WHUP ¶DUPHG IRUFHV· LV QRW GHILQHG LQ a satisfactory manner. Indeed, an effort by 
Committee I in its report began with a tautology,124 GHVFULELQJ DV ¶DUPHG IRUFHV· ´DOO
armed forces ² including those which under some national systems might not be called 
regular forces - «µ ZKLOH LW PHQWLRQHG WKDW PDQ\ GHOHJDWLRQV H[FOXGHG ´RWKHU
JRYHUQPHQWDO DJHQFLHV WKH PHPEHUV RI ZKLFK PD\ EH DUPHGµ VXFK DV WKH SROLFH DQG
customs.125 This, in turn, is refuted by the Commentary where it is said that the term should 
EHXQGHUVWRRG´LQ LWVEURDGHUVHQVHµ LQRUGHU WR LQFOXGHDUPHGIRUFHV´QRW LQFOXGHG LQ
the definition of the army in the national legislation of some countries (national guard, 
FXVWRPVSROLFHIRUFHVRURWKHUVLPLODUIRUFHµ126 The apparent conflicts of interpretation 
reflect the difficulties of setting a priori an exhaustive list of state organisations and 
IRUPDWLRQV ZKLFK FDQ EH VDLG WR SDUWLFLSDWH LQ DQ ¶DUPHG FRQIOLFW· ,W DOVR UHIOHFWV WKH
tensions between the effort by some states to keep as many situations as possible in the 
DUHD RI ¶LQWHUQDO GLVWXUEDQFHV DQG WHQVLRQV· DQG WKH DWWHPSW WR DVVHVV WKH PDWHULDO
H[LVWHQFHRIDQ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·EH\RQGWKHLQVLJQLDRIWKHIRUFHVSDUWLFLSDWLQJ 
7KHLQWHUSUHWDWLYHGHEDWHRYHUZKDWH[DFWO\FRQVWLWXWHG¶DUPHGIRUFHV·DOVRUHODWHVWRWKH
degree of organisation of those forces. The regular army would constitute the conceptual 
nucleus of organisation but the degree of organisation would have to exist in other 
groups as well. An interesting parallel can be drawn with the structure of article 4 of 
                                              
121 For various authors see Moir, 103-4.  
122 Sandoz, Commentary, 1351-2. 
123 Such conflicts include the conflict in Angola since approximately 1975 where the two main factions (the MPLA 
and UNITA) were not governmental; the variety of Somali liberation movements especially since 1989; the 
Lebanese civil war from 1975 to 1991; the conflict in Liberia since 1989 and until, with variations in the actors, 2003; 
the on-going conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo since the mid-1990s.   
124 See Moir, 105. 
125 CDDH/219/Rev. 1, 19, 40. 
126 Sandoz, Commentary, 1352. 
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Geneva Convention III, setting down the criteria for privileged combatancy, and the 
relation between paragraphs 4(a)(1) and 4(a)(2). There is a presumption, rebuttable or 
not,127 that the regular armed forces of the state will satisfy the requisite criteria of 
organisation. 
In relation to the insurgents, a certain degree of organisation is required the level of 
which can only be determined with functional criteria. Accordingly, even if there is no 
VWULFW ´KLHUDUFKLFDO V\VWHP RI PLOLWDU\ RUJDQLVDWLRQ VLPLODU WR WKDW RI UHJXODr armed 
IRUFHVµWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQPXVWEH´FDSDEOH«RISODQQLQJDQGFDUU\LQJRXWVXVWDLQHGDQG
FRQFHUWHGPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQV« >DQG@«RI LPSRVLQJGLVFLSOLQH LQ WKH QDPHRI D de facto 
DXWKRULW\µ128 The language in the ICRC Commentary is indicative of the interplay between 
the organisation and intensity in article 1. It is also reflective of the inescapable 
assumptions of the state-like character of the insurgent party. A degree of organisation is 
expected that would guarantee the possibility of the Protocol to function.  
 
5.4.3. Territorial control 
 
The most restrictive and controversial criterion introduced by article 1 of Protocol II is 
that of territorial control. The addition of this criterion has been rightly criticized as 
imposing too restrictive a scope and as being particularly incompatible with modern 
guerrilla warfare.129 As Abi-Saab, speaking as the delegate of Egypt, put it in the 
'LSORPDWLF &RQIHUHQFH ´>L@Q DUPHG FRQIOLFW VLWXDWLRQV FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ KLJK PRELOLW\
territorial control continuously changes hands, sometimes altering between day and night, 
WR WKHSRLQWRIEHFRPLQJPHDQLQJOHVVµ130 In any case, the key to the determination of 
the degree of control is once again functional and qualitative, relating to the ability to 
apply the Protocol.  
                                              
127 See Dinstein, 36. 
128 Sandoz, Commentary, 1352. See also Moir, 105, who mentions organisations like ETA (in the Basque region) and 
the IRA (in Northern Ireland) as examples that do not fulfil this criterion. 
129 6HHDOVR.DOVKRYHQ¶&RPEDWDQWV· 
130 CDDH/I/SR. 24, par. 32.  
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During the course of the Diplomatic Conference there were suggestions for words to be 
inserted that would set out quantitative criteria for measuring such control. It was 
VXJJHVWHG WKDW WKH FRQWURO VKRXOG EH RYHU D ´QRQ-QHJOLJLEOH SDUWµ131 RU D ´VXEVWDQWLDO
SDUWµ132 These criteria were abandoned. Failing to provide a specific quantitative 
criterion, the quantity of territorial control should be considered as an element of its 
quality. This quality will be understood as contributing to the implementation of the 
Protocol. A qualitative or functional criterion of territorial control will also have the 
benefit of linking such control to the purposes of applying the rules and not to the 
strictly proto-state character of the actor.133 
The quality of such control can either be understood in relation to the control exercised 
by the government,134 or to the capacity of the insurgent group reflected in the control of 
territory. The latter interpretation is the one most favoured by the language of the article: 
It calls for control of territoU\´such «as to enable [the group] to carry out sustained and 
FRQFHUWHG PLOLWDU\ RSHUDWLRQV DQG WR LPSOHPHQW WKLV 3URWRFROµ135 It is also the 
interpretation favoured by the ICRC Commentary136 and the relevant literature.137 There is 
some flexibility interpreted into the criterion,138 in an effort to make it compatible with 
modern guerrilla warfare, but a minimum of territorial control is inescapable.139  
In any case, the extent of control will be determined by its contribution to the application 
of the Protocol. Accordingly, the insurgents must be able to do more than restrict the 
access of the government to the areas under their control.140 They must be able to 
LPSOHPHQWWKHVXEVWDQWLYHSURYLVLRQVRIWKH3URWRFRO)RUH[DPSOHWKHLQVXUJHQWV´PXVW
be able to detain prisoners and treat them decently or to give adequate care to the sick 
                                              
131 CDDH/I/79. 
132 CDDH/I/32.  
133 It is reiterated how, in the case of belligerency, the control of territory and the organisation of the actor were 
understood as a reflection of its potential statehood, thus influencing the assessment of the criteria. See section 
2.2.2.  
134 This argument was advanced in relation to the control exercised by the FLN in Algeria, in the context, however, 
of recognition of belligerency. See Bedjaoui, 38 ff. Abi-Saab, at 410, uses this interpretation in the context of article 
1(4) of Additional Protocol I. See also See Moir, 106. 
135 Italics provided. 
136 See Sandoz, Commentary, 1352-3.  
137 See, for example, Abi-6DDE¶&RQIOLFWV· 
138 See for example ' )RUV\WKH ¶7KUHH 6HVVLRQV RI /HJLVODWLQJ +XPDQLWDULDQ /DZ )RUZDUG 0DUFK 5HWUHDW RU
3DUDGH5HVW"·International Lawyer )RUV\WKH¶)RUZDUG0DUFK·. 
139 Sandoz, Commentary, 1352-3. 
140 6HH/*UHHQ¶/RZ-,QWHQVLW\&RQIOLFWDQGWKH/DZ·ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 493, 
*UHHQ¶/RZ-,QWHQVLW\·. 
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DQG ZRXQGHGµ141 The examples chosen are indicative, however, of the imbalance 
between the level of the threshold and the substantive law whose application depends on 
achieving this threshold. The substantive law, being little more than an elaboration of 
humanitarian protections already stipulated in common article 3, does not seem to 
necessitate control over territory. Accordingly, as Greenwood argues, there is no reason 
why the APII threshold should be higher than common article 3.142 This further supports 
the argument that the higher threshold can be better understood if the status- and 
sovereignty-based considerations discussed above are taken into account. 
Territorial control is also supposed to reflect, and in the language of the Protocol is 
OLQNHG ZLWK WKH PDWHULDO OHYHO RI WKH KRVWLOLWLHV DQG ZLWK WKH ´VXVWDLQHG DQG FRQFHUWHG
FKDUDFWHURIPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVµ$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH ,&5& Commentary it is this criterion 
´ZKLFKHIIHFWLYHO\GHWHUPLQH>V@FRQWURORID WHUULWRU\µ143 This makes more sense if one 
takes into account the meaning of the terms. According to the Commentary  
 
>V@XVWDLQHGµ LQ )UHQFK WKH UHIHUHQFH LV WR ´opérations continuesµ PHDQV WKDW WKH
operations are kept going or kept up continuously.144 The emphasis is therefore on 
FRQWLQXLW\DQGSHUVLVWHQFH´&RQFHUWHGµ LQ)UHQFK´concertéesµPHDQVDJUHHGXSRQ
planned and contrived, done in agreement according to a plan.145 
 
7KHUHIRUH WKH ZRUG ¶FRQFHUWHG· VHHPV WR UHIHU EDFN WR WKH organisation of the group, 
necessitating operational capabilities, while also hinting at the intensity of the operations, 
in the sense of the magnitude of the military campaigns. Such strategy and planning can 
be related to an administrative apparatus, which in turn would benefit significantly from, 
LI QRW UHTXLUH D WHUULWRULDO EDVLV 0HDQZKLOH WKH WHUP ¶VXVWDLQHG· DQG WKH )UHQFK
¶continues· UHIHUV WR WKH GXUDWLRQ DQG WKH QRQ-sporadic nature of the hostilities. This 
                                              
141 Junod, 37. 
142 C. Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law and the Laws of War (Preliminary Report for the Centennial 
Commemoration of the First Hague Peace Conference 1899, pursuant to UN General Assembly Resolution. 52/154 
of 15 December 1997 and UN Doc. A/C.6/52/3) (The Hague, 1999), paragraph 137. Quoted in Moir, 103. 
143 Sandoz, Commentary, 1353. 
144 7KHLGHDWKDWWKHFRQIOLFWVKRXOGEHRID¶SURORQJHGSHULRG·WKH)UHQFKH[SUHVVLRQEHLQJ© pendant une longe 
période » was included in the drafting Committee Report at the first Conference and supported at the second but 
ultimately abandoned as too prone to subjective interpretation. See Wilhelm, 349. 
145 Sandoz, Commentary, 1353. (reference added.) 
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means that at the beginning of an internal conflict Protocol II will rarely, if ever, be 
DSSOLFDEOH ¶,QWHQVLW\·DQG¶GXUDWLRQ·ZHUHSURSRVHGDVFULWHULD146 but were abandoned as 
too prone for subjective interpretation. According to the Commentary ´WKH FULWHULRQ
whether military operations are sustained and concerted, while implying the element of 
FRQWLQXLW\DQGLQWHQVLW\FRPSOLHVZLWKDQREMHFWLYHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHVLWXDWLRQµ147 It is 
difficult to see how the latter terms are more objective than the former.  
The criterion of duration of the conflict, as opposed to the duration of the violence148 can be 
seen as related to a status-based rationale. This is because it can allow governments to 
delay the applicability of the law until the point when the non-state armed group has 
achieved such political and military status, both internally and externally, that the 
JRYHUQPHQW KDV ¶OLWWOH WR ORVH· E\ FRQFHGLQJ WKH DSSOLFDELOLW\ RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ WR D
¶SDUW\WRWKHFRQIOLFW·149  
 
5.4.4. The ability to implement the Protocol and reciprocity 
 
The ability to implement the Protocol seems to be the key to the interpretation of the 
levels of all the other criteria provided, as well as the legal nature of the Protocol.150 
Indeed, this was so understood during the creation of the Protocol at the Diplomatic 
Conference and wDVH[SUHVVHGLQWKH&DQDGLDQGHOHJDWLRQ·VVWDWHPHQWWKDW´>W@KHNH\WR
WKHKHLJKWRIWKUHVKROGZHVXJJHVWOLHVLQWKHH[SUHVVLRQ¶WRLPSOHPHQWWKLV3URWRFRO·IRU
the threshold of the Protocol will now clearly depend upon the contents of the 
3URWRFROµ151 
                                              
146 CDDH/I/26; CDDH/I/32. 
147 Sandoz, Commentary, 1353. A similar approach was taken at the Conference of Government Experts. See 
Wilhelm, 349. 
148 See sections 3.3.1 and 3.4.3, where the link with status is further discussed. 
149 This concept of duration in Additional Protocol II has also influenced the interpretation of the Rome Statute. See 
section 7.4.1.  
150 According to the Commentary ´>W@KLV LV WKH IXQGDPHQWDO FULWHULRQ ZKLFK MXVWLILHV WKH RWKHU HOHPHQWV RI WKH
GHILQLWLRQµ6HHSandoz, Commentary6HHDOVR-XQRG7KHFRQFHUQWKDW´WKHSURYLVLRQVPXVWEHZLWKLQWKH
perceived capacity of thosHLQYROYHGWRDSSO\WKHPµZDVDOVRRQHRIWKHUDWLRQDOHVEHKLQGWKH3DNLVWDQLGUDIWDWWKH
Diplomatic Conference. See CDDH/SR.49, par. 11.  
151 See CDDH/I/SR. 49, par. 77.   
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This statement recalls the imbalance between the threshold and substantive contents of 
the threshold, begging the question why it was necessary to require territorial control for 
the implementation of almost purely humanitarian provisions. Furthermore, the centrality 
of the ability to implement the Protocol within the definition of the scope leads us to 
consider another fundamental point; namely, the nature and degree of reciprocity as a 
condition for the application of the Protocol. It has been argued that to the extent that 
´WKH DGYHUVH SDUW\µ KDV WR FRQWURO D SDUW RI WKH WHUULWRU\ ¶DV WR HQDEOH WKHP«WR
LPSOHPHQWWKLV3URWRFRO·WKHUH´VHHPVWREHDQREOLJDWLRQWRGRVRµ152 Furthermore, it 
has been argued, this constitutes a departure from common article 3 where there is no 
reciprocity or contractual obligation.153  
Protocol II is an instrument of humanitarian character, rather than a synallagmatic treaty, 
as are the Geneva Conventions.154 This satisfies the absence of de jure reciprocity. There 
is, however, a role for de facto reciprocity that is relevant to the interpretation of the 
threshold. As far as humanitarian instruments are concerned, there is the presumption 
that states, as recognised international legal subjects, are capable of observing the rules 
they have accepted.155 Therefore, there is a presumption that the parties to an agreement 
share certain characteristics that will allow them to carry out the obligations to which they 
subscribe. The existence of these characteristics is necessary for the legal regime 
established by the treaty to function and the existence of the presumption allows states to 
¶WUXVW· WKH UHJLPH DQG EHFRPH PHPEHUV 7KHUH LV DQ H[SHFWDWLRQ RI UHFLSURFLW\ ZKLFK
activates the legal regime, even if the frustration of this expectation does not deactivate it. 
In the case of non-LQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQIOLFWVWKLVSUHVXPSWLRQKDVWREH¶HDUQHG·E\
the non-state group, through the fulfilment of the criteria that constitute the threshold. If 
the material criteria are there, it ought to be expected that the insurgents will be able to 
carry out their obligations. 
                                              
152 6HH3.RRLMPDQV ¶,Q WKH6KDGRZODQG%HWZHHQ&LYLO:DUDQG&LYLO6WULIH6RPH5HIOections on the Standard-
6HWWLQJ 3URFHVV· LQ $ 'HOLVVHQ DQG * 7DQMD HGV Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict Challenges Ahead, Essays in 
Honour of Frits Kalshoven (Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), 225, 232 (Kooijmans). 
153 See ibid., 232-6HHDOVR&/\VDJKW ¶The Scope of Protocol II and Its Relation to Common Article 3 of the 
*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQVRIDQG2WKHU+XPDQ5LJKWV,QVWUXPHQWV·American University Law Review 9, 22 
/\VDJKW¶6FRSH·6HHDOVRVHFWLRQ3. 
154 See Junod and above section 3.3.3 fn 123 ff. 
155 See also, in relation to wars of national liberation, section 4.3.3. 
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It is only, however, the presumption that will have to be fulfilled. The language of the 
article is somewhat confusing, linking the control of territory with the ability to launch 
operations and implement the Protocol. The material conditions set down by the article 
refer exclusively to the military capabilities of the party. The Protocol accepts that the 
concerted and sustained military operations should actually be taking place. However, 
what is crucial with respect to the implementation is that a material situation exists that 
entails the ability to implement the Protocol. It is the ability rather than the actual 
implementation that is a criterion. The actual observance of the Protocol is not a criterion, 
the prior fulfilment of which will lead to the reciprocal coming into effect of the legal 
regime. There is no reciprocity de jure.  
This does not mean, however, that there is no degree of reciprocity de facto. In fact, the 
insurgent group has to share with the government the common-denominator 
characteristics that correspond to the application of the Protocol. In that sense the 
contents of the Protocol do have an effect on its threshold irrespective of the actual 
implementation of the Protocol.156 The effect that they do have, however, can be 
LQWHUSUHWHG WR EULQJ WKH WKUHVKROG ¶GRZQ WR HDUWK· RU WR SXW LW GLIIHUHQWO\ EDFN WR D
functional understanding of the reality of the conflict. If the criteria of territorial control 
and duration are there only to guarantee de facto reciprocity for the observance of the very 
limited humanitarian rules contained in the Protocol, the assessment of their existence 
can be quite flexible. Such an interpretation can not entirely mitigate, however, the 
reversion to a paradigm of an actor that has, in time and space, achieved state-like status.  
 
5.4.5. Conclusion: a qualitative difference? 
 
As discussed in chapter 3,157 the move away from strict reciprocity and from a horizontal 
to a vertical structure for the applicability of the jus in bello constituted a fundamental 
structural feature of common article 3, which allowed it to develop a humanitarian 
protection rationale. The question is whether the situation under Additional Protocol II 
                                              
156 See Moir, 107-8 who argues that this would be the case particularly if there was to be de jure reciprocity. 
157 Section 3.3.3. 
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is, because of the high threshold, significantly different. It is certainly quantitatively 
different, as the threshold is significantly higher, but not qualitatively different. Although 
in common article 3 there was an absence of both a definition of material criteria and 
mention of the need for the material ability of the insurgents to apply the article, 
arguably, any (necessary) interpretation of the article and its scope would be influenced 
by its effet utile and set the threshold appropriately.158  
The elaboration of criteria in article 1 of Protocol II only reflects and accentuates the de 
facto reciprocity necessary for the application of the legal instrument. Therefore it is 
incorrect to say that the element of reciprocity in Protocol II is a significant departure 
from common article 3,159 as, conversely, it would be incorrect to argue that Additional 
Protocol II introduces de jure reciprocity. The only difference is a quantitative one. This 
means that the legal structure introduced by common article 3 is still retained by Protocol 
II, as was the purpose of those advocating the Protocol.  
However, the function of de facto reciprocity is frustrated by a threshold which is in 
imbalance with the substantive law it is meant to activate. This reflects the inherent 
tensions in the effort to develop a vertical legal structure which will not depend on 
horizontal de jure reciprocity between the parties. It further reflects the continuous effect 
of the status-based rationale in the regulation of situations of non-state armed groups and 
the difficulty of developing a legal regime based on the protection of individuals in 
situations that have developed partly due to the characteristics and political/military 
capacities of the group.160  
Finally, a comparison to belligerency would further clarify whether Additional Protocol II 
constitutes a qualitative departure from the logic of common article 3 and a move to a 
state-like paradigm. Although the criterion of control of territory approximates the 
material situation required for the traditional category of belligerency,161 it would be 
wrong to equate the two.162 The state-like quality needed for the insurgents to be 
                                              
158 See, e.g., Draper, 90 .  
159 Though both common article 3 and Protocol II differ in this instance from human rights instruments. Cf 
/\VDJKW¶6FRSH· 
160 See section 1.2.2. 
161 6HH:6ROI¶&RPPHQWRQ1RQ-,QWHUQDWLRQDO$UPHG&RQIOLFWV·American University Law Review 927, 928-
9 (Solf), at 931, who links the two thresholds. 6HHDOVR*UHHQ¶/RZ-,QWHQVLW\· 
162 See 6FKLQGOHU¶7\SHV·, 147. 
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recognised as belligerents calls for a level of administration and a degree of control more 
on a par with that of a government.163 This is especially the case if the role of political 
organisation in the recognition of belligerency is taken into account.164 As has been 
mentioned, there can be some containment of the proto-state quality of the group 
through a functional interpretation, linked to the reality of the conflict.  
Ultimately, this does not affect the fundamentally lop-sided character of the Protocol. 
One hope in the initiation of the process to lead to an Additional Protocol had been to 
correct the deficiencies of common article 3 in relation to both the substantive rules and 
the difficulties in the application of the article, stemming from its non-definition of the 
WHUP ¶DUPHG FRQIOLFW· Both these corrections would have furthered the humanitarian 
protection rationale in the centre of common article 3. In both these cases the results are 
far from adequate. Some elaboration and fleshing out of the rules of common article 3 
was achieved.165 7KH GHILQLWLRQ KRZHYHU RI ¶DUPHG FRQIOLFW· FRXOG KDYH WKH RSSRVLWH
effect from the one expected. It voiced the status-based rationale that common article 3 
strove to avoid. It created a new layer of regulation, between common article 3 and 
international armed conflicts, which both complicates the legal regime and pulls it 
towards the paradigm of proto-state entities. 
Indeed, states could interpret the criteria provided narrowly and refuse to acknowledge 
the applicability of the Protocol.166 7KLVZDVDIWHUDOOSDUWRI WKHDUJXPHQWRI WKH ¶QRQ-
GHILQLWLRQVFKRRO·LQWKHFDVHRIFRPPRQDUWLFOH167 The fact remains that the quest for 
¶REMHFWLYH·FULWHULD LVSDUWO\IXWLOHDQGSDUWO\DV LQWKLVFDVHGDQJHURXV,W LVIXWLOH WRWKH
extent that there is no authoritative third party that will determine the application of the 
criteria and assess the material situation.168 In this case, it proved dangerous for the 
development of humanitarian law as states used this quest in order to narrow the scope 
and limit the applicability of the new instrument. Because of these shortcomings of the 
                                              
163 6HH IRU WKH H[SRVLWLRQ RI ERWK YLHZV $ &XOOHQ ¶.H\ 'HYHORSPHQWV $IIHFWLQJ WKH 6FRSH RI ,QWHUQDO $UPHG
&RQIOLFWLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZ·2005) 183 Military Law Review &XOOHQ¶'HYHORSPHQWV· 
164 See section 2.2.2. fn 45 ff and text. 
165 See *UHHQZRRG¶3URWRFROV·, 113. 
166 6HH&XOOHQ¶'HYHORSPHQWV·6HHDOVR)RUV\WKH¶)RUZDUG0DUFK· 
167 See section 3.2.4. See also Draper, 87; Farer, 52; Ciobanu, 49. 
168 See Solf, 931-2. 
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new instrument it is important that common article 3 continues to be applicable 
alongside it. 
  
5.5. The application of the Protocol in practice 
 
In practice Protocol II has been applied less often than common article 3. There are 
many reasons for this including the continuing existence of common article 3. It is 
sensible to expect that Additional Protocol II would have been applied more frequently if 
it was the only available instrument to regulate non-international armed conflicts. There 
have also been a number of conflicts to which the Protocol would not apply since the 
hostilities took place between two non-governmental armed groups.169  
Since the coming into effect of the Protocol, there have been a variety of conflicts where 
the application of the Protocol was not mentioned by the parties,170 or where the 
government had not ratified the Protocol.171 Considerations of space do not allow a 
detailed review of whether the criteria of applicability were satisfied in these cases. In 
some cases, however, willingness to apply the Protocol was expressed by the parties, if 
with usually disappointing results. The present survey will focus on such instances. 
A case in point is the armed conflict in El Salvador. The most significant period of the 
conflict started from 1979 and lasted until 1992 when a truce was concluded. The 
Protocol was ratified by El Salvador on 23 November 1978. The main forces in the 
conflict were the government troops, right-wing paramilitary groups and a leftist guerrilla 
group called Frente Farabundo Marti Para La Liberacion National (FMLN).172   
                                              
169 See fn 123 above. 
170 See Moir, 120, who mentions Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Haiti and Nicaragua. In 
WKH6UL/DQNDQFRQIOLFWKRZHYHUWKHUHEHOJURXS/77(SOHGJHGWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI ¶WKH Geneva Conventions and 
WKHLU $GGLWLRQDO 3URWRFROV· 6HH 6 6LYDNXPDUDQ ¶%LQGLQJ $UPHG 2SSRVLWLRQ *URXSV·   International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 369, 388. 
171 This was, for example, the case with Chad. Although, both the Government and the insurgents (Frolinat) had 
UHFRJQLVHGWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDQ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·&KDGKDGQRWUDWLILHG3URWRFRO,,6HH-XQRG 
172 6HH WKH ¶$QQXDO 5HSRUW RI WKH ,QWHU-$PHULFDQ &RPPLVVLRQ RQ +XPDQ 5LJKWV· -8), available at 
hhttp://www.cidh.org/annualrep/87.88eng/chap4a.htm 
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The conflict developed very quickly in both organisation and intensity.173 According to 
one observer  
 
7KH)0/1FRQWUROOHGPDLQO\XQSRSXODWHG DUHDVEXW WKH\ ´HQJDJH>G@ LQPLOLWDU\
RSHUDWLRQVIRUDFHUWDLQWLPHDUJXDEO\´VXVWDLQHGµDQGWKH\DSSDUHQWO\KD>G@GRQH 
VR LQ D V\VWHPDWLF FRRUGLQDWHG ZD\ DUJXDEO\ ´FRQFHUWHGµ )XOO-fledged field 
battles are not necessary in order to make Protocol II applicable. Regular 
harassment operations from rather remotely situated areas controlled by rebels 
DOVR FDQ FRQVWLWXWH ´VXVWDLQHG DQG FRQFHUWHG PLOLWDU\ RSHUDWLRQVµ ZLWKLQ WKH
PHDQLQJ RI WKH 3URWRFROµ 0RUHRYHU WKH )0/1 KDG EXLOW ´D FHUWDLQ
administrative and military structureµ that made them comparable to the armed 
forces of a government.174  
 
He concludes that the threshold of applicability of Additional Protocol II, to which El 
Salvador is a party, arguably, had been reached.175 Other observers were not convinced: 
For instance, Solf argued, at the same point in time, that the insurgents in El Salvador, by 
QRWFRQWUROOLQJ´DVLQJOHWRZQµGRQRWFRQWURO´VXIILFLHQWWHUULWRU\µIRUWKHDSSOLFDELOLW\
of Additional Protocol II.176 Indeed, the territorial control achieved by the rebels seemed 
to be fleeting as they had to abandon territory gained in favour of mobility. This case 
illustrates the difficulties in the applicability of the territorial control criterion in internal 
armed conflicts even of a great magnitude.177  
The government initially accepted the applicability of common article 3 but not of 
Additional Protocol II.178 Eventually, though it did not admit that Protocol II was 
DSSOLFDEOHDVDPDWWHURIODZLWYRZHGWRDSSO\LWRQWKHEDVLVWKDW´LWVSURYLVLRQVPHUHO\
GHYHORSHG DQG FRPSOHWHG WKH SURYLVLRQV RI FRPPRQ DUWLFOH µ179 The FMLN made a 
                                              
173 See Interim Report of the Special Representative of the UN Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. A/36/608 
and Final Report of the Special Representative of the UN Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1502. 
174 See %RWKH¶&DVH6WXGLHV·, 906.  
175 Ibid. As Bothe points out, however, the Protocol was not applicable between the FMLN and the right-wing 
paramilitaries. 
176 Solf, 932. 
177 See also Junod, 39-40. 
178 Ibid., 39. 
179 See Moir, 120-1.  
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statement in 1988 to the effect that its combat methods would comply with both 
common article 3 and Additional Protocol II.180 
Another case where there was some willingness to abide by the Protocol was the conflict 
in the Southern Philippines. The conflict occurred between the government and two 
main rebel groups,181 a left wing (National Democratic Front or NDF) and an Islamist 
one (Moro Islamic Liberation Front or MILF). The conflict first developed in the 1970s 
and remains ongoing.182 After a particularly brutal attack on civilians by the NDF in July 
1988 the rebel group declared that it would discipline the perpetrators and stated that 
´JXHUULOOD ILJKWLQJ IRUFHV DQG VXSSRUWHUV ZHUH EHLQJ ´HGXFDWHGµ RQ SURYLVLRQV RI
>FRPPRQ@DUWLFOHDQG3URWRFROVDQGRI WKH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQµ183 Through the 
efforts of various actors, including the church and NGOs, an international conference 
was convened that produced a Code of Behaviour based on Additional Protocol II.184 
The code expressly re-stated the basic humanitarian protections present in common 
article 3 and Protocol II, and referred to those instruments as well as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.185 Although the government accepted the draft code, 
neither insurgent party did so. The rebels did promise to educate their fighters on the 
laws of war.186  
The case of Chechnya provides an interesting example of a variety of assessors and 
assessments. The former Soviet Republic declared independence in 1991 and the conflict 
between the separatist rebels and the Russian Federation took place in two phases. The 
first one lasted from 1994 to 1996, costing around 80,000 lives, while fighting broke out 
again in 1999.187 Russia ratified Additional Protocol II on 29 September 1989.  
                                              
180 See, however, ibid., 122, on compliance. 
181 Although more groups have emerged over time. 
182 )RU D SUHVHQWDWLRQ RI WKH PDLQ WLPHOLQH DQG WKH PDLQ DFWRUV VHH WKH %%& ¶*XLGH WR WKH 3KLOLSSLQHV FRQIOLFW·
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-apcific/1695576.htm.  
183 50\UHQ ¶$SSO\LQJ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZVRI :DU WR1RQ-International Armed Conflicts: Past Attempts, Future 
6WUDWHJLHV·Netherlands International Law Review 347, 368 (Myren). 
184 Kooijmans, 230-2. 
185 See, for a summary of the code, Myren, 369. 
186 See Moir, 131 fn XVLQJ WKH,&5&$QQXDO5HSRUW´)LOLSLQR LQVXUJHQWV WROG WKH ,&5&RQ$XJXVW
1991 of their desire to comply with common article 3 and Additional Protocol II, although Asia Watch in 1990 had 
concluded that, while they were operating under responsible command and capable of launching operations in all 
SURYLQFHVWKHLUFDSDFLW\WRLPSOHPHQWWKHGXHSURFHVVUHTXLUHPHQWVLQ$UWLFOHRIWKH3URWRFROZDVGRXEWIXOµ 
187 For a brief historical introduction see. F. SperotWR¶/DZLQ7LPHVRI:DU7KH&DVHRI&KHFKQ\D·Global 
Jurist 1, 1-6SHURWWR ¶&KHFKQ\D·)RUDPRUHH[WHQVLYHVXUYH\VHH&*DOODQG7'H:DDO Chechnya (New York 
University Press, 2000). 
189 
 
During the first phase of the conflict, the issue came before the Russian Constitutional 
Court which, called on to adjudicate alleged violations committed by Russian forces, 
opined that Additional Protocol II was applicable to the Chechen conflict.188 The Court, 
however, did not elaborate on the existence of the material criteria. Although the Court 
argued that it could not pronounce on the actual conduct of Russian armed forces, it 
conceded that violations were probably made but put these down to the non-
incorporation of the Protocol in Russian domestic law.189 
Eventually, the Russian government accepted that the 1994- FRQIOLFW ZDV DQ ¶DUPHG
FRQIOLFW· ZLWKRXW KRZHYHU DGPLWWLQJ WKH DSSOLFDELOLW\ RI 3URWRFRO ,,  $ 5XVVLDQ
GRPHVWLF ODZ ´SURYLGLQJ DGGLWLRQDO FRPSHQVDWLRQ IRU WKRVH WURRSV VHQW RQ SDUWLFXODUO\
hazardous missions was amended in  WR FRYHU WKRVH ZKR KDG ¶FDUULHG RXW
assignments under the conditions of a non-international armed conflict in the Chechen 
5HSXEOLF·µ190  
In relation to the second phase, the government claimed its campaign was anti-terrorism 
action,191 although certain statements implied the recognition of the existence of an 
¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·192 7KH&KHFKHQDUPHGJURXSFDOOHG¶WKH&KHFKHQ5HSXEOLFRI,VKNHULD·
claimed that both common article 3 and Additional Protocol II were applicable.193 A 
panel of experts in the Crimes of War Project194 argued unanimously that common article 
3 was applicable.195 The matter was more complicated, however, as far as Additional 
Protocol II was concerned: four of the six experts could not pronounce on its 
                                              
188 6HH 3 *DHWD ¶7KH $UPHG &RQIOLFW LQ &KHFKQ\D %HIRUH WKH 5XVVLDQ &RQVWLWXWLRQDO &RXUW·   European 
Journal of International Law 563 . 
189 See ibid., 568.  
190 Moir, 128. 
191 Russia initially claimed that the applicable law was The Federal Law on Defence of 1996 and The Federal Law on 
Combating Terrorism oI6HH6SHURWWR¶&KHFKQ\D·7KHJRYHUQPHQWDOVRVXFFHHGHGLQDPHQGLQJDUHSRUWE\
the UN Secretary General, to the effect that the hostilities did not constitute an armed conflict and that the Chechen 
JURXSV ZHUH ¶LOOHJDO DUPHG JURXSV· 6HH : $EUHVFK ¶$ +XPDQ 5LJKWV /DZ RI ,QWHUQDO $UPHG &RQIOLFW 7KH
(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV LQ&KHFKQ\D·  European Journal of International Law 741, 743 (Abresch, 
¶&KHFKQ\D· 
192 See B. Tuzmukhamedov, at www.crimesofwar.org/chechnya, who quotes Russian President Putin who stated to 
the Financial Times WKDW5XVVLDZDV´VWULFWO\FRPSO\LQJZLWKLWVREOLJDWLRQVFRQFHUQLQJWKHSURYLVLRQVRILQWHUQDWLRQDO
KXPDQLWDULDQODZµ 
193 6HH$EUHVFK¶&KHFKQ\D· 
194 These were independent academics consulted by the project in their private capacity. 
195 See www.crimesofwar.org/chechnya7KHSURMHFWGHVFULEHV LWVHOIDV´DFROODERUDWLRQRI MRXUQDOLVWV ODZ\HUVDQG
scholars GHGLFDWHGWRUDLVLQJSXEOLFDZDUHQHVVRIWKHODZVRIZDUDQGWKHLUDSSOLFDWLRQWRVLWXDWLRQVRIFRQIOLFWµ6HH
´ZZZFULPHVRIZDURUJDERXWDERXWKWPO 
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applicability, partly due to the criterion of territorial control.196 Other observers have 
argued that the conflict had the necessary elements of Additional Protocol II, particularly 
during the period that they held Grozny,197 while others considered that no humanitarian 
law applies.198 
Moreover, international institutions offered assessments of the situation. The Council of 
Europe declared that the Russian actions were in contravention with basic principles of 
humanitarian law, therefore implying the existence of an armed conflict.199 The UN 
Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution evoking specifically common article 
3 and Additional Protocol II, among other rules of international law.200 The ECHR also 
dealt with the conflict, applying exclusively human rights law.201 
Other cases of conflicts where the material situation arguably fulfilled the criteria of 
Protocol II are the conflicts in Rwanda (1994) and the former Yugoslavia (1991-1995).202 
The conflict in Rwanda occurred between the Hutu government and the Tutsi Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF). The RwandDQ 3DWULRWLF )URQW ´VWDWHG WR WKH >,&5&@ WKDW LW ZDV
ERXQGE\ WKHUXOHVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZµ)XUWKHUPRUH according to the 
ICTR, WKH\ SRVVHVVHG LQFUHDVLQJ ´FRQWURO RYHU WKH 5ZDQGDQ WHUULWRU\µ 7KH\ ZHUH
´GLVFLSOLQHGDQGSRVVHVVHGDVWUXFWXUHGOHDGHUVKLSZKLFKZDVDQVZHUDEOHWRDXWKRULW\µ203  
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia had both internal and international aspects. As the 
,&7< SXW LW ´>W@R WKH H[WHQW WKDW WKH FRQIOLFWV KDG EHHQ OLPLWHG WR FODVKHV EHWZHHQ
                                              
196 C. Bassiouni argued that both common article 3 and Additional Protocol II was applicable. At the other end, 
DFFRUGLQJWR%7X]PXNKDPHGRYDOWKRXJKFRPPRQDUWLFOHZDVDSSOLFDEOHDVIDUDV3URWRFRO,,JRHV´GDWDWKDW
appears reliable do not prove that armed groups opposing Federal forces meet all requirements of the Protocol's 
Art.1 para 1. Individual groups may have elements of internal structure and discipline. It is less certain that there is 
centralized control or responsible command. It is doubtful that they are capable of coordinated action. They 
GHILQLWHO\GRQRW´H[HUFLVHVXFKFRQWURORYHUDSDUWRI [its] territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and 
FRQFHUWHGPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVµµ$5RJHUVDQG)+DPSVRQFRXOGQRWSURQRXQFHRQWKHDSSOLFDELOLW\RI3URWRFRO
II. See www.crimesofwar.org/chechnya.  
197 6HH$EUHVFK¶&KHFKQ\D· 
198 6HH IRU DQ XQFRQYLQFLQJ DQDO\VLV 6 %\UQH $ 0DXUR DQG 6 5XGRL ¶5XVVLD·V &KHFKQ\D DQG $PHULFD·V
Afghanistan Geo-SROLWLFDO,QWHUHVWVLQWKH5HJLRQDQG,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZ·Sri Lanka Journal of 
International Law 41, 55 ff. 
199 See Council of Europe, Declaration on Chechnya, 10 December 1999. 
200 Resolution 2000/58 on the Situation in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation, UN Doc. 
E/CH.4/RES/2000/58, 25 April 2000. 
201 6HH $EUHVFK ¶&KHFKQ\D·  2WKHU DFWRUV VXFK DV WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ WKH 2UJDQLVDWLRQ IRU 6HFXULW\ DQG
Cooperation in Europe, and the International Monetary Fund also expressed their concern, without, however, a 
specific assessment of applicability. See Moir, 129-30 for references to press sources. 
202 The conflict in Kosovo will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. See section 6.5. 
203 See Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998, par. 627 (Akayesu). See further 
Moir, 123-5. 
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Bosnian Government forces and Bosnian Serb rebel forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as 
well as between the Croatian Government and Croatian Serb rebel forces in Krajina 
&URDWLD WKH\ KDG EHHQ LQWHUQDOµ204 To the extent that the conflict was internal the 
ICTY found that Protocol II was applicable at a minimum. However, the parties agreed 
on 22 of May 1992 to apply common article 3, though not Protocol II.205  
This review of state practice is only partial and dealing with situations where the 
applicability of Protocol II was an issue of relative visibility. The relative rarity of 
H[DPSOHVVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHVWLSXODWLRQRIVSHFLILFFULWHULDIRUWKHGHILQLWLRQRIDQ¶DUPHG
FRQIOLFW·GLGQRWIDFLOLWDWHWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHLQVWUXPHQWAs the structural deficiencies 
of the system persist, the governments concerned are free to either deny the existence of 
an armed conflict, as is the case in common article 3, or deny the existence of the 
material criteria required for Protocol II. Where the issue of territorial control played 
some part, it was to narrow the applicability of the Protocol, although not reverting to a 
fully proto-state paradigm. What little state practice there is shows that Additional 
3URWRFRO,,FRPSRXQGHGFRPPRQDUWLFOH·VVKRUWFRPLQJVZKLOHQRWRIIHULQJPXFK LQ
return. 
 
5.6. Conclusions 
 
The efforts to develop the humanitarian protection rationale of common article 3 
through a new instrument were largely unsuccessful. While Additional Protocol II does 
not effectively reverse the vertical structure introduced through common article 3, it 
reflects potent status- and sovereignty-based concerns by many states. Indeed, a status 
based approach was present at the 1974-7 Diplomatic Conference and manifested itself, 
in different ways, in the drafting of both Protocols I and II.  
While the ascription of state-like status to national liberation movements led to article 
1(4), the fear of ascribing status to armed groups outside the colonial context led to 
                                              
204 Prosecutor v 7DGLý Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, par. 72 (7DGLý Appeal). 
205 Ibid.SDU,QYLHZRIWKHFRQIOLFW·VLQWHQVLW\WKH3DUWLHVDOVRDJUHHG´WRDSSO\FHUWDLQSURYLVLRQVRIWKH Geneva 
&RQYHQWLRQVFRQFHUQLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRQIOLFWVµ 
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significant resistance in the drafting of Additional Protocol II. This manifested itself both 
in the narrowing of the proposed threshold and the paring down of substantive 
humanitarian provisions. The result is a flawed creation, reflecting a lingering paradigm of 
status-based regulation and a specific historical circumstance, favouring absolute and 
unitary sovereignty. Indeed, the position of many states can be understood in relation to 
a conflation of legal status stricto sensu, the very extension of a set of rules to a non-state 
armed group, with a wider legal and political status, which is in direct conflict with state 
sovereignty. While such a position, if taken to its logical extreme, would mandate no 
international regulation of conflicts involving non-state armed groups, in this case status-
based concerns only managed to narrow the applicability of humanitarian protection, by 
instituting a high threshold.  
The new threshold, if not fully reverting to belligerency, uses key elements of the proto-
state paradigm, most notably the criterion of territorial control. The armed groups that 
governments agreed to include in the legal regime must have already achieved, in time 
and space, a certain political and military status. Importantly, however, a functional 
interpretation of the threshold, based on its language and de facto reciprocity allows the 
assessment to focus more narrowly on the military capabilities, rather than political 
organisation. Even so, the applicability of the Protocol is affected by the high threshold. 
This is compounded by the inability to correct the structural deficiencies that allow the 
incumbent government such a prominent role in the assessment of applicability. This 
prominence continues to hamper the aspirations of automatic application of the article 
and allow a status-based rationale to be exercised in the process of assessment of 
applicability.  
Overcoming this deficiency required a different set of actors. International courts and 
tribunals applying a different, if related, legal regime ² international criminal law ² were 
to contribute to the development of the humanitarian protection rationale from the early 
1990s and onwards. This is the topic of the next, and final, chapters.  
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6. Chapter 6: The applicability of the jus in bello through International 
Courts and Tribunals 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapters have discussed the different thresholds created through 
international treaties, for the applicability of different regimes of the jus in bello to armed 
conflicts involving non-state armed groups. The discussion has yielded some tentative 
conclusions, central to which is the point that the thresholds are influenced by a status-
based rationale. This, compounded with the decentralised and incompletely legalised 
process of assessment, leads to problematic results as far as the protective potential of 
the rules is concerned. These regulatory shortcomings were heightened by the limited 
protective rules activated in case the applicability of one of the above instruments was 
established. Again the unwillingness of states to develop the substantive regime has been 
shown, particularly through the examination of travaux préparatoires, to be related to the 
above sovereignty- and status-based rationale.  This is where the law stood at the 
beginning of the 1990s when the Security Council, responding to the atrocities 
committed in conflicts which included non-state armed groups, established the ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)1 and Rwanda (ICTR).2  
The creation of international judicial institutions3 has had a significant effect on the 
determination of what is to be the threshold for the application of the jus in bello as well as 
for extension of the applicable legal regime. Indeed, it will be argued that these two 
aspects are interrelated. The ad hoc Tribunals contributed vastly to the development of 
                                              
1 Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) created a Commission to investigate alleged international crimes in the 
former Yugoslavia, Resolution 808 (1993) contained the statute of the Tribunal recommended by the Secretary-
General and Resolution 827 (1993) adopted this statute. 
2 Security Council Resolution 935 (1994) created a Commission and Resolution 955 (1994) the Tribunal.  
3 This chapter will focus primarily on the ICTY, and secondarily to the ICTR and to the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL), in accordance with their contribution to the elaboration of the threshold. For the latter, see Security 
Council Resolution 1315(2000) which led to an agreement between the Secretary General and the Government of 
Sierra Leone on 16 January 2002. 
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the, then, rudimentary regime of international criminal law4 and influenced the 
movement for the creation of a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC).5  
As international institutions, international courts and tribunals constitute a move away 
from the decentralised system of states. Courts and tribunals are, moreover, judicial 
institutions, and this adds an important element of legalisation: Decisions on the 
applicability and the application of the legal rules are less influenced by political and 
status-based considerations. This applies both to the definition and clarification of what 
is the threshold and on the assessment of whether the threshold is met in a specific case. 
In this chapter and the next there will be an analysis and discussion of the (continuing) 
contribution of the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC in the development of the definition of 
the threshold for the application of the jus in bello. This jurisprudence has developed for 
the determination of the applicability of the law on war crimes.6  
The central question is whether the work of courts and tribunals has fundamentally 
altered the rationale for the application of the jus in bello. More specifically, there will be 
an effort to discern whether there has been a decisive move away from status-based 
considerations that influenced, in different ways, the thresholds discussed so far and 
towards humanitarian protection as the fundamental rationale. A key element in this 
discussion is the development of international criminal law and its similarities and 
differences with the jus in bello regime. Furthermore, this chapter will consider the effects 
of the fact that the regime of international criminal law has been applied and developed 
by judicial institutions. The analysis will focus on the refinement and clarification of the 
criteria and factors that satisfy the threshold. This line of enquiry is pursued in this 
chapter through the discussion of the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals and in the 
next chapter through the analysis of the legal regime of the ICC. 
 
                                              
4 See A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2003), 17 (Cassese, ICL).  
5 On the process for the creation of the ICC see section 7.3.  
6 This is because for there to be genocide or crimes against humanity there need not necessarily exist an armed 
conflict. See R. Cryer, H. Friman, D. Robinson and E. Wilmshurst, International Criminal Law and Procedure 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007), 167and 191 (Cryer et al). 
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6.2. 7KHFRQFHSWRI¶ZDUFULPHV·DQGWKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPLQDOODZ
and the jus in bello. 
 
6.2.1.  Introduction: similarities and differences 
 
7KHODZRI¶ZDUFULPHV·GLVSOD\VDVLJQLILFDQWDIILQLW\QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJFHUWDLQGLIIHUHQFHV
to the law of armed conflict. The central link between these two legal regimes is the 
temporal and logical primacy of the law of armed conflict. This has been expressed 
GRFWULQDOO\LQ%RWKH·VIRUPXODWLRQWKDW¶ZDUFULPHV·DUH´VHFRQGDU\UXOHVLQUHODWLRQWRWhe 
SULPDU\ UXOHV FRQFHUQLQJEHKDYLRXUZKLFK LVSURKLELWHG LQFDVHRI DQ DUPHGFRQIOLFWµ7 
0RUHRYHU ¶ZDU FULPHV· DUH FRQVLGHUHG WR EH D ¶G\QDPLF· FRQFHSW LQVRIDU DV WKH
substantive applicable rules under that headline can change alongside a change in the 
primary rules in the jus in bello.8 This means that the development of the law of armed 
conflict, for example the extension of substantive protective rules to non-international 
armed conflicts, can have an effect on the law of war crimes.   
A ¶ZDUFULPH·FDnnot exist unless the behaviour is already proscribed in the applicable jus 
in bello. Conversely, this also means that when there is an agreement that certain conduct 
constitutes a war crime, it follows that the conduct is proscribed in the law of armed 
conflict. This is particularly the case when the rule is valid beyond the legal instrument 
that formulates it and is accepted as customary law. Accordingly, the jus in bello is affected 
by the development of the substantive law by the ad hoc tribunals, as well as in the Rome 
Statute, to the extent that they reflect customary international law or contribute to the 
creation of custom. 
2QWKHRWKHUKDQG´QRWHYHU\DFWSURKLELWHGXQGHUWKHSULPDU\UXOHVDOVRFRQVWLWXWHVD
ZDUFULPHµ9 Even though the law of war crimes and the law of armed conflict share a 
common basis they are not identical concepts or legal regimes. There is an additional 
element that renders a conduct not just proscribed in the jus in bello, but also leading to 
                                              
7 0%RWKH ¶:DU&ULPHV· LQ A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2002), 379, 381 (Bothe). 
8 See Prosecutor v Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1-A, Judgment, 12 June 2002, par. 67; Bothe, 381; G. Mettraux, 
International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals (Oxford University Press, 2005), 29 (Mettraux). 
9 Bothe, 387. Thus also 7DGLýAppeal, par. 94. 
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the individual criminal liability of its individual perpetrator. Understanding the elements 
WKDWGLIIHUHQWLDWH WKHVSHFLHVRI ¶ZDUFULPHV· IURPWKHJHQXVRISURVFULEHGEHKDYLRXU LQ
armed conflict can help us understand how the developments discussed in these two 
chapters affect the overall regulation of conflicts involving non-state armed groups. 
Furthermore, although the relationship between primary and secondary rules relates more 
directly to the substantive legal regime, the analysis of the concepts and the juxtaposition 
between international criminal law and the jus in bello relates to the overall rationale for 
the applicability of these regimes. This can be of help in understanding the effect that 
international criminal law has had and can have on the question of threshold(s) of 
applicability and on whether they contribute to an individual-protection rationale. 
)LQDOO\ D KLVWRU\ RI WKH FRQFHSW RI ¶ZDU FULPHV· ZRXOG EH EH\RQG WKH VFRSH RI WKLV
chapter. Suffice it to say that beginnings of the modern concept10 are usually traced to the 
First World War and the consequent Leipzig trials,11 while its formalisation, through its 
inscription in a treaty, occurred with the Nuremberg12 and Tokyo13 Tribunals. The 
FRQFHSWZDVIXUWKHUGHYHORSHGWKURXJKWKHSURYLVLRQVIRU¶JUDYHEUHDFKHV·LQWKH*HQHYD
Conventions,14 and WKH OLVW RI ¶JUDYH EUHDFKHV· ZDV VXSSOHPHQWHG DQG EURDGHQHG LQ
$GGLWLRQDO3URWRFRO,DVZHOODVH[SOLFLWO\UHFRJQLVHGDV¶ZDUFULPHV·LQDUWLFOH$IWHU
WKHHQGRIWKH&ROG:DU¶ZDUFULPHV·ZHUHLQFOXGHGLQWKHVWDWXWHVRIWKHad hoc Tribunals, 
as discussed below.  
 
6.2.2.  Distinguishing features of war crimes: an emphasis on the individual 
 
One point of comparison between international criminal law and the law of armed 
conflict has to do with the role of different actors in these legal regimes. One 
                                              
10 For the pre-20th FHQWXU\KLVWRU\RIZDUFULPHVVHH70F&RUPDFN¶)URP6XQ7]XWRWKH6Lxth Committee: The 
(YROXWLRQ RI DQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO /DZ 5HJLPH· LQ 7 0F&RUPDFN DQG * 6LPSVRQ The Law of War Crimes 
(Kluwer, 1997), 286. 
11 See Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties, Report 
Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (1920) 14 American Journal of International Law 95.  
12 $UWLFOHERIWKH1XUHPEHUJ&KDUWHUSURYLGHGIRU´:DUFULPHVQDPHO\YLRODWLRQVRIWKHODZVRUFXVWRPVRI
ZDU6XFKYLRODWLRQVVKDOOLQFOXGH«µ 
13 Article 5.(b) Jurisdiction Over Persons and Offenses. See N. Boister and R. Cryer, The Tokyo International Military 
Tribunal: A Reappraisal (Oxford University Press, 2008), chapter 7.  
14 See articles 41, 51, 130 and 147 of Geneva Conventions I-IV.  
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distinguishing feature of the concept of war crimes is that it marks a shift in the structure 
of international law towards the individual as a subject of rights and obligations. The 
centrality of the individual has been expressed in one of the canonical texts of 
international criminal law, the decision of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg:  
 
[C]rimes against international law are committed by men, not abstract entities, and 
only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZEHHQIRUFHG«15 
 
This is not to say that international criminal law applies exclusively to individuals.16 The 
practice however has focused almost exclusively on the criminal liability of the individual. 
This has been the focus of international criminal judicial institutions. This distinction was 
clearly stated by the ICTY in 7DGLý ´WKH REOLJDWLRQV RI LQGLYLGXDOV XQGHU LQWHUQDWLRQDO
humanitarian law are independent and apply without prejudice to any questions of the 
responsibiOLW\RI6WDWHVXQGHULQWHUQDWLRQDOODZµ17  
The above sentence also points out that the individual obligations are present already 
under the law of armed conflict and that international criminal law serves to enforce 
them. In the law of armed conflict there is an element of a contest between two entities, 
as well as an element of individual action and protection from suffering. The former is 
closer to questions of status and reciprocity while the latter follows the rationale of the 
humanitarian protection of individuals and imposes obligations on individuals to 
minimise the suffering caused by the conflict. In that sense international criminal law can 
be seen as accentuating the latter element already present in the law of armed conflict.  
 Accordingly, international criminal law can be seen as the development of a legal and 
institutional regime for the enforcement of the individual-protection rationale of the law 
                                              
15 ¶1XUHPEHUJ,0T: Judgment DQG6HQWHQFH·American Journal of International Law 172, 221 
16 See generally N. Jørgensen, The Responsibility of States for International Crimes (Oxford University Press, 2000); A. 
&ODSKDP ¶([WHQGLQJ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO /DZ EH\RQG the Individual to Corporations and Armed Opposition 
*URXSV·Journal of International Criminal Justice 899. 
17 3URVHFXWRUY7DGLýCase No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 7 May 1997, par. 573 (7DGLý TC).   
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of armed conflict. The focus shifts from a contest between two entities to the 
relationship between the perpetrator of a violation and the victim(s) of that violation.   
 
6.2.3.  Distinguishing features of war crimes: the seriousness of humanitarian values 
 
Aside from similarities and differences between the actors involved in the law of armed 
conflict and international criminal law, there are also similarities and differences with 
respect to the acts that constitute violations of the two areas of law. In this respect, an 
important point concerns the distinguishing factors that make some acts prohibited by 
the law of armed conflict war crimes and not others.  
,QLWLDOO\LWVKRXOGEHVDLGWKDWDVFRQFHGHGE\WKH,&75´>W@KHOLQHEHWZHHQWKRVHIRUPV
of responsibility which may engage the criminal responsibility [...] and those which may 
not can be drawn in the DEVWUDFWRQO\ZLWKGLIILFXOW\µ18 This is not least because of the 
fragmentary and haphazard way in which the states have decided or not on the 
criminalisation of certain forms of behaviour.19 It might therefore be that the search for a 
definite element or principle which renders a violation of the law of armed conflict 
criminal is futile.20  
Nevertheless, it is not impossible to discern some central elements. The ICTY Appeals 
Chamber offers a starting point. The 7DGLý Interlocutory Appeal decision set certain 
conditions for a crime to exist:  
(i) the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of international 
humanitarian law;  
(ii) the rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to treaty law, the required 
FRQGLWLRQVPXVWEHPHW>«@ 
                                              
18 See also Prosecutor v Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, 7 June 2001, par. 36 (Bagilishema).  
19 6HH 5 &U\HU ¶7KH 'RFWULQDO )RXQGDWLRQV RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDOLVDWLRQ· LQ & %DVVLRXQL HG International 
Criminal Law vol. 1 (3rd ed., Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 107, (&U\HU¶'RFWULQDO·), 118.This is indeed shared with the jus in 
bello. See & %DVVLRXQL ¶7KH 1RUPDWLYH )UDPHZRUN RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO +XPDQLWDULDQ /DZ 2YHUODSV *DSV DQG
$PELJXLWLHV·Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 199. 
20 Or, indeed, dangerous, as leDGLQJWRVXEMHFWLYHDQGPRUDOLVWDSSURDFKHV6HH&U\HU¶'RFWULQDO·-3. 
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(iii) the violation must be "serious", that is to say, it must constitute a breach of a 
rule protecting important values, and the breach must involve grave consequences 
for the victim [...]  
(iv) the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or conventional law, the 
individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule.21 
While condition (i) seems to be a formulation of nullum crimen sine lege,22 as well as 
acknowledging the dependence of war crimes from the jus in bello, condition (ii) limits the 
sources to treaty and custom. Condition (iv) has been criticised as redundant. It has been 
argued that evidence for individual criminal responsibility, due to the lack of relevant 
proceedings, is sparse and that, in truth, this condition is subsumed in condition (iii) 
ZKLFK SURYLGHV IRU WKH ¶VHULRXVQHVV· RI WKH YLRODWLRQ 7KXV DOO ¶VHULRXV· YLRODWLRQV DUH
criminalised.23 Nevertheless, condition (iv) serves to accentuate the shift of focus to the 
individual discussed in the previous sub-section 
Therefore, the word that remains as our sole guide for distinguishing criminal from non-
criminal violations of the jus in bello LVWKHZRUG¶VHULRXV·¶6HULRXV·PLJKWVRXQGYDJXHRU
¶TXHVWLRQ-EHJJLQJ·24 but it is not beyond interpretation. Indeed, the Appeals Chamber, in 
the above definition, provided both an explanation of the term, stating that ´>WKH
violation] must constitute a breach of a rule protecting important values, and the breach 
PXVW LQYROYHJUDYHFRQVHTXHQFHVIRU WKHYLFWLPµ as well as an example of a distinction 
between a serious and a non-serious violation:  
 
(iii) [...] Thus, for instance, the fact of a combatant simply appropriating a loaf of 
bread in an occupied village would not amount to a "serious violation of 
international humanitarian law" although it may be regarded as falling foul of the 
basic principle laid down in Article 46, paragraph 1, of the Hague Regulations 
                                              
21 7DGLýAppeal, par. 94. 
22 See 06KDKDEXGHHQ¶'RHVWKH3ULQFLSOHRI/HJDOLW\6WDQGLQWKH:D\RIWKH3URJUHVVLYH'HYHORSPHQWRI/DZ"·
(2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1017. 
23 See, generally, Cryer et al, 226; Indeed rule 156 of the ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study 
does not include condition (iv). See J. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, vol. 
1: Rules (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 568 ff and 571 (ICRC, Customary6HHDOVR5&U\HU¶3URVHFXWRUY*DOLý 
DQGWKH:DU&ULPHRI7HUURU%RPELQJ·  IDF Law Review 73, 93-5, discussing, in the context of the *DOLý
Judgment, the reasons in support of condition (iv) offered in 7DGLý.  
24 Thus G. Abi-6DDE¶7KH&RQFHSWRI:DU&ULPHV·LQ6<ee and W. Tieya (eds.), International Law and the Post-Cold 
War World: Essays in Memory of Li Haopei
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(and the corresponding rule of customary international law) whereby "private 
property must be respected" by any army occupying an enemy territory;25 
 
,QGHHG ¶VHULRXVQHVV· VHHPV WR EH D FRPELQDWLRQ RI WKH YDOXHV SURWHFWHG DQG WKH
consequences of the violation for these values. It is argued here that these values are 
fundamentally humanitarian. This can be seen in the above example in terms of both 
values and consequences.  The centrality of humanitarian values is reflected in the 
discussion in both judicial practice and the doctrine.26  
The centrality of humanitarian values, can also be seen in the approach taken by the 
ICRC study on customary international humanitarian law:  
 
A deductive analysis of the actual list of war crimes found in various treaties and 
other international instruments, as well as in national legislation and case-law, shows 
that violations are in practice treated as serious, and therefore as war crimes, if they 
endanger protected persons or objects or if they breach important values.27 
 
Despite the syntax of the above passage it should be clear that the protection of civilians 
and civilian objects is a central value of the legal regime.28 ¶,PSRUWDQWYDOXHV· LV IXUWKHU
H[HPSOLILHG E\ WKH VWXG\ E\ VXFK DFWV DV ´DEXVLQJ GHDG ERGLHV VXEMHFWLQJ SHUVRQV WR
KXPLOLDWLQJWUHDWPHQW«UHFUXLWLQJFKLOGUHQ«µDQGVRRQ29 
In conclusion, even though it is very difficult to draw a clear line between criminalised 
and non-criminalised violations of the jus in bello or to find one definite element leading to 
criminalisation, it can be argued that the protection of humanitarian values is a central 
rationale in the system. This suggests that the process of criminalisation draws from and 
accentuates the humanitarian protection rationale which is present in the law of armed 
conflict. Viewed historically it seems to be the evolution, consolidation, and 
                                              
25 7DGLý Appeal, par. 94. See also Prosecutor v Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 24 
March 2000, par. 30-38  for the consideration of whether a series of acts of mistreatment of detainees by the 
defendant were of a sufficiently serious nature 
26 See also Mettraux, 51. 
27 See ICRC, Customary, 569. 
28 See also 0HWWUDX[WUDQVODWLQJ¶LPSRUWDQWYDOXHV·LQWRKXPDQLWDULDQYDOXHVDPRQJRWKHUV 
29 See ICRC, Customary, 570. 
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institutionalisation of the focus on humanitarian protection that exists alongside 
considerations of status.  
Common article 3 and the efforts to transcend the status-based conundrum that blocked 
the protection of individuals in non-international armed conflicts were at the very heart 
of this project. It is therefore not surprising that the development of the individual-
protection rationale through the international criminal law regime would bear some of its 
more impressive fruits in the context of non-international armed conflicts. This, as will 
be seen, is the case both with respect to the expansion of the substantive law applicable, 
and the development of the vertical structure of applicability and the formulation of a 
low threshold. The creation and jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals, analysed below, 
constitutes a significant move in that direction. 
 
6.3. The creation of the ad hoc Tribunals  
 
The conflicts occurring in the first half of the 1990s in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia and in Rwanda deeply affected public opinion30 and led to significant 
initiatives against the impunity of those suspected of committing crimes. In the former 
Yugoslavia, the egregious violations of the law of armed conflict, especially in the conflict 
in Bosnia,31 led to the Security Council Resolutions urging compliance with international 
humanitarian law32 and, eventually, creating a Commission of Experts to report on grave 
breaches of international humanitarian law.33 There was the implicit understanding that 
the Commission would serve as a first step to an international tribunal, were the parties 
to continue the violations.34 Indeed, the Security Council requested35 the Secretary 
General to prepare a report, within 60 days, on the establishment of a Tribunal. The 
Secretary General annexed to the report the Statute of the new Tribunal, drafted, after 
                                              
30 Cassese, ICL, 335. 
31 ' 6KUDJD DQG 5 =DFNOLQ ¶7KH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO 7ULEXQDO IRU WKH )RUPHU <XJRVODYLD·   European 
Journal of International Law 360, 360 (Shraga and Zacklin). 
32 See, e.g., SC Resolutions 713 (1991), 764 (1992), 771 (1992). 
33 Created through SC Resolution 780 in October 1992. 
34 Shraga and Zacklin, 361. 
35 SC Resolution 808 (22 February 1993), operative paragraph 2. 
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wide consultation,36 E\ WKH6HFUHWDULDW·V 2IILFHRI/HJDO$IIDLUV37 The Security Council 
DFFHSWHG WKH 6HFUHWDU\ *HQHUDO·V UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV DQG HVWDEOLVKHG WKH 7ULEXQDO XQGHU
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, through Resolution 827, on 25 May 1993.  
The Security Council Resolutions, and the Commission of Experts38 and Secretary 
General Reports,39 did not conclusively determine the nature of the armed conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia, although there seemed to be little doubt that an armed conflict 
existed at the time. It seems, however, that there was a widely held assumption that the 
armed conflict was of an international character.40 This can be viewed in, and led to, the 
drafting of the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.  
Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute provide that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over grave 
EUHDFKHVRIWKH*HQHYD&RQYHQWLRQVDQGRYHURWKHU¶YLRODWLRQVRIWKHODZVDQGFXVWRPV
RIZDU·41 Reference to violations of the law of non-international armed conflicts was not 
expressly made. This approach meant that when the Tribunal found that certain parts of 
the conflict were of a non-international character42 there was a legal hurdle to surmount 
in order to find that it had jurisdiction over war crimes committed in such conflicts.  
Shortly after the establishment of the ICTY, the short but extremely brutal conflict in 
Rwanda convinced the Security Council to adopt a similar approach. In this case, there 
ZDVQRSUHSDUDWRU\UHSRUW7KH7ULEXQDO·V6WDWXWHZDVSUHSDUHGDQGnegotiated by New 
Zealand and the United States43 and adopted by the Security Council in Resolution 955, 
                                              
36 Shraga and Zacklin, 362. 
37 L. -RKQVRQ¶7HQ<HDUV/DWHU² 5HIOHFWLRQVRQWKH'UDIWLQJRIWKH6WDWXWH·Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 368, 369 (Johnson). 
38 See Interim Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) (26 January 
1993) UN doc. S/25274; Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 
(1992) (27 May 1994), UN doc. S/1994/674. In the latter report, however, at par. 43-5, the Commission did 
consider the question, arguing that it would be for the Tribunal to settle, while DUJXLQJ IRU WKH &RPPLVVLRQ·V
approach to apply the law of international armed conflicts. 
39 See Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN doc. S/25704. 
40 7KLV LV DUJXHG IRU H[DPSOH E\ 0HURQ ZULWLQJ EHIRUH WKH ,&7< LVVXHG LWV ILUVW GHFLVLRQ 6HH 7 0HURQ ¶:DU
&ULPHVLQ<XJRVODYLDDQGWKH'HYHORSPHQWRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ·American Journal of International Law 78, 
80-1(MerRQ¶&ULPHV· 70HURQ ¶,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDOLVDWLRQRI,QWHUQDO$WURFLWLHV·American Journal of 
International Law 554, 556 0HURQ¶&ULPLQDOLVDWLRQ·).  
41 Grave breaches included violations such as wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, extensive destruction of 
property, or the taking of hostages. Violations of the laws or customs of war included employment of prohibited 
weapons, attacks on civilian targets or destruction of cultural property. 
42 This was the case early on, in the first annual report by the Tribunal. See UN doc. A/49/342-S/1994/1007, par. 
,WZDVFHUWLILHGDQGGHYHORSHGLQWKH7ULEXQDO·VILUVWGHFLVLRQ6HH7DGLýAppeal, par. 72. 
43 5/HH¶7KH5ZDQGD7ULEXQDO·Leiden Journal of International Law 37, 39. 
203 
 
on 8 November 1994. Moreover, in the case of the ICTR the circumstances of the 
conflict resulted in a different approach in terms of applicable law.  
As the conflict there appeared to be non-international, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
was framed accordingly. Article 4 of the ICTR Statute provides that the Tribunal has 
jurisdiction over violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II. The 
criminalisation of internal atrocities, even though safely based on rules contained in treaty 
instruments, was hailed as progressive at the time.44  
7KH IDFW WKDW WKH ,&75 6WDWXWH EDVHG WKH 7ULEXQDO·V MXULVGLFWLRQ H[SUHVVO\ RQ WUHDW\
sources, however, was of no help to the ICTY. It seemed to support the argument that if 
the Security Council had wanted to confer jurisdiction on, or recognise the criminal 
nature of, violations of the laws of armed conflict in a non-international armed conflict, it 
would have done so expressly.45 This argument also seemed to follow the prevailing legal 
opinion of the time, which very much doubted the customary nature of war crimes in 
non-international armed conflicts. Indeed, this opinion was shared by the Commission of 
Experts in their Report,46 by the ICRC,47 as well as many scholars.48  
The lack of reference to violations of the law in non-international armed conflicts and the 
uncertainty over their criminalisation constituted significant hurdles to the extent that the 
ICTY had to deal with such conflicts. As we will see in the next section, the Appeals 
&KDPEHU·VDSSURDFKZDVWRUHO\RQDQGGHYHORSDQH[SDQVLYHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIFXVWRP
7KLVVWUDWHJ\ZDVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKH7ULEXQDO·VRYHUDOODSSURDFKRQWKHZLGHDSSOLFDELOLW\
of rules of humanitarian protection and with its approach on re-defining the threshold 
for the existence of an armed conflict.  
                                              
44 6HH0HURQ¶&ULPLQDOLVDWLRQ· 
45 See Johnson, 370. This would be even more the case in relation to rules not included in common article 3 or 
Additional Protocol II. See 3URVHFXWRU Y 7DGLý, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li on the 
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995 (7DGLý Li Dissent). 
46 Final Report of 27 May 1994 of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 
780 (1992), UN doc. S/1994/674, par. 42. This was used by Judge Li in his dissent. 
47 6HH ¶3UHOLPLQDU\ 5HPDUNV RQ WKH 6HWWLQJ-up of an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
<XJRVODYLD·''0-85E0DUFKSDUD 
48 6HH3$NKDYDQ ¶7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO7ULEXQDOIRU5ZDQGD7KH3ROLWLFVDQG3UDJPDWLFVRI3XQLVKPHQW·
(1996) 90 American Journal of International Law 501, 503. See, generally, W. Schabas, The UN International Criminal 
Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 232 (Schabas, Tribunals). 
See also T. HoffmDQQ ¶7KH *HQWOH +XPDQL]HU RI +XPDQLWDULDQ /DZ $QWRQLR &DVVHVH DQG WKH &UHDWLRQ RI WKH
Customary Law of Non-,QWHUQDWLRQDO $UPHG &RQIOLFWV· LQ & 6WDKQ DQG / YDQ GHQ +HULN Future Perspectives on 
International Criminal Justice (TMC Asser, 2010) 58, 60-1 (Hoffmann) for further references to pre-1995 literature. 
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6.4. The beginning: 7DGLý 
 
6.4.1. Substantive Law through Custom 
 
The first decision of the Appeals Chamber49 provided a new start for the perennial 
TXHVWLRQ RI ¶ZKDW LV DQ DUPHG FRQIOLFW· DQG ZKDW UXOHV DUH DSSOLFDEOH LQ D QRQ-
international one. The defendant had filed a motion on jurisdiction alleging inter alia that 
the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the acts described in articles 2 and 3, when 
occurring in a non-international armed conflict. The Trial Chamber argued that neither 
article specifies whether the conflict should be international.50 Moreover, it argued that 
article 3 violations are to be grounded in custom51 and that rules such as the ones 
included in common article 3 constitute customary law.52  
7KLV DSSURDFK ZDV IXUWKHU SXUVXHG E\ WKH $SSHDOV &KDPEHU 7KH $SSHDOV &KDPEHU·V
decision can be viewed as a bold assertion of judicial power in an area of law in particular 
need of enforcement mechanisms. This stance was manifested on many legal issues, such 
DV WKH GHWHUPLQDWLRQ RI WKH &RXUW·V LQVWLWXWLRQDO FRPSHWHQFH-competence,53 and its 
extended findings on the existence and applicability of substantive legal rules in non-
international armed conflicts as a matter of custom.54  
The difficulties contained in the drafting of the Statute, discussed above, posed a 
problem for the Tribunal in discharging its mandate. One way to resolve this was to 
consider the entire conflict as an international one, as it was viewed by many 
                                              
49 7DGLýAppeal. 
50 Ibid. SDUDQG6HH IXUWKHU&*UHHQZRRG ¶,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZDQG WKH 7DGLý&DVH· 
European Journal of International Law 265, 268 (Greenwood, 7DGLý).   
51 TDGLýAppeal, par. 60 ff.  
52 Ibid., par. 65 ff. 
53 See Ibid., par. 9-6HH-$OYDUH]¶1XUHPEHUJ5HYLVLWHG7KH7DGLý &DVH·European Journal of International 
Law  & :DUEULFN DQG 3 5RZH ¶7KH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO 7ULEXQDO IRU <XJRVODYLD The Decision of the 
Appeals Chamber on the Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction in the 7DGLý &DVH·   International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 691, 691 ff (Warbrick and Rowe).  
54 As well as individual criminal responsibility for breaches of these rules. See 7DGLýAppeal, par. 96 ² 127 and 128-
137. 6HH DOVR 7 0HURQ ¶7KH &RQWLQXLQJ 5ROH RI &XVWRP LQ WKH )RUPDWLRQ RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO +XPDQLWDULDQ /DZ·
(1996) 90 American Journal of International Law 0HURQ¶&XVWRP· 
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commentators at the time.55 Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber took the position that 
the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina contained both internal and international 
elements.56 This approach was closer to the facts. It also refOHFWHGWKH$SSHDOV&KDPEHU·V
stance to not shy away from difficulty and its willingness to develop the law, by taking on 
the issue of applicable customary rules. This was understood even by commentators who 
KDGDUJXHGIRUDQRYHUDOO¶LQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQIOLFW·DSSURDFK57 
While the Appeals Chamber, unlike the Trial Chamber,58 conceded that the grave 
breaches regime, referred to in article 2 of the Statute, was only applicable in international 
armed conflicts,59 it extended the application of article 3 of the Statute to non-
international armed conflicts.60 This was attempted through the argument that the rules 
were customary not only insofar as international humanitarian law was concerned but 
also in terms of individual criminal responsibility.61 Moreover, the IDFW WKDW DUWLFOH ·V
HQXPHUDWLRQZDVQRWH[KDXVWLYH´EXWPHUHO\LOOXVWUDWLYHµ62 gave the Tribunal free hand in 
deciding what constitutes validly proscribed conduct.63 
0RUHRYHU WKH 7ULEXQDO·V DQDO\VLV RI opinio juris reflected and supported its overall 
approach and rationale. The Tribunal began its analysis by arguing that the 
international/non-LQWHUQDWLRQDO ´GLFKRWRP\ ZDV FOHDUO\ VRYHUHLJQW\-oriented and 
reflected the traditional configuration of the international community, based on the 
coexistence of sovereign States more inclined to look after their own interests than 
FRPPXQLW\ FRQFHUQV RU KXPDQLWDULDQ GHPDQGVµ64 The Tribunal went on to state the 
basic tenet of its philosophy: 
                                              
55 6HHIRUH[DPSOH0HURQ¶&ULPHV·-1; 0HURQ¶&ULPLQDOLVDWLRQ·-2·%ULHQ¶7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO7ULEXQDOIRU
9LRODWLRQVRI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZLQWKH)RUPHU<XJRVODYLD·  American Journal of International 
Law 639, 647-8. 
56 See 7DGLýAppeal, 72.  
57 This is FRQFHGHGE\*$OGULFK ¶-XULVGLFWLRQRI WKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO7ULEXQDO IRU WKHIRUPHU<XJRVODYLD·
(1996) 90 American Journal of International Law $OGULFK6HHDOVR0HURQ¶&XVWRP· 
58 See 3URVHFXWRUY7DGLý, Case No. IT-94-1-TR72, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, 10 August 1995, 
par. 46-56. 
59 7DGLýAppeal, par. 79-85. But see in ibid. the Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab, par. 5, arguing that the grave 
breaches regime was applicable to non-international armed conflicts. 
60 Ibid., par. 86 ² 137. 
61 See ibid., par. 94 for the development of the four stages discussed above fn 21 and text. 
62 Ibid.SDU ,QGHHG WKH7ULEXQDOFRQFOXGHG WKDWDUWLFOH´PD\EH WDNHQ WRFRYHU all violations of international 
humanitarian law other WKDQ WKH JUDYH EUHDFKHV RI WKH IRXU *HQHYD &RQYHQWLRQV IDOOLQJ XQGHU $UWLFOH µ
(emphasis in the original) 
63 See also R. Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 265. 
64 See 7DGLýLi Dissent, par. 96. 
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A State-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by a human-
being-oriented approach. [...] It follows that in the area of armed conflict the 
distinction between interstate wars and civil wars is losing its value as far as human 
beings are concerned. Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, 
torture or the wanton destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or private 
property, as well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary suffering when two 
sovereign States are engaged in war, and yet refrain from enacting the same bans or 
providing the same protection when armed violence has erupted "only" within the 
territory of a sovereign State? If international law, while of course duly safeguarding 
the legitimate interests of States, must gradually turn to the protection of human 
beings, it is only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy should gradually lose its 
weight.65 
 
In the above passage the humanitarian protection rationale present in the jus in bello is 
expressed and accentuated. The court argued for the replacement of status-based 
considerations with what is the primary focus of the legal regime: humanitarian 
protection. The Tribunal went on to offer some instances of state practice that ground 
the application of a set of principles and rules to both international and non-international 
armed conIOLFWV´SULQFLSOHVGHVLJQHGWRSURWHFWcivilians or civilian objects from the hostilities 
or, more generally, to protect those who do not (or no longer) take active part in hostilitiesµDVZHOO
as rules regulating means and methods of warfare.66 Finally, the Appeals Chamber 
completed its syllogism by qualifying the transposition of custom to non-international 
armed conflicts by conceding that 
 
[t]he emergence of the aforementioned general rules on internal armed conflicts 
does not imply that internal strife is regulated by general international law in all its 
aspects. Two particular limitations may be noted: (i) only a number of rules and 
principles governing international armed conflicts have gradually been extended to 
apply to internal conflicts; and (ii) this extension has not taken place in the form 
of a full and mechanical transplant of those rules to internal conflicts; rather, the 
general essence of those rules, and not the detailed regulation they may contain, 
has become applicable to internal conflicts.67 
 
                                              
65 7DGLýAppeal, par. 97. 
66 Ibid., par. 119. (emphasis in the original)      
67 Ibid, par. 126.  
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This is another iteration of the effort to extend rules applicable to international armed 
conflict to non-international armed conflict. The effort was previously seen particularly in 
the design of common article 3 to contain the principles rather than the provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions.68 One difference is that in this case the extension and detail 
SURYLGHGWR¶WKHHVVHQFHRIWKHUXOHV·LVWREHGHWHUPLQHGE\D7ULEXQDOZLWKDPDQGDWH
to minimise impunity and not by states with vested interests. 
TKH7ULEXQDO·VSURMHFWZDVUHDOLVHG LQ WKUHH VWHSVDUWLFOHRI WKH6WDWXWHZDV IRXQG WR
apply to non-international armed conflicts; it was found to be virtually open-ended; its set 
of rules was gathered around certain humanitarian principles. This rationale, as expressed 
openly by the Tribunal,69 was to transcend sovereignty- and status-related considerations 
in determining the applicable rules in non-international armed conflicts for the protection 
of human beings.  
The result was both innovative and controversial. Indeed, the general stance,70 and the 
specific dicta it led to,71 were criticised at the time. Nevertheless, other commentators 
received the decision with more enthusiasm72 and its innovation and ambition are now 
recognised for their significance. $V 6FKDEDV SXWV LW ´>L@W LV QRZ EH\RQG TXHVWLRQ WKDW
there is international criminal responsibility for war crimes committed during non-
international armed conflict and this undoubtedly thanks to the bold initiative of the four 
judges of the majority in the Appeals Chamber in the 7DGLý MXULVGLFWLRQGHFLVLRQµ73 
This shows how the humanitarian-protection rationale, present in the law of armed 
conflict is developed in international criminal law and was applied by an international 
judicial institution. While, at the time, the expansion of substantive law was the feature of 
                                              
68 See chapter 3.2.2. 
69 See above fn 66 and text. 
70 6HHIRUH[DPSOH06DVVROLDQG/2OVRQ¶3URVHFXWRUY7DGLý· (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 
SRLQWLQJRXWWKDW´RQHKDVWKHLPSUHVVLRQWKDWWKH,&7<RIWHQUXVKHVDKHDGWRFODULI\HYHU\OHJDOLVVXHWKDW
it canZKHUHDVRWKHUFRXUWVGHFLGHRQO\WKHLVVXHVWKDWWKH\PXVWµ6HHDOVRGreenwood, ¶7DGLý·, who points out, at 
278, the use of obiter dicta. 
71 2QWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIDUWLFOHIRUH[DPSOH5RZHH[FODLPHGWKDWWKH7ULEXQDOVHQW´DFRDFKDQGIRXUWKURXJK
the traditional distinctions between an international and a non-LQWHUQDWLRQDO DUPHG FRQIOLFWµ 6HH :Drbrick and 
5RZH  6HH DOVR*:DWVRQ ¶7KH+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZ RI WKH<XJRVODYLD :DU&ULPHV7ULEXQDO -XULVGLFWLRQ LQ
3URVHFXWRUY7DGLý· (1995-1996) 36 Virginia Journal of International Law 687. 
72 See, for example, Aldrich, 68- 6HH DOVR / 0DUHVFD ¶7KH 3URVHFXWRU Y 7DGLý 7KH $SSHOODWH 'HFLVLRQ RI WKH
ICTY and Internal Violations of Humanitarian Law as International CrLPHV· Leiden Journal of International 
Law 219. 
73 Schabas, Tribunals, 236. 
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WKH7ULEXQDO·VMXULVSUXGHQFHWKDWUHFHLYHGPRUHQRWLFHDQGXQGHUVWDQGDEO\VRWKH7DGLý 
DSSURDFKDOVR\LHOGHGDQHZVWDUWLQWKHVHWWLQJRIWKHWKUHVKROG7KH7ULEXQDO·VDSSURDFK
in this matter is fully compatible with its overall approach. 
 
6.4.2. The re-setting of the threshold 
 
The Appeals Chamber further contributed to the legal regime by setting a new definition 
for the threshold of an armed conflict. In paragraph 70 of this important decision it 
proclaimed:  
 
Therefore, we find that an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed 
force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities 
and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.74 
 
A striking feature of the AppHDOV &KDPEHU·V GHILQLWLRQ LV WKDW WKHUH LV QR SUHOLPLQDU\
discussion or analysis of why this threshold and particular phrasing was chosen: It is not 
FOHDUZK\WKLVLVZKDWDQ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·LV7KH$SSHDOV&KDPEHUGLGQRWH[SUHVVO\EDVH
itself on the interpretations of common article 3 or on the threshold of Additional 
Protocol II. It did not discuss the importance of or the reasons for excluding a reference 
to reciprocity or territorial control in the definition.  
Nevertheless WKH EDVLF FULWHULD RI ´SURWUDFWHG DUPHG YLROHQFHµ DQG ´RUJDQL]HG DUPHG
JURXSVµDUHILUPO\EDVHGRQDQGDEVWUDFWHGIURPWKHKLVWRU\RIWKHGHEDWHDQGWKHPDLQ
criteria of intensity and organisation.75 At the same time, their formulation is consistent 
ZLWKWKH$SSHDOV&KDPEHU·VUDWLRQale of providing a minimum threshold that will offer 
maximum applicability. This approach was developed by the Tribunal in later cases, as 
will be seen in the analysis of the development of the criteria in the next subsection. 
Furthermore, the avoidance of expressly basing the formulation of the threshold on 
                                              
74 7DGLýAppeal, par. 70. 
75 See sections 2.2.2., 3.3.1-7KLVZDVLQGHHGWKH7ULDO&KDPEHU·VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRQFHWKHFDVHZHQWEDFNWR
the Trial Chamber. See 7DGLý TC, par. 562. 
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common article 3 and Additional Protocol II also serves the primacy given to customary 
law. This does not mean that the threshold in custom has to be different from that in a 
treaty. It is only necessary that it is separate and existing alongside the treaty.76 Indeed, the 
creation of a customary law threshold was the first step to overcoming the shortcomings 
of the previous instruments in terms of substantive law.77  
While the reformulation of the threshold through a customary law approach allowed the 
emancipation of substantive law, it also allowed the Court to develop a jurisprudence that 
would address those deficiencies in the instruments that were directly related to the 
setting of the threshold. These deficiencies related to a dilemma between a non-definition 
that attempted to leave the threshold low and flexible (common article 3) and a definition 
that, when agreement could be achieved on specific criteria, was set very high (Additional 
Protocol II). The ad hoc Tribunals, and primarily the ICTY, developed a jurisprudence 
that offered and analysed a wealth of factors, while forming a threshold that would 
guarantee a wide applicability of the substantive law developed. This will now be 
analysed.  
 
6.5. The development of the criteria by the ad hoc Tribunals 
 
6.5.1.  Introduction 
 
The 7DGLý threshold proved very influential. The ICTY Trial Chambers, bound by the 
precedent set by the Appeals Chamber, treated it as a starting point in every single case,78 
                                              
76 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), [1986] ICJ 
Reports 4, par. 178. 
77 See above section 6.4.1 above for the focus on custom. For a detailed analysis of areas of substantive law covered 
by 7DGLý and subsequent ICTY jurisprudence see S. Boelaert-6XRPLQHQ¶7KH<XJRVODYLD7ULEXQDODQGWKH&RPPRQ
&RUHRI+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZ$SSOLFDEOHWR$OO$UPHG&RQIOLFWV·Leiden Journal of International Law 619, 637 ff 
(Boelaert-Suominen). 
78 See, for example, Prosecutor v Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment, 25 June 1999, par. 43; Prosecutor v 
%ODJRMHYLýDQG-RNLýCase No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 17 January 2005, par. 536 (%JODJRMHYLý); 3URVHFXWRUY'HODOLý0XFLý
'HOLý/DQGæRþHOHELýL, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 16 November 1998, par. 183 (þHOHELýL; Prosecutor v Haradinaj, 
Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, 3 April 2008, par. 37 (Haradinaj); 3URVHFXWRU Y 0LORäHYLý, Case No. IT-02-54-T, 
Decision on Motion for Judgment on Acquittal, 16 June 2004, par. 16 (0LORäHYLý; 3URVHFXWRUY0DUWLý, Case No. IT-95-
11-T, Judgment, 12 June 2007, par. 41.  
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even where a finding for the existence of an armed conflict was not necessary.79 The 
definition was adopted in the same way by the other ad hoc Tribunals.80 These Tribunals, 
especially the ICTY, did not merely quote the formula followed by a finding.  They 
developed, systematised and interpreted the 7DGLý definition, providing a sophisticated 
understanding of the material facts that merit and justify the applicability of the legal 
regime. Indeed, and not surprisingly, this was the case when the controversy concerned 
the very existence of an armed conflict,81 rather than its nature as international or non-
international armed conflict.82  
The systematisation and development of criteria is based on the understanding that the 
existence or absence of an armed conflict is of an objective nature.83 This approach 
reverts back to that of the drafters of common article 3, and fits with the paradigm of 
vertical rules automatically applicable.84 However, it was not possible to provide absolute 
and inflexible criteria that would provide an exhaustive and cumulative check list to be 
completed by the assessor. This meant that the 7DGLý Chamber broke down the 7DGLý 
definition into two flexible criteria; organisation and intensity.85 These two criteria were 
then understood, interpreted and assessed through an illustrative set of indicative 
factors.86 The Trial Chambers showed consistency and thoroughness, referring widely to 
decisions of other Trial Chambers,87 as well as to these of other courts and tribunals,88 
                                              
79 In many cases the existence of an armed conflict was not disputed by the parties to the case. See, e.g, %ODJRMHYLý, 
par. 549. 
80 See Akayesu, par. 620; Prosecutor v Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, 6 December 1999, par. 92; 
Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, 20 June 2007, par. 243; Prosecutor v Fofana and 
Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, 2 August 2007, par. 124; Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon, and Gbao, Case No. 
SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, 2 March 2009, par. 95.  
81 This concerns primarily the cases relating to the conflict in Kosovo as well as the one case in FYROM. For 
example in þHOHELýL; Haradinaj; Prosecutor v Limaj, Bala and Musliu, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, 30 November 2005 
(Limaj); %RäNRVNL. 
82 This was the case with respect to the cases concerning the conflict(s) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
dominated the first years RIWKH,&7<·VZRUN 
83 See Limaj, par. 89; Akayesu, par. 624; Bagilishema, par. 101. 
84 Section 3.2.4. 
85 See 7DGLýTC, par. 562.  
86 These factors are often also referred to as criteria. This can be confusing but, it seems, not easily avoided. In any 
case, tKHDGMHFWLYH¶LQGLFDWLYH·KDVWKHHIIHFWRIVXEMXJDWLQJWKHVHIDFWRUVWRWKHWZRPDLQFULWHULD 
87 In one case a summary of the various findings and factors used in previous judgments preceded the detailed 
findings of the Trial Chamber. See Haradinaj, par. 41 ff. 
88 %RäNRVNL, par. 179-182. 
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and attempting to abstract an accurate understanding of the factors leading to a finding 
of armed conflict.89 
The analysis of the criteria of organisation and intensity in the jurisprudence of the 
Tribunals will now be discussed. It is noted, however, that organisation and intensity do 
show some degree of overlap in some cases, with the result that what is viewed as a 
factor pointing at the organisation of the party can be also viewed as a factor of intensity 
of the conflict. An example would be the use of heavy weaponry. While it points to the 
seriousness of the fighting and of the threat that the group poses to the government 
because of its organisational ability to use such weaponry, it also shows the organisational 
qualities of the group in training its fighters and operating such weaponry. Another 
example could be the existence of extended and effective military operations. While the 
mounting of such operations points to intensity, it also reflects the logistical and 
organisational capacity of the group. 
Finally, the elaboration of the criteria that constitute the threshold in custom aimed at 
GLVWLQJXLVKLQJDQ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·IURPVLWXDWLRQVWKDWDUHQRWDQ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·7KLVLV
distinct from the purpose of creating a new threshold for an armed conflict for the 
specific purposes of the ICTY or, indeed, international criminal law as distinct from 
international humanitarian law. 7KLVFDQEHVHHQLQWKH7ULDO&KDPEHU·VGLFWXPLQ7DGLý
that the  
 
test applied by the Appeals Chamber to the existence of an armed conflict for the 
purposes of the rules contained in Common Article 3 [is using WKHDERYH@´FORVHO\
UHODWHGµ FULWHULD VROely for the purpose, as a minimum, to distinguish an armed 
conflict from banditry, unorganised and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist 
activities, which are not subject to international humanitarian law.90  
 
Accordingly, the elaboration and refinement of the criteria as well as their grounding in 
custom should not be seen to create a threshold separate from that of common article 3. 
Rather, it is a move towards the clarification of the basic concept of non-international 
                                              
89 See, e.g., in ibid., par. 199-203. 
90 7DGLýTC, par. 562, quoting the ICRC Commentary. See also Limaj, par. 89. 
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armed conflict.91 In contrast, in some parts of its analysis the ICTR develops the criteria 
IRUWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI$GGLWLRQDO3URWRFRO,,ZKLFKUHIHUVWRWHUULWRULDOFRQWURO¶VXVWDLQHG
DQGFRQFHUWHGPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQV·DQGWKHDELOLW\WRLPSOHPHQWWKH3URWRFRO92 
 
6.5.2. Organisation 
 
The organisation necessary for the criterion to be satisfied seems to be relative to the 
capability and effectiveness in waging an armed conflict. While this level of organisation 
is presumed to exist in the case of a state army, a variety of indicative factors are resorted 
to in order to assess its existence in armed groups.93 The level of organisation is flexible, 
which is evident from SKUDVHVVXFKDV¶RUJDQLVHGWRDJUHDWHURUOHVVHUH[WHQW·94 RU¶VRPH
GHJUHHRIRUJDQLVDWLRQ·95 that have been used by the Tribunals.  
$ VHW RI IDFWRUV KDV EHHQ GHYHORSHG WR LOOXVWUDWH WKH GHJUHH QHFHVVDU\ 7KH ,&7<·V
approach in %RäNRVNL is illustrative of the methodical approach of the Trial Chambers. 
The Trial Chamber collected indicative factors for the existence of a requisite amount of 
organisation and split them into five groups: Those indicating the presence of a 
command structure;96 the ability of the group to carry out operations in an organised 
manner;97 factors indicating a level of logistics;98 a level of discipline and the ability to 
LPSOHPHQW´WKHEDVLFREOLJDWLRQVRI FRPPRQDUWLFOHµ99 and the ability to speak with 
one voice.100   
Indeed, one element of organisation is the existence of a system of authority,101 although 
the authority need not be civilian.102 The focus on the strictly military nature and function 
                                              
91 This important element is particularly relevant with respect to the situation as developed, and complicated, by the 
Rome Statute. See section 7.3. 
92 See Akayesu, par. 626.  
93 Haradinaj, par. 60. 
94 Akayesu, par. 620 ; Prosecutor v Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment-DQXDU\SDU¶JUHDWHURU
OHVVHUGHJUHH· 
95 %RäNRVNL, par. 196 and fn 785. 
96 Ibid., par. 199.  
97 Ibid., par. 200.  
98 Ibid., par. 201.  
99 Ibid., par. 202  
100 Ibid., par. 199-203. 
101 Ibid., par. 195. 
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of the authority differentiates this factor from criteria used in both the doctrine of 
belligerency103 and the case of wars of national liberation.104 In both these cases the 
political rather than just military character of the authority was taken into account. It has 
been argued in those sections that this reflected the influence of eventual statehood in the 
application of the legal regime and that it brought considerations of status problematically 
close to the process of application. In the elaboration of the criteria by the Tribunals, in 
contrast, the clear focus is on the military function of the authority.  
Nevertheless, this authority can play a dual role: It both commands and organises the 
struggle inside the group and it is able to present a unified identity outside of the group. 
Factors demonstrating the existence of such an authority include the ability to identify 
specific individuals as the leaders of a group which are recognised as such by all other 
members.105 Structures for governing, controlling, and leading the people, and the 
existence of areas under such authority, might point towards an element of stability and 
of consolidation of the structure of the group. More strictly, military elements such as the 
existence of operational headquarters,106 the operational dividing of the territory where 
combat is taking place107 and the ability to organise extensive military operations within 
the territory are relevant.108 This can also be indicated through the issuing of orders and 
communiqués.109 
A further illustrative factor of military organisation is the ability to unite disparate pockets 
of fighters into one unified group system. Indeed, a turning point in the identification of 
the existence of an armed conflict might be when outbreaks of violence emanating from 
a variety of individuals and local groups can be said to be orchestrated and led by a 
unifying centre.110  
                                                                                                                                            
102 0LORäHYLý, par. 34.  
103  See section 2.2.2.  
104  See section 5.3.2. 
105 But see Limaj, par. 131-2., where some statements by western officials to the effect that they knew nothing about 
./$·VVWUXFWXUHDQGFRXOGQRWILQGLQWHUORFXWRUVDUHFRXQWHUHGE\WKHDUJXment that this does not prove the non-
existence of organisation but the secrecy which was necessary since the KLA was an underground movement. 
106 See 0LORäHYLý, par. 23. 
107 Ibid.; Limaj, par. 95-6. 
108 3URVHFXWRUY+DOLORYLý, Case No. IT-01-48T, Judgment, 16 November 2006, par. 166 (+DOLORYLý). 
109 Haradinaj, par. 88; %RäNRVNL, par. 269; Limaj, par. 103. 
110 3URVHFXWRU Y 0LOXWLQRYLý HW DO, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment, 26 February 2009, vol. 1, par. 816 (0LOXWLQRYLý) 
Sociologically, but not necessarily in law, this can be seen to have parallels with the conception of the monopoly of 
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Organisational capability can also be expressed through the ability of the group to 
procure weapons,111 uniforms, and other elements necessary for the waging of the 
conflict and the military life of its fighters.112 The ability of the group to recruit,113 
equip,114 and train115 fighters is of significance for its dynamism as a contender in the area 
and the longevity of its struggle. Military discipline is another important factor. The 
existence of discipline will show that the group can be viable as a group and will not split 
into anarchic sub-groups.  
Furthermore, and importantly for the applicability of the legal regime, discipline also 
relates to the issuing of rules and regulations,116 in the training of the fighters to abide by 
these rules and regulations and in the ability of the group to enforce such rules.117 
Explicit proof of elaborate disciplinary and judicial procedures, however, does not seem 
to be required.118 In addition, according to one Trial Chamber, the organisational capacity 
in enforcing the rules seems only to be considered necessary in relation to the minimum 
humanitarian standards of common article 3.119 This has the advantage of avoiding 
piecemeal and complex evaluations of applicability of specific rules. It is also a 
manifestation of limited role of reciprocity even in its de facto form in the applicability of 
the regime. Although this reading can be challenged if the 7ULEXQDO·VH[SDQVLYHDSSURDFK
with respect to the applicable rules is taken into account.   
An important and controversial factor for organisation (and for intensity) is the control 
of territory. As a criterion sine qua non, this has been criticised as referring back to the 
concept of belligerency and reverting to a clearly status-based approach to the regulation 
of armed conflict.120 The Tribunals have been clear, and this is one of the most important 
                                                                                                                                            
YLROHQFHDVDGLVWLQJXLVKLQJIHDWXUHRIWKHVWDWH6HH0:HEHU¶3ROLWLFVDVD9RFDWLRQ·/HFWXUHDW0XQLFK8QLYHUVLW\
1918, available at http://media.pfeiffer.edu/lridener/dss/Weber/polvoc.html 
111 Haradinaj, par. 76 ff. 
111 Ibid., par. 76; 0LOXWLQRYLý par. 819 Indeed, the smuggling of weapons from Albania was necessary for the viability 
of the KLA. 
112 Financial support is also very important. See ibid. , par. 834. 
113 Haradinaj, par. 83 ff. 
114 Ibid., par. 76 ff. 
115 %RäNRVNL, par. 284; Limaj, par. 119-22. 
116 Ibid., par. 98. 
117 Ibid., par. 111-2. 
118 6HH66LYDNXPDUDQ¶,GHQWLI\LQJDQDUPHGFRQIOLFWQRWRIDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHU· LQ&6WDKQDQG*6OXLWHU
(eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Brill, 2008), 363, 368 (Sivakumaran). See also %RäNRVNL, 
par. 274 ILQGLQJ´DEDVLFV\VWHPRIGLVFLSOLQHZLWKLQWKH1/$WKDWDOORZHGLWWRIXQFWLRQZLWKVRPHHIIHFWLYHQHVVµ 
119 Ibid., par. 196, referring to the ICRC Commentary, and par. 202. 
120 See, in the context of Additional Protocol II, section 5.4.3. 
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clarifications of this process, that it is not a necessary criterion for the applicability of the 
jus in bello and international criminal law.121 This suggests a move away from state-like 
characteristics. Nevertheless, it is telling that in almost every case a certain element of 
territorial control, however fleeting or subject to the ebb and flow of guerrilla 
operations,122 has been found to exist.123 The consolidation of authority over an area 
seems to be very closely linked to the ability of the group to wage an organised struggle.  
Accordingly, territorial control survives in the current discussion but with two important 
differences. The first is that it is only an indicative factor and not a criterion sine qua non, 
as in the threshold of Additional Protocol II. The second is that territorial control is 
understood as more flexible and relative to that of the state. Accordingly, territorial 
control, as an indicative factor, can consist of ebbs and flows and not a clearly defined 
area stably and consistently controlled by the group.124 Moreover, such control exists to 
the extent that the ability of the government to operate in the given area is curtailed.125 
Even if the fighters are not able to set and maintain stable headquarters in a specific place 
the fact that the area is not easily used by the government signifies their ability to operate 
in it.126  
Finally, as hinted at above, another indication of the necessary level of organisational and 
command structure is the extent to which the group speaks with one voice both within 
the conflict and internationally.127 This is linked to the political status of the group. The 
ability of international actors who might mediate in the conflict to identify the apex of 
the organisational structure and deal effectively with the group can indicate that the 
group has achieved the de facto standing to be a party to an armed conflict. It is evident 
that such a factor directly relates to the de facto if not de jure legitimisation of the actor; the 
sufficient degree of respect that allows the group to be an interlocutor in an international 
                                              
121 See 0LORäHYLý, par. 36. 
122 0LOXWLQRYLý, par. 827. 
123 +DOLORYLý, par. 162; 0LOXWLQRYLý, par. 801; 0LORäHYLý, par. 37; %RäNRVNL, par. 242; Limaj, par. 158. 
124 %RäNRVNL SDU  ´7KH RYHUDOO SLFWXUH LV RI DQ LQFUHDVLQJ 1/$ HIIHFWLYHQess at loosening the control of the 
FYROM government and its forces over what had become more obviously defined geographic areas, mainly in the 
north-ZHVWRIWKHFRXQWU\µ 
125 Akayesu, par. 626. 
126 0LOXWLQRYLý, par. 795; Haradinaj, par. 73. 
127 Ibid., par. 60; %RäNRVNL, par. 203.  
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conversation because of its effectiveness in using violence.128 It is important to stress the 
indicative nature of the factor and the fact that it is merely a reflection of its military 
organisation.  
In conclusion, the indicative factors that are used for assessing the criterion of 
organisation point to the emergence of an actor within the territorial entity that is 
developing structures and capacities that are militarily challenging those of the state. 
Factors related to the organisation of the group are not unrelated to connotations of 
status: The existence of a unified authority, the control of territory, or the participation in 
international negotiations, can be understood pointing to the capability of the group to 
achieve its political and military goals and further its collective status. Indeed, it would be 
impossible to completely avoid such connotations as they reflect the fact that the 
application of the law will be the result of collective entities fighting for such status.  
1HYHUWKHOHVV LQ WKH 7ULEXQDOV· Murisprudence these factors are related strictly to the 
applicability of the law. The focus is on military rather than political organisation. Moreover, 
the necessary level of organisation is rather low, while its assessment is flexible and can be 
satisfied through the use of indicative factors, rather than more or less strict and 
extensive requirements, as is the case in Additional Protocol II. This mitigates the role of 
political status and, significantly, its conflation with a legal status lato sensu. It will be 
sufficient that there is a distinctive group, more or less organised, and that poses a 
military challenge to the government. Ultimately, both the low level of organisation 
necessary and its military focus shift the focus from the actor as a status-bearing entity, 
and place it on the situation of the conflict. The centrality of the situation, rather than 
actor, is significant in moving away from status as a central rationale for applicability. The 
necessary attributes of the situation are then specified through the criterion of intensity. 
 
6.5.3.  Intensity 
 
                                              
128 See Limaj SDU  IRU WKH FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW ´E\ -XO\  WKH ./$ KDG EHFRPH DFFHSWHG E\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDQGZLWKLQ.RVRYRDVDNH\SDUW\LQYROYHGLQSROLWLFDOQHJRWLDWLRQVWRUHVROYHWKH.RVRYRFULVLVµ 
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The criterion of intensity refers less directly to the qualities of the group qua group and 
more to the situation that has been developed, partly, of course, due to these qualities. If 
the criterion of organisation refers to the organisational ability of the group to militarily 
challenge the authority of the state in the territorial unit, the intensity of the conflict looks 
at the effects of that challenge. It is these effects that necessitate the applicability of a 
specific set of rules. The basic question then is whether the situation on the ground, the 
social situation within the territorial unit justifies the application of the jus in bello and 
international criminal law. To put it differently, the question is whether society is 
sufficiently affected, so that the jus in bello is the most appropriate regime to apply for the 
protection of individuals.129 
Initially, it can be said that confusion has arisen with respect to the relation between the 
ZRUGV¶SURWUDFWHG·DQG¶LQWHQVLW\·While the 7DGLý $SSHDOV&KDPEHUVSRNHRI¶SURWUDFWHG
DUPHGYLROHQFH·WKLVZDVWUDQVODWHGDV¶LQWHQVLW\·RQFHWKHFDVHUHYHUWHGEDFNWRWKH7ULDO
Chamber to apply the definition to the facts.130 Ever since then the vast majority of Trial 
Chambers have taken the organisation/intensity pair as the starting point of their 
analysis.131 7KLV WKURZV LQWR GRXEW WKH VWDWXV RI WKH WHUP ¶SURWUDFWHG· ,W LV QRW FOHDU
whether it is a criterion sine qua non, like organisation and intensity, or whether it is 
another indicative factor that demonstrates the intensity of the conflict. It is also unclear 
whether the duration of factual circumstances that call for the application of the jus in 
bello for the purposes of the Tribunals is to be considered. Moreover, it is not obvious 
what the extent of any such duration would have to be. 
It seems that an element of duration is generally necessary. One example to the contrary 
is to be found outside the context of the ad hoc Tribunals, in the jurisprudence of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. In the Abella FDVH D VLQJOH ¶EDWWOH· WKDW
lasted for only a few hours was considered to be an armed conflict the Commission.132 
                                              
129 Not that the jus in bello is always and exclusively applied for that reason. However, this rationale for application is 
arguably at the centre of the judicial assessment of the applicability of the jus in bello through international criminal 
law.  
130 7DGLýTC, par. 562. 
131 See, e.g., Haradinaj, par. 40. 
132 Juan Carlos Abella, Case 11.137, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 18 November 1997, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, Doc. 6 rev, 13 April 1998, par. 152. 
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This decision has been rightly criticised.133 It is not by chance that in every conflict 
discussed by the Tribunals, particularly the conflicts in Kosovo and FYROM, the 
duration was measured in months.134 Furthermore, these situations manifested a gradual 
process of development of the social situation into an armed conflict.135 This may reflect 
the differences between inter-state and intra-state conflict. The process of the 
organisation of violence is more gradual. If one refers to the concept of the militarization 
of a certain territorial unit, even if actual conflict occurs in pockets of it, then it is difficult 
to see how a conflict could exist in a few hours.  
On the other hand, a scenario in which a group is clandestinely organised and suddenly 
unleashes wide-scale military attacks and is immediately engaged with by the armed forces 
could be seen as meeting the necessary intensity, if with very little duration. Alternatively, 
it is possible for a non-state armed group to cross a border with similar results. 136 
It is important to note that even if it was accepted that duration is necessary and not just 
indicative, duration refers to the violence rather than the conflict in general. Accordingly, 
once protracted armed violence has reached the intensity of an armed conflict there need 
not be a protracted armed conflict to activate the legal regime. In that sense, the duration 
here should be distinguished from the implicit use of duration seen in the application of 
common article 3. In that case, it served more as a period for the government to accept 
that it had little to lose with respect to status by accepting the applicability of common 
article 3.137 In that sense, while duration of the violence will contain the necessary process 
for the intensification of such violence and the military organisation of the group, 
duration of the conflict can be used to link the applicability of the law to questions of 
status. 
                                              
133 L. Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
138. 
134 See for example 3URVHFXWRUY.RUGLýDQGþHUNH]Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, 17 December 2004, par. 341. 
Arguably, the shortest duration of violence before the determination of the existence of an armed conflict in the 
7ULEXQDOV·MXULVSUXGHQFHLVWKHFDVHRI)<520ZKLFKZDVOHVVWKDQWZRPRQWKVSee %RäNRVNL, par. 287 ff. 
135 See, e.g., %RäNRVNL, par. 288. 
136 See Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) on the Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber 
II, ICC-01/05-01/08, 15 June 2009, par. 247 ff. (Bemba), where the ICC seems to find the existence of an armed 
conflict at the date when the non-state armed group in question enters the territory of the Central African Republic. 
,WJRHVRQKRZHYHUWRUHTXLUHWKHH[LVWHQFHRID ¶SURWUDFWHGDUPHGFRQIOLFW·6HHVHFWLRQ4.1. See also ICJ, Case 
Concerning Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda), 19 December 2005. 
137 See for the examples of Algeria and Nigeria, section 3.4.3. 
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Accordingly, duration of the violence should be understood as a usually necessary factor 
leading to the necessary intensity for there to be an armed conflict.138 The interplay 
between the concepts of intensity and duration are found LQWKH7ULDO&KDPEHUV·DQDO\VLV
Indeed, the gradual intensification of hostilities, the frequency of incidents and the 
gradual spread of the fighting in the territorial unit, beyond isolated pockets, are 
frequently taken as indicative factors.139 The fighting can be of guerrilla nature, with ebbs 
and flows, even periods of relative calm, as long as there is fighting and a degree of 
effectiveness. Moreover, the magnitude of military operations, the weapons used,140 and, 
importantly, the destruction caused, particularly the effects of the fighting on the civilian 
SRSXODWLRQDUHLPSRUWDQWIDFWRUV7KHODWWHULVDIDFWRUXVHGTXLWHRIWHQLQWKH7ULEXQDOV·
case law.141 This relates to the rationale for the applicability of the legal regime. The 
government is militarily challenged by the non-state armed group to the extent that 
society is affected and civilians suffer. This is central to the activation of the legal regime.  
Accordingly, the above factors lead to the understandable perception that the society is 
militarized and at war. At times, this can be clearly implied, or even explicit, in the acts of 
the government. The use of the army, general mobilisation,142 and the use of military laws 
or decrees143 might indicate that the government, for all practical purposes, considers 
itself at war. This is an interesting parallel with the situation in the doctrine of 
belligerency, the difference being that the legal characterisation of the situation does not 
depend on a declaration by either the government or third state. It also does not depend 
on actions, statements, and decisions by international organisations144 or other 
international actors,145 though they too can be a helpful indication. Ultimately, the legal 
assessment is of a factual situation, declarative of the application of the legal regime. 
                                              
138 As put by the Trial Chamber in Haradinaj, par.49, ´7KHFULWHULRQRISURWUDFWHGDUPHGYLROHQFHKDVWKHUHIRUHEHHQ
interpreted in practice, including by the 7DGLý Trial Chamber itself, as referring more to the intensity of the armed 
YLROHQFHWKDQWRLWVGXUDWLRQµ 
139 Limaj, par. 168; %RäNRVNL, par. 214. 
140 E.g. ibid., par. 220. 
141 Ibid., par. 181 and 213.; Haradinaj, par. 94-99. Limaj, par. 134 and 171-3. 
142 See e.g. 0LOXWLQRYLý, par. 808. 
143 %RäNRVNL, par. 246. 
144 Ibid., par. 192; Akayesu, par. 621. For contrast see the role that international organisation had in the decision for 
the applicability of article 1(4) at section 4.5.1. 
145 %RäNRVNL, par. 216, for the ICRC evacuating civilians. 
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In conclusion, for the assessment of the existence of this criterion the Tribunals adopted 
a flexible approach, through the use of indicative factors. While the level of the hostilities 
needs to reach the necessary intensity to pose a military threat to the government and to 
affect individuals, there is no need for full mobilisation or a regular army. In this case, the 
criterion of intensity refers to the situation in the territorial unit. The situation has been 
brought about partly due to the organisational qualities of the group. This might suggest a 
link to the status-based rationale. On the other hand, the situation also affects individuals 
and it is this that necessitates the activation of the protective qualities of the jus in bello 
and international criminal law. This shows that there is no necessary relation with the 
status-based rationale. In the jurisprudence of the Tribunals, the qualities of the actor are 
partly subjugated to the reality of the situation. Even though the conflict is, to some 
extent, made by the actor, it is the conflict and not the actor that is the primary measure. 
This is because the rationale behind the applicability of the legal regime, both jus in bello 
and international criminal law, is the individual and her protection.  
  
6.6. Conclusion 
 
The development of the regime of international criminal law and its application by the ad 
hoc Tribunals have accentuated and developed the humanitarian-protection rationale so 
that it is at the centre of the law of armed conflict. International criminal law shifts the 
focus from a relationship between status-bearing entities to that between an individual 
perpetrator and the victims of his acts. It is activated when there is a violation of the law 
of armed conflict that is serious in the values it harms and the consequences it has. 
Values of a humanitarian nature and consequences on individuals are central to this 
rationale.  
This legal regime was applied by ad hoc Tribunals, the most important of which, in this 
context, is the ICTY. In 7DGLý, the Tribunal provided a minimal and flexible definition 
that helped clarify the basic threshold for the existence of an armed conflict. While this 
GHILQLWLRQFODULILHGWKHFRQFHSWRI¶QRQ-LQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQIOLFW·RIFRPPRQDUWLFOH
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it did so on the level of custom. This allowed the Court to develop significantly the 
substantive legal regime applicable.  
Moreover, the definition was consolidated, elucidated and refined by the further work of 
the Tribunals, again, primarily the ICTY. The two criteria of organisation and intensity, 
present since the beginning of the debate, were elucidated in detail while retaining an 
element of flexibility through the use of indicative factors. The degree of organisation is 
flexible and is focused on its military aspect. It is an organisation capable of militarily 
challenging the government rather than becoming a state. Territorial control is only 
useful as an indicative factor and not understood as a necessary proto-state quality. Thus, 
the status connotations of factors of organisation are tempered and these factors are 
interpreted strictly with respect to the applicability of the law.  
At the same time, the focus shifted from the entity to the situation and the intensity of 
the violence. Such violence, which might need a minimum of duration to intensify, has as 
a consequence the military challenge posed to the government and the effects that this 
situation has on individuals. This necessitates the activation of the regime. 
The quality of the clarification of the relevant criteria, the flexibility of their application 
and the fact that the threshold is set low, with a wide spectrum of applicability, further 
the humanitarian protection rationale in both the law of armed conflict and international 
criminal law. 
Nevertheless, the factors used to determine the necessary level of organisation and the 
intensity of the conflict carry traces of their provenance in the status-based paradigm that 
focuses on the construction of an actor. To a certain extent this is inevitable as this actor 
is the one that is effective into rallying people for the exercise of collective violence. The 
struggle for collective status is always a part of the conflict and the law cannot fully 
insulate itself, even when the primary rationale is protective. Accordingly, while the ad hoc 
Tribunals have managed to formulate and use the criteria in a manner consistent with an 
individual-protection rationale, the tension between the status-based and the 
humanitarian-protection paradigms can still be detected. The consolidation and 
refinement of the law is something that a permanent judicial institution can perhaps 
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contribute to, even more than ad hoc ones. Accordingly, the next chapter will look at the 
role of the International Criminal Court.  
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7. Chapter 7: The International Criminal Court 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
The analysis of the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals showed that the development of 
international criminal law and its application through judicial institutions led to significant 
progress with respect to the development of the legal regime for conflicts involving non-
state armed groups. The existence of judicial institutions helped to transcend or moderate 
the effects of the status-based rationale that had influenced the legal regime. Through the 
TribunaOV·MXULVSUXGHQFHDQGHVSHFLDOO\WKDWRIWKH,&7<WKHUHZDVDVLJQLILFDQWHURVLRQ
of the paradigm of a status-based rationale in the determination of the threshold, the 
process of its application, and the extent of the legal regime extended. A humanitarian-
protection rationale is accentuated by the legal regime of international criminal law and 
ZDVFHQWUDOLQWKH,&7<·VDSSURDFKRQDYDULHW\RILVVXHV7KHVHLQFOXGHGWKHIRUPXODWLRQ
RIWKHWKUHVKROGRIDSSOLFDELOLW\7KH7ULDO&KDPEHUV·DQDO\VHVFODULILHG the concept of a 
non-international armed conflict first introduced through common article 3. The 
threshold defined through a minimum of organisation and intensity, assessed through a 
set of flexible indicative factors. The result was a low, clear, and flexible threshold, largely 
informed by a humanitarian-protection rationale for wide applicability.  
At the same time, elements of a status-based paradigm survive in the criteria and 
indicative factors used in the jurisprudence of the Tribunals. It was argued1 that this 
could not be avoided, as the actors involved in such conflicts were collective entities 
using force to achieve some form of political status. The tension is unavoidable and a 
careful and skilful balancing approach is necessary for an individual-protection based 
application. As the creation of a permanent international criminal court can be seen, 
historically and conceptually, as the evolution and culmination of the process of 
institutionalisation of the international criminal law regime, it is important to consider 
how the ICC might approach this tension.  
                                              
1 See section 6.6. 
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A prominent claim of this thesis is that the threshold for the applicability of the jus in bello 
and the contents of the substantive law extended depend on the nature of the forum 
where the rules are created and the forum where they are applied.2 In this context, a 
difference between the ICC and the ad hoc Tribunals should be mentioned: Negotiations 
among states rather than Security Council action led to its creation. We have already seen, 
in the case of the conferences drafting the Geneva Conventions and the Additional 
Protocols,3 how negotiations between states can refer to and perpetuate certain 
conceptual stances, very much affected by a sovereignty- and status-based approach.  
Furthermore, the actors that participated in the negotiations would be potentially subject 
to the jurisdiction of the institution they were creating. Cryer has distinguished between 
WKH SURFHVV RI FUHDWLRQ RI D ¶VDIH WULEXQDO· ´ZKLFK LV QRW OLNHO\ WR H[HUFLVH MXULVGLFWion 
RYHUWKHFUHDWLQJ6WDWHVµDQGDQ¶XQVDIHWULEXQDO·ZKLFKPLJKWH[HUFLVHVXFKMXULVGLFWLRQ
´'LIIHUHQW FRQVLGHUDWLRQV DSSO\ LQ HDFK VLWXDWLRQ ZLWK WKH QDUURZHVW IRUPV RI WKH
UHOHYDQW ODZ WHQGLQJ WREH FUHDWHG LQ WKH ODVWRI WKHVH VLWXDWLRQVµ4 The creation of the 
ICC is very different from the creation of the ad hoc Tribunals, where the existence of an 
armed conflict was a fact of common knowledge of such potency as to mobilise 
international actors. While the ad hoc Tribunals were created to deal with concrete 
situations of conflict already taking place,5 the ICC was created in abstracto and for 
situations arising in the future.6 Its activities would not necessarily be dependent on the 
prior existence of sufficient international political agreement.  
This chapter will look at how the characteristics of the process of creation of the ICC 
have influenced the threshold of applicability in the Statute, and how this threshold has 
been applied in practice. It will consist of four parts. The first part will be a discussion of 
the travaux préparatoires of the ICC Statute. After a brief summary of the process of 
creation of the Court, the language of the delegates will be looked at more closely. This 
                                              
2 See e.g. section 6.1. 
3 See sections 3.2.3, 4.3.2, and 5.2.3. 
4 &U\HU¶'RFWULQDO·, 119.  
5 An exception to this would be the conflicts in Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with 
which the ICTY eventually became concerned. 
6 6HH DUWLFOH  RI WKH 5RPH 6WDWXWH VWLSXODWLQJ WKDW ´ The Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes 
committed after the entry into force of this Statute. 2. If a State becomes a Party to this Statute after its entry into 
force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this 
6WDWXWHIRUWKDW6WDWHµ7KH6WDWXWHFDPHLQWRIRUFHRQ-XO\ 
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ZLOOKHOSGLVFHUQVWDWHV·DSSURDFKHVWRWKHLQFOXVLRQRIQRQ-international armed conflicts 
in the Statute, as well as clarify the new threshold for such conflicts. The second part will 
look at the threshold itself. The third part will turn to the analysis of the jurisprudence of 
the Court so far, enquiring how the Court fares in the interpretation and application of 
the threshold. The analysis in these sections will help build an understanding how the 
creation and jurisprudence of the Court, particularly in setting a threshold, fit in the 
gradual emphasis towards a humanitarian-protection regime, where there is a clear, low 
and flexible threshold of applicability. The chapter will then conclude with a look at how 
the developments in international criminal law can be linked to the jus in bello. 
 
7.2. The making of the Rome Statute 
 
7.2.1. The general process of creation of the International Criminal Court 
 
The post-World War II efforts7 to establish either a Draft Code of Crimes or a 
permanent judicial institution were frustrated by the realities of the Cold War.8 With the 
end of the latter the UN General Assembly once more requested the International Law 
Commission (ILC) ´WR DGGUHVV WKH TXHVWLRQ RI HVWDEOLVKLQJ DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO FULPLQDO
FRXUWµ9 The ILC adopted a Draft Statute in 1994.10 This process coincided with that of 
the creation of the ad hoc 7ULEXQDOV E\ WKH 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO DQG WKH ODWWHU·V ZRUN
contributed to the preparation of both state and public opinion for a permanent 
institution for the prosecution of core crimes.11 The ILC Draft was sent back to the 
General Assembly, which created the 1995 ad hoc Committee and, eventually, the 1996 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
                                              
7 6HH JHQHUDOO\ $ &DVVHVH ¶)URP 1XUHPEHUJ WR 5RPH ,QWernational Military Tribunals to the International 
&ULPLQDO &RXUW· in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2002), 3 (Cassese¶1XUHPEHUJ·). 
8 Ibid., 10. 
9 UN GA Res. 44/39 (1989). 
10 Report of the International Law Commission on its Forty-Sixth Session, Draft Statute for an International 
Criminal Court, 2 May²22 July, 1994, General Assembly, 49th Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/49/10) 1994 (ILC 
Report). See -&UDZIRUG ¶7KH:RUNRI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ&RPPLVVLRQ· in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J. Jones 
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2002), 23. 
11 See Cassese ¶1XUHPEHUJ·, 16. 
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(PrepCom).12 The latter submitted a Draft Statute at the Diplomatic Conference, which 
was held in Rome between 15 June and 17 July 1998. 
The main organs of the Conference were the Plenary, the Committee of the Whole and 
the Drafting Committee.13 The Plenary dealt with organisation, general political 
statements and the final adoption of the Statute. The development of the Statute was the 
responsibility of the Committee of the Whole, which debated the articles and then 
delegated them to working groups or sub-committees.14 When approved by the 
Committee of the Whole, articles were sent to the Drafting Committee to be refined and 
then were, again, approved by the Committee of the Whole. On the final day of the 
Conference, the final report of the Committee of the Whole, with the full draft of the 
Statute, was sent to the Plenary and approved.15 
 
7.2.2. A summary of the process and the main issues 
 
In the ILC Report on a future international criminal court, war crimes in non-
international armed conflicts were not included.16  This was the case, as discussed 
above,17 because the customary status of the criminal nature of such violations was at the 
time still disputed and, therefore, such an inclusion could jeopardise the success of the 
project. The opposition of many states to the very inclusion of war crimes committed in 
non-international armed conflicts was also evident in the report submitted by the 
Preparatory Committee in 1996.18 It is perhaps a tribute to the influence of the 
                                              
12 See A. %RV ¶)URP WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ&RPPLVVLRQ WR WKH5RPH&RQIHUHQFH -· in A. Cassese, P. 
Gaeta and J. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary vol. 1 (Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 35. 
13 See P. Kirsch and - +ROPHV ¶7KH 5RPH &RQIHUHQFH RQ DQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO &RXUW 7KH 1HJRWLDWLQJ
3URFHVV·American Journal of International Law 2, especially at 3 (Kirsch and Holmes). 
14 The Committee of the Whole was headed by a Bureau, which consisted of the representatives of Canada, 
Argentina, Romania, Lesotho, and Japan. 
15 .LUVFKDQG+ROPHV)RUWKHILQDOGD\VVHHDOVR$&XOOHQ¶7KH'HILQLWLRQRI1RQ-International Armed Conflict 
in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: An Analysis of the Threshold of Application Contained in 
$UWLFOHI·Journal of Conflict and Security Law 419, 434 (Cullen). 
16 See ILC Report.  
17 See section 6.4.1. 
18 See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court; General 
Assembly, 50th Session, Supplement No. 22 (A/50/22) 1995, par. 74. See also Cullen , 420 ff, for more on the 
development of the issue prior to the Rome Conference.  
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jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals that this position changed and the draft submitted 
for consideration to the Rome Conference by the Preparatory Committee included such 
crimes.19  
These were divided in sections C and D of article 8,20 ZKLFK SURYLGHG IRU WKH&RXUW·V
jurisdiction on war crimes. While the substantive crimes covered by sections C and D 
were taken from common article 3 and Additional Protocol II respectively,21 they were 
XQGHU D FRPPRQ FKDSHDX ZKLFK GHILQHG ¶DUPHG FRQIOLFW· RQO\ QHJDWLYHO\ DV H[FOXGLQJ
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, as per article 1(2) Additional Protocol II. 
The draft further provided the delegates with five options on these sections. Whilst the 
ILUVW WZR RSWLRQV FRQFHUQHG WKH UROH WKDW ´D SODQ RU SROLF\µ LQ WKH FRPPLVVLRQ RI WKH
crimes would have for the jurisdiction of the court,22 the fourth and fifth concerned the 
deletion of section D or both C and D respectively. Only the third option addressed 
directly the threshold, by suggesting the deletion of the chapeau. No option was provided 
for the addition of criteria and the setting of the threshold higher than the existence of an 
armed conflict. This state of affairs would survive until the last week or so of the Rome 
Conference23 when the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, Philippe Kirsch, asked 
WKHGHOHJDWHV WRRIIHUFRPPHQWVRQDPRQJRWKHU LVVXHV ´WKHQHHGIRUD WKUHVKROG IRU
ZDUFULPHVµ24   
                                              
19 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Draft Statute and 
Draft Final Act, A/Conf.183/2/Add.1, 18 April 1998. This did not mean, however, that divisions were overcome 
and the delegates at Rome were conscious of this. See, for example, the delegate for the Netherlands, at 
A/CONF.1&65 SDU  SRLQWLQJRXW WKDW ´>D@V WR ZKHWKHU VHFWLRQV& DQG' VKRXOGEH LQFOXGHG DW DOO
PRVWEXWQRWDOOGHOHJDWLRQVLQWKH3UHSDUDWRU\&RPPLWWHHKDGIDYRXUHGWKHLULQFOXVLRQµ 
20 The text of the chapeaus of sections C and D is as follows:  
C. In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of article 3 common to the 
four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts... 
D. Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, 
within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts... 
See, Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, Part 2: Jurisdiction, A/AC.249/1998/CRP.8, 2 April 1998. 
21 Although, in the case of section D, not exclusively.  
22 This is relevant for our discussion only insofar as, as discussed above, the very existence of an armed conflict is 
sufficient for triggering the legal regime, rather than the added criteria in the cases of crimes against humanity and 
genocide. 
23 Although some delegates expressed unease with the lack of definition. See Turkey, at A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.5, 
par. 107. 
24 A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25, par. 2. Kirsch was referring to a discussion paper prepared by the Bureau of the 
Committee of the Whole. See A/CONF.183/C.1/L.53.  
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0DQ\ GHOHJDWHV· FRPPents recalled some of the spectres that had haunted the 
Conferences of 1949 and 1974-725 and led to a proposal by the Bureau of the Committee 
of the Whole evoking, for section D, the higher threshold of Additional Protocol II: 
 
Section D of this article applies to armed conflicts not of an international character 
and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances or tensions, such as 
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies 
to armed conflicts that take place in a territory of a State Party between its armed 
forces and dissident armed forces or other organised armed groups which, under 
responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable 
them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations.26 
 
The limitations of the provision, because of the forbiddingly high threshold, were 
obvious to many delegates. Sierra Leone, a state facing a non-international armed conflict 
at the time, acted against this danger, by offering a counter-proposal on the threshold for 
section D which was eventually adopted, leading to the final formulation of what is now 
article 8 of the Statute. Thus, article 8 provides: 
 
)RUWKHSXUSRVHRIWKLV6WDWXWH¶ZDUFULPHV·PHDQV 
(c) In case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious 
violations of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
QDPHO\>«@ 
(d) Paragraph 2(c) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and 
thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as 
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. 
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts 
not of an international character, within the established framework of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZQDPHO\>«@ 
(f) Paragraph 2(e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and 
thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as 
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It 
applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there 
                                              
25 Such comments will be discussed in more detail below. 
26 A/CONF.183/C.1/L.59. 
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is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organised 
armed groups or between such groups.27 
 
In the following there will be first an exposition and analysis of the stance that the 
delegates held and the language they used with respect to the main issues at stake in the 
regulation of non-international armed conflicts. Then, turning to the text of article 8, the 
travaux will still be helpful, in tackling the question of whether there are two separate 
thresholds.  
 
7.2.3. Sovereign talk: An analysis of the travaux préparatoires   
 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, the extension of the applicability of the jus in 
bello to non-international armed conflicts has always been one of the most controversial 
issues in diplomatic conferences, evoking sovereignty- and status-based concerns.28 The 
Rome Conference was no exception. The criminalisation of violations of the jus in bello in 
non-international armed conflicts was one of the more contentious issues in the Rome 
Conference.29 The controversy extended well beyond the issues of threshold and even 
questioned the propriety of an international court adjudicating acts committed in such 
conflicts. Before the delegates were asked to express their position with respect to a 
threshold, they had the opportunity to position themselves in relation to the very 
inclusion of war crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts in the Statute. 
7KHGHOHJDWHV·SRVLWLRQRQWKHWRSLFUDQJHGIURPZKROH-hearted support for the inclusion 
of all the rules contained in sections C and D, to a readiness to accept only those in 
section C which reflected common article 3 and considered of a customary nature, to 
GRZQULJKW RSSRVLWLRQ WR WKH H[WHQVLRQ RI WKH &RXUW·V MXULVGLFWLRQ WR QRQ-international 
armed conflicts.  
                                              
27 As of May 2010 there have been 111 states that have ratified the Statute. See http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/.   
28 See Sections 3.2.2. and 4.3.2.  
29 .LUVFK DQG +ROPHV  7 *UDGLW]N\ ¶:DU &ULPH ,VVXHV %HIRUH WKH 5RPH 'LSORPDWLF &RQIHUHQFH 2Q WKH
Establishment of an InternationaO&ULPLQDO&RXUW·UC Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 199, 208; E. 
/D+D\H¶9LRODWLRQVRI&RPPRQ$UWLFOH·LQ5/HHHGThe International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence (Transnational Publishers, 2000), 207, 207; Sivakumaran, 363. 
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Nevertheless, the inclusion of non-international armed conflicts was supported by a clear 
majority of states.30 The extension of the jurisdiction of the Court to such conflicts was 
seen as central to the function of international criminal institutions; a term repeatedly 
XVHGE\SURSRQHQWVZDVWKHDGMHFWLYH¶HVVHQWLDO·31 6WDWHVLQIDYRXUPLJKWKDYH´DWWDFKHG
JUHDW LPSRUWDQFHµ32 to this extension of jurisdiction because of the fact that non-
international armed conflicts have grown to constitute the majority of conflicts in the 
world.33 This directly affected the relevance34 of the Court in the contemporary 
circumstances and the credibility35 that it would have as a judicial institution, in order to 
deter the commission of crimes and end impunity. Moreover, it can be argued, from the 
SURPLQHQFHRI WKHDGMHFWLYH ¶HVVHQWLDO· WKDW WKHYHU\HVVHQFHRI WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDOSURMHFW
was not unrelated to transcending sovereignty-based obstacles. If its jurisdiction were to 
be hampered at this early stage with the exclusion of non-international armed conflicts, 
WKH&RXUW·V´UDLVRQG·rWUHµ36 DQG´LQWHJULW\DQGUDWLRQDOHµ37 would suffer. 
Not all states were in favour, of course. A significant minority was opposed to the 
inclusion of non-international armed conflicts in the Statute to a greater or lesser extent. 
                                              
30 In response to a question by the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole on the inclusion of non-international 
armed conflicts in the Statute 73 states were reported to be in favour as opposed to only 16 against. See D. Momtaz, 
¶:DU&ULPHVLQ1RQ-,QWHUQDWLRQDO$UPHG&RQIOLFWVXQGHUWKH6WDWXWHRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUW·
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 177, 179 fn 14, quoting Terra Viva, Nr. 21, Rome 13 July 1998. 
31 See A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25, par. 52 (Norway); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25 par. 62 (Trinidad and Tobago); 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25, par. 68 (UK); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25, par. 71 (Germany); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25 
par. 78 (Australia); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25 par. 80 (Senegal); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, par. 69 (Italy); 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, par. 111 (Netherlands); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.27, par. 34 (Israel); 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.27, par. 49 (Denmark); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, par. 67 (Canada). See also 
A/CONF.183/C.1/L.53 for the use of the term by the ICRC. See also A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, par. 107 (Ireland), 
DUJXLQJWKDWWKHLQFOXVLRQZDV´IXQGDPHQWDOµ 
32 As was avowed by Italy. See A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.5, par. 64. Guinea-%LVVDX YLHZHG WKH PDWWHU DV RI ´SULPH
LPSRUWDQFHµ6HH$&21)&65SDU0DQ\RWKHU VWDWHV´VWURQJO\IDYRXUHGµRU´VWURQJO\VXSSRUWHGµ
the inclusion of non-international armed conflicts. See A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25, par. 55 (Sierra Leone); 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25, par. 76 (Croatia); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, par. 44 (Lithuania); 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, par. 116 (Georgia); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.27, par. 17 (Finland); 
$&21)&65SDU %RVQLD DQG+HU]HJRYLQD6ORYHQLD WKRXJKW WKH LQFOXVLRQZDV´QHFHVVDU\µ6HH
$&21)&65 SDU  2WKHUV YLHZHG D IDLOXUH WR GR VR DV ´XQDFFHSWDEOHµ 6ee 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, 38 (Lichtenstein); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25, par. 19 (New Zealand); The Austrian 
GHOHJDWHYLHZHGWKHPDWWHUDV´DVLQHTXDQRQIRUKLVGHOHJDWLRQµ6HH$&21)&65SDU 
33 A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4, par. 72 (Denmark); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25, par. 10 (South Africa speaking for 
SADC) ; A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25, par. 76 (Croatia); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, par. 66 (Mali); 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, par. 131 (Slovakia); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.27, par. 27 (Hungary); 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.28, par. 4 (Ethiopia). 
34 A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4, par. 72 (Denmark); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4, par. 74 (Sweden); 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, par. 123 (Greece). 
35 A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26 (Togo). 
36 A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, par. 54 (Republic of Korea).  
37 A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, par. 97 (US). 
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$PRQJWKHVHZHUHVWDWHVZKLFKDUJXHGWKDW´DVDPDWWHURISULQFLSOHµ38 the Court should 
have no jurisdiction over war crimes committed in such conflicts.39 These states adopted 
an approach based on a traditional and rigid concept of sovereignty.40 Often, and 
interestingly, the inclusion of such crimes in the Statute was viewed as interference in the 
internal affairs of the state, in contravention with the guarantees provided in common 
article 3 and Additional Protocol II.41 Others viewed any such inclusion as against the 
principle of complementarity.42 
There were some states that drew a distinction between sections C (criminalising the rules 
contained in common article 3) and D (containing rules primarily taken from Additional 
Protocol II). Thus, it was argued that while the crimes included in section C had achieved 
customary status, those included in section D had not.43 States not party to Additional 
Protocol II did not want to be bound to it through the Statute.44 Such arguments were 
usually followed by a preference to completely delete section D,45 rather than simply raise 
its threshold. Indeed, many of the states that were arguing for a provision of a (higher) 
threshold wanted it to apply to both sections C and D,46 or even only C.47 Occasionally, 
                                              
38 A/CONF.&65SDU,QGLD$&21)&65SDU,UDQ¶in SULQFLSOH· 
39 A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4, par. 65 (China); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4, par. 66 (UAE); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4, par. 
70 (Bahrain); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.5, par. 115 (India); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.5, par. 120; 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.27, par. 2 (Iraq); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.27, par. 46 (Burundi); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.27, 
par. 60 (Indonesia, arguing that C and D could be punished under crimes against humanity); 
$&21)&65 SDU  9LHWQDP ´VWURQJO\ DGYRFDWLQJµ WKH H[FOXVLRQ RI & DQG '
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.28, par. 9 (Pakistan); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.28, par. 51 (Thailand); 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.28, par. 104 (Libya). 
40 $VWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLYH IRU ,QGLDSXW LW UHIHUULQJ WRERWKVHFWLRQV&DQG'´WKHUHFRXOGQot be a homogeneous 
structure for treatment of international and non-LQWHUQDWLRQDODUPHGFRQIOLFWVVRORQJDVVRYHUHLJQ6WDWHVH[LVWHGµ
At A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.5, par. 115.  
41 See A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, par. 115 (Egypt); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.27, par. 5 (Algeria). 
42 See A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.27, par. 80 and A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, par. 44 (Sri-Lanka); 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, par. 57 (Qatar). These states clearly allowed sovereignty- and status-related concerns to 
conflate a question of admissibility with one of overall jurisdiction of the Court. But see, below fn 49 ff and text, on 
KRZWKHSUHRFFXSDWLRQZLWKFRPSOHPHQWDULW\LQWKLVFRQWH[WILWVZLWKWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH¶WRWDOFROODSVHRIWKH
VWDWH·LQFOXGLQJLWVMXGLFLDOPHFKDQLVPVDVWKHRQO\DFFHSWDEOHWKUHVKROG 
43  A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, par. 102 (Iran); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.28, par. 20 (Russia). $OWKRXJK VHH &KLQD·V
SRVLWLRQDW$&21)&65SDUZKRZDQWHGWKHGHOHWLRQRIERWK&DQG'´DVQRWEHLQJLQNHHSLQJ
ZLWK LQWHUQDWLRQDO FXVWRPDU\ ODZµ ,Q DGGLWLRn some states pointed out that they were not parties to Additional 
Protocol II. But see A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, par. 41 (Switzerland), arguing that C reflected customary law, and 
section D excluded some Additional Protocol II rules, since many states were not parties. 
44 A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4, par. 76 (Sudan) ; A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25, par. 59 (Azerbaijan) ; 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25, par. 65 (Mexico) ; A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.27, par. 73 (Nepal). 
45 A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25, par. 59 (Azerbaijan) ; A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25, par. 65 (Mexico) ; 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, par. 102 (Iran) ; A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.28, par. 20 (Russia). 
46 $&21)&65 SDU  6\ULD DSSO\LQJ WKH ¶WRWDO FROODSVH RI WKH FRXQWU\· FULWHULRQ
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.28, par. 64 (Sudan). 
47 A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, par. 11(J\SW´FRXOGFRQVLGHUVHFWLRQ&LIVDIHJXDUGVVXFKDVQRQ-interference in the 
internal affairs of States, a higher threshold and the guarantees contained in Additional Protocol II to the Geneva 
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the threshold suggested was that of Additional Protocol II,48 but most states were not so 
specific.  
Many states did not refer to a specific threshold, but accepted the inclusion of war crimes 
RQO\ZKHQ´WKHWRWDOFROODSVHRIWKHVWDWHµKDGDOUHDG\RFFXUUHG49 This phrasing reflects 
the approach of some states and their conception of the limits of regulation by 
international (judicial) supervision. One side to this relates to the concern with 
complementarity as a strictly objective concept:  This means that the jurisdiction of the 
Court would be triggered only in the absence of judicial mechanisms within a the state 
and not when the state, exercising sovereign prerogatives, would be unwilling to conduct 
genuine proceedings, as determined by someone outside that state.50 This allows the 
sovereignty concerns that underpin the principle of complementarity to spread and 
conflate a question of admissibility with a question of jurisdiction. 
The sovereignty-related basis of this conflation  relates to a wider understanding of the 
incompatibility of internationally regulating a conflict between a state and a non-state 
armed group. Accordingly, the collapse that would allow regulation has to be total, not 
just partial, and it has to be political.51 This would mean that the political status of the 
government has already suffered significantly, to the extent that it is either non-existent 
or down to a level of a non-state armed group. Before this point regulation is seen as 
subtracting status from the government.  
                                                                                                                                            
&RQYHQWLRQVRIZHUHVWLSXODWHGµ$&21)&658, par. 40 (Bangladesh); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.33, 
par. 33 (Syria) 
48 A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.27, par. 21 (Bahrain). 
49 $&21)&65 SDU  6\ULD ´WRWDO FROODSVH RI WKH FRXQWU\·V FHQWUDO UHJLPHµ
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.28, par. 92 (Oman); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, par. 54 (Pakistan). 
50 The current relevant formulation in the Statute for the admissibility of the case is included in article 17(1)(a) and 
FRQVLGHUV D FDVH DGPLVVLEOH  ZKHQ ´the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
proVHFXWLRQµSome states, when talking about the collapse of the state did refer in particular to its judicial organs. 
6HHIRUH[DPSOHWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRI6UL/DQNDDUJXLQJWKDW´XQOHVVWKHUHZHUHDFRPSOHWHEUHDNGRZQRIWKHMXGLFLDO
and administrative strXFWXUH GXH UHJDUG VKRXOG EH SDLG WR WKH SULQFLSOH RI FRPSOHPHQWDULW\µ DW
$&21)&65 SDU  6HH DOVR ,QGLD DW $&21)&65 SDU  ´ZKHUH D 6WDWH·V
DGPLQLVWUDWLYHDQG OHJDOPDFKLQHU\KDGFHDVHG WRIXQFWLRQµ$&21)&65SDU 4DWDU´FRXOGQRW
DFFHSW WKH MXULVGLFWLRQ RI WKH &RXUW RYHU LQWHUQDO FRQIOLFWV H[FHSW LQ FDVHV RI WRWDO FROODSVH RI D 6WDWH·V MXGLFLDO
V\VWHP DQG ZLVKHG WR UHDIILUP WKH SULQFLSOH RI FRPSOHPHQWDULW\ EHWZHHQ QDWLRQDO V\VWHPV DQG WKH &RXUWµ
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.36, par. 20 (Oman). See also A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, par. 44 (Sri Lanka, who maintained 
its opposition on these grounds, even after the Bureau proposal.) 
51 See the previous fns DQGVHH$&21)&65SDU<HPHQ´WKH&RXUW·VMXULVGLFWLon began when the 
SROLWLFDOVWUXFWXUHRID6WDWHFROODSVHGWRWDOO\QRWMXVWSDUWLDOO\µ 
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This approach is informed by the understanding of the conflict as a zero sum game of 
status and the understanding that the application of international law depends on the 
existence of such status. From this perspective, international legal regulation is only 
possible on a horizontal plane among entities of equal or similar political status and 
denies its role as a vertical system of rules. It reflects the rationale that allows regulation 
only through internationalisation stricto sensu and that has, to some extent, trapped the 
application of common article 3 between the overpowering concepts of police operations 
and international armed conflict.52 It further reflects the conflation of the narrow legal 
status commensurate with the specific rules extended with a wider political/legal status, 
which is in direct conflict with that of the state. 
Since most of the opponents of the regulation of non-international armed conflicts were 
either absolutely against any regulation RUKDGVXFKDFRQFHSWLRQRI¶WRWDOFROODSVH·DVDQ
acceptable threshold,53 it was not easy for a negotiating coalition to be built that would 
achieve a higher threshold for one or both sets of war crimes. The closest the opponents 
got was through the use of the Additional Protocol II threshold.54 This threshold 
required territorial control, sustained (rather than just prolonged) conflict and an 
applicability limited to conflicts between governments and non-state armed groups and 
not between such groups. As such, it can be seen as an attempt to combine a status-based 
rationale with a preference for a relatively inactive court. 
However, Additional Protocol II was not an acceptable solution. Widespread reactions 
against this new proposed threshold meant that the last minute limitation of the scope of 
the treaty was not achieved. Critics of the higher threshold pointed out that the 
introduction of a high threshold would unacceptably limit the function of the Court,55 
since conflicts reaching the Additional Protocol II threshold were rare and most conflicts 
would be excluded.56 Opposition was voiced specifically against the requirement of 
                                              
52 See section 3.4.3. 
53 Above fns 49 ff and text. 
54 See section 5.4. 
55 A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.34, par. 22 (New Zealand); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, par. 49 (Tanzania). 
56 A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.33, par. 24 (US) ; A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.33, par. 80 (UK); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, par. 
68 (Denmark) ; A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, par. 76 (Estonia); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.36, par. 30 (Slovenia); 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.36, par. 42 (Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
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territorial control,57 as well as the non-applicability of the threshold to conflicts involving 
armed groups fighting each other.58 )RUWKHVHVWDWHVLWZDVFOHDUWKDWWKH¶HVVHQFH·RIWKH
whole project was incompatible with such a high threshold.59 As Robinson and von 
+HEHOUHPDUN´WKHLQWHQVHUHDFWLon by an overwhelming majority to the shortcomings of 
the Additional Protocol II definition, only twenty years after its adoption, is particularly 
LQWHUHVWLQJµ60  
 
This shift might be related to the limited effect that Additional Protocol II has had. This 
explanation is suggested by the criticisms that such a threshold would severely limit the 
function of the Court. The rejection of the high Additional Protocol II threshold also 
reflects the significant development of the international approach on the justiciability of 
war crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts, especially because of the 
work of the ad hoc Tribunals. It might also reflect a difference of approach to the extent 
that the rules and thresholds that would be the outcome of the negotiations concerned 
the creation of an independent judicial institution and their application would depend 
primarily on such an institution and not exclusively on states. These explanations could 
follow from the wide-VSUHDGXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKDW WKH ¶HVVHQFH·of the Court, as a judicial 
institution battling impunity, necessitated its role in non-international armed conflicts. 
Finally, the unacceptability of the restrictive threshold is reflected potently in the fact that 
the delegation that solved the impasse belonged to a country that was facing, at the time, 
a conflict below that threshold. As the delegate of Sierra Leone put it, he 
 
KDG UHVHUYDWLRQV>«@UHJDUGLQJ WKH FKDSHDX>@ZKLFK UHIHUUHG WR RUJDQLVHG DUPHG
JURXSV WKDW H[HUFLVHG ´FRQWURO RYHU D SDUW RI >D 6WDWH SDUW\·V@ WHUULWRU\µ 7KDW
wording was very restrictive: in his own country, for example, the rebel forces did 
not occupy a territory. Thus, as presently drafted, section D would exclude the 
type of internal conflict presently taking place in Sierra Leone.61  
 
                                              
57 A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.34, par. 34 (Spain); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.34, par. 107 (Australia) ; 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, par. 23 ; A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.36, par. 37 (Costa Rica). 
58 A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.34, par. 34 (Spain); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.34, par. 60 (South Africa); 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.34, par. 107 (Australia) ; A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.34, par. 94 (Sudan) ; 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, par. 80 (Solomon Islands); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.36, par. 37 (Costa Rica). 
59 See, again, for the use of the word A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, par. 67 (Canada). 
60 See D. RobinsRQ DQG+ YRQ+HEHO ¶:DU&ULPHV LQ ,QWHUQDO&RQIOLFWV$UWLFOH RI WKH ,&&6WDWXWH·  
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 193, 208 (Robinson and von Hebel). 
61 A/CONF.183/SR.35, par. 8. 
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To conclude, in this Diplomatic Conference, as in the others examined in this thesis, 
certain themes were re-played by the representatives of states. Just as the concept of state 
sovereignty was seen by some delegates as in principle opposed to the regulation of 
armed violence within the state, now it was seen as opposed to judicial oversight of that 
violence, even when it had reached the level of an armed conflict. The negotiations 
suggest that there was, in the perception of many states, little ground between the 
existence of an armed conflict, the propriety of a second opinion on whether the law of 
armed conflict is observed, and the internationalisation lato sensu62 of the whole matter in 
violation of state sovereignty. This meant, in practice, that there was little ground 
between the states that considered the regulation of non-international armed conflicts as 
essential and of fundamental importance for the function and relevance of the court and 
those that were opposed, on principle of sovereignty, to any such regulation.  
The states that tried to position themselves in the middle could not easily find firm 
ground. The Additional Protocol II threshold, while seemingly conciliatory, in truth was 
much closer to the opponents of inclusion of non-international armed conflicts to the 
Statute than to the proponents: Practically speaking, it excluded the majority of conflicts 
and conceptually speaking it was a step towards the paradigm of status. In the case of the 
Rome Conference, however, unlike in the negotiations that led to Additional Protocol II, 
WKHUHGLGQ·WVHHPWREHDFOHDUPLGGOHJURXQGZKHUH¶PRGHUDWHV·DQG¶PLQLPDOLVWV·63 could 
coalesce and produce a threshold of high-intensity and territorial control. Too many 
states understood that it was essential for the new institution to have a wide threshold of 
jurisdiction.  
Accordingly, the suggestion by some states of an Additional Protocol II threshold can be 
seen less as a well-supported and organised attempt to limit the applicability of the 
Statute and more as a last minute defensive position. This might explain its failure. 
Moreover, as will be further discussed in the next section, it is one reason why there was 
arguably not an understanding of a threshold that fell short of Additional Protocol II but 
was higher than the one in common article 3, 7DGLý, and article 8(2)(d). This is important 
to bear in mind while interpreting the threshold(s) of applicability of article 8. 
                                              
62 See section 4.1. fn 2. 
63 See, in the context of Additional Protocol II, section 5.3.2. 
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7.3. The result: Article 8 
 
7.3.1. The dangers of having two thresholds 
 
Even if the Sierra Leone proposal64 allowed the avoidance of the language of the 
threshold of Additional Protocol II, some difficulties still remain. It is reminded that, 
while section 8(2)(d) simply mentions ´DUPHGFRQIOLFWVQRWRIDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHUµ
section 8(IUHIHUVWR´DUPHGFRQIOLFWV WKDWWDNHSODFHLQWKHWHUULWRU\RID6WDWHZKHQ
there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organised armed 
JURXSVRUEHWZHHQVXFKJURXSVµThe structure of the article, by providing two threshold 
provisions for two different sets of substantive rules, seems to introduce a difference in 
these thresholds for the crimes included in sections (c) and (e) respectively.65 This may 
lead to the conclusion that, as far as non-international armed conflicts are concerned, 
there are now three different thresholds provided for in international instruments: In 
ascending narrowness there are, common article 3 (and article 8(2)(d) of the Statute), 
article 8(2)(f), and Additional Protocol II. Nevertheless, it may be possible to avoid the 
creation of another threshold through the interpretation of the provisions, by doctrine or 
WKH&RXUW·VMXULVSUXGHQFH  
This possibility would enable two interrelated dangers to be avoided: The further 
complication of the thresholds of applicability and, more centrally for this thesis, the 
limitation of the applicability of the legal regime contained in article 8(2)(e) through the 
creation of a threshold above that of the mere existence of an armed conflict. 
Conceptually, a new, higher, threshold would allow a pull towards a status-based 
understanding of applicability. Requiring more than an armed conflict as reason enough 
for the applicability of a set of war crimes, suggests a movement from a situation-based 
                                              
64 See section 7.2.3. above 
65 6HH&.UHVV¶7KH&ULVLVLQ(DVW7LPRUDQGWKHWKUHVKROGRIWKH/DZRQ:DU&ULPHV·Criminal Law 
Forum .UHVV¶7LPRU·´7DNHQOLWHUDOO\WKLVFDQKDUGO\EHGHQLHGµ6HH DOVR/&RQGRUHOOL¶:DU&ULPHVDQG
,QWHUQDO&RQIOLFWVLQWKH6WDWXWHRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUW·LQ03ROLWLDQG*1HVLThe Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A challenge to impunity (Ashgate, 2001) 107, 112 (Condorelli); Sivakumaran , 373. 
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threshold to one based on the characteristics of the actors involved. The direction of 
such a move is that of Additional Protocol II and the understanding of an actor that has 
developed state-like characteristics, especially through territorial control. Even if the 
difference is limited to an element of duration of the conflict, rather than the violence, 
such duration can be seen to have the function of requiring the consolidation of 
political/military status of the group, beyond what is necessary for the existence of an 
armed conflict.  
It will be argued that the language of the article does not really support such a move, and 
not only because of the lack of a criterion of territorial control. Ultimately, even if an 
independent concept of armed conflict between common article 3 and Additional 
Protocol II is conceivable, such a concept does not emerge from either the language of 
the article or the travaux préparatoires.  
In interpreting the article, there are two inter-related problems: the departure of the 
8(2)(f) definition from the customary law definition in 7DGLý and the higher threshold of 
8(2)(f) in relation to 8(2)(d). The former is a question of clarity and consistency of the 
relevant area of international law. Space does not permit an extensive analysis of the 
language of 8(2)(e) and its essential reiteration of 7DGLý However it is necessary to 
mention that the difference between the two is WKHSKUDVH¶SURWUDFWHGDUPHGFRQIOLFW·LQ
H UDWKHU WKDQ ¶SURWUDFWHG DUPHG YLROHQFH· LQ 7DGLý.66 There will be however an 
attempt below to argue against the narrowing of the threshold. The argument will be that 
a higher threshold, reflecting considerations of status, is not reflected in the overall 
approach by states at the Rome Conference. 
 
7.3.2. Reconciliation between articles 8(2)(f) and 8(2)(d) 
 
                                              
66 )RUWKHDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHUHLVOLWWOHVHQVHLQLQWHUSUHWLQJ¶SURWUDFWHGDUPHGFRQIOLFW·DVGLIIHUHQWIURP¶SURWUDFWHG
DUPHGYLROHQFH·VHHSivakumaran, 373 ff; Condorelli, 113. See also, on the identical nature of the 7DGLý and 8(2)(f) 
thresholds, Bothe, 423; .UHVV¶7LPRU·&.UHVV¶:DU&ULPHVFRPPLWWHGLQQRQ-International Armed Conflict 
DQG WKH (PHUJLQJ 6\VWHP RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO -XVWLFH·   Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 103, 118 
.UHVV¶&ULPHV·; Cryer et al, 237-8.. See also section 7.4.1 below. 
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The article contains two separate substantive parts dealing with non-international armed 
conflicts that are covered by two separate and differently phrased thresholds. The second 
threshold came about after some delegates proposed an Additional Protocol II threshold, 
being dissatisfied with the common article 3 one, and in order to cover substantive war 
crimes that they considered not part of the common article 3 or customary regime. If the 
article 8(2)(f) threshold came about as a compromise between a common article 3 and an 
Additional Protocol II threshold, then surely it must be somewhere in between or, at 
least, it cannot be identical to one of the two. This section will attempt to disprove this. 
Throughout the negotiations, although there was the realisation of the different 
provenance contained in the rules in sections (c) and (e), the approach was to trigger both 
sections with one threshold. Firstly, it is important to point out that, before the Bureau 
proposal that suggested an Additional Protocol II threshold,67 sections C and D (to be 
8(2)(d) and (f)) shared the same threshold. Therefore, even though the substantive war 
crimes were not taken only from common article 3 and even though they were divided 
into two paragraphs, one and the same threshold was initially envisaged. This is apparent 
in the statement of the German delegate, who opposed the higher threshold by saying 
WKDW KH ´FRQWLQXHG WR EHOLHYH WKDW WKH VDPH VWDQGDUGV VKRXOG DSSO\ LQ VHFWLRQ ' DV LQ
VHFWLRQ &µ68 Furthermore, the clear majority of states that were arguing for a higher 
threshold,69 or just the clarification of the threshold,70 wanted it to apply to both sections 
C and D. 
Moreover, whereas the proposed higher threshold caused significant opposition in the 
Conference, it did not find enough support. Most states that were hostile to the inclusion 
of non-international armed conflicts in the jurisdiction of the Court did not want such 
conflicts included at all.71 The raising of the threshold was not going to alter this 
                                              
67 A/CONF.183/C.1/L.53. 
68 A/CONF.183/SR.33, par. 68. 
69 See, for example, Bahrain, at A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.27, par. 21, who ´IRXQGWKHWKUHVKROGVLQVHFWLRQV&DQG'
difficult to accept because there was no positive definition of non-international armed conflicts.µ 
70 6HH8UXJXD\DW$&21)&65SDUDUJXLQJWKDW´EHDULQJLQPLQGWKHFRQFHUQVRIVRPHFRXQWULHV
WKH VFRSH RI WKRVH FULPHV LQ VHFWLRQV & DQG ' VKRXOG EH PRUH SUHFLVHO\ GHILQHGµ 6HH DOVR WKH 86 DW
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.26, par. 97, who ´KRSHGWKDWWKHFRQFHUQVRIFHUWDLQGHOHJDWLRQVFRXOGEHDFFRPPRGDWHGE\
appropriate wording, in the chapeau or elsewhere, that clearly established the high threshold to be covered by those 
two sections.µ See also A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.27, par. 5 (Algeria). 
71 See above fn 38 ff for states hostile to any inclusion of non-international armed conflicts.  
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fundamental position,72 although in one caVH WKLV GLG DOWHU WKH VWDWH·V SRVLWLRQ73 This 
meant that no consensus could be achieved on the Bureau proposal.  
This opened the space for the Sierra Leone proposal. The delegate expressed his wish for 
the inclusion of both sections C and D and his uneasiness about the high threshold that 
was proposed. The reasons that Sierra Leone gave for its proposal were not that this was 
a middle ground between a minimal and a maximal threshold, but that the elements 
contained in the Bureau proposal were unacceptable as they would unduly limit the 
jurisdiction of the Court. The delegates that supported the Sierra Leonean proposal 
spoke on similar grounds, especially focusing on the restrictive element of territorial 
control.74 It can be therefore argued that the Sierra LHRQH SURSRVDO ZDV ¶ULJKWLQJ WKH
ZURQJV·RIWKH%XUHDXSURSRVDOUDWKHUWKDQVXJJHVWLQJDFRPSURPLVH75 
Furthermore, the Sierra Leone proposal allowed for the clarification of a definition that 
had hitherto been merely negative. While 8(2)(d) contains the negative definition of an 
DUPHGFRQIOLFWQDPHO\WKDWLW´GRHVQRWDSSO\WRVLWXDWLRQVRILQWHUQDOGLVWXUEDQFHVDQG
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar 
QDWXUHµ WKH SURSRVDO PDGH VXUH WKDW WKLV LV FRPSOHmented in sub-paragraph (f) by a 
positive definition.76 If article 8 is to be viewed as a whole, the fact that there are two 
sub-paragraphs dealing with thresholds can be put down to the mechanics of the 
negotiations rather than the substance of the article. This haphazard element in the 
drafting of the Statute is also reinforced by the fact that the discussion on thresholds was 
                                              
72 6HHIRUH[DPSOH&KLQD·VUHDFWLRQDW$&21)&65SDU6HHDOVR$&21)&65SDU
7XUNH\ZKR´SUHIHUUHGWhe new wording for the chapeau of section D but, for the time being, maintained his 
SRVLWLRQ WKDW VHFWLRQV & DQG ' VKRXOG EH GHOHWHGµ $&21)&65 SDU  ,UDQ
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.34, par. 82 (Russia); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.34, par. 85 (Thailand); 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, par. 31 (Algeria); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, par. 54 (Pakistan). Some states, interestingly, 
continued to express their opposition specifically on section D thus showing that the logic of applying a separate 
and higher threshold on section D, as opposed to section C, had little effect. See, for example, 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, par. 4 (Egypt). 
73 A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.35, par. 35 (Indonesia), without, unfortunately, explaining the rationale behind this change 
of position. 
74 See above fn 56 ff  for states expressing this criticism. 
75 Although this seems not entirely in accordance with the understanding of at least one delegate: Bosnia and 
+HU]HJRYLQD ´ZDV FRQFHUQHG DERXW UDLVLQJ WKH WKUHVKROG IRU ZDU FULPHV XQGHU DUWLFOH  TXDUWHU VHFWLRQ ' EXW
thought that, if a different threshold had to be established, the wording proposed by the delegation of Sierra Leone 
ZRXOGEHDFFHSWDEOHµ$&21)&65SDU 
76 See for this approach Robinson and von Hebel, 204-5. See also Cryer et al, 236-7. 
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conducted on the last days of the Conference and the Sierra Leone delegate proposed the 
final text on the final day dedicated to the matter.77 
Therefore, although it was undoubtedly the intention of some of the participants to raise 
the threshold and limit the jurisdiction of the Court, as had occurred in the negotiations 
that resulted in Additional Protocol II, in this case they failed. Moreover, this failure 
resulted not in a compromise solution but in a clarification. Once it was clear that 
Additional Protocol II was too high, and in the hasty circumstances of the last days of the 
Conference, it was not possible for a coherent negotiating position to be found. 
Ultimately, a separate, identifiable concept of a non-international armed conflict between 
that of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II did not emerge from the Rome 
Conference. 
To conclude, it is possible and, indeed, necessary to interpret article 8(2)(f) in accordance 
with both article 8(2)(d), as well as the customary definition of what is an armed conflict. 
As such article 8, as a whole,78 builds on the concept of non-international armed conflict 
initiated by common article 3 and developed by the jurisprudence of the Tribunals. Its 
threshold is what has been accepted as the customary clarification of common article 3 
and its substantive contents include the legal regime initially included in common article 3 
and subsequently developed through the jurisprudence of the Tribunals. It is a further 
step in entrenching a regulatory structure that provides a low and flexible threshold of 
applicability and expansive humanitarian protection. Although, a status-based rationale is 
always present and was expressed in some of the concerns of states in the negotiations, it 
seems that it was clear to the majority of states that an individual-protection rationale is a 
necessary feature for the function of the Court.  
 
7.4. The Jurisprudence of the Court  
 
                                              
77 See Cullen, 434, who provides some illuminating detail and also points out that the lack of time, as the new 
threshold had to be incorporated to the text sent to the Committee of the Whole on the same day, is to blame for 
the fact that there was no further discussion of the Sierra Leone proposal and no more recorded comments. See also 
.UHVV¶&ULPHV· 
78 That is, its parts dealing with non-international armed conflicts. 
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7KH&RXUW·V3UH-Trial Chambers I and II have now treated the issue of the existence of 
an armed conflict in four decisions, three being on the confirmation of charges79 and one 
on the issue of an arrest warrant.80 In this section, there will be a discussion of three 
inter-UHODWHGLVVXHV7KHILUVWFRQFHUQVWKHXVHRIWKHWHUP¶SURWUDFWHGDUPHGFRQIOLFW·DQG
the path that the Court seems to have taken in affirming a higher threshold for article 
8(2)(f). The second issue concerns a seemingly divergent approach to the criterion of 
organisation, as a result of the use of Additional Protocol II. The third issue is the 
unfortunate step towards territorial control and its subsequent correction.  
 
7.4.1. Intensity  
 
The starting point of the Pre-7ULDO &KDPEHU·V examination of the elements of a non-
international armed conflict as per article 8(2)(f) was, problematically, Additional 
3URWRFRO,,$IWHUSRLQWLQJRXWWKDWWKLV´VHWVRXWWKHFULWHULDIRUGLVWLQJXLVKLQJEHWZHHQ
non-international armed conflicts and situDWLRQVRILQWHUQDOGLVWXUEDQFHVDQGWHQVLRQVµ81 
the Chamber set out its criteria, namely that  
 
the armed groups must: i) be under responsible command implying some degree 
of organisation of the armed groups, capable of planning and carrying out 
sustained and concerted military operations and imposing discipline in the name 
of a de facto authority, including the implementation of the Protocol; and ii) 
exercise such control over territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and 
concerted military operations.82 
 
The Chamber then juxtaposed this definition with that in 7DGLýDQGFRQFOXGHGWKDW´WKH
ability to carry out sustained and concerted military operations is no longer linked to 
                                              
79 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/04-
01/06, 29 January 2007 (Lubanga); Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-01/04-01/07, 30 September 2008 (Katanga); Bemba. 
80 Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir'HFLVLRQRQWKH3URVHFXWLRQ·V$SSOLFDWLRQIRUD:DUUDQWRI$UUHVW3UH-Trial Chamber 
I, ICC-02/05-01/09, 4 March 2009 (Al Bashir).  
81 Lubanga, par. 231. See 6LYDNXPDUDQ´:KLOH WUXH WKLV LVKDUGO\ WKHSXUSRVH$UWLFOHSDUDJUDSK VHHNV WR
serveµ 
82 Lubanga, par. 232. 
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WHUULWRULDO FRQWUROµ83 )LQDOO\ UHIHUULQJ EDFN WR DUWLFOH I·V UHIHUHQFH WR ´SURWUDFWHG
armed conflict between [...] [organised armed JURXSV@µLWFRQFOXGHVLQOLJKWRIWKHDERYH
WKDW´WKLVIRFXVHVRQWKHQHHGIRUWKHDUPHGJURXSVLQTXHVWLRQWRKDYHWKHDELOLW\WRSODQ
and carry out military operations for a prolonged period of timeµ84 The added phrase seems to 
betray a perception of a higher degree of duration in article 8(2)(f). This is mitigated if 
one considers the, original, French text in combination with the language in 7DGLý:  
 
The original, French, text of Lubanga UHIHUVWR´SURORQJpHµWKHVDPHZRUGXVHGLQ
the French text of 7DGLý WKH (QJOLVK RULJLQDO RI ZKLFK ZDV ´SURWUDFWHGµ 6R
´SURWUDFWHGµ ZDV WUDQVODWHG DV ´SURORQJpHµ ZKLFK ZDV WUDQVODWHG EDFN DV
´SURORQJHGµ7KXVIRUWKHVHSXUSRVHV WKHZRUGV´SURWUDFWHGµDQG´SURORQJHGµ
were considered interchangeable and as has already been seen, the 7DGLý definition 
contains an element of protraction, albeit as part of the broader notion of 
intensity.85 
 
In the end, the Pre-7ULDO &KDPEHU·V FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW ´DQ DUPHG FRQIOLFW RI D FHUWDLQ
degree of intensity and extending from at least June 2003 to December 2003 existed on 
WKHWHUULWRU\RI,WXULµ86 is similar to the formulations of ICTY judgments, based on 7DGLý, 
and does not clearly refer to an element of added duration. 
Unfortunately, the same argument cannot be made with respect to the subsequent 
decisions of the Pre-Trial Chambers, which consolidated this linguistic confusion in their 
English original. While Katanga does not refer to duration,87 the formula introduced in 
Lubanga is the starting point for the same Pre-7ULDO&KDPEHU·VGHFLVLRQRQWKHLVVXLQJRI
DQDUUHVWZDUUDQWIRU6XGDQ·V3UHVLGHQW2PDU$O%DVKLU7KH3UH-Trial Chamber quoted 
in full Lubanga·V WKRXJKW-process, including the attention given to Additional Protocol 
II88 DQG WKHSKUDVH ¶IRUDSURORQJHGSHULRGRI WLPH·89 The phrase found its way in the 
                                              
83 Ibid., par. 233. 
84 Ibid., par. 234. (emphasis added) 
85 Sivakumaran, 379. 
86 Lubanga, par. 235. 
87 7KH&RXUWWKHUHIRXQGWKDW´EHWZHHQ$XJXVWDQG0D\DQarmed conflict took place in the territory of 
Ituri between a number RI ORFDO RUJDQLVHG DUPHG JURXSVµ 6HH Katanga, par. 239. This decision, however, is not 
without its problems, as will be seen below. 
88 Al Bashir, par. 59. 
89 Ibid., par. 60. 
243 
 
initial conclusion on the question of intensity,90 while, finally, the more general 
conclusion on the fulfilment of arWLFOH I·V FULWHULD VSHDNV RI D ¶SURWUDFWHG DUPHG
FRQIOLFW·91 6WLOO LW FDQ EH DUJXHG WKDW WKH XVH RI WKH SKUDVH ¶IRU D SURORQJHG SHULRG RI
WLPH·PHUHO\FDUULHVRQLubanga·VFRQIXVLRQZLWKRXWFODULI\LQJDQGDIILUPLQJWKDWWKHXVH
of the phrase requirHV DGGHG GXUDWLRQ 6LPLODUO\ WKH UHIHUHQFH WR ¶SURWUDFWHG DUPHG
FRQIOLFW·LQDUWLFOHILVXQDYRLGDEOHDVWKLVLVWKHDSSOLFDEOHOHJDOIRUPXOD 
Another blow was dealt by the most recent decision of the Court on the matter. In the 
case against Jean-Pierre Bemba, Pre-Trial Chamber II distinguishes between article 
GDQGWKHILUVWVHQWHQFHRIDUWLFOHIRQWKHRQHKDQGZKLFKUHTXLUH´DQ\DUPHG
conflict not of an international character to reach a certain level of intensity which 
exceeds that RILQWHUQDOGLVWXUEDQFHVµ92 and the second sentence of article 8(2)(f) on the 
other hand.93 TKH&RXUW¶LVPLQGIXO·RIWKHGLIIHUHQFHLQODQJXDJHEHWZHHQGDQGIDQG
argued that  
 
this can be seen to require a higher or additional threshold to be met[...]The 
argument can be raised as to whether the requirement can nevertheless be applied 
also in the context of article 8(2)(d) of the Statute. However, irrespective of such a 
possible interpretive approach, the Chamber does not deem it necessary to 
address this argument, as the period in question covers approximately five months 
DQGLVWKHUHIRUHWREHUHJDUGHGDV´SURWUDFWHGµLQDQ\HYHQW94 
 
7KH &RXUW LQ WKLV SDVVDJH QRW RQO\ DFNQRZOHGJHG WKDW WKH WHUP ´>SURWUDFWHG DUPHG
conflict] can be seen to require a hLJKHURUDGGLWLRQDOWKUHVKROGWREHPHWµEXWDOVRUDLVHG
the question whether this higher threshold should be applied to article 8(2)(e). As the 
conflict had been going on for five months, it is protracted and therefore the issue need 
not have been addressed. The Court here seems to attempt to reconcile (d) and (f) but by 
                                              
90 Ibid. SDU  ´As a result, the Chamber concludes there are reasonable grounds to believe that, since at least 
March 2003, both the SLM/A and the JEM had, as required by article 8(2) (f) of the Statute, the ability to carry out 
VXVWDLQHGPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVIRUDSURORQJHGSHULRGRIWLPHµ 
91 Ibid.SDU´In conclusion, the Chamber finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that from March 
2003 to at least 14 July 2008, a protracted armed conflict not of an international character, within the meaning of 
article 8(2)(f) of the Statute, existed in Darfur between the GoS and several organised armed groups, in particular 
WKH6/0$DQGWKH-(0µ 
92 Bemba, par. 225. 
93 Ibid., par. 226. See above fn 28 for the text of article 8. 
94 Ibid., par. 235. 
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raising the former rather than lowering the latter. It is not clear why the Court would take 
this approach. In any case, it later clearly concluded that  
 
[g]iven the concurring views of the parties on the time-frame of approximately 
five months during which those armed hostilities lasted, and its own assessment..., 
WKH&KDPEHUILQGV WKDW WKHDUPHGFRQIOLFW LV WREHFKDUDFWHULVHGDV´SURWUDFWHGµ
within the meaning of article 8(2)(f) of the Statute.95 
 
:HUH LW QRW IRU WKDW ILQDO FRQFOXVLRQ WKH &RXUW·V ODQJXDJH ZRXOG SHUKDSV DOORZ VRPH
LQWHUSUHWLYHOHHZD\7KHLPSUHVVLRQLVWLFHIIHFWRIWKHSKUDVH´FDQEHVHHQWRUHTXLUHµDV
ZHOO DV WKH &RXUW·V DEVWHQWLRQ IURP FRQFOXGLQJ LWV SURSRVHG ´LQWHUSUHWLYH DSSURDFKµ
would have allowed the matter to remain unsettled. This could still have been claimed 
although the linguistic confusion which began in the drafting of article 8 has taken the 
Court down a slippery slope to complication and the narrowing of the threshold. 
However, the centrality of the finding that the armed conflict is protracted in the 
FRQFOXVLRQPDNHVFOHDUWKDWWKH&RXUW·VXQGHUVWDQGLQJLQBemba is that it does not suffice 
to find that an armed conflict exists but it is necessary to find that this is protracted. 
This shift of focus to the duration is also seen in terms of the application of the law to 
the facts. In Lubanga when the Court was analysing the relevant factors that indicated the 
necessary intensity of the conflict, it did not seem to focus on duration as something 
separate from the overall intensity.96 Indeed, the Court mentioned a series of factors such 
as the number of attacks, the number of victims and the involvement of the UN Security 
Council.97 Similarly, in Al Bashir it applied the Lubanga definition98 to the facts finding 
WKDWWKHDUPHGJURXSVLQYROYHGKDGPRXQWHG´QXPHURXVPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVµDJDLQVWWKH
government,99 while the government mobilised the militia100 and mounted a full counter-
insurgency campaign.101  
                                              
95 Ibid., par. 255. 
96 Sivakumaran, 379. 
97 Lubanga, par. 235. 
98 Above fn 115-7 and text. 
99 Al Bashir, par. 63, giving specific examples. 
100 Ibid., par. 66. 
101 Ibid., par. 67. 
245 
 
This approach changed in Bemba. While the Court discusses certain attacks,102 the number 
of soldiers and battalions involved103 as well as the mounting of joint operations104 and 
the spread of the operations,105 XQGHU D VHFWLRQ HQWLWOHG ¶WKH H[LVWHQFH RI DQ DUPHG
FRQIOLFW·106 it then dedicated DVHSDUDWHVHFWLRQRQWKH´GXUDWLRQRIWKHDUPHGFRQIOLFWµ107 
There the Court discussed the evidence at its disposal in order to determine the date on 
which the Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC) soldiers entered the territory 
of the Central African Republic, marking the beginning of the conflict. This allows the 
Court to reach the aforementioned conclusion, satisfying what it perceives to be the 
necessary, separate criterion of duration. 
The approach applied in this case appears to fLQG DQ ¶LQVWDQWDQHRXV· EHJLQQLQJ RI DQ
armed conflict, marked with the entry of the MLC soldiers, rather than a gradual 
FXOPLQDWLRQRI LQWHQVLW\DQGRUJDQLVDWLRQDVZDV WKHFDVHZLWK WKH,&7<·V WUHDWPHQWRI
the conflicts in Kosovo108 and former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).109 
$FFRUGLQJO\DQDUPHGFRQIOLFWLVQRWVHHQDV¶SURWUDFWHGDUPHGYLROHQFH·EXWDQDUPHG
conflict erupts and then must become protracted in order to fall under article 8(2)(f). 
Even if the facts of the Bemba case justify the abrupt beginning of an armed conflict, it 
would be interesting to see how this approach would work in a case where there was a 
gradual increase of organised violence and its gradual effects on society in the territorial 
unit.110 The Court then would have to discuss the time-frame for both the existence of an 
armed conflict and LWVVXIILFLHQWGXUDWLRQ7KHQWKHIRUPXOD¶SURWUDFWHGSURWUDFWHG·ZRXOG
have to be applied and the result can possibly be even more confusing.  
It is telling that the Court has not explained in general terms how much time needs to go 
by for a conflict to be protracted. No absolute answer is given nor is the relation between 
duration and intensity addressed. It is also interesting to look at the facts of the cases that 
the ICC has dealt with and compare them with the cases dealt with by the ad hoc 
                                              
102 Bemba, par. 240 ff. 
103 Ibid., par. 240 and 242. 
104 Ibid., par. 242. 
105 Ibid., par. 243. 
106 Ibid., par. 240 ff. 
107 Ibid., par. 247 ff. 
108 See, for example, Limaj; Haradinaj. 
109 See %RäNRVNL. 
110 See section 6.5.3. 
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Tribunals. How would five months in Bemba compare with the duration of the conflict in 
Kosovo111 or Rwanda,112 or FYROM?113 If it is accepted that the conflicts that article 
8(2)(f) is meant to cover undeU¶SURWUDFWHGDUPHGFRQIOLFW·DUHQRWVLJQLILFDQWO\GLIIHUHQW
in nature than the conflicts that the ad hoc 7ULEXQDOVZHUH FRYHULQJXQGHUSODLQ ¶DUPHG
FRQIOLFW· it can be argued that ¶SURWUDFWHG DUPHG FRQIOLFW· LV MXVW D GLIIHUHQW DQG
inaccurate, way of rHIHUULQJWRDQ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·.  
Ultimately, one has to relate to what would be the rationale for deciding on a particular 
threshold. The creation of the ad hoc Tribunals have brought into the fore-front a 
rationale for applicability of the jus in bello and the criminalisation of its violations that is 
based on humanitarian protection rather than the status achieved by the parties. The 
element of duration of the armed conflict, rather than just the armed violence, can be 
used to argue for the applicability of the legal regime only at the point when the non-state 
armed group has achieved such an incontrovertible political status that the government 
would have nothing to lose by accepting the applicability of the law. While it is possible 
that there is such dXUDWLRQ ZLWKRXW D FOHDU PRYH WR WKH FRQVROLGDWLRQ RI WKH JURXS·V
position and its military/political status, it is one of the functions that duration can have. 
Such a rationale for applicability conforms to a status-based, defensive approach taken by 
many embattled governments, but not to the approach of a judicial institution applying 
objective criteria leading to wide applicability.114  
A status-based rationale, as discussed above, was not achieved by some states that gave 
indications of desiring one in the Rome Conference. Nor is it fair to conclude that the 
Court, in its early jurisprudence, was consciously following such an approach. It has not 
expressed such a regulatory philosophy nor, as an international judicial institution, does it 
have such an interest. Arguably, it is more a case of an insufficient understanding of the 
ODQJXDJHXVHG7KH&RXUW·VMXULVSUXGHQFHVHHPVWRKDYHXQGHUWDNHQWKLVFRXUVHGXHWRD
number of factors. One such factor is the admittedly confusing formulation of article 8, 
                                              
111 Limaj, par. 171 ff ; Haradinaj, par. 100 ff. 
112 The conflict in Rwanda had already started before the genocide, which lasted three months. The ICTR has not 
determined its precise duration. 
113 Things are more borderline in the conflict in FYROM. While the ICTY found that at the times material for the 
indictment, August 2001, there was an armed conflict, its discussion of intensity shows that the criteria were only 
beginning to be fulfilled by mid-2001. Would the conflict fDLOWKH,&&·VWHVW"6HH%RäNRVNL, par. 287 ff. 
114 6HH LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI WKH 7ULEXQDOV· MXULVSUXGHQFH VHFWLRQ 5.3, and, in the context of the application of 
common article 3, section 3.4.3. 
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which gives the impression that there are two separate thresholds for non-international 
armed conflicts in article 8. Another factor is the slippery slope of Lubanga·VUHOLDQFHRQ
Additional Protocol II. Finally, matters came to a head through the peculiar 
circumVWDQFHV RI WKH ¶LQVWDQWDQHRXV· DUPHG FRQIOLFW LQ Bemba, which meant that the 
duration of the conflict could no longer be conflated with the duration of the violence. In 
any case, adding an undefined element of duration is not in accordance with the will of 
WKHGUDIWHUVSRWHQWLDOO\QDUURZVGRZQWKH&RXUW·VMXULVGLFWLRQDQGOHDGVWRFRQIXVLRQ,W
is hoped that the Court will alter its course.  
 
7.4.2. Organisation  
 
The treatment of the organisation of the parties by the Pre-Trial Chambers has followed 
in the path carved out by the ad hoc Tribunals. The indicative factors that were used to 
define the necessary organisation of the armed groups involved were the existence of 
responsible command and an operative internal disciplinary system;115 the ability to act as 
a unitary group resulting in issuing statements116 and reaching agreements between the 
groups and the government,117 as well as the control of towns118 and, in general, 
territory.119 
A particularity in the emerging ICC jurisprudence on the matter springs from the 
prominent use that was given to the Additional Protocol II definition in Lubanga. As 
seen, Lubanga began by quoting Additional Protocol II which states that the armed 
JURXSVVKRXOG´H[HUFLVHVXFKFRQWURORYHUDSDUWRILWVWHUULWRU\DVWRHQDEOHWKHPWRFDUUy 
RXW VXVWDLQHG DQG FRQFHUWHG PLOLWDU\ RSHUDWLRQV DQG WR LPSOHPHQW WKLV 3URWRFROµ120 
While Lubanga made sure to point out that, after 7DGLý, territorial control was taken out of 
WKLV GHILQLWLRQ LW DGRSWHG WKH ODWWHU IRUPXODWLRQ WR WKH HIIHFW WKDW ´SURWUDFWHG DUPHG
                                              
115 Katanga, par. 239; Bemba, par. 234. 
116 Lubanga, par. 236. 
117 Al Bashir, par. 68. 
118 Lubanga, par. 236. 
119 Katanga, par. 239; Al Bashir, par. 60. More on this below. 
120 Quoted in Lubanga, par. 231. 
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FRQIOLFWµ´IRFXVHVRQWKHQHHGIRUWKHDUPHGJURXSVLQTXHVWLRQ to have the ability to plan 
and carry out military operations IRUDSURORQJHGSHULRGRIWLPHµ121  
It is important, however, to differentiate between Additional Protocol II and article 
8(2)(f). While in the Additional Protocol II phrasing the ability is linked to territorial 
control and is exercised in sustained and concerted military operation, these terms are not 
contained in the Lubanga definition. Moreover, even if one accepts a certain duration of 
the conflict as a criterion, the term sustained122 means a continuous intensity throughout 
a duration, thus adding the element of constancy of the operations.123 This results in the 
¶DELOLW\WRSODQDQGFDUU\RXWPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQV·WREHWKHDEVWUDFWTXDOLW\RIWKHDELOLW\WR
reach intensity, achieved through territorial control.124 As pointed out by Sivakumaran, 
however, as was the case with Additional Protocol II,125 such ability will not be 
interpreted in the abstract but seen in the actual conduct of operations.126 These issues of 
interpretation point to the complication and confusion that derives from the prominent 
use of Additional Protocol II by the Chamber. In any case, the phrasing has survived, as 
has most of the Lubanga approach, into the subsequent decisions of the Court. 127 
While this consequence of the reliance on Additional Protocol II does not add to the 
clarity of WKH&RXUW·VZRUNDQRWKHUFRQVHTXHQFHLVPRUHGDQJHURXV$VDOUHDG\QRWHGLQ
$GGLWLRQDO3URWRFRO,, WKHJURXSVDUH ¶HQDEOHG· WRFDUU\RXWPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVE\WKHLU
control of territory. While Lubanga avoided this link, it was unnecessarily taken up in an 
obiter remark by the Court in Katanga. The Pre-Trial Chamber had already found the 
existence of an international armed conflict because of the involvement of Uganda.128 
Nevertheless it went on to pronounce on the criteria for armed groups required to 
                                              
121 Ibid., par. 234. (emphasis added) 
122 ,QWKH)UHQFKWH[W ¶FRQWLQXHV·6HHSandoz, Commentary, 1353. See also Wilhelm, 349, pointing out that the idea 
WKDWWKHFRQIOLFWVKRXOGEHRID¶SURORQJHGSHULRG·WKH)UHQFKH[SUHVVLRQEHLQJ© pendant une longe période » was 
included in the drafting Committee Report for Additional Protocol II at the first Conference (1974) and supported 
at the second but ultimately abandoned as too prone to subjective interpretation. See above 5.4.3. 
123 See Sandoz, Commentary, 1353. 6HHDOVR$=LPPHUPDQQ¶3UHOLPLQDU\5HPDUNVRQSDUDF-(f) and para.3: War 
crimes committed in an armed conflict not of an LQWHUQDWLRQDO FKDUDFWHU· LQ27ULIIWHUHU Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd ed., Verlag C.H. Beck oHG, 2008) 475, mn 348. See also Boelaert-
Suominen, 635. 
124 See Sandoz, Commentary, 1352-3, on the link between territorial control and the other criteria. See also section 
5.4.3. 
125 See Akayesu, par. 626. 
126 Sivakumaran, 379-80. 
127 Al Bashir, par. 63; Bemba, par. 233. 
128 Katanga, par. 240. 
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establish the existence of a non-LQWHUQDWLRQDO DUPHG FRQIOLFW $PRQJ WKHVH ZDV ´the 
capacity to plan and carry out sustained the concerted military operations, insofar as they 
KHOGFRQWURORISDUWVRIWKHWHUULWRU\RIWKH,WXUL'LVWULFWµ129 
This logic was taken up by the Court again in Al Bashir. The Pre-Trial Chamber found 
WKDW DW WKH UHOHYDQW WLPH WKH JURXSV ´FRQWUROOHG FHUWDLQ DUHDV RI WKH WHUULWRU\ LQ WKH
Darfur region. As a result...since at least March 2003, both the SLM/A and the JEM had, 
as required by article 8(2)(f) of the Statute, the ability to carry out sustained military 
operations for a prolonged period of time.µ130 This is another example of the Court using 
legal language without thorough reflection. The danger of using territorial control as 
anything but an indicative factor can result in the narrowing of the jurisdiction of the 
Court and the shifting to a status-based paradigm of applicability, Al Bashir has been 
criticised on this basis.131 In any case, the Court has changed course on this issue with the 
decision in Bemba stating that the Chamber ´ZLVKHVWRFODULI\µWKDWWHUULWRULDOFRQWURO´LV
QRWDUHTXLUHPHQWXQGHUWKH6WDWXWHµ132 
 
7.5. Conclusions 
 
The fundamental importance that the creation and jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals 
have had in setting a clear, low, and flexible threshold for the applicability of an extensive 
legal regime to non-state armed groups has been, with reservations, carried forward with 
the ICC. The creation of the ICC through multilateral negotiations and its character as an 
¶XQVDIH· WULEXQDO133 did lead to a clash between different rationales in the Rome 
Conference. Nevertheless, a significant majority of states saw the establishment of a low 
threshold as an essential feature for the function of the new institution. States denying 
any jurisdiction to the Court in non-international armed conflicts were in a minority, the 
effort to set a high and limiting threshold failed, and a new threshold between those of 
                                              
129 Ibid., par. 239. (emphasis added) 
130 Al Bashir, par. 64-65. (emphasis added) 
131 R. Cryer ¶7KH'HILQLWLRQRI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPHV LQ WKH Al Bashir $UUHVW:DUUDQW'HFLVLRQ·  Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 283, 285-6. 
132 Bemba, par. 236. 
133 Above fn 4 and text. 
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common article 3 and Additional Protocol II, it has been argued, was not created. As this 
chapter has attempted to show, the end result, article 8 of the Statute insofar as it deals 
with non-international armed conflicts, can and should be interpreted, despite its 
confusing formulation, as creating a single threshold. This single threshold is low and 
flexible and thus consolidates the humanitarian-protection approach reflected in both 
common article 3 and the 7DGLý definition, and entrenches this rationale in a permanent 
international judicial institution. 
The Court has only issued a handful of decisions, all at a very early stage in the process of 
a case. It has not had the time to go into great detail and to develop a coherent approach 
on the level of the threshold and on the particulars of its constitution. In practice, it has 
not denied the applicability of the legal regime due to the construction of a high 
threshold. The first decisions by the Pre-Trial Chambers, however, give cause for 
concern. The Court has shown a tendency to use the language contained in the various 
definitions unreflectively, starting from the one in article 8(2)(f), a tendency that seems to 
DFTXLUHPRPHQWXPRILWVRZQDQGFRXOGVRRQIRUPWKH&RXUW·VDSSURDFK 
As it is still very early in the life of the Court, it is quite possible for this process to be 
reversed. Questions relating to the correct interpretation of article 8, the de lege ferenda 
advisability of a low threshold and the practical conundrums of adding duration should 
be entertained more thoroughly and systematically. As the opposition of some states in 
the Diplomatic Conference did not frustrate the emphasis on the humanitarian 
protection rationale that the development of international criminal law and the 
jurisprudence ad hoc Tribunals achieved, this rationale should further inform and be 
GHYHORSHGE\WKH&RXUW·VMXULVSUXGHQFH 
 
7.6. Closing the circle?: The effect of international criminal law and institutions on the 
jus in bello. 
 
7.6.1. Introduction 
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As has been shown throughout the analysis of the various thresholds discussed in this 
thesis, status-based and individual-protection-based rationales co-exist and are often in 
tension. The jus in bello and international criminal law purport to regulate a material 
situation that consists of collective entities violently vying for political status. At the same 
time, some of the very characteristics that contribute to a non-state armed group 
achieving success on the battlefield and to increasing political status, are the same ones 
that enable it to apply legal rules. As has been seen, there is a fine line between, on the 
one hand, setting out some minimum criteria that allow, and necessitate, the application 
of the legal rules, and, on the other hand, the construction of a state-like actor.  
These last two chapters have looked at how this balance has been approached by 
international judicial institutions applying international criminal law. The results have 
been of fundamental importance, if not uniformly satisfactory. It is important to 
remember, however, that the structure of the international system is still, to a large-
extent, state-based and decentralised. Moreover, international criminal law is applied by 
judicial institutions often ex post facto. A fuller answer to the question how the rationale 
for applicability of legal rules has developed necessitates a look back to the jus in bello 
outside international judicial institutions.  
 
7.6.2. The influence of international criminal law thresholds on the jus in bello  
 
The question of thresholds is a question of the applicability of different sets of rules. This 
signifies the importance of identifying a customary threshold as well as the complexity 
and difficulty in doing so. It is reflective of this difficulty that the ICRC study on 
customary international humanitarian law does not include the question of threshold in 
its findings,134 although doing so would have added to the contribution of the study.135 
                                              
134 6HH -3HMLý ¶6WDWXVRI$UPHG&RQIOLFWV· LQ(:LOVPKXUVW DQG6 Breau (eds.), Perspectives on the ICRC Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 77. The study also does not discuss 
TXHVWLRQVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOLVDWLRQRIDUPHGFRQIOLFWVDOWKRXJK3HMLýDWVXJJHVWVWKDWRQ the one hand, this fits in 
ZLWKWKHVWXG\·VRYHUDOODSSURDFKWRLGHQWLI\PRVWRIWKHUXOHVDVDSSOLFDEOHWRERWKNLQGVRIFRQIOLFWV3HMLý·VUHPDUN
KRZHYHUDW WKDWDGHILQLWLRQFRXOG´FUHDWHDVWUDLJKW-jacket that would not be more useful than the currently 
H[LVWLQJFULWHULDµVKRXOGEHFRQWUDVWHGWRWKHXVHRIQRQ-definition by states in denying the applicability of protective 
rules. 
135 International Law Association, Initial Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict, (2008), 18 (ILA Report). 
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This does not mean that the question whether the development of international criminal 
law has had an effect on the level of thresholds on the jus in bello cannot be addressed. It 
can be addressed in two respects: the first one concerns the specific definition set down 
in 7DGLý, while the second one concerns the overall question of rationale for applicability.  
The formula set in 7DGLý, as a customary law elaboration of the concept of non-
international armed conflict first introduced through common article 3, has had a 
significant impact beyond international criminal courts and tribunals. It has also been 
applied in the reports of UN Special Rapporteurs136 and UN Commissions of Inquiry,137 
as well as national courts138 and other international bodies.139 One can agree with the 
International Law Association 2008 Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict that the 
7DGLý definition is today considered as authoritative.140  
Things are less cut and dried when one looks at the practice of states outside of 
international organisations, and especially the practice of governments in the territory of 
which armed violence occurs. A variety of situations that qualify as armed conflicts occur 
at present and they range from cases where the existence of an armed conflict is 
uncontroversial141 to cases where it is not accepted.142 The latter cases recall the patterns 
                                              
136 See Report on the situation of human rights in Somalia, prepared by the Independent Expert of the Commission on Human Rights, 
Ms. Mona Rishmawi, pursuant to Commission resolution 1996/57 of 19 April 1996 (3 March 1997), UN doc. 
E/CN.4/1997/88, par. 54; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Sudan (11 January 2006), UN 
doc. E/CN.4/2006/111, par. 8; Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr. John Dugard, on the 
situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, (6 March 2002), UN doc. 
E/CN.4/2002/32, par. 18; Specific Human Rights Issues: New Priorities, in particular Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, Final 
Report of the Special Rapporteur Kalliopi K. Koufa, (25 June 2004), UN doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/40. See also Report of the 
Independent Expert on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Robert K Goldman, (7 
February 2005) UN doc. E/CN.4/2005/103.See also Interim report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, prepared 
by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, (30 September 1999) UN doc. A/54/422 at par. 52, not 
quoting 7DGLýSHUVHEXWUHIHUULQJWRWKHWHUP¶SURWUDFWHGDUPHGFRQIOLFW· 
137 See Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General, pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004 (1 February 2005), UN doc. S/2005/60, par. 74; Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry on Lebanon pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-2/1, (23 November 2006), UN doc. A/HRC/3/2, par. 
51. 
138 See HH & Others (Mogadishu: Armed Conflict: Risk) Somalia v Secretary of State for the Home Department. CG [2008] 
UKAIT 00022, especially the analysis at par. 257 ff. 
139 See European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) Opinion on the International 
Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State 
Transport of Persons, 17 March 2006, Op. no. 363/2005, CDL-AD (2006)009. 
140 ILA Report, 2 and 13. 
141 This is the case, for example, with the conflicts in Pakistan and Afghanistan. For an analysis of the parties to the 
FRQIOLFW LQ3DNLVWDQDQG WKHLU DGKHUHQFH WR WKH ODZVHH16KDK ¶:DU&ULPHV LQ WKH$UPHG&RQIOLFW LQ3DNLVWDQ·
(2010) 33 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 283. For the official British position on the existence of an armed conflict in 
Afghanistan see GS (Existence of Internal Armed Conflict) Afghanistan v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, CG 
[2009] UKAIT 00010, United Kingdom: Asylum and Immigration Tribunal/Immigration Appellate Authority, 23 
February 2009, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49a3b4242.html. 
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of state behaviour developed before the establishment of judicial institutions and 
discussed in chapters 3 and 5.143 As far as territorial governments are concerned, practice 
is ultimately inconclusive in determining a specific direction on the acceptance of 
applicability. Moreover, even when states do accept the existence of an armed conflict 
they very rarely, if ever, mention the criteria that they have used for their determination. 
They do not refer to a specific definition of an armed conflict and their practice cannot 
be used to determine the argument advanced above on the existence of one basic 
threshold in both custom and treaties.  
The argument for a common threshold, however, in both international criminal law and 
the law of armed conflict, is supported by the international organisations and other 
bodies that have adopted the 7DGLý definition. Importantly, in the application of the 7DGLý 
definition, these bodies did not distinguish between the law of armed conflict and 
international criminal law. To this one should add the complete lack of authority for the 
proposition that the 7DGLý definition applies only to international criminal law and not to 
ODZ RI DUPHG FRQIOLFW ,QGHHG LI RQH ORRNV DW WKH ,&7<·V ODQJXDJH LQ VHWWLQJ144 and 
analysing145 the 7DGLý definition it is manifestly the case that the threshold for the 
GHWHUPLQDWLRQRIDQ¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·LVRQHDQGWKHVDPHIRUERWKLQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPLQDO
law and the law of armed conflict. This approach conforms with the understanding that 
international criminal law rules constitute secondary rules to those in the law of armed 
conflict.146 The result is that the specific definition set out in 7DGLý, to the extent that it 
does in fact reflect custom and is accepted as such, applies to both international criminal 
law and the law of armed conflict.  
This relationship between international criminal law and the jus in bello can also help us 
understand the development of the legal regime on a more conceptual level. It has been 
argued that international criminal law develops and accentuates the humanitarian-
                                                                                                                                            
142 See for the example of the conflict in Chechnya section 5.5. See also for the example of the conflict between 
7XUNH\DQGWKH.XUGLVK:RUNHUV·3DUW\3...<LOGL]DQG6%UHDXThe Kurdish Conflict: International Humanitarian 
Law and Post-Conflict Mechanisms (Routledge, 2010), especially chapters 3 and 4.  
143 Sections 3.4. and 5.5. 
144 See the 7DGLý Appeals Chamber talking of the existence of an armed conflict for the applicability RI¶LQWHUQDWLRQDO
KXPDQLWDULDQODZ·7DGLýAppeal, par. 70. 
145 See, e.g., the 7DGLý Trial Chamber using the criteria to distinguish between an armed conflict per 7DGLý and 
VLWXDWLRQVRIEDQGLWU\HWF´ZKLFKDUHQRWVXEMHFWWR LQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQLWDULDQODZµ. See 7DGLýTC, par. 562, using 
the ICRC Commentary. See also Limaj, par. 89. See section 6.5.1. 
146 See Bothe, 381. See section 6.2.1. 
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protection rationale already present in the law of armed conflict.147 Indeed, the 7DGLý 
definition, its clarification by the Tribunals, and its entrenchment in the Rome Statute, 
can be understood to constitute developments not outside the law of armed conflict but of 
the law of armed conflict. Accordingly, to the extent that the practice of courts and 
tribunals has led to a low and flexible threshold, which focuses on wide applicability and 
reflects a rationale of humanitarian protection, such practice develops and accentuates 
the humanitarian-protection rationale for the applicability of the jus in bello in general.     
                                              
147 Section 6.2. 
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8. Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
The thesis has posed a question about whether a progression can be seen from a status-
based rationale to a humanitarian-protection rationale in the application of the jus in bello 
to conflicts involving non-state armed groups. This question concerns the applicability of 
a legal regime that contains rules protective of individual human beings in a practical and 
conceptual context where questions of group status are central and often in conflict with 
such protection. The focus of the analysis has been on the various thresholds that have 
been constituted over time to activate the relevant legal regimes. Through the analysis of 
thresholds, seen in the context of the substantive law they activate and the processes of 
their assessment, there has been an effort to discern the characteristics of actors and 
situations that lead to the application of the law. These characteristics help us understand 
the rationale behind the systems of applicability of the jus in bello. Each chapter has 
focused on one such regime and system of application. The sequence of chapters is more 
or less chronological. This allows the mapping of the evolution of the rationale, while 
reflecting the developments in the international legal system.  
 
8.2. The stages of the argument: from belligerency to international courts and 
tribunals. 
 
The second chapter of the thesis begins the enquiry at the first set of thresholds 
developed for the regulation of conflicts involving non-state armed groups, through the 
doctrines of recognition of belligerency and insurgency. Recognition of belligerency was 
first developed in the second half of the 18th century, was crystallised throughout the 19th 
century and gradually fell into desuetude throughout the 20th century. It was developed in 
state practice, especially in the context of the interests of third states in relation to the 
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activation of the regime of neutrality. As it developed in a purely horizontal legal system 
where states were understood to be the only subjects of international law it served the 
purpose of elevating the non-state armed group to the level of subjecthood for the 
SXUSRVHDQGGXUDWLRQRIWKHFRQIOLFW7KLVDSSURDFKILWZLWKWKHFRQFHSWWKDW¶ZDULQWKH
OHJDOVHQVH·FRXOGRQO\EHZDJHGE\Vovereign entities. Accordingly, legal regulation was 
identified with quasi-sovereign status. 
The status-based rationale was clearly reflected in the criteria that needed to be fulfilled 
for the recognition to occur. These focused on the situation and the actor, initiating the 
concepts of intensity and organisation as the constitutive elements of war/armed conflict. 
The hostilities had to be of a certain magnitude, but a central measure of such magnitude 
was the effect the conflict had on the interests of third states. This effect was indicated in 
criteria such as the maritime aspects of the conflict or the control of territory by the 
armed group. With respect to organisation, the criteria were those necessary for the actor 
to wage war of the requisite magnitude, but were not confined to that. They included a 
level of political organisation - akin to that of a state - which enabled the recognising state 
to envisage the eventual statehood of the non-state armed group. Both in terms of 
intensity and organisation the non-state armed group had to assert its role militarily and 
politically, affecting the interests of third states and convincing them of its potential for 
statehood. Accordingly, recognition of belligerency was often seen as a first step towards 
the recognition of statehood. 
Status was also reflected in the legal regime activated, which was the full legal regime 
applicable to war between sovereign states. Neutrality, the central legal institution in this 
regime, obliged third states to treat government and insurgent forces on an equal level for 
the duration of the conflict and for matters related to it. Moreover, the process of 
assessment of the criteria was akin to recognition of statehood. It was entirely 
decentralised, allowing each state to assess independently both the criteria of magnitude 
and organisation, but also the extent to which its interests were affected. The latter factor 
was seen by some to constitute a separate criterion for recognition. This reflected a 
political and arbitrary element in the process of assessment. 
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As an often arbitrary process of conferment of status, recognition of belligerency was 
gradually seen as unwieldy. This led to a parallel development towards, in the second half 
of the 19th century, the doctrine of recognition of insurgency. The practice of recognition 
of insurgency showed that there could be a space between no regulation and full 
regulation and between full-subjects of international law and entities of piratical 
character. It did so by providing the possibility of ad hoc recognition of specific rights 
and duties rather than the full legal regime. The criteria forming the necessary threshold 
were similar to those of belligerency but with a difference of degree. Status was still very 
much at the centre of the doctrine, but some flexibility with respect to the rules activated 
was introduced. As it was the first legal doctrine for the regulation of an actor in the jus in 
bello without the conferment of full legal status for the purposes of the conflict, it can be 
seen as a forerunner of later attempts in incremental regulation. Nevertheless, 
decentralisation and arbitrariness in the assessment of the criteria continued to be central 
in the system and contributed to gradual dysfunction of the doctrines. This dysfunction 
of the system of ascription of status was particularly prominent in the case of the Spanish 
civil war (1936-9), a sign of the gradual desuetude of the doctrines.  
The Spanish civil war, because of a combination of new military technology the role of 
the popular press, was a turning point in the interests of the international community in 
the humanitarian aspects of civil war. Such concerns were not at all central in the 
rationale behind belligerency and insurgency. After World War II, however, a new effort 
to address the humanitarian aspects of all conflicts, including non-international ones, led 
to the drafting of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Common article 3 to these Conventions 
constituted a compromise between those advocating the extension of the full 
humanitarian regime to non-state armed groups and those wanting no regulation for fear 
of ascription of status to such groups and limitation of the options of governments. This 
coincided with the move from the concept of war to that of armed conflict, the latter 
being a material situation rather than an entirely separate formal legal regime activated at 
will by sovereign entities. 
Common article 3 attempted a central structural move from a horizontal regime of 
regulation of sovereign actors, which has status as its main rationale, to a vertical regime 
of automatic application to protect humanitarian rules. It extended a minimum 
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humanitarian regime, without, however, expressly spelling out the criteria that form its 
threshold. The non-definition approach aspired to provide a low and flexible threshold 
and the automatic application of the rules as soon as an armed conflict occurs. It is clear 
from the travaux that a wide application of the article was intended through a minimal 
level of organisation and intensity that allowed de facto reciprocity with respect to the 
humanitarian rules extended. Moreover, overtly narrow criteria, such as the control of 
territory, were not seen as necessary for the threshold.  
Nevertheless, common article 3 did not fully succeed in overcoming the status-based 
approach of the past. The non-definition of the threshold, together with the necessity for 
assessment in a still decentralised system where the territorial governments had a central 
role in the application of the rules, meant that the aspirations of automaticity were not 
fulfilled. In practice, considerations of status often led to common article 3 existing 
precariously between police operations and international armed conflict, thus limiting its 
application. Common article 3, however, constitutes a shift of paradigm and a clear 
advancement of a humanitarian protection rationale. 
The next step in the regulation of conflicts involving non-state armed groups, however, 
was less successful. The 1974-7 Diplomatic Conference, leading to the two 1977 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions occurred in the context of the process 
of decolonisation. The questions of the legal status of anti-colonial struggles, and the 
armed movements that fought them, as well as the defence of the sovereignty of newly 
independent states were central considerations in the approach of a significant portion of 
actors at the negotiations.  
The Conference led to the internationalisation of wars of national liberation. The 
application of the full humanitarian regime to a specific set of non-state armed groups, 
namely national liberation movements, was achieved through article 1(4) of Additional 
Protocol I. However, a narrow status-based rationale, limited to a specific historical and 
political context meant that the humanitarian protection provided through this 
development never materialised. Whereas in the doctrine of belligerency status was 
conferred partly through the material prospects for statehood of the insurgent group, 
national liberation movements were conferred status as they were seen to be exercising 
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the right to external self-determination of a people. The latter concept was further limited 
by the specification of the opponent against whom the people were struggling. Status was 
to be conferred to a specific set of actors struggling against a specific set of opponents. 
This further anchored the concept of wars of national liberation to the process of 
decolonisation and contributed to the non-ratification of the Protocol by states 
concerned that this conferment of status led to their delegitimation.  
After the internationalisation of wars of national liberation was achieved in the 
Diplomatic Conference, states concerned with the conferment of status that legal 
regulation of non-state armed groups would result in were hostile to extensive regulation 
of non-state armed groups outside the colonial context. This led to a significant 
narrowing of the threshold and the limitation of the substantive regime extended through 
what became Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. This was reflected in 
the inclusion of the criterion of territorial control and the creation of a high threshold not 
justified by the limited substantive rules, in terms of the de facto reciprocity necessary for 
the application. The system of application remained decentralised and together with the 
limitations imposed by the threshold, this meant that status considerations limited the 
application of the protective rules in practice. 
While the International Committee of the Red Cross played, and is still playing, a 
significant part in the application of an individual protection rationale, and the United 
Nations and regional organisations played a role in the development of the right of self-
determination and the recognition of national liberation movements, it was judicial 
institutions that contributed to the next step in the regulation of conflicts involving non-
state armed groups. The creation of international judicial institutions, by the UN Security 
Council, to try serious violations of international humanitarian law in the conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, led to the development of the regime of international 
FULPLQDOODZDQGWRDQHZWKUHVKROGRI¶DUPHGFRQIOLFW·EDVHGLQFXVWRP 
International criminal law as a legal regime separate but linked to the jus in bello 
accentuates and develops the individual protection rationale in the latter. At the same 
time, the new definition of armed conflict by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the seminal 
7DGLý case, and extensively refined by the tribunals, clarified the basic criteria of 
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organisation and intensity of common article 3. The emphasis was placed on the intensity 
of the violence in the territorial unit, resulting in the need for the activation of the legal 
regime. The assessment of the characteristics of the actors consisted of a minimum 
degree of organisation, allowing them to apply rules of humanitarian protection. At the 
same time, while the characteristics of the actors fit with the state-like paradigm, such as a 
hierarchical organisation able to speak internally and externally with one voice, the focus 
was placed solely on the military ability to enforce minimum rules, rather than the 
political prospects of the actor. Overall, the threshold that was developed by the tribunals 
was low, clear and flexible thus facilitating the application of protective rules. Moreover, 
an extensive substantive legal regime based on custom was applied by the ICTY, while 
the application of the rules through a judicial organ excluded status-based considerations 
in the assessment of the applicability of the legal regime.  
These trends were challenged but ultimately consolidated through the creation of the 
International Criminal Court. While in the Rome Conference, which led to the creation 
of the Court, status- and sovereignty-based concerns were once more present, there was a 
clear majority that was in favour of a threshold guaranteeing wide applicability and 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the circumstances of the drafting contributed to a slight 
variation in language from the 7DGLý definition in article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute and 
the prima facie impression that two different thresholds are created. Such an understanding 
seems to have informed the early jurisprudence of the Court, leading to the addition of 
an element of duration to an existing armed conflict, for the application of article 8(2)(e). 
It has been argued that such an approach leads to problematic results and that the better 
argument supports the reconciliation between the thresholds in 8(2)(f) and 8(2)(d), both 
being essentially identical to the 7DGLýdefinition. The breadth of the threshold, its clarity 
of assessment and application, and its flexibility through the use of indicative factors 
contribute to the accentuation of the humanitarian-protection rationale in the system of 
applicability.  
Finally, the link between the international criminal law and international humanitarian law 
regimes means that the above developments in the former can translate in a clarification 
of the overall threshold in the latter. The 7DGLý definition, even though not expressly 
invoked by governments in relation to conflicts in their territory, has been widely 
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considered as authoritative and used by international organisations, national courts and 
other bodies. Ultimately, the development and accentuation of the humanitarian-
protection rationale through international criminal law can be seen as reflecting the 
development of the rationale for the regulation of non-state armed groups in the law of 
armed conflict. This conclusion should be seen in the context of ² and qualified by ² the 
continuing tension between status-related goals and characteristics of the actors involved 
in armed conflicts and the still decentralised system of applicability. 
 
8.3. The function of the concept of status and its tension with humanitarian 
protection. 
 
How different functions of status influence the thresholds of applicability of the various 
legal regimes, and the assessment of whether the threshold is met, has been at the centre 
of this thesis. In the introduction1 different functions of status, and specifically legal 
status, were suggested. The more straightforward aspect of legal status is what has been 
called legal status stricto sensu, which is simply the aggregate of the legal rules contained in 
the legal regime, activating certain rights and obligations for the parties to the conflict. 
For example, to the extent that common article 3 applies, the rights and obligations 
contained in that article apply and the group is dealt with by the law as a party to the 
conflict. In that sense, the caveat in common article 3 that the article does not alter the 
legal status of the parties can be seen as moot.2  
There is, however, a more complicated and vague form of status, which has been called 
general legal status or legal status lato sensu. This, it has been argued, can be described as 
FRQIODWLQJWKHJHQHUDOOHJDOVWDWXVRID¶VXEMHFW·RILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZZLWKVWDWH-like political 
status. It straddles legal and political status and exists more in the perception of various 
actors, namely the non-state armed group and, particularly, the territorial government. It 
can be understood as a result of a system originally based on a subject/object dualism. 
                                              
1 Section 1.2.2. 
2 Cf Pictet, Principles, 60, fn 2. See section 3.2.4 fn 81 and text. 
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The result is that any legal regulation can be perceived as moving towards the ascription 
of such general state-like legal status. 
This latter phenomenon is more obvious in cases where the question is the application of 
the law of international armed conflict. Then the equation of the non-state armed group 
with a state for the purposes of an armed conflict both recognises an entity with state-like 
legal status for the purposes of the conflict and evokes its eventual legal status, beyond 
the legal status stricto sensu contained in the specific rules and regulations extended. This 
paradigm is further reinforced to the extent that a state-centric system, where states are 
the only subjects to be regulated by international law, constituted the context of the first 
doctrine of regulation of non-state armed groups, that of belligerency. The more recent 
equivalent of international armed conflict involving non-state armed groups, that of wars 
of national liberation, substitutes the substantive legal right for external self-
determination for the material criteria of belligerency. It follows, however, the same logic 
of regulating the armed conflict in accordance with the general and expected political and 
legal status of the collectivity.  
This paradigm also influences the application of the law of non-international armed 
conflict. The legal status stricto sensu, extended through instruments such as common 
article 3 or Additional Protocol II, can be perceived, particularly by the territorial 
government, as legal status lato sensu for two reasons. One is that the nature of the 
situation will be that the non-state armed group will have to have displayed some 
effectiveness in waging armed violence and some consistency in its structure to have 
created a situation of sufficient intensity. This can be seen as military and political status 
in the context of the conflict, pointing to the potential success and legal status of the 
group. The other reason why legal status stricto sensu is conflated with legal status lato sensu 
is the predominance of the paradigm of a horizontal system where international law only 
regulates states and state-like entities, reflected in the fact that the first doctrine of 
regulation of non-state armed groups fit this paradigm. These factors can explain why 
governments can be seen to be reluctant to accept the applicability of even a limited set 
of international legal rules. Such reluctance will exist in addition to the unwillingness of 
WKHJRYHUQPHQWWR¶KDYHLWVKDQGVWLHG·E\UXOHVRIKXPDQLWDULDQSURWHFWLRQ 
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It is this conflation that a caveat such as the one contained in common article 3 can be 
understood to try to avoid. However, the conflation of these two kinds of legal status is 
often too powerful in the perception of states for such a caveat to have a convincing 
effect. This was manifested in the common article 3 travaux in the comments of delegates 
hostile to any regulation,3 and it was manifested again in the decision of states to drop a 
similar caveat from Additional Protocol II, because of the perception that the effects of 
WKHWHUP¶SDUWLHVWRWKHFRQIOLFW·FRXOGQRWEHUHPHGLHGE\VXFKDFDYHDW4  
Accordingly, many governments will in practice conflate legal status stricto sensu with legal 
status lato sensu and will see any regulation as conferring the latter on the group. This 
approach will fit with an understanding that international law can only regulate state or 
state-like entities. Accordingly, with respect to the creation of thresholds for the 
applicability of international law states adopting this approach will create legal regimes 
that provide for the application of the law of armed conflicts only in situations where the 
non-state armed group has already achieved a state-like political and military status and 
when the government has little to lose on the symbolic and conceptual level. This does 
not necessarily mean that the non-state armed group is on a certain path to achieving 
statehood, but that the territorial government cannot but recognise the political status of 
the non-state armed group. This is one of the functions of the criterion of territorial 
control, at least as understood as a separate and substantial part of the territory of the 
state. Alternatively, an element of duration can mean that the non-state armed group has 
consolidated its military presence as seen both within the state and in the international 
(institutional) arena. This factor was present in the process of application of common 
article 3.5  
This rationale links the applicability, and the assessment of applicability, of the law with 
the perception that political status or legal status lato sensu is conferred on the non-state 
armed group. Such a status-based rationale in deciding when the law is applicable can 
lead to the non-application of humanitarian protection that can have a significant effect 
in minimising the atrocities that usually follow war, especially of the civil kind. It is then 
necessary to de-couple such considerations of status from the assessment of when the 
                                              
3 See, e.g., section 3.2.4. fn 78 and text for the comments of the delegate from Burma. 
4 See sections 5.3.4 fn 78-80 and text; 5.3.5. fn 108. 
5 See section 3.4.3. 
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law is applicable. It is necessary to move from an understanding of a horizontal system of 
virtually equal group actors to a vertical system of humanitarian protection irrespective of 
the status perceptions of the parties to the conflict. The central rationale for such a 
system is the protection of individuals affected by the conflict. This thesis has attempted 
to trace the history of thresholds, as formulations describing what kinds of actors and 
situations merit a particular kind of legal regulation, to see whether there is a move 
towards the centrality of humanitarian-protection over status.  
The answer is one of cautious optimism. It seems that the need for humanitarian 
protection has been increasingly understood and this has led firstly to the paradigm-shift 
of common article 3 and then, through a gradual evolution, to international judicial 
institutions and the elaboration of a low, clear and flexible threshold that reflects an 
individual-protection rationale. It has not been a clear and unhindered evolution. It has 
been argued, for example, that the 1977 Additional Protocols are, in some respects and in 
different ways, reflective of a regression to status. Moreover, the positive legal 
developments of the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC can prove to be linked too closely with 
this form of international institutional practice and not translate to a wider acceptance of 
a low, clear and flexible threshold by states. Ultimately, as long as status-based 
considerations are a central element in armed conflicts, and as long as the assessment of 
the applicability of the law remains decentralised, a status-based rationale in the 
applicability of the jus in bello will always be present. This will be the case not only in the 
process of assessment of the applicability of the law in specific cases but also in possible 
future multilateral negotiations.  
Ultimately, as questions of collective status are often central among the reasons why 
organised armed violence occurs, they form a part of the structure of the rules that 
govern the exercise of such violence. As such they permeate the law of armed conflict 
and can lead to tension with efforts to protect the individuals caught up with it. The jus in 
bello is both about channelling violence,6 and about humanitarian protection.7 The role of 
status and its tension with humanitarian protection in the creation and application of the 
                                              
6 %HUPDQ¶3ULYLOHJLQJ· 
7 See Pictet, Principles, FKDSWHU6HHDOVR0HURQ¶+XPDQL]DWLRQ· 
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legal rules can constitute an illuminating interpretive tool, leading to both the 
understanding and change of the legal regime. 
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